CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/05/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02901112
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: May 17, 1953

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IV/ SECU INFORMATION
17 May 1953
Copy No. 0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. _
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECU NFORMAT1ON
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
\X../Peiping states Communistswill "never" accept immediate release
of Korean prisoners (page 3).
\fi: Continued Chinese Nationalist air supply to Li Mils forces reported
(page 3).
EASTERN EUROPE
3. New information substantiates earlier report of Satellite policy
conference in mid-April (page 4).
4. Comment on Czech release of Oatis (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
Outlook brighter for European Political Community (page 5).
EDC further delayed in French Assembly (page 6).
French urge prevention of return of Otto Strasser to Germany
(page 6).
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ECURITY INFORMATION
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FAR EAST
1. Peiping states Communists will "never"accept inunediate release of
Korean prisoners:
A long editorial in the official organ of the
Chinese Communist Party on 16 May em-
phasizes that the UN Command's proposal
to release with an armistice all Korean
prisoners unwilling to be repatriated "can
never be accepted." Less emphatic language is used in objecting to
other UN proposals regarding the work of the neutral commission,
arrangements for Communist access to the unwilling, and the re-
lease after 60 days of those who remain so.
Comment: The Communists are undoubtedly
encouraged by the unfavorable comment from other UN allies on the
first proposal, and they will almost certainly persist in rejecting it.
They appear disposed to compromise on other points, although there
Is still no evidence that they are prepared to accept any arrangement
which would be likely to result in nonrepatriation of a substantial
number of prisoners.
2. Continued Chinese Nationalist air supply to Li Mt's forces reported:
A four-engine plane of the Chinese Nation-
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alist Air Force is making regular air
drops to supply Li Mi's force in Burma,
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RITY INFORMATION
Comment: It has generally been believed
that supply flights to Li Mi's force had been completely suspended
during the past few months of negotiations regarding its evacuation.
Chiang ICai-shek does not intend that Li MiTs troops shall be re-
moved. If air supply is continuing, and the Burmese become aware
of it, their suspicion that Taipei is not acting in good faith will be
confirmed. Under such conditions there would be virtually no
chance of success for the Mixed Committee which is to attempt to
arrange for removal of the Nationalists.
EASTERN EUROPE
3. New information substantiates earlier report of Satellite policy
conference in mid-April:
Recent reliable information that the Czech
and Bulgarian premiers were absent from their respective countries
in April adds credibility to a previous report that a meeting of Sat-
ellite leaders was held in Moscow sometime during the week of 12
to 18 April. told the American legation
at that time that they were fairly certain that Hungarian Deputy
Premier Gero was attending such a meeting.
On 21 April the Bulgarian foreign minister
tolo that Premier Chervenkov "was back 3.3(h)(2)
from his trip." A Czech Foreign Ministry official told Ambassador
Wadsworth on 12 May that Prime Minister Siroky had been "away
part of the time" during the past month. During this period, the
Polish and Rumanian premiers made no public appearance in their
respective countries.
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The meeting would presumably have been
held to inform Satellite leaders on recent developments in Soviet
policy and possible organizational changes planned for the Satellites.
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URITY INFORMATION
4. Comment on Czech release of Oatis:
The pardon of AP correspondent William
Oatis is one more conciliatory Communist gesture to the free world
without cost to the USSR The quick follow-up in Pravda and the
fact that the pardon was granted within four days after Ambassador
Bohlen's approach to the Soviet foreign minister on the question are
clear indications of Moscow's participation in the decision. It is
probably timed to take advantage of differences now developing
among Western countries over negotiations with the Soviet bloc.
In addition to contributing to the Kremlin's
"peace offensive," the Czech government probably considers that this
pardon will lead to the restoration of its overflight privileges over
western Germany and the reopening of the American market to Czech
exports. The American embargo in late 1951 virtually eliminated
Czechoslovakia's dollar income and seriously curtailed its ability
to obtain strategic commodities from the West.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Outlook brighter for European Political Community:
According to Ambassador Bruce, Chancellor
Adenauer and Premier de Gasperi were
gratified at the progress made by the for-
eign ministers of the six "Little Europe"
coun ries at their recent European Political Community meeting,
which was an unexpected success. They attribute this to the
improvement in Bidault's attitude since their meeting last March
in Strasbourg.
The final communique on the meeting was
the first outright commitment of the six foreign ministers to the
creation of a political community as called for in the EDC treaty.
5
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6. EDC further delayed in French Assembly:
Chancellor Adenauer's refusal to sign the
EDC protocols is delaying French parlia-
mentary consideration of the treaty,
according to the American embassy in
Paris.
7,
The French, who regard the protocols as
an integral part of the treaty, say they must be signed by the foreign
ministers of the six EDC countries, following the precedent set in
May 1952. Adenauer maintains that signature by the respective
ambassadors would obviate submission of the protocols to the Bonn
Parliament for approval.
French spokesmen are not optimisticAhat
Adenauer will sign now, despite Bundesrat approval of the treaty.
Comment: A Foreign Ministry spokesman
recently admitted that the EDC has been "temporarily shelved," and
increasing pressure for four-power talks has aroused new hope for
an East-West understanding on a neutralized Germany.
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Adenauer now plans to submit only a verbal
summary of the protocols for Bundestag approval. The procedure of
signing the protocols by the foreign ministers may cause a parliamentary
demand for formal ratification which would give the Social Democrats
another opportunity to defeat the treaty.
French urge prevention of return of Otto Strasser to Germany:
American officials in Bonn report that
French?iliglkeommissioner Francois-
Poncet s di turbed over the possible
return of Otto Strasser, renegade Nazi
leader now in Canada. A German court recently decided in favor
of his readmission. Francois-Poncet feels that the Allied High
Commission should take action to keep htm out if the Bonn govern-
ment is not able to do so.
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SECIJITY INFORMATION
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The West German Ministry of Interior intends
to appeal the Strasser ruling but must await a cabinet decision, which
is expected next week. The government is particularly interested in
preventing Strasser's return prior to elections.
Comment: Because of his prominence as
leader of the proletarian faction of the Nazi party and his flight from
the Hitler regime after the 1934 purge, Strasser is regarded by some
Germans as a legendary representative of the "good" in National
Socialism and might serve as focal point for discontent with the pres-
ent regime.
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