CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/05/23
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02901117
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
July 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
July 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 23, 1953
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15671769].pdf | 321.66 KB |
Body:
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23 May 1953
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DO(.2-UMENT NO. _
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DATES4,1,
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
tZ-India urges support for Communist proposals on Korea (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2.,e, Greeks speculate on improved relations with Moscow (page 3).
vr Step-up of Soviet consumer goods production indicated (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Vietnam premier to exploit France's devaluation of piaster (page 4).
Laotian premier critical of Thai security measures (page 5).
X Li Mi's attitude on troop evacuation from Burma causes concern
.0/(page 6).
Burmese plan for evacuation of Nationalists reported (page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Iran offers France large discount on oil purchases (page 7).
Eavnt reportedly to wage war of nerves against British (page 8).
6/-
WESTERN EUROPE
12. Comment on the French cabinet crisis (page 9).
13. France may circumvent COCOM in trade negotiations with USSR
(page 10).
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GENERAL
1. India urges support for Communist proposals on Korea:
Comment: India apparently is actively attempt-
ing to win France, and possibly other countries, to its point of view.
This suggests that unless the UN Command submits a new proposal meet-
ing the Indian point of view, India, as a future member of the five-power
neutral commission, will be inclined to vote in favor of the Communist
position in the hope of achieving a quick settlement after the armistice
of Korean and Far Eastern problems.
SOVIET UNION
2. Greeks speculate on improved relations with Moscow:
The scheduled return to Moscow of Soviet
charge Tchernichev, reported by the Greek
press, has led to speculation in Athens that
the USSR, in line with the current peace
offensive, may be seeking to improve diplomatic relations with Greece
either by raising the rank of Tchernichev or replacing him with an
ambassador.
Comment; Tchernichev has been in Athens
since 1946, and has been charge since 1949.
The resumption of Soviet-Greek relations on
an ambassadorial level has been rumored for several weeks, and two
Greek statesmen stated, following Stalin's death, that the time for this
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was ripe. Moreover, Soviet diplomats in Moscow, Athens and Washing-
ton have made unusually friendly diplomatic gestures toward Greece
during this period.
Some improvement in Soviet-Greek relations
i s also reflected in current trade talks between Greece and the USSR
and some Satellite countries which, according to the Greek radio, are
proceeding "particularly" well.
3. Step-up of Soviet consumer goods production indicated:
Increased output is to be realized through the
"broadest use" of local raw materials and scrap from heavy industry.
Comment:
the new Soviet regime, following the amnesty decree and large price
cuts, now intends to step up the production of consumer goods. Such
action would be in line with the previous attempts of the new leaders
to portray themselves as more liberal than Stalin.
With sufficient allocations of raw and scrap
materials, local industries would be able to overcome many long-
standing shortages of consumer goods.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Vietnam premier to exploit France's devaluation of piaster:
Premier Tam informed the American charge
that he was elated by France's unilateral de-
valuation of the piaster, notwithstanding his
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public protests. The French action had united Vietnamese opinion
behind the government to an unprecedented degree, he believed, thus
enabling him to move forward with a program leading to complete
independence.
Tam further said that since the French had
acted without consultation, he was now in a position to tell them that
he could act without consultation.
Comment: While Tam did not have the
reputation of being a strong nationalist before he became premier,
he has since been increasingly critical of French authority. The
present situation unquestionably gives him a chance to press for greater
independence.
5. Laotian premier critical of Thai security measures:
In a conversation with the American charge
in Vientiane, the premier of Laos angrily
accused the Thai government of deliberately
bungling its security measures which were
to have controlled the several thousand pro-Viet Minh Vietnamese in
Thailand. As a result, he said, over 500 of them recently crossed
into Laos.
The premier not only wrote off Thailand as
a source of military support in the event of a renewed Viet Minh
campaign, but stated that Thailand might become a base for Communist
attacks against Laos.
The American charge told the premier it
would be unfortunate if Thailand and Laos did not compose their
differences before a Viet Minh offensive begins next fall.
Comment: The Thai government has been
slow to follow through on announced police measures against local
Viet Minh adherents, possibly in the hope that they will voluntarily
re-enter Laos. The difficulties of the problem are illustrated by the
implied admission of the Laos government that it has been unable to
police its own side of the frontier.
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6.
Li Mi's attitude on troop evacuation from Burma causes concern:
Ambassador Sebald in Rangoon warns that
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General Li Mi's demand for a general cease-
fire prior to the withdrawal of his troops from
Burma may defeat the efforts of the mixed com-
mittee considering their evacuation. The ambassador doubts that the
Burmese would agree to such a condition, although they have indicated
a willingness to consider a truce in limited areas.
Sebald warns that Burmese leaders are fully
prepared to raise the problem in the United Nations again, probably
with less restraint, unless the Chinese Nationalists abide by the UN
resolution calling for the disarmament and withdrawal of the troops.
Comment: Previous reports indicate the
Burmese are willing to issue a cease-fire order covering those troops
in a position to be evacuated. They say, however, they will not cease
operations against scattered Nationalist units.
7. Burmese plan for evacuation of Nationalists reported:
The Burmese representatives to the mixed
committee have been instructed to have no
dealings with Li Mi and to insist on the air
evacuation of all of his troops under Burmese
snnervision from several widely scattered
points;
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The American embassy in Rangoon comments
that this information reflects a Burmese misconception of the American
position that the removal of the Nationalist "hard core" will reduce the
problem to manageable proportions, and that it indicates an unrealistic
assumption that the Nationalist troops can be induced to assemble under
Burmese control prior to evacuation.
Comment: There are already strong indica-
tions that the Chinese Nationalists will not seriously cooperate with the
committee, and the Thai have expressed a determination to keep all
Nationalist weapons if the troops are evacuated through Thailand.
Burmese insistence on the acceptance of this impracticable plan would
further jeopardize a solution of the problem.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
8. Iran offers France large discount on oil purchases:
Prime Minister Mossadeq has offered France 3.3(h)(2)
a 45 percent discount on purchases of Iranian
crude oil and refined products during the next
five months, 3.3(h)(2)
"the Tehran 3.3(h)(2)
government is suffering very keenly from its isolation," adding that "if
our world-wide commitments permit us to, it would be most advantageous
for us" to help Iran break out of its isolation.
Comment: There is no indication that the
French government, which has a substantial interest in the British-
controlled Iraq Petroleum Company, will buy Iranian oil in the absence
of an Anglo-Iranian oil settlement.
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in view of the very critical French balance-of-payments position, there
Is little likelihood that France would risk incurring British displeasure
when French participation in four-power talks is being considered.
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9.
10. Egypt reportedly to wage war of nerves against British:
Nagib's Revolutionary Command Council is
prepared to play a "waiting game" on the
question of the Suez canal in the belief that
time is against the British,
The regime reportedly
intends to continue a policy of restraint and is taking special measures
to ensure public security.
The regime, however, will also wage a "not
so cold war" of nerves against the British in Egypt.
Comment: A "war of nerves" against the
British could seriously endanger the Egyptian government should the
mobs get out of control.
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11,
WESTERN EUROPE
12. Comment on the French cabinet crisis:
Foreign policy considerations are expected to
play an important role in ending the present French cabinet crisis. The
Gaullists are likely to approve decree powers for any government in which
they are represented, but their objections to the EDC will first have to be
giver greater recognition.
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While the readiness of 30-odd Gaullist deputies
to accept the EDC precludes insistence by the group as a whole on abandon-
ing the treaty, the current pressure for four-power talks will strengthen
tacit understanding among most National Assembly deputies to postpone
parliamentary action.
In any case the immediate problem of the govern-
ment will still be to find a financial program that will reduce the current
deficit with a minimum of political discord.
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13. France may circumvent COCOM in trade negotiations with USSR:
The economic director of the French Foreign 3.3(h)(2)
Ministry, Pierre Charpentier, recently told
American officials in Paris that he had been
instructed to negotiate the best possible trade
agreement with the USSR without subsequent
reference to COCOM. He asked for early
American approval for France to export six
cargo ships and more than 2000 tons of lead;
as he anticipated a Soviet request for these commodities which are
quantitatively restricted.
Charpentier justified the request on the basis
of France's "general" need for Soviet exports. Trade discussions, he
said, are tentatively scheduled to resume on 2 June.
Meanwhile, the French ambassador in Moscow
has informed Ambassador Bohlen that Soviet officials there, although
they believe an important expansion of trade is possible, have not empha-
sized strategic goods.
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