CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/05/26
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02901119
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
July 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
July 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 26, 1953
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Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15671743].pdf | 332.28 KB |
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rr7� for Release. de3ACI E72901,0, #
SECURI NFORMATION
Tap SE- ET
26 May 1953
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Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANCE IN CLASS,
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: 73 ^
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
A;JTH -
DATEI �
REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP S RET
SECUBd1f INFORMATION
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IN...C. I
INFORIvATIoN
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
We:Pravda article stresses Anglo-American differences (page 3).
1.2! Belgium alone supports US in opposing proposed Italo-Czech trade
agreement (page 3).
3. British member of parliament seeks release of Sanders in Budapest
(page 4).
FAR EAST
4. Chinese Communists may be planning heavier attacks on central
Korean front (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Vole'Salan says Paris dictates defensive policy in Indochina (page 5).
6. Letourneau reportedly urges Indochinese agitation for increased
iffy freedom (page 5).
Quirinots renomination seen threatening bloodshed in November
elections (page 6).
8. Indonesian cabinet reportedly about to fall (page 7).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
9. Iranian labor union seeks 140 Mexican oil technicians (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
10. 3.3('1)(2)
11. Set flights reportedly observed at East German air base (page 9).
12. Pressure seen growing in France for withdrawal from Indochina
(page 9).
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GENERAL
1. Pravda article stresses Anglo-American differences:
Ambassador Bohlen comments that the most 3.3(h)(2)
striking feature of the 24 May Pravda editorial
is its open attempt to play up to the British
government, and in particular to Churchill
personally, in order to exploit Anglo-American differences. Bohlen
considers that these differences are unquestionably greatly exaggerated
in Soviet thinking.
Pravda gives definite support to Churchill's
proposal for a high-level meeting to include the USSR, but warns that
the proposed Bermuda conference of the three Western powers would
prejudice a four-power meeting. Ambassador Bohlen suggests that the
editorial may foreshadow some official Soviet approach for a four-power
meeting in order to forestall a three-power conference.
Pointing out that the editorial is in complete
harmony with Stalin's Bolshevik article of last October, the ambassador
notes that it confirms that the new regime "is adopting different methods
rather than departing in important respects from previous Soviet policy
under Stalin."
2. Belgium alone supports US in opposing proposed Italo-Czech trade
agreement:
Belgium was the only COCOM member to i3
3(h)(2)
the United States on 22 May in opposing the pro-
posed Italo-Czech trade agreement under which
Italy would export $1,000,000 worth of embargoed
bearings. France, Denmark, and Norway voiced approval of the agree-
ment, while Britain and three other members expressed hope that the
quantity of embargoed bearings could be reduced.
Nearly all the delegates, taking the view that
Italy was the best judge of its own political, economic and social diffi-
culties, emphasized the easing of the cold war in defense of their attitude.
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Comment: The positions taken by most of
the national delegates are indicative of the growing opposition in COCOM
to the American position on strategic trade with the Soviet bloc. As late
as 5 May the British delegate told American officials that he regarded
the proposed Italo-Czech deal as an "open and shut case warranting
rejection."
3.3(h)(2)
3. British member of parliament seeks release of Sanders in Budapest:
According to the British legation in Budapest,
Harold Wilson, former president of the British
Board of Trade, visited Hungary at the sug-
gestion of Soviet foreign trade minister Mikoyan
t�dTStheSrtidgar Sanders. During a conversation with Wilson
in Moscow, Mikoyan agreed that the continued imprisonment of Sanders
was a hindrance to East-West trade.
Wilson, however, received no encouragement
from Hungarian officials when he suggested that Sanders be given an
amnesty without a quid pro quo in the hope that trade between Britain
and Hungary would be resumed subsequently. Nevertheless, Wilson
told British legation officials in Budapest that he was "optimistic."
Comment: The British embassy in Moscow
thinks that Sanders may soon be released, possibly as a result of Wilson's
efforts. Wilson's rebuff by Hungarian officials in Budapest may be because
they lacked instructions from Moscow.
FAR EAST
3.3(h)(2)
4. Chinese Communists may be planning heavier attacks on central Korean
front::
el ments of two
3.3(h)(2)
preparations on
the central Korean front for an attack
on a larger scale than the
battalion-size actions of recent weeks. While
limited-objective attacks are probably planned,
mese armies may be involved.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Salan says Paris dictates defensive policy in Indochina:
3.3(h)(2)
General Salan in a recent off-the-record press 3.3(h)(2)
interview in Hanoi explained his lack of military
success by stating that he was under a "secret
and personal directive from Paris" to incur no
casualties and to refrain from attacking the Viet Minh except in a last-
ditch defense of the Tonkin delta.
Comment: This explanation is at variance
with Salan's recent statement to Governor Tri of Tonkin that, despite
urging from Paris, he was unable to undertake any offensive actions
for lack of troops. He said he had intended to warn his successor,
General Navarre, "not to allow himself to be pushed into making a
premature offensive."
The long French record of failure to exploit
military opportunities indicates that there is a high-level policy, whether
it originates in Paris or Saigon, against vigorous prosecution of the war.
This defensive attitude is explained, according to many observers, by
French fear of larger Chinese Communist participation;
6. Letourneau reportedly urges Indochinese agitation for increased freedom:
3.3(h)(2)
Mi ni stpr LAtnurneau
has made frank statements
to Bao Dai and Governor Tri of Tonkin suggesting
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that this would be a propitious time for the Associated States to agitate
for more freedom. He pointed out that by devaluating the Indochinese
piaster, France violated the agreements governing its relations with the
Associated States and thus a renegotiation looking to greater independence
could be argued.
Comment: Letourneauts disgruntlement over
the devaluation of the piaster without his prior knowledge would be the
most likely explanation for such an approach. Statements of this sort
by France's top representative in Indochina could only reinforce the
Associated States' already apparent attitude that the devaluation opens
the way for concessions.
7. Quirino's renomination seen threatening bloodshed in November elections:
The American embassy in Manila comments tlq._(h)(2)
the manipulation of the Liberal Party convention
in Manila on 24 May by President Quirino and
his supporters confirms the president's intention
to obtain re-election at any cost. The embassy believes that the result
will be all-out corruption with serious danger of bloodshed in November.
The embassy believes that Romulo, rather than
continue with his plans for a third party, may accept reported Nacionalista
offers to support him as a candidate for the senate presidency or to re-
appoint him to his f ormer position as ambassador to Washington and the
United Nations in return for his support of Magsaysay.
Comment: President Quirino won office over
Nacionalista candidate Laurel in 1949 by means of extensive fraud and
coercion. The elections in 1951 were relatively clean, but the presi-
dency was not at stake.
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8. Indonesian cabinet reportedly about to fall:
The Indonesian cabinet is expected to fall in
the near future, 3.3(h)(2)
Vice President Hatta has been approached
to form a nonpolitical cabinet.
The Communist Party prefers to see the present
cabinet remain in of fice, and at least one Communist newspaper recently
criticized Hatta as a "tool of the West."
Comment: 3.3(h)(2)
an imminent cabinet collapse. Although
several political groups are highly critical of the cabinet, no one appears
willing to assume responsibility for forcing it to resign. The Communists
would oppose a government led by the conservative Hatta, who might be
expected to curb their expanding influence.
The over-all Indonesian situation has deteri-
orated seriously since October 1952. Governmental inefficiency and
Indecision have been complicated by the political ramifications of a
split in the army which has permitted increased insurgency.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
9. Iranian labor union seeks 140 Mexican oil technicians:
An Iranian oil workers' union has reportedly3.3(h)(2)
asked the Mexican Oil Workers' Union to help
obtain 140 technicians and engineers for the
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).
The report stated that Iran offered two-year
contracts with payment in American dollars and salaries 20 percent
higher than those paid in the United States. Air transportation to and
from Mexico was promised.
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Comment: Iran had once before asked
Mexico for oil technicians but without result, probably because
Ihe-sliortaze_of technicians in the Mexican petroleum industry.
10.
Prime Minister Mossadeq has thus far been
frustrated in his attempts to get even a small number of American
technicians, and the NIOC has not been able to get American training
for Iranian technicians.
WESTERN EUROPE
3.3(h)(2)
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11. Jet flights reportedly observed at East German air base:
Air activity involving MIG-15's was observed 3.3(h)(2)
at Cottbus airfield in late April and single
flights of Type-29 aircraft were observed on
18 May.
about 100 MIG3-1:!,-
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and Type-29 aircraft were shipped to Cottbus in April, and the training
of East German air force pilots in these aircraft is believed to have been
started.
Comment: The Type-29 aircraft is a modified
MIG-15 with two seats and reduced armament; it is normally used f or the
transition training of jet fighter pilots. The observation of MEG trainers
at Cottbus would tend to confirm previous reports 3.3(h)(2)
that jet training for East German pilots is under way.
12. Pressure seen growing in France for withdrawal frorti Indochina:
Ambassador Dillon states that although the 3.3(h)(2)
growing pressure in France for a negotiated
settlement and withdrawal from Indochina has
not yet reached dangerous proportions, it can
be expected to have more effect now than ever before. If the new com-
mand in Indochina, coupled with American assistance, creates a new
sense of hope for a real victory, however, the sentiment for withdrawal
should again recede.
Dillon believes that the government must soon
offer the National Assembly a definite hope of a long-range solution.
Comment: The vigorous parliamentary
debate expected shortly after a new French government is formed
should reveal the extent of dissatisfaction over past Indochina policy.
A withdrawal is unlikely unless the French position in Indochina
becomes much worse.
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