PRINCETON CONSULTANTS MEETING ON 19 AND 20 NOVEMBER

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02903581
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: December 7, 1953

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SECURITY INFORMTION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF mum ESTLIA.TES
December 1953
STAR? NELIORANDUll No. 413
SUBJECTt Princeton Consultants Neeting on 19 and 20 November
3.953
Chaizn of Consultants Heating
Abbot tndh
Consultants to Board of National Estimates
Richard C. Bissell
Charles B. Fahs
Calvin B. Hewer
WilliamL. Langer
Col. G. A. Lincoln
Philip Moseley
Lewis V. Thomas
T. Curler Young
Board of National Estimates
Edger I. gamer (PridNy)
Sharman Kent (Thursday)
Adm. R. E. Schnirmann (Thursday)
DeMertDirectatence
A. imory (Priclay)
Observer
Maj. pen. John R. Deane (Thursday)
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTI-11 HR 70-2
DATE: e91M-0- REVIEWER:
Staff Uembers of Office of National Estimates
hetmr L. Cooper
Charles Cremeans (Friday)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
?or czavra
CI: 0 EV
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I, GENEEAL TOPICS OF DISCUSSIOV
Tle formal agenda for the Consultants' Meeting at Princeton
ane. 20 November 1953 included NIB.100, Soviet Bloc Capabi-
lities for Economic Warfare (1st draft); et..90, 6ommun1st
?gases of Action In Asia ibrou0 111W544 (1st draft); I.63/1,
SalaWISZPIerm Developerents in Policy (published
raceibar1.5)4 at a memorandum ior-the Director of Central
IntklUgence entitled, The Short-Term Political Outlook in
Italz (through 1955), dated 0-November 1953, This potpourri of
We's was further augmented by discussion of several other
timely issues, including present Soviet internal economic policy,
aad Tsraeli-Arab relations. The consultants expressed satin-
faction with the procedure of discussing papers in rough draft
tons since greater freedom for individual comments was then
possible,
II. COMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA THROUGH MID.1951j CUIE0.98)
1. ,Discussion of this paper provobmilismay, and for the
most part bermonioue responses from the consultants. Led 'Wm-.
Fahs and It titger� the group emphasised probable Soviet satis-
re-Mon with status quo, and that Communist intentions in
Asia are directed toward malmtAining, mot redwing, tensions in
the Fir Beat, Ncreover, it was generally agreed that the
Comonists prObahly considered the risk of Western.42S military
commteraetion as a lesser deterrent to their freedom of action
till indicated in the draft. Specifically, it was agreed that
Chinese entrance in the UN would not lead to a relaxation of
tensions, nor would it necessarily indicate air desire by the
USSR for a relaxation of tension. Only mr. Bissell gave a modi-
fied dissent when he pointed out that the Todk fad probably
become somewhat less willing to risk war, and thus nqy be more
mccommodating in its general policy in the Far Bast toward the
West.
2, Regarding Soviet..Sino relations, it was generally agreed
that China is more an ally thane satellite. Moreover, they
accepted a thesis propounded primirilytorEr, Bissell Ind Neo Fails
that the Kremlin may consider enlaces federattonli as the most
practicable and profitable arrangement for the longer run, since
such a relationship would dopy resources to the West while
requiring a minimum Soviet outlay.
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3. Other genera conclusions reached were:
a. No real change in Soviet.Sino relations has
resulted since the death of Stelin;
b. Rajor Communist policy decisions in the Far Eaet
are probably made only after cons&batbmabetemi
Uoscow and Peiping;
c. The Kremlin will probably continue to strengthen
the Chinese, but that the Chinese build.up, will
be slow and cause the Kremlin little alarm.
III. SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES FOR ECONCOICHWARFARE (not published)
1111E4oci
1. Despite the highly controversial* and in uneyrespects
speculative nature of the paws on EastAiest trade, the consultants
(led by Eassrs. Bissell, C. Hoover, 'lovely* Lincoln) reached
considerable agreement. by careitil dissection of taw main genera
conclusion of the paper (stated by the chairman as "limited Bloc
eoonomic capability against the free world, as a whole"), and heavy
emphasis on individual cases of recent increases of Soviet-
West trade and their political implications, Ismael/1117U*
Icelandic barring situation, Um following general conclusions
were reached:
.ecale increase of East-lest trade and/or
on of Western terns is utaikelY.
(1) Inflexibility of the Soviet economy and die-
inclination for eetabliehing long.range trade
patterns.
(2) Lack of economic nfat,0 especially under
present internal economic conditions. This
virtually precludes grants and aid and
seriously limits the USSR in providing commodi-
ties desired by the outside world* except at
considerable economic cost.
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(3) Western ability to counter Soviet attenpta to
namipulate world currencies or markets*
b* However, increased trade could still be danproue
iithout being large 8OhApr rl1y -because of
Western potitica3. vu1mrb.ility resulting from
divergent, views on Easit.West trade0
s xaiidii Tis connection were:
(1) USSR could probably double present trade leads
with the West (1900, approximately beck to
prewar levels) without undue strain on its
economy*
(2) Some increase of EastAlest trade mutually
profitable, i0e0, avoid idea that on balance
any increase of trade economicaIlybad for
the West,
(3) Langer from increased Last.blest trade is poli-
tical, not economic, stemming primarily from
differences of "Western" views as to trade
restriction, and occasioned primarily by US
sensitivity to any relaxation of rigid controls*
c. The immediate oblemia not the extent of ovar.all
0
daviet economic inducements 14Lcamsaison
MRiZriarean A
(1) Countries which were mentioned most often in
this context wares Finland, Iceland, Italy, Jaw',
Denmark, Indonesia, and Ceylon*
(2) The consultants appearrd to be in general agree.
ment that the analysis could be made without
specific country or area studies. However, there
was considerable support for the view that such
individual studies would improve considerably
our understanding of Soviet economic warfare
capabilities and intentions*
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2, For the most part the consultants limited their comments
to the capability aspect of the problem and did not address
themselves directly to the question of determining Soviet intent
underlying present trade patterns. In general, however, it
appeared that the consultants were disposed to consider the two
as inexorably entwined, and that the political aspects were
generally in the forefront of the Kremlin mind� nevertheless,
mr. C. Hoover and ma'. Iely did qualify this general attitude
by pointing out respectively: (1) present trade trends probably
derived primarily from economic muses, that is, the present
stage of industrial development, and thus could be characterised
as resulting more from "economic fluctuation" than "duplicity";
(2) if the Kremlin had intention of exploiting trade primerAy
for political purposes it probably had greater opportunity during
the last 7..8 years, and favorable internal conditions will not
reappear until about 1956, assuming implementation of the present
economic program.
3. Or. Lincoln suggested that a 5.year time limit be placed
an the paper. kr, Amer arguing nn the basis of present trade
agreements, suest1iat the period be limited to 3 years.
IV. PROBABLE SHORT-TERM DEVELOPHENTS II FRENCH PCLICY (NIE.63/1)
A. Donestic Policy Developments
1. The consultants were in general agreement that poli-
tical developments, whether to Right or Left, would
not have narked effect on French economic gradth.
2, Ur, Bissell thought that a paper on "What Ails
France" should have more mullet can be done - that
the possibilities for amelioration of the situation
by pressures (external) on the French environment
should be examined. If the French can be driven off
dead.center (on EDC for example) it would have a
beneficial effect on French morale and might permit
progress in other fields (economic), On the other
hand, if EDC etc. are blocked and other environmental
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changes not made, the chances of a rightist coup
will increase. However, Messrs. Lincoln,
Armstrong* ioee expreesed doubt that the
Prench enough vigor to bring off
a coup.
3, In obvious response to the generally pessimistic
picture of France which evolved from the dis-
cussion, Or.Langer added an historical insight
that even in tUlacyon days before 1914 French
gcnrernments were klaked around; but nevertheless,
France survived.
1. The consultants were in general accord that present
French tactics will continue to be motivated by
desire to delay Cierann rearmament. Aro noted*
however* that the stalling period was to
a close.
2. A straw vote on the outlook for French EDC ratifi-
cation within the next 6 months was taken at
consultants willing to take a stand, Based on
individual "knife edge" decisions the results were
3 yes Cdessra.ammT, Armstrong Lad esell), and
3 no (Ir. Hoover, aa. LIncetn, and )0
3. AU agreed that continuing US pressures* "skill.
fully" applied* would be necessary to secure
ratifications* but there was variation of judgment
as to what pressures would be efficacious. Ur.
Bissell thought that US threats of alternative means
of rearming Germany -would have a negative effect.
Ur0jAaga! thought that, as a last-ditch effort, a
Uwe-Wares= Germany unilaterally might work,
Ur. Armstrong thought that a threat of withdrawal of
US forces (Presumably threat of a peripheral strategy)
sight work,
Is. a., lrnetxong, though thinking that on balance EDC
would be ratified, noted the strong opposition in
the French Foreign Office (as well as elsewhere).
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He also noted the French motional resistance to
the disappearance of the French national army.
ilk*0 Calvin Hoover elso underlined the French fear
that EDC would become dominated by the German
C. Indochina
(Indoch(na was also discussed in the context of HIE.98.
Views of consultants then expressed are incorporated
lathe following.)
1. There was general agreement that Indochina probably
represented the most difficult single problem
with which the US policy maker was presently faced.
2. Concerning the various modes of negotiations of the
issue, the consultants were generally agreed that
for all practical purposes they cane down to negoti.
ations with Ho Chi They believed, fMrthermore,
that whatever the outcome of such negotiations, it
would probably, if not almost entirely, lead to
Communist control of Indochina. Ar. Fahs believed
that the French and the US prebahlyrrailnized this
and that such negotiations will probably never
"come to a boil."
3. Regarding Chinese Communist latitude in Indochina,
the consultants were in general agreement with ar.
Bissell's proposition that the CC's meld go a long
Tarnilikkelbinsudthout grave risk of general war.
L. Lan sbelieved (and the consultants generally
agre t UL0.98 underestimated the likelihood of
the CC intervention in Indochina in the event the US
entered in farms but that this intervention would
probably be carried out in such manner as to require
the US to decide whether or not to initiate open and
direct opposition. However, Ur. Bissell later opined
that, in view of the ambitious Communiat Chinese
economic program, possible US hostile action probably
weighs increasingly heavy on Chinese Communist
thinking. Col. Lincoln agreed and also noted that
Indochina has a rrme�owestrategic importance for Communist
China and USSR than did Korea.
TOILrei3i&
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4. It was also noted that Indochina, favoring as it
did guerrilla warfare in which the CCIs had had
considerable experience* was more suited to
Cammunist Chinese capabilities than Korea, despite
the greater logistical problems in Indochina.
:re. Armstrong suggested, and the others gave
vigorous assent, that it would probably suit Soviet
aims to have the US intervene in force in Indo-
china* i.e., be interpreted as "a now white invasion
in Asia." He also noted that even if US forces
cleaned up the Viet Einh (orthodox military forces)
the CC's would probably finance extensive guerrilla
operations in the area.
5. The consultants were unable to reach agreement on
the impact the loss of Indochina would have on
Southeast Asia, especially since the reaction would
probably vary with the manner and tng of such
loss. I. Nasal inclined to the view that Communist
success would cause a frightened India to gravitate
westward, and possibly lead to an India-Pakistan
defense arrangement. riesers. Fabs and Calvin Hoover
agreed India would be frightearSut mare likely
into a position of stricter neutrality.,
V. THE SHORT-TERN POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN ITALY
The discussion an Italy centered primarily upon probable poli-
tical developments and the present conflict between the fluce" line
and the staid taken in the present um and subject memo; the former
holding that Pellais demise carries considerable risk of a Commmint
takeover, the latter that a collapse of Palms government would
not alter the general 'lightest gravitation of Italian politics. No
clears.cut formulation of opinion emerged from the discussion,
although its general tone indicated support for the subject memo
position. However, I, Armstrong, and to lesser degree z:r. Calvin
!Issas!, were inclined to believe that a Leftist orientation was
UAW-a more serious possibility than presently expressed.
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VI. Ca-rallTS ou ii tIAL Ecomac SITUATION n; THU trza
Following Nro Smith's introductory comment on present intel-
ligence regarding the Soviet Union, particularly the divergence
of views between OIR and ORR as to the extent and significance of
recent economic changes, the consultants were asked to comment
on the question. Oro Calvin Hoover suggested that the export of
Soviet gold could be a significant index as to the wariousness of
the present internal situation, and thus an area warranting special
attention. Ur.1141% commented that the level of popular dis-
content in the so warranted Closer Observation, and
suggested that recent governmental action indicated that popular
discontent ney be presenting the Krei.lin with serious problems.
Irr� Bissell advised, that a study of labor productivity be made the
aemararfocus, and that the whole question of uebanwrural
relationships be more thermally exanined. Ho suggested, that
present readjustments in the economy may have resulted free' admini-
strative limitations, and the nuid for a longer..range industrial
urban planning to provide the necessary base for a viable industrial
economy.
VII. COMMITS ON ISRAEL.ARAB MATIONS
The consultants were in general agreement that recent Arab-
Israeli clashes have made the Dear Eastern situation more volatile
than indicated in recent estimates. It was suggested that a re-
appraisal of Israeli...Arab relations should be undertaken�
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