COMMUNIST UNITS PARTICIPATING IN ATTACKS DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02912257
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

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3.5(c)
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Communist Units Participating in Attacks
During the Tet Offensive
30 January Through 13 February 1968
DOCCEitif LERARY
FILE COPY
DO NOT DESTROY
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� et
Copy No . 75
ER IM 68-23
February 1968
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DCPANOIIADIND AND
DECLAPISIEICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Communist Units Participating in Attacks
During the Tet Offensive
30 January Through 13 February 1968
Summary
A review of field reporting since the start
of the current Communist offensive indicates that
approximately 58,000 Communist main and local
forces were committed in attacks on urban areas
and military installations through 13 February.
(For detailed data on forces available and engaged
in the Tet offensive, see Appendixes A and B.)
Of this total, about 37 percent were North Viet-
namese Army (NVA) troops and another 29 percent
were Viet Cong (VC) main force troops. The
remaining 34 percent consisted of VC local forces
which had been reinforced for the attacks by the
upgrading of local guerrillas. On the basis of
MACV's latest order of battle of 115,000 men, the
Communists would appear to have committed about
50 percent of their regular forces to the attacks.
If the reported losses of 32,500 killed in
action and 5,500 detained applied solely to the
VC/NVA regular forces, the Communists would have
lost more than 65 percent of the forces committed
to the Tet offensive. This would have been a devas-
tating blow. However, there are a number of
pieces of evidence which suggest that such an
interpretation would overstate the Communist
manpower drain.
First of all, VC/NVA forces participating in
the offensive were augmented by numbers of
Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. It
was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
with the assistance of the Vietnamese Affairs
Staff and coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence. It analyzes developments reported
through 13 February 1968.
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guerrillas operating in independent units or
integrated into local force units. Second, there
was extensive VC activity to raise new recruits.
Third, casualties included laborers conscripted
to move VC supplies, as well as a number of
civilians in densely populated areas taken under
attack. Almost certainly the rate of casualties
among new and relatively untrained forces was
higher than among hard-core troops.
In summary, a number of factors suggest that
the VC/NVA losses, although high, are not as
serious as first believed. Most recently, the
enemy has been taking advantage of his greater
control of the countryside to accelerate recruiting
among the rural population. All of these develop-
ments make it difficult to assess the current
enemy manpower situation with any accuracy.
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Introduction
1. The intensity of the Communist Tet offensive
is reflected in the fact that 39 of South Vietnam's
44 provincial capitals, plus the autonomous cities
of Saigon and Da Nang, were attacked. All of them
were subjected to artillery and mortar fire or
ground assault, and most of them were hit within
the first three days. At least 35 of these capitals
and the two autonomous cities were physically pene-
trated by Communist armed forces. In addition,
at least 71 district capitals also were attacked.
(For a list of the provincial and district capitals
attacked, see Appendix B.) The offensive was aimed
at civilian centers of authority, as well as at
military installations such as base camps, airfields,
and logistical facilities.
2. The Tet offensive is a part of the winter-
spring campaign which the Communists have described
as being the "decisive" phase of the war. As a
maximum objective, the Communists hoped the campaign
would culminate in a geperal uprising which would
involve severe defeats for Allied military forces
and would lead to US withdrawal from South Vietnam.
At the same time, they also hoped that large-scale
political agitation combined with attacks on urban
areas would result in the collapse of the South
Vietnamese government and create conditions favor-
able for a settlement and the establishment of a
coalition government on Communist terms.
3. The Tet offensive also has several more
immediate tactical objectives: (1) to disperse
and tie down Allied military units in defensive
positions, (2) to disrupt South Vietnamese centers
of political authority, and (3) to demonstrate the
inability of the South Vietnamese government to
protect the population. In addition, the Communists
may be attempting to gain greater control over a
larger segment of the rural population by disrupting
or destroying the pacification program while Allied
forces are diverted to the protection of urban
areas.
4. Although the Communists have not accomplished
as much as they had hoped in this offensive, they
have dealt a severe psychological blow to an urban
population, accustomed to relative security from
the active phase of the war. The Vietnamese
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populace appears to be dismayed at the apparent
ease with which the Communists were able to enter
the cities in strength and attack key installations.
Large portions of some cities, including Hue, My
Tho, and Ban Me Thuot, have been destroyed, and
the increasing number of refugees and homeless
created by the attacks have imposed substantial
new economic and social burdens on an already
heavily burdened government.* The Communists also
inflicted considerable damage on Allied military
installations, in addition to tying down a number
of Allied military forces to restoring security
in urban areas.
5. Despite these achievements, the Communists
failed to organize any significant support from
the general populace. Moreover, the offensive
has been waged at a considerable cost in terms of
losses of men and weapons.** The importance of
the loss of men lies less in the numbers killed,
which are believed to be overstated, than it does
in the caliber of the troops lost. Although
guerrillas, recently infiltrated personnel, and
untrained new recruits probably account for many
of the casualties, the identificatiun of units
taking part in the assaults indicates that a
considerable number of skilled, well-trained VC/NVA
infantry, sappers, and special-action troops also
were lost.
Forces Committed to the Tet Offensive
6. A review of field reporting since the
start of the Communist offensive, although still
incomplete, provides sufficient information to
identify most of the enemy units directly partici-
pating in the attacks against urban areas and
military installations.*** These units are listed
in Appendix B, which shows that as of 13 February
(Saigon time), approximately 58,000 Communist main
and local forces had been actively committed in
* See ER IM 68-203 The Effects of the Tet
Offensive on the Economy of South Vietnam as of
15 February 1968, 16 February 1968, SECRET/NO
FOREIGN DISSEM.
** For additional information on enemy losses,
see paragraph 9 and Appendix B.
*** This memorandum does not include attacks on
military installations in the Khe Sanh area.
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the Tet attacks. The number of Communist forces
committed to reserves and defensive positions for
the Tet offensive is not considered in this memo-
randum.
7. About 22,0Q0, or 37 percent of the 58,000
actively committed, have been identified as North
Vietnamese troops. All of these troops were
located in the I and II Corps areas, where they
accounted for 60 to 65 percent of the attacking
forces. Nearly 17,000, or about 45 percent of
the 36,000 VC forces offensively engaged, were
main force troops, the remainder being local force
troops. In addition, it is believed that a con-
siderable portion of the guerrilla forces, which
were built up in preparation for the current
offensive, directly participated in the attacks.*
Some of the guerrillas were upgraded to EilVC
main and local force units up to full order-of-
battle strength and, therefore, are believed
counted in the total estimate of VC/NVA forces.
However, the figure of 58,000 is understated to
the extent that certain main and local force units
and independent guerrilla units which participated
in the attacks have not been identified. Evidence
also indicates that the attacking units contained
a number of new, inexperienced recruits and that
civilians were impressed to provide support to --
these units.
8. On the basis of MACV's order of battle of
31 December 1967, which lists 115,000 VC/NVA
maneuver and combat-support troops for the entire
country, the Communists appear to have committed
about 50 percent of their main and local forces
to the attacks. At least 7 percent of the troops
tentatively identified in the attacks, however,
are not listed in MACV's order of battle. (For
the methodology used in estimating these troops,
see Appendix C.) These units are not as yet
carried in the order of battle because they are
newly formed, recently infiltrated, or previously
unidentified.** Examples of these three include the
4 A separate OER report on the role of the guer-
rillas in the Tet offensive is being prepared.
** MACV's acceptance and rejection criteria for
Communist units, particularly for newly infiltrated
units, tend to minimize the number of units and
soldiers listed for any [footnote continued on p. 6]
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510th and 511th VC local force battalions, the
31st regiment of the 341st NVA division, and the
Nha Trang Municipal Unit.
9. More than 32,500 of the attacking forces
reportedly had been killed and another 5,500
detained as of 13 February. The many uncertainties
attached to these data make them extremely difficult
to evaluate, particularly in terms of their impact
on enemy strength. The compilation of field report-
ing on enemy forces committed in the III Corps
\area, for example (see Table 4), falls far short
of the numbers reported killed and detained (see
Table 5). Even allowing for incompleteness in the
identification of units, the implied loss rate of
the data presently available for the III Corps area
imply a loss rate far in excess of that which is
reasonably possible. It seems clear, therefore,
that the number of enemy losses should not be
compared with the number of main and local forces
listed in the order of battle or the numbers en-
gaged in the attacks. There is sufficient evidence
to support a judgment that the enemy casualties
include (1) guerrillas operating in independent
guerrilla units; (2) guerrillas recently upgraded
to main and local force units; (3) new recruits;
(4) laborers conscripted to move supplies for the
attacks; and (5) civilians in densely populated
areas taken under attack.
point in time. MACV's order of battle of 31 December
1967 indicates a decline in the size of the main and
local forces from the order of battle of 31 October.
Evidence suggests, however, that the Communists
actually were in,the process of increasing the size
of their regular units during this period in prep-
aration for the Tet offensive.
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APPENDIX A
Forces Available and Engaged in the TET Offensive
(30 January-13 February 1968)
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Table 1
Countrywide Data on the Tet Offensive
Friendly force available
1)12i2222
US forces 2/
490,700
(153,600)12/
Third-nation forces
60,700
(33,800)12/
South Vietnamese forces .2/
635,300
NVA
VC
Communist forces available 1/
224 ,500
55,600.
168,900
Maneuver55,200
Combat support
45,500
10,000
4,500
Administrative service
100
37,600
Guerrilla
71,600
Estimated Communist main and local
forces identified as attacking
urban areas and military installa-
tions 57,600
North Vietnamese 21,500
Viet Cong 36,100
Main force 16,800
Local force 19,300
Casualties and weapons losses 2/
South Third-Nation
Casualties US Vietnamese Forces Total Communist
Killed in action
1,073
2,245
65
3,383
32,549
Wounded in action
5,488
8,373
259
14,120
N.A.
Detained
5,528
Enemy weapons losses
Individual
Crew served
7,967
1,227
a. As of 29 January 1968.
b. Numbers in parentheses represent ground combat forces.
c. Preliminary figures; as of 1 January 1968. Includes RF/PF forces.
d. As reported in MACV Order of Battle Summar, 1 November through
31 December 1967.
e. As reported by MACV as of 13 February 1968 (Saigon time).
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Table 2
Friendly Forces Available
Total I Corps
II Corps
III Corps
IV Corps
US forces 2/ 490,700, (153,600) y 138,700
(51,000)
148,400
(39,000)
189,200
(49,500)
14,400
(4,loo)
Army 327,000 (115,200) 33,600
(22,600)
118,000
(39,000)
166,100
(49,500)
9,300
(4,100)
Marine Corps 74,600 (38,400) 74,500
(38,400)
Negl.
100
Navy/Coast Guard 32,600 23,400
2,000
3,800
3,400
Air Force 56,500 7,200
28,400
19,200
1,700
Third-nation forces 6.2222 (33,8040 6,200
(3,800)
39,000
(24,400
15,500
(5,600)
South Vietnamese forces s/ 635,300 99,700
142,200
217,200
176,200
Regular 340,200 55,400
70,500
152,500
61,800
RF/PF 295,100 44,300
71,700
64,700
114,400
Total 1,186,700 21414,600
329,600
421,900
190,600
a. As of 29 January 1968.
b. Numbers in parentheses represent ground combat forces.
c. Preliminary figures; as of 1 January 1968.
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Table 3
Communist Forces Available Ri
Total
I Corps
II Corps
III Corps
IV Corps
224.500
63,200
NVA VC
57,500
NVA VC
54,100
NVA VC
49,700
VC
26,900
36,300
1/,/22
39,800
11,000
43,100
49,700
Maneuver
100,700
21,900
10,600
14,100
10,100
9,500
17,100
17,400
Combat support
14,500
5,000
700
3,500
800
1,500
2,200
800
Administrative service
37,700
7,600
loo
51500
16,200
81300
Guerrillas
T1,600
17,400
23,400
7,600
23,200
As reported in MACV's Mbnthly Order of Battle Summary, 1 November through 31 December 1967.
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Table 4
Estimated Communist Main and Local Forces
Identified as Attacking Urban Areas and Military Installations
North Vietnamese
Total
I Corps
II Corps
III Corps
IV Corps
21,500
9,800
11,700
Viet Cong
36,100
6,200
6,200
10,300
13,400
Main ILorce
16,800
2,400
3,900
6,000
4,500
Local force
19,300
3,800 2/
2,300
4,300
8,900
Total
,57,600
16 000
__.2....__
17,900
10,300
13,400
a. Including 1,500 unidentified troops, believed to be Viet Cong local
force.
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Table 5
Casualties and Weapons Losses 2/
Total I Corps II Corps III Corps IV Corps
Total friendly casualties
Killed in action
Wounded in action
United States
3,383
1,186
506
1,137
554
14,120
4,788
1,788
',370
2,174
Killed in action
1,073
524
120
346
83
Wounded in action
5,488
2,686
605
1,787
410
South Vietnamese
Killed in action
2,245
638
363
775
469
Wounded in action
8,373
1,986
1,132
3,491
1,764
Third-nation forces
Killed in action
65
24
23
16
2
Wounded in action
259
116
51
92
Communist casualties
Killed in action
32,549
10,592
5,539
11,195
5,223
Detained
5,528
2,255
1,693
800
78o
Enemy weaponslosses
Individual
7,967
2,049
1,672
2,653
1,593
Crew served
1,227
496
177
315
239
a. As reported by MACV as of 13 February 1968 (Saigon time
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APPENDIX B
List of Provincial and District Capitals Attacked
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I Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified, and
Their Strengths, by Province 2/
City
Communist Units
Identified. in Attacks Estimated
in Province Strength
Quang Tri
Quang Tri City y 812th NVA Begt. 2,600
Cam Lo 2/ 1st Bn, 803rd NVA Regt. 500
Hai Lang 2/ 1st Bn, 270th Regt. 350
Mai Linh 2/ 5th NVA Regt. 1,340
Trieu Phong 2/ 27th Ind. INA Bn. 300
3 U/I Bns. 1,200
Hue City)/
Phu Loc c
Total
Thua Thien
62
190
Hue Municipal Unit
(Hue Sapper Bn.) 225
800th VC Bn, 6th NVA Regt. 300
4th NVA Regt. Ind. 2,000
Total 2,525
Quang Nam
Da Nang (Auton City)
Hoi An City y R-20 VC LF Bn. 400
Dien Ban 2/ V-25 VC LF Bn. 400
Hteu Nhon 2/ 3rd Bn, 31st Regt. 341 NVA Div. 500
Duy Xuye Hoa yang c
by 3 U/I Co's - est. 300
Poss els GK 31 AA Bn NVA Ad Bn.
1400
Total
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� e
I Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province .9./
(Continued)
City
Tam Ky City IV
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
in Province Strength
Quang Tin
72nd VC LF Bn.
21st NVA Regt.
70th VC MF Bn.
V-12 VC LF Co.
V-13 VC LF Co.
V-16 VC LF Co.
74th VC LF Co.
78th VC LF Co.
F. 105 VC LF Co.
300
1,500
400
500
Total 2222
Quang Ngai
Quang Ngai City 1/ 48th VC LF Bn 400
Binh Son 2/
Son Tinh 2/
Nghia Hanh 2/ 401st Sap Reg. & Sub Bns 1,700
Mo Duc 2/ 406 Sap Bn. (450)
120th Mont. Bn. (400)
107th AA Bn. (400)
405th Sap Bn. (450)
81st VC LF Bn. 360
Total
2,1460
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a. Identifies all province and district towns reported attacked
during the Tet offensive. Communist units identified in the attacks
do not necessarily correspond to the cities and towns as listed.
b. Province capital.
c. District capital.
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II Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province 2/
City
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks
in Province
Estimated
Strength
Kontum
Kontum City 12/
4th Bn, 24th NVA Regt.
435
Dak To 2/
6th Bn, 24th NVA .Regt.
335
66th NVA Regt.
1,560
40th Arty Regt.
1,000
2nd Bn, 174th NVA Regt.
220
�
Total
Pleiku
3,550,
Pleiku City 12/
407th VC Sap Da
500
Le Trung 2/
H15 VC LF .Bn
400
Thanh An 2/
408th VC Sap Bn
360
4th Bn, 95B NVA Regt.
475
5th Bn, 95B NVA Regt.
375
Hq & Spt Bn NVA Regt.
500
32nd NVA Regt.
1,600
200th VC Arty Bn
400
Total
42610
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Dalat City 12/
Tuyen Duc
C-809 VC LF Co. I
210
c-810 vc LF Co.
C-610 VC LF Co.
2 Co's, 145th NVA Regt. 150
Total 360
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II Corps
Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province 2/
(Continued)
City
Qui Nhon City 12/
Phu Cat pi
An Nhon
y
Phy My c
Tuy Phuoc 2/
Hoai Nhon
Ban Me Thuot City 12/
Buon Ho 2/
Thuan Hieuy
Lac Thien c
Tuy Hoa Cityi12/
H1*1 Xuong c
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks
in Province
Binh Dinh
36th Sap Bn
E 2 B VC LF Bn
36B Sap Bn
18th NVA Regt.
Total
Darlac
33rd NVA Regt.
E301 VC LF Bn
95th NVA Regt.
H-5 VC LF Bn
381st VC Sap Bn
86th VC LF Bn
88th VC LF Bn
181st Mont. Bn, 95th NVA
481st VC Sap Bn
Total
Phu Yen
Estimated
Strength
2)4-5
200
250
1,250
1,924-5
860
14.70
1,275
45
200
300
300
Regt, VC 300
200
5th Bn, 95th NVA Regt.
4th Bn, 95th NVA Regt.
30th VC Bn
U/I El-MS, 91st NVA Regt.
85th VC Bn & 1 NVA Pit.
Total
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3, 9 50
280
260
200
200
300
1,214-0
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II Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified),
and Their Strengths, by Province 2/
(Continued)
City
Communist' Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
in Province Strength
Khanh Hoa
Nha Trang City 12/ 7th Bn, 18B NVA Regt. 205
Ninh Hoay 8th Bn, 18B NVA Regt. 290
Cam Lam c 9t1LBn, 18B NVA Regt.
270
Nha Trang Municipal Unit 20
1(90 VC Sap Co. 35
95th NVA Arty Bn. 150
1(89 VC Sap Co. 120
T86th VC Sap Co. 120
1(91 VC Sap Co. 35
T88 VC Sap Co. (Recon) 120
Total 1,365
Binh Thuan
Phan Thiet City12/ 1..82 VC LF PL. 400
Thien Giao 2/ 840 VC MF Bn. 250
430 VC LF Co. 50
2 U/I LF Co's 120
Phan Rang 12/
Total 820
Ninh Thaan
U/I LF Co. 100
a. Identifies all province and distri2t towns reported attacked
during the Tet offensive. Communist units identified in the attacks
as listed do not necessarily correspond to the cities and towns as
listed.
b. Province capital.
c. District capital.
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III Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province 2/
City
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
in Province Strength
Phuoc Long
Phuoc Binh City y
Song Be 2/ VC LF Co's
Long Khanh
400
Xuan Loc City Y (H.4 PLT) VC LF 50
Dinh Quan 2/
Bien Hoa City I/
Due Tu 2/
Tan Uyen
Long Thanh 2/
Tay Ninh City 12/
.Phu Khuong 2/
Hieu Thien 2/
Phuoc Ninh 2/
Bao Trai City y
Cu Chi 2/
Due Hoa 2/
Due Hue 2/
An Loc City 12/
Loc Ninh 2/
Chon Thanh 2/
Bien Hoa
274th VC MF Regt.
275th VC MF Regt.
Phu Loi VC LF Bn
Dong Nal VC MF Bn
4th VC LF Bn
Total
Tay Ninh
VC LF Dist. Co's
Hau Nghia
VC LF Co's
Binh Long
VC LF Co's
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1,650
1,650
1400
1400
200
14,300
1400
1400
100
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III Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province 2/
(Continued)
City
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
in Province Strength
Binh Duong
Phu Cuong City 12/ 273rd VC MF Regt. 1,750
Ben Cat 2/ 681 Bac Ben Cat LF Co 50
Phu Hoa 1/
i c
Phu Giaoj/
Tr Tam
Tan An City b/
Ben Luc 2/
Total
Long An
317 Binh Luc Dist. LF Co
Phuoc Tuy
1,800
80
100
180
Phuoc Le City 12/ C 41 Chan Duc LF Co. 85
Gia Dinh/Saigon. (Autonomous City)
Gia Dinh City 12/ 269th VC MF Bn 300
Hoc Mon 2/ 2nd. VC LF Bn 270
Thu Duc 2/ 6th VC LF Bn 450
D-14 LF VC Bn 300
D-12 LF VC Bn 300
C-10-VC SAPPER Bn 350
D-16 LF VC Bn 420
1 Co. 3C6 MF Bn 150
Total 2 540
a. Identifies all province and district towns reported attacked
during the Tet offensive. Communist units identified in the attacks
as listed do not necessarily correspond to the cities and towns as
listed.
b. Province capital.
c. District capital.
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IV Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province fil
City
My Tho City 12/
Cal Be 2/
Cal Lay 2/
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
in Province Strength
Dinh Tuong
512th VC LF Bn. 550
514th VC LF Bn. 100
DT1 VC MF Regt. 1,500
207th VC MF Bn. 400
Total
Go Cong
2,550
Go Cong City 11/ '514th VC LF Bn. 300
361st VC LF Bn. 300
Total
Kien Hoa
600
Ben Tre City 12/ 516th VC MF Bn. 500
Mo Cay 2/
Binh Dai 2/
Vinh Binh
Tra Vinh City12/ 503rd VC LF Co. 130
Cang Longy 505th VC LF Co. 120
Tieu Can c
525th VC LF Co.
8o
509th VC LF Bn. 250
501st VC LF Bn. 350
531st VC LF Bn. 300
527th VC LF Bn. 300
306th VC MF Bn. (Elms)
Total
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1,530
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IV Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province fl./
(Continued)
City
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
in Province Strength
Vinh Long
Vinh Long City 12/ 306th VC MF Bn. 500
Vung Liem 21 857th VC LF Bn. 200
Cho Lach c 308th VC MF Bn. 500
Tam Binh s/
Binh Minh 2/
Total 1,200
Chuong Thien
Vi Thanh City12/ 3 VC LF Co's & 2 Pits. 330
Soc Trang City 12/
My Xuyen 2/
Thanh Tri 2/
Ba Xuyen
2 VC LF Co's
606 My Xuyen.LF Co.
Tran Tri LF Co.
Total
Bac Lieu
200
loo
80
380
Vinh Loi City 12/ 5 vc LF Co's 420
An Xuyen
Quan Long City12/ U Minh 11 VC LF Bn
Cai Nuoc 2/ New 306th, VC LF Bn. 1,200
Phong Dinh
Can Tho City b 303rd Bn, D2 VC MF Regt. 500
Phung Hiep c Tay Do VC LF Bn. 400
Phong Dien 2/ New Tay Do VC LF Bn. (AKA 307 Bn.) 400
Thuan Nhon 2/ 309th VC MF Bn. 590
Total 1,850
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IV Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province -.92/
(Continued)
City
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
in Province Strength
Kien Giang
Rach Gia City 12/ 2 Co's U,Minh 10 LP Bn. 400
Ha Tien 2/
Kien An 2/
Chau Phu City 12/
An Phu 2/
Tri Ton 2/
Cao Lanh City y
Hong Ngu 2/
Chau Duc
512th VC LF Bn. 550
510th VC LF Bn. 500
511th VC LF Bn. 500
Total 1,550
Kien Phong
U/I Elms, 502nd LF VC Bn. 300
Kien Tuong
Moe Hao City 12/ 267th VC MB Bn.
Sa Dec City 12/
Due Ton 2/
Duc Thanh 2/
Sa Dec
3 VC LF Co's
14-00
114.0
a. Identifies all province and district towns reported attacked
during thm Tet offensive. Communist units identified in the attacks
as listed do not necessarily correspond to the cities and towns as
listed.
b. Province capital.
c. District aapital.
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APPENDIX C
Methodolovy Used in Estimatin5 Strength
of Communist Units Attacking Urban Areas
and Military Installations
1. Estimates of enemy troop strengths deployed
in the Tet offensive are based on the compilation
of units identified
/Although in most cases,
reporting is fragmentary and obviously incomplete,
efforts have been made to include as many positive
identifications as possible, while attempting to
preclude duplication of units and consequent double
counting.
2. Enemy unit strengths were generally taken
directly from the MACV Order of Battle Summary.
In cases where identified units did not appear in
the MACV order of battle, strengths were assigned
on the ba.,-'s of similar units prevalent in the
particular area, and/or estimated strength cited
in field reporting. Unit code names, newly formed
units, units not identified previously, or units
dropped for lack of recent verification, explain
differences in units listed and the MACV order of
battle.
3. In several instances, the same units were
identified as active in attacks in more than one
area. This was resolved by splitting the estimate
of the units total strength between areas or by
listing the unit in only one area.
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