PRINCETON CONSULTANTS' DISCUSSION ON 18 AND 19 MARCH 1953 OF SE-39, 'PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN AND OF THE ELEVATION OF MALENKOV TO LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR' (10 MARCH 1953)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02927799
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: March 26, 1953

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Harold Ford
John Huizenga
Ro J. Smith
`TiNtiMar
SECURITY INFORMTION
CENTRAL IrTELLTnr.NCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMTIM
26 March 1953
STAFF 11EIDRANDULI NO. 336
SUBJECT* PRINCETON CONSULTANTS, DISCUSSION ON 18 AND 19 NARCH
1953 OF SE.39, "PROBABLE CONSEPTIENCES OF THE DP,ATH
OF STALIN All) OF 111E ELEVATION OP NALENROV
LEADERSHIP IN TM USSRn(10 March 1953)
CHAIRMN OF CONSULTANTSt MEETING
Raymond Jo Sontag
Consultants to Board of National Estimates
Samuel Flagg Bemis
Burton Paha
Calvin Hoover
George Kennon
William Langer
Philip ?Tosely
Joseph Strayer
Board of National astiroates
DeForest Van Slyck
Staff Members of Office of National Estimates
DOCUMENT NCI.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
0 DECLASSED
CLASS. CRANE TO: IS S 1/4.9�,
NEXT RLVIEW uATE: -...
AUTH: HR 11.1-2
DATELAI\11-3--REVIEWE
(b)(3)
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PRINCETON CONSULTANTS' DISCUSSION CN 10.19 UARCH OF SE.39
"PROBABLE COMErUENCES OV THE DEATH OF STALIN AHD OF
THE ELEVATION OF ITALPIRCOV TO LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR"
(10 March 1953)
I. SWIM'
1. The discussion focussed on the queetion of transfer of power
in the USSR and, specifically, =whether and with slut degree of
risk the enormous power concentrated in Stalin personally could be
transferred to a successor or successors. The majority of the
consultants leaned to the view that, in the process of solving the
transfer of power problem, the Soviet system would probably be
weakened. In this respect, the majority departed from the vies
which has genarnlly obtained in ONE, that the transfer of power
would probably be accomplished; without weakening the continuity
and effectiveness of the Soviet stet*.
2. Broadly speaking, two points of viovremerged from the
diecussiong
The majority, with the degree at confidence varying
with individuals, argued largely on the basis of
historical analogy that the transfer of power might
shako the Soviet system. They- viewed the structure
of power in the USSR as intensely personal. They-
said that Malenkov ladle) the majesty of Stalin and
is surrounded by ambitious end fearful men who, if
they could, would challenge what appears to be his
pro-eminent position. These consultants also believed
that a man such as LIalenkov, roared in the sheow of
Stalin, may have qualities and deficiencies which
would make it difficult for him to succeed to Stalin's
power. These consultants conceded, however, that
despite the dangers which they saw menacing the Soviet
system, the trnnsfer of power may nevertheless be
effected without dagsgo to the syutem.
b. The contrary view was based upon an analysis of Soviet
society itself, and concluded tha:. there was little or
no prospect that the transfer of power would shake or
EvilMism
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disrupt the Soviet system. These consultants atid
that historical precedents were not relevant because
there MAO no historical example of a system of eontrole
such as Soviet power had developed. These controls,
they said, penetrated all the institutions of power
in the society so that even if a. poligonal struggle
occurred on the top level it would be transient and
would not affect the stabilityre the whole system.
THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS
A. The Majority Position
30 Kerman began by stating flatly that amy concept of saidaritT
or cooperative committee relationships among the men in the top ruling
group was nutter nonsenao.� The relationships among these men had
been marked throughout the Stalin era by extreme tension, the most
delicate intrigue, and savagery. There were enormous possibility or
violence implicit in this situation.
I. Moreover, there had been signs in recent months of a peak
of tension which pointed to a power for straggle. nine possible
that Nalenkov was not Stalin's choice in the final weeks of his life;
it was also possible that Stalin has been dead for some time aud.that
'a struggle has been going on in consequence of his death. The
abolition of the Politburo at the 19th Congress Was "an act of epoch-
making significance," for which Stalin did not take personal responsi.
Kitty. Molotov's attitude toward Maleinkov in the funeral speeches
was not the same as Eeriest which may moan that MblotoviS at odds
with the other tan and that they cannot eliminate'himnowbecanse he
has support in the Party. The sudden prominence given the army,
both before and after Stalin's death, suggests that Uhlenkov may be
intriguing with the army for its support. The re-emergence of thukov
site this, for his earlier baniehmentsse a personal act of Stalin.
Roman concluded that "whatever the apparatus of power is at this
time, it is not unified."
50 Langer asked whether the doctors' plot, with its 4nd1sect
attacks on Eerie, had issued from a Stelin-Ltolotov coMbination against
Velenkov and Berta. He speculated further that there might have been
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a policy difference between the two factions, Stalin.liolotov
representing a "cautious" element teal Ealenkov6Beria a *forward"
element.
6. Xennan's reclLywmts that the alirpment of personalities
suggested was (Fite possible, although the policy issue Which might
lie behind it obscure. He felt that a divergence of views had
developed within the Soviet hoirerchy early in 1952 over the response
which the USSR should make to developments in the West, particularty
VS rearmament-and the possibility' of Vest nerman rearmament. One
school believed that these developments were of such a magnitude
that the US1R must decide at once either to fight or to negotiate,
and that the latter course was preferable. The other school felt
that developments in the West did not involve such a threat and that
the 'USSR could afford to sit tight. Kennan saw two indications to
support his belief that there had been a struggle along these lines.
One was the distinct impression he had in Macaw last sumer that
a studied effort was being made in certain quarters to koep him away
from Stalin and Holotov, which he supposed was related to the Isere
of whether the USSR should negotiate with the DS. The other evidtnce
was that he detected a pattern of wavering in Soviet policy on
Germany, He thought that the March note reflected a temporary victory
of the "negotiation" camp, whereas the later notea withdrew the bid
which VW implicit in the March note. The Stalin article appearee
to settle the issue at least temporarily, for it stated that
developments in the%est did not constitute a threat, that war war
not inevitable, and therefor* by implication, that negotiations
were not necessary, It placed Soviet policy in the costive* "No
concessions and no negotiations."
7. Sontag then summarised Kennants position as follows& (a) there
was evidence of a struggle for some time among the possible heirs of
Stalin and there was also evidence that this struggle had not been
resolved at Stalin's death; (b) there was involved in the strugg3.i . a
difference of views an policy toward the West; (c) the present structure
of power represented a compromise which, given the nature of the relations
among Communist leaders, is most unlikely to be maintained.
8. Keenan aocepted this summary and than added a further observa-
tion. He said that much would depend on Whether the Vest confroWad
the Soviet leaders with the necessity of making najor policy decisions,
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If they were so confronted, a great strain would be placed on their,
present relationships. Differences among the top leaders would then
be reflected in the Satellite and other Communist parties, the loaders
of which would pot respond to lk3Ainkcn4* authority as they had to
Stalin's, so that a tremendous strain would be placed on the unity of
the entire COmmunint movement,
9. Langer asked *lather a Western initiative mould not units
the leadership, since historically that had been the effect of a
foreign threat upon a divided leadership. Hannan replied that a '.'48 tern
(US) move should not involve amorthreat. He said that Germany was a
potentially divisive issue among the Soviet leaders, and he believed
that a. newUestern proposal on Germany would Bait them wide open.
B. The Minority Position
10, In support of the view that the transfer of power was net
likely to shake the Soviet system, Vesely offered a different version
of mhat had been taking place in the USSR as well as a different
picture of the nature of the Soviet power system. He believed thtt
Stalin had given mndh thowtt to the succession problem and that.he
had placed Ltalenkor in a position to aesums power with a minima risk.
The last real struggle for the succession had taken place between
Malenkev and Zdahnov, and Delenkov had won. He had been intimately
involved with the uork of the Secretariat for at least 14 years.
This was a key position, for it meant control of personnel from
colonel 112 in the army, from the ralon up in the Party, and from the
managers of enterprises up in the bureaucracy. All personnel arrange.
manta had been confirmed by the recent Congress.
11. Mosely agreed with Kennan that the doctors' plot had beun
a blow at Serial but the announcement of it meant that the strugfle
was already resolved, not that ono was in progress. The replacement
of Abakumov by Ignatiev, a key personnel shift in Beriale sector of
responsibility, showed that Berta's sector had been reprimanded, but
not Beria pe The aspersions oast an the security organs in
the arinouncement of the doctets' plot was away of conveying to the
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Party that Berle had subordinated himeelf in the power strurgles
tbeely said he thought it possible that the Uhlenkov.Beria
relationship had been worked outlast spring and that the montior
of prominent generals as targets of the doctors' plot was an
attempt to convey that the leading figures in the armed forces Were
supporting Malenkev. Measly did not regard the abolition of the
Politburo and its replacement by an enlarged Presidium at the
19th Congress as simificant. The Presidium contained the three
elamentsitlich had always; iormod the top echelon of powers the
leading personalities in the Politburo, the second string youngez
men in positions of great adminsitrative responsibility, and the
regional satraps. The important thing was that Stalin had wanted
one dominant successor, and he had worked out the personal relation.
ships so as to place Tialenkar's hands on the levers of power.
12, This version drew a number of questions from those
consultants who inclined toward the view outlined by Korman.
In replying to these questions, !Way further clarified his
position:
a. When asked to explain the perfunctory tributes
paid to Stalin at his funeral and the apparently
rapid deflation of the Stalin myth, llosely replied
that Lialenkov was probably responding to a feeling
in the party that the deification of Stalin had
been overdone. (Kennan noted in this connection
that in the last year or so there had been nstrange
'hiatuses* in the press treatment of Stalin. He
speculated that Stalin might have become "fed up
eithnthe Halenkov-Beria combination and had been
engaged in a struggle to destroy them. He thought
it significant that 'Berta popped up into prominence
as soon as Stalin died.)
b, When asked to explaiXtwhether Stalin's Bolskevik
article had not undermined Ealenkov's position, boaely
replied that he believed that the Bolshevik article
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wompoit
representedUalenkovis line toward Europe, I.e.,
the West was no threat and the USSR had room for
maneuver (l!alenkoir's speech to the Congress).
Mosely explained Why tho Bolshevik article had
been published by speculatinz that Stalin had
planned to give the article at the Congress as a
speech, but that because of failing health he had
been unable to deliver such a major address. His brief
appearance was intended to sanctify the promedinus and
to place a seal of approval upon Balenkov's report,.
(Hero Duman and others introduced the hypothesis
that Stalin may Arcady have been dead at the timu of
Congress and had been represented by a double.)
13. Strayer said he thoudit there were two principal flaws in
%sales interpretation. It made it difficult to explain, first the
rebuke to Berta before Stalin's death and then his sudden build.tp
after Stain's death, and second, the abolition of the Politburo and
the erection of the Presidium at the Congress, followed by what
amounted to the restoration of the former after Stalin's death,
Kennon added that he was sure therewam no real power in the Presidium
because it was too big. He pointed to the theses introduced by
Kruschev at the Congress, which specified that the Secretariat, rot
the Predsidium, would have control over personnel. This raoant that
the Pretifturawas a. purely formal body and that Molotov prior to
Stalin's death had not been in a position to exercise any influence
over personnel.
14. Sontag asked whether it was possible to believe that a
man who had struggled bitterly for power, as Stalin had done, world
� arrange a succession. The picture of an orderly transfer of power,
sinply out of a, spirit of service to the cause, did not fit the
history of revolutions. Mosely replied that the factor of Stalin's
failing health due to heart trouble over a long period should be taken
into account, for Stalin had probably long realized that he midht have
to relinquish power at any time.
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15. Hoover said that 1)8810814W, agreed with Oman's thesis,
but thalbhedid not think that the Kennan and 'Noway interpretations
were incompatible. He thought that Halerskov was undoubtedly Stalin's
choice, but he considered it most unlikely that Stalin mould have
actuallytamnsterred power as an irrevocable trust. The doctors'
plot and the reversal of Congrees decisions after Stalin's death
indicated that the succession had not boon decided and that Halenlcov
had to and actually did seise power. Although lialenkov hold paw
now, there was a poseibilrenhat others she felt threatened night
combine agateat him. Personal power was vastly more important to these
men than policy differences. UalmWamrtmkbubtedly felt the need to
associate other tap figures with himself temporarily, but in time he
would wish to rid himself of them. If Berta or Molotov shoved the
Slightest sign of disloyalty, blood mould flaw. There was therefore
a potentially explosive situation, althoull none of the others would
Joke the slightest challenge to Halenkov unless they could do so in
combination. Kennan intertected Lenin's remark that Russian history
alternated beteeenowildvielence and the most delicate deceits."
Hoover's personal ruess was that 7Talenkov's chances of oonsolidattng
his power wore good, for Ualenwov was in abettor position than
Stalin after timings death due to the control system which had been
developed,
16. Sontag questioned whether a comparison with 1924 was valid,
in view of the increased size of the Soviet empires the complexity of
the system and the pressuree engendered by the efforkto operate a
planned ecoomgr under forced draft. Wes it not possible that, in my
such closely articulated structures hesitations might be fatal, and
therefore was it not true that personality was still decisive? roweity
replied that there had been a great administrative development since
192b which made the system largely selt.sustaining. It had weathered
The shock of the great purges without a sign of breakdemn. The control
of key mon from the Secretariat reduced the need for personal inter,
ventions.
17. Kennen said he believed that modern totalitarianism inevitably
degenerated into personal dictatorship. Stalin had become more aad
more like Hitler, For the general population a myth could be built
around Halenkov, and ha oould be fitted into Stalin's role With relative
ease. For the people at medium levels in the apparatus of powers it
was a real question; they had probably been left in A trauma by Stalin's
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death and oi3ly gradwaly would they ask themmelvee whether his
towering personality could be replaced. But at the very top level
there was surely a terrific tension. We couldiut penal:Bari:old:At
whether they would repave it in violence or by polite mamma..
The injection of complicated problems of empire �. relations with
Llao and the Satellites made the now relationship far more difricuIt.
10. Meaelarreplied that the key question WAS whether an,
struggle at the top level could moult in an institutional clash
that is, whether any top leader in resorting to violence could
call upon the army or the socrot police as a unit. He did not
believe this was possibile because of the interpenetrating nature of
the controls in all the instruments of poser. Melenkov had long
operated this system based on the card indexes of the Secretariat.
Hbeely believed that he still controlled it and that therefore no
institutional (slash was likely.
le, Kennan said he thought the personal element in this control
system ought not to be overlooked for it demanded continual juge.ing.
He was convinced that Stalin maintained his power by an intentional
preeervation of instability and tension. In the last years of ht.e
life, he.lsoked the vigor to give the continuous attention which was
required, and coagulation had developed in organisations or the Atate
and the Party. If Malenkov had to comnromieewith institutional
solidarities, he was lost.
20. Langer said that even if it were conceded that Nalenkav
had succeeded to Stalin's power, the real question was whether he
could operate the syutem with the same skill as had Stalin himselfo
On the question of balenkov's cepacities, there did not seem to be
enough evidence to forma jUdgmant.
III. OTHER ISSUES
21. The coneultante suggested meglifications of 3t;.39 in several other
reepectss
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a. Langer said he dicliked the flat atabmvent in
paramaph 3 that the peoples of the USSR were
Ilunlike4 to participate activelyn if a *truffle
for power should break out. He suggested that it be
nodified at *mat to read that" the peoples of the
US11 are unlikely to initiate or to participate
actively in the early stages of the 5truf4.e.*
b. On the 'bele, there was an inclination among the
consultants to believe, at least more than SE.39
convoyed, that Stalin's death might result in the
weakening of Soviet controls in the Satellites and over
Communist parties outside the Bloc. However, Hoover,
Uosely, and nes opposed the majority on this. There
was &similar division of opinion on the question of
vhethor Tito had prospects for increased influence in
the Satellites and other Communist parties. Kennon
in particular held that Tito's influence would increase.
a. Mile there was no serious objoction by any of the
consultants to 3g.39's statement, on the probnble
effects of Stalin's death on Sino-Soviet relations,
Lancer thought it important to stress other fnotors
than appeared in the paper. He argued that if no
great change in Sino..Soviet relations were to be expected
it was primarily because (a) the two states would be
held together by their common interest in the Korren
ear, and (b) China would long be dspondent on the USSR
for industrial aid and the Russians mould wish to exploit
this dependence to maintain effective influence. Vhile
not disputing the general position nor the argemert under
(a), Seeman saidbothoOghtthat Russia wadi not rive
much industrial aid to Chime and that in addition
Russian penetration and influence ;Ja China were far less
than was generallYbelieved.
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