CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02929525
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: June 11, 1953

for Release: 2019/171CO2929525
SECU INFORMATION // 0/4
11 June 1953
opy JNO. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO,
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT 11E:VIEW UPI F:
AUTH:
D REVEWER:
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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RITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. USSR to appoint ambassador to Yugoslavia (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on possible reduction in force in Yakutsk security
apparatus (page 3).
FAR EAST
. South Korean cabinet reportedly decides against unilateral
military action (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
New Indochina commander probably will make no early change
in strategy (page 4).
5, Communist China reportedly to include Burmese territory in a
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
. Comment on Egyptian withdrawal from Sudanese electoral
/
commission (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
/Comment on the Italian election results (page 7).
3.3(h)(2)
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GENERAL
1. USSR to appoint ambassador to Yugoslavia
Ambassador Bohlen reports that Soviet
foreign minister Molotov has asked Yugo-
slavia to accept an ambassador and has
expressed the hope that Yugoslavia would
feciprocate. The foreign minister requested agrement for the pres-
ent chief of the Foreign Ministry's Balkan section.
Comment: There is no indication at the
present time that the Kremlin will make an attempt to re-establish
closer economic and cultural relations with Yugoslavia or that the
latter would be receptive to such overtures.
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SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on possible reduction in force in Yakutsk security apparatus:
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the pending merger of the Yakutsk
MGB and MVD was causing considerable difficulty in finding positions
for experienced personnel. Apparently the transfer of MVD economic
organs to economic ministries has resulted in a large-scale reduction
in force in the Yakutsk MVD-MGB administration.
the merger of the MVD and MGB on the national level and
the transfer of the MVD's economic functions were causi
confusion in the higher levels of the Soviet government.
the confusion has now spread to the republic level.
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The loss of certain functions and any reduc-
tion in force of the combined MVD-MGB would create a morale prob-
lem in the Soviet Union's coercive apparatus. De-emphasis of these
agencies suggests that the present regime is attempting to appear less
dependent than Stalin on police control.
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FAR EAST
3. South Korean cabinet reportedly decides against unilateral military
action
The South Korean cabinet and a group of
influential National Assemblymen decided
on 8 lune to recommend to President Rhee
that the Republic of Korea army take no
ilitary action
Most of these officials believed
Rhee would agree to their recommendation. They urged, however,
that antitruce demonstrations continue, stating it would be "disgrace-
ful" to accept the truce unconditionally.
Comment: Political leaders are still
opposed to the truce agreement but apparently are coming to the
conclusion previously reached by ranking military officers that
independent military action to secure unification would be highly
impractical at this time. Rhee's fanatical opposition to the con-
tinued division of Korea continues to be the controlling factor in
South Korea's truce stand.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. New Indochina commander probably will make no early change in
strategy:
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The new French commander in Indochina, 3.3(h)(2)
General Navarre, appears still overwhelmed
with his job and will go slow in initiating any
major changes in strategy
The confused state of French politics
and the political issues involved in the handling of the Indochina war
are complicating his task of restoring morale and confidence in the
French officer corps.
Both Navarre and his deputy strongly favor
a rapid build-up of the Vietnam army and an increase in its responsi-
bilities; the latter, however, has expressed dismay at the lack of
Vietnamese officers for staff and command positions.
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Comment � Improvement in French officer
morale is unlikely unless an aggressive policy is adopted. Hitherto,
military initiative appears to have been tempered by political con-
siderations in both Paris and Saigon.
The development of an effective national
army, including the training of all categories of officers, still
appears to be a long-term project susceptible to many delays.
5. Communist China reportedly to include Burmese territory in a Shan
autonomous state�
Communist China plans to establish an
autonomous Shan state which will include
territory in Yunnan and all the area of Burma
east of the Salween River,
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This action reportedly will take place not later than October, wit.W�r
exact timing dependent on the extent and rapidity of the withdrawal of
the Chinese Nationalist troops from the area.
In the meantime, the Chinese Communists
are allegedly building roads to facilitate communications between
China and the new state.
Comment � The dissatisfaction of many
Shan leaders over the curtailment of their powers by the Rangoon
government has been exploited by the Chinese Nationalists, who,
have contacted the Shan chieftains 3.3(h)(2)
regarding the establishment of an autonomous state. There have also
been reports that the Chinese Communists were seeking to exploit the
Shan discontent.
33(h)(2)
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6.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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7. Comment on Egyptian withdrawal from Sudanese electoral commission:
The withdrawal on 7 June of the Egyptian
member and the pro-Egyptian Sudanese representative from the inter-
national commission supervising the forthcoming elections in the Sudan
may represent a maneuver through which the Egyptians will be in a
position to charge the commission with partiality in preparing the
elections and to disavow the results in the event of defeat. The with-
drawal followed the rejection of Egypt's demand that tribal leaders be
prohibited from political activity.
Egyptian influence in the Sudan has suffered
since the coalition of Sudanese parties collapsed in April, when the
pro-independence Umma party charged Egypt with undue interference
in Sudanese politics. The commission's recent decision to forbid
government personnel from taking part in political activities has also
been a severe blow to the pro-Egyptian faction which counted on this
group for its strength.
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WESTERN EUROPE
8. Comment on the Italian election'results:
The slim majority obtained in both
houses of parliament by the center electoral bloc in the Italian
national elections will make the De Gasperi government virtually
inoperative without support from either the right or left. The bloc
failed to obtain the popular majority of votes which would have
given it almost 65 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
A feature of the election was the pro-
nounced shift to the left, which was reflected in the impressive
gains made by the Nenni Socialists, as contrasted with the modest
gains of the neo-Fascists and Monarchists on the right.
Before the election, De Gasperi indi-
cated that he would call for new elections if his bloc failed to
win a majority of the popular vote. He is under considerable
pressure, however, to form an alliance with the Monarchists.
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