ARE THE NEXT FOUR MONTHS DECISIVE? - 1967/12/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02959201
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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MEMORANDUM )
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NINIF
INFORMATION
Saturday, December 16, 1967 -- 3:15 p.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
SUBJECT: Are the Next Four Months Decisive?
I asked Saigon to collect and analyze all the captured documents they have
on the present winter-spring offensive and negotiations, including the coalition
government.
They did a good, long paper.
I then asked CIA to reproduce it and comment on it. The comment and the
Saigon paper are attached.
Taken together, they reveal an interesting difference of emphasis and
judgment between Saigon and CIA Washington.
The Saigon people read these documents as saying (see p. II, 5-8, paper
clipped):
-- the Communists are simultaneously making a maximum military effort
and preparing their people for an early negotiation;
-- if they achieve some tactical success, they are likely to negotiate in
the late winter or spring;
if they do not, they are likely to scale down the war;
-- "the war is probably nearing a turning point and the outcoxne of the
1967-68 winter-spring campaigri Wirt iii all likelihood determine the future
direction of the war."
Our CIA people (as you can see in the marked passages of the covering
note) are inclined to believe the present military campaign, combined with
emphasis on a negotiated coalition government, is less "decisive" than Saigon.
They see the war going on for several years.
At the end, however, they accept an important point: having gotten the
Viet Cong to accept these months as "decisive" and moving towards peace and
victory "this situation could have serious effects on Viet Cong morale and
lead to a substantial increase in defections" if the campaign fails.
In any case, I thought you'd like to know the terms in which experts are
debating the present evidence.
ostow
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
15 December 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
SUBJECT
Papers on Viet Cong Strategy
1. Per your request, we are sending you the
attached clean copies of three papers recently pre-
pared by the Saigon Station:
(1) "Overview of Viet Cong Strategy"
(2) "The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese
Winter-Spring Campaign"
(3) "The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese
Position on Coalition Government"
We understand that these papers were written at
Ambassador Locke's request and constitute, in ef-
fect, his response to a personal request you levied
on him.
2. The attached papers constitute a field
study and should not be read as the considered opinion
of this Agency. Although these papers provide a use-
ful and provocative preliminary analysis of a num-
ber of recently captured documents and intelligence
reports, they omit reference to other important
materials bearing on the subject. Moreover, the
basic thrust of the papers is predicated on certain
assumptions whose validity seems questionable from
our perspective here in Washington. For these
reasons, we are inclined to draw interpretations
which differ somewhat on major points with those
of our colleagues in Saigon.
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vral
3. In sum, while we agree that there has been
a recent upsurge in Communist military activity --
a new tactical departure -- we do not find it in-
explicable or mysterious. The current activity pat-
tern follows the strategic line laid down in the
1967 Truong Son and Giap articles and is very simi-
lar to the Communist activity pattern of 1963 and,
again, of early 1965. We agree that there is a
renewed emphasis on coalition government. We also
consider reasonable the hypothesis that the Com-
munists plan a period of intense military activity,
designed to increase US frustration, and then to
follow this with a play for negotiations and a
"coalition" settlement, i.e., dangling bait which
the Communists feel the US will find tempting in
an election year. Our main point, however, is
that one can subscribe to this explanation of near-
term Communist strategy without adopting or accept-
ing the additional hypothesis that this strategy
(quite a sensible one) is necessarily a last-ditch
desperation gamble or proves that the Communists
are on the verge of collapse.
4. Among the principal reasons for our draw-
ing conclusions different from those of our Sai-
gon colleagues is the fact that our reading of
captured documents on Viet Cong strategy and at-
titudes on negotiations and a coalition government
is conditioned by other evidence on Hanoi's out-
look. This evidence is contained in diplomatic
reports -- many of them sensitive and thus per-
haps not available to analysts in Saigon -- and
in other materials which reflect Hanoi's official
policies and viewpoints. These materials provide
the essential context within which the fragmentary
information contained in captured documents must
be interpreted. Most captured documents contain
doctrinal jargon whose wording cannot always be
taken literally, particularly when couched in
what may be imperfect translations. Moreover,
many are no more than handwritten notes taken by
students at low-level political indoctrination
courses, which often simply amplify basic policy
lines already available to us in more comprehensive
form from other sources. Where several such
documents agree on certain points, we can be
reasonably sure that they validly reflect the
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basic Viet Cong line. When they contradict each
other on key matters, however, or when some con-
tain nuances not reflected in others, we cannot
be sure whether these represent basic policies,
or merely local elaborations by political cadre,
or embellishments or misinterpretations on the
part of the note-taker. In any event, any such
deviations or embellishments not supported by
other evidence must be analyzed with caution.
Unfortunately, some of the more dramatic points
cited in the attached papers represent such un-
supported elaborations on what we otherwise know
to be basic enemy policy.
5. Substantively, we question the thesis that
the Communists may be about to make "crucial" new
decisions on the course of the war. We believe
their basic course has been set since early 1966,
when Hanoi realized that an early military vic-
tory was no longer feasible, and therefore
shifted to a policy of eroding our will to pur-
sue a protracted war. We believe the factors
cited in the first paper as evidence that Commu-
nist strategy may be in a state of flux -- i.e.,
the new Liberation Front program, the documentary
references to negotiations and a coalition gov-
ernment, and the current winter-spring campaign --
are instead manifestations of basic decisions al-
ready made. We believe Hanoi's fundamental aim
in the current winter-spring campaign is not to
"alter the balance of forces" in an absolute
sense, but rather to demonstrate "decisively"
that they can frustrate what they construe to be
our basic goals -- destruction of Communist
main forces and pacification of rural areas. The
Communists are confident that by checking our
momentum, they will create conditions favorable
for political-psychological maneuvers, both within
Vietnam and within the United States, which might
end the war on their terms.
6. It is in this context that they are giving
new emphasis to preparing the groundwork for the
contingency of negotiations through which they
would seek to gain their interim objectives --
withdrawal of U.S. troops and creation of a Front-
dominated coalition government. As the field
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papers correctly point out, the Communists view
the South Vietnamese political situation as being
still quite fragile and offering new possibilities
for political agitation and subversion. Moreover,
although they seem to be uncertain about the impact
of the war on the coming U.S. elections, they ap-
parently hope to be ready to exploit any favorable
opportunities which might arise from them. Their
apparent readiness to negotiate does not imply any
change in their basic aims; there is ample evi-
dence that they intend to negotiate only when and
if we are ready to compromise on their terms.
7. The field papers are predicated on the
assumptions that the present rate of attrition
is not acceptable to the Communists, and that
they are incapable of checking or reversing the
basic trends in the war. We question the validity
of these assumptions. In our 8 December review
of the situation in Vietnam, we concluded that
despite manpower difficulties, the Communists
remain capable of replacing their losses and of
maintaining the basic military force structure
in the south at roughly its present strength.
Although Communist losses this year have reached
record levels, we believe Hanoi is prepared to
pay this price in an effort to reverse the un-
favorable trends of the past two years. We see
little likelihood that they will change their
minds over the next year or so.
8. We believe the situation has developed
unevenly this year, with both sides experiencing
successes and failures. Our military offensives
have lost some momentum over the past six months,
and the Communists have regained the initiative
in some key areas. While our forces almost cer-
tainly will continue to inflict disproportionately
heavy losses on the enemy and deny him tactical
victories in almost every case, we do not per-
ceive any decisive weakening of the Communist
military potential in the coming year. We do
expect some slow progress in pacification, and
hence some further decline in the enemy's posi-
tion, but no early turning point seems likely.
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9. In the final analysis, we believe the Com-
munists view their military effort in a political-
psychological context that is not always compatible
with Western precepts. "Victory" for them can be
simply avoidance of defeat, if by doing so they
frustrate -- and thereby "defeat" -- the aims of
their opponent. They believe that if they can
demonstrate that the war is in an indecisive
stage -- and this is their aim -- this will open
new possibilities for political instability in
South Vietnam and the United States. While their
confidence may be misplaced, in their eyes it is
based on historical precedents, and it should
not be underrated.
10. If the Viet Cong fail completely in
their objectives, and the current campaign ends
without their being able to claim that they have
effectively checked our momentum and hence have
imposed a conditional stalemate, they will be
extremely vulnerable to psychological attack.
It is evident that some local Viet Cong cadre
may have embellished the basic party line by
promising an early "decisive" and victorious
end to the war. If this fails to materialize,
a major psychological campaign exploiting this
situation could have serious effects on Viet
Cong morale and lead to a substantial increase
in defections. In this sense, the Communists
are taking a potentially serious risk in
gambling for major near-term gains.
3.5(c)
Geofge A. Carver, Sr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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8 December 1967
I. OVERVIEW OF VIET CONG STRATEGY
1. Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese (NVN)
strategy appears to be approaching a crucial
period where basic decisions concerning the future
conduct of the war must be made. This is evi-
denced by the promulgation of the new program of
the National Front for the Liberation of South
Vietnam (NFLSV) on 20 August 1967, by increasing
references in captured enemy documents to the
necessity of establishing a "coalition government"
and the possibility of negotiations, and by
VC/NVN plans for launching an all-out military
and political offensive during the 1967-68
"winter-spring campaign" designed to gain deci-
sive victory.
2. The VC/NVN position in South Vietnam
has steadily deteriorated over the past two
years, and so far the VC have shown no signs
of being able to reverse this trend. They have,
however, successfully maintained their basic
organizational integrity, militarily, politically
and economically, in the face of very heavy
allied pressure. Nevertheless, it is doubtful
that at present rates of attrition the VC/NVN
will be able to maintain the present scale of
the conflict for very much longer without a
radical change in the balance of forces.
3. Since the promulgation of the 12th
resolution of the NVN Lao Dong party in De-
cember 1965, the war in South Vietnam has been
characterized by the VC/NVN leadership as a
"local" war which is to be fought by a combina-
tion of military, political and economic means
designed to result in "victory in the shortest
possible time" if feasible, or to be conducted
as a "protracted" war lasting 10-15 or 20 years
if necessary. The ultimate objective remains
the forcible takeover of South Vietnam by VC/NVN
forces, leading finally to communization of the
South and reunification with the North.
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4. The possibility of an interim solution
to the war, involving the establishment of a
so-called "coalition government" in South Viet-
nam between the VC/NVN forces and some non-Com-
munist elements was recognized in the original
program proclaimed by the NFLSV in 1960 and
was stated though not stressed in the 12th
resolution. This particular solution is viewed
as a tactic designed to ease the way towards
final Communist takeover and is not regarded
as a final solution. In VC terms it is defined
as a "decisive victory" and a step short of
"complete victory."
5. The new program of the NFLSV promul-
gated on 20 August 1967 calls for all major
elements of Vietnamese society to join together
in driving out the Americans and overthrowing
the current Government of Vietnam (GVN). While
the text of the front program does not specifi-
cally call for the establishment of a coalition
government as such, it is very strongly implied.
And the communique accompanying the text of the
new Front program does call for a coalition
government.
6. In order to bring about this "coali-
tion," the possibility of negotiating or "talk-
ing" with the Allies was recognized by the
VC/NVN as a possible tactic to be undertaken
provided the VC/NVN could do so from a position
of sufficient strength. This position of
strength however could only be achieved by
victories on the battlefield.
7. Since the beginning of the year, and
especially within the last two months, the VC/NVN
have been talking more and more frequently in
their internal documents about the possibility
of the "coalition government," even though they
do not possess the position of strength they
require to impose such a government.
8. The 1967-68 winter-spring campaign as
described in enemy documents is intended to
bring about a fundamental change in the balance
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of forces in South Vietnam. The winter-spring
campaign is apparently an attempt to win deci-
sive victory "in the shortest possible time" and
is intended to result in the withdrawal of
American forces from South Vietnam and the
establishment of a so-called "coalition govern-
ment" which will, in effect, be under VC/NVN
control.
9. The goals established by the VC/NVA for
the winter-spring campaign are clearly far beyond
their capability to accomplish, and it is doubtful
if the VC/NVN leadership seriously expects to be
able to achieve all that they have promised their
troops. From this standpoint, the real objectives
of the campaign are still obscure, and several
explanations for VC actions are possible. One is
that the VC are trying to establish as strong a
negotiating position as possible before talks be-
gin.
10. It seems unlikely, however, that the
VC/NVN would agree to serious negotiations
without having achieved the position of strength
they have established as their goal for the
winter-spring campaign. In this event it is
more likely that this campaign represents a
supreme effort by the VC/NVN high command to
make use of what assets remain to them, both
military and political, to reverse current trends
before being forced to reduce the level of
intensity of the conflict.
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8 December 1967
II. The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese
Winter-Spring Campaign
1. Numerous recently captured documents have
brought into focus Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnam-
ese (NVN) plans and ambitions for their 1967-68
winter-spring campaign. This campaign is to con-
sist of three phases: a first phase from October
to December, 1967; a second phase from January to
March 1968; and a third phase from April to June
1968. The campaign entails mil-
itary and political ambitions which surpass any-
thing previously attempted in such a relatively
short period of time by the VC/NVN in South Vietnam.
Moreover, thus far VC/NVN activity indicates that
they are indeed attempting to implement these plans
at their intended levels of intensity. For example,
there has been a definite increase in coordinated
attacks on GVN and Allied installations. The most
notable of these thus far have been at Loc Ninh
and Dak To. In these attacks, the VC mounted sus-
tained assaults despite very heavy casualties, and
apparently with less preparation than is normal for
VC operations of such size, in an only partially
successful attempt to "coordinate" the two attacks.
In brief, the 1967-68 winter-spring campaign is
described by the VC/NVN as the "decisive" phase
of the war, crucial to its ultimate outcome.
2. In their assessments of the current situ-
ation, the VC state that they are in a very favor-
able position. Strategically, the American military
forces are described as having been forced into a
defensive posture as a result of the widespread
VC/NVN attacks, especially in the DMZ. Moreover,
according to the VC/NVN, the combat strength of
the U.S. forces has been reduced and their attacking
power limited, thereby leaving the over-all U.S.
position weakened. In addition,
the U.S. is viewed as being increasingly isolated
politically abroad and torn by mounting dissension
from within. The VC/NVN state that the present
U.S. administration feels itself under pressure
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to end the war before the 1968 elections in order
to guarantee its political survival.
3. Within South Vietnam, the VC/NVN also view
their position optimistically. They describe the
Government of Vietnam (GVN) as corrupt, increasingly
unpopular, and inefficient. They also apparently
believe that the GVN is becoming weakened by in-
ternal disagreements within the Vietnamese society,
such as those represented by the militant Buddhists
and the disgruntled candidates in the recent national
elections. Furthermore, the GVN military forces are
now described by the VC/NVN as playing only a minor
role in the war, a situation that the VC/NVN believe
will lead to increased anti-U.S. sentiment in the
GVN armed forces and in the Vietnamese body politic
as a whole. In any event, the VC/NVN consider these
forces as incapable of fighting effectively, as
having failed to protect the pacification program,
and, most important, as incapable of being improved.
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
4. The VC, on the other hand, consider them-
selves in a strategically offensive posture with
the initiative firmly in their hands. While admit-
ting "certain difficulties" such as recruitment and
manpower problems, food shortages, and war-weariness,
which have given rise to hopes or "illusions" of
peace among "some" troops, the 3.5(c)
VC/NVN describe the over-all situation as offering
a significant opportunity for gaining great military
and political victories in the forthcoming winter-
spring campaign. 3.5(c)
5. Viet Cong pronouncements concerning the
significance of upcoming periods of activity (winter-
spring, summer-autumn, etc.,) traditionally stress
the importance of impending campaigns. Descriptions
of the current 1967-68 winter-spring campaign, how-
ever, are placing unusually heavy emphasis on its
historic significance and decisive nature. A letter,
dated 31 August 1967 from the Central Office for
South Vietnam to party chapters and members through-
out South Vietnam exhorts its addressees to "make
all-out efforts to achieve unusual and historical
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successes during the 1967-68 winter-spring campaign."
A letter dated 18 September 1967
from one military cadre to another in Long Khanh
Province states that "the period of late 1967-early
1968 is being regarded as a "historical phase."
A directive outlining the missions
and objectives of the winter-spring campaign issued
by the current affairs section of VC Military Region 3,
dated 21 October 1967 and classified Top Secret,
describes VC/NVN missions in the 1967-68 winter-
spring campaign as "militarily and politically de-
cisive to the achievement of our (VC/NVN) objec-
tives." Numerous other references
to the decisive nature of this winter-spring cam-
paign have been noted in enemy documents, circulars,
notebooks and letters.
6. These same documents call for all-out, co-
ordinated attacks throughout South Vietnam utilizing
both military and political means to achieve "ulti-
mate victory" in the near future.
Although the exact date by which this "ultimate
victory" is to be achieved is not specified, it
is strongly implied that it will be some time in
1968.
7. VC/NVN strategy for this campaign is de-
scribed as an "all-out attack." This is a departure
from the traditional VC/NVN three-phase strategy "of
resistance, general offensive, and general uprising."
The immediate objective is to
step up military and political offensives "on all
battlefronts" and to create favorable conditions for
a "turning point" which will result in "a general
counter-offensive and general uprising."
A notebook captured in KontuM states that
"we must carry out large-scale and continuous at-
tacks" and "coordinate activities with other areas
of operations throughout South Vietnam."
A directive captured in Dinh Tuong Prov-
ince describes the winter-spring campaign as a
"campaign of large-scale and continuous attacks
conducted evenly on all battlefields (in South Viet-
nam)."
8. Viet Cong/North Vietnamese military and
political missions for the winter-spring campaign
can be broken down as follows--
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3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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A. Military:
(1) Conduct large-scale continuous,
coordinated attacks by main force
units, primarily in mountainous
areas close to border sanctuaries.
(2) Conduct widespread guerrilla at-
tacks on large U.S./GVN units in
rural/heavily populated areas.
(3) Attack key U.S./GVN agencies and
rear service bases.
(4) Destroy lines of communications.
(5) Conduct terrorist activities
the cities by special action
sapper units.
B. Political:
in
and
(1) Consolidate and strengthen VC/NVN
organizations at province, district,
and village levels throughout South
Vietnam.
(2) Coordinate military actions with
political activities to promote
political turmoil and struggle
movements.
9. Through these tactics, the VC/NVN hope to
force the redeployment of major Allied military units
to the border areas where the VC/NVN enjoy sanctuary
and will be able to inflict heavy casualties on them.
According to the VC/NVN plan, this will tie the Allied
forces down in static defensive positions and, equally
important, will relieve the pressure on the VC/NVN
activities in the populated areas. Elsewhere, the
VC/NVN intend to accomplish the systematic destruc-
tion of the GVN's administrative apparatus in the
rural areas, and to "liberate" most of these areas.
A final goal of the VC/NVN is to launch the long-
promised "general uprising." To accomplish this,
the VC/NVN have set themselves the task of occupying
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and holding some urban centers in South Vietnam and
of isolating many others.
10. The VC/NVN state that if they are success-
ful in the above activities, the conditions will
have been created for the overthrow of the present
GVN and its replacement by a regime which will con-
sent to form a coalition government with the Na-
tional Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
(NFLSV) and will follow the program of the NFLSV.
Moreover, in these circumstances, the VC/NVN state
that they would assume control of the country's armed
forces and would ensure that they exercised control
at the local administrative level.
The second major expectation on the part ot tne
VC/NVN is that if they are successful, this will
break the "aggressive will" of the Americans and
force them to agree to withdraw from South Vietnam
in a short period of time.
Conclusions
11. VC/NVN strategy toward the war appears to
have reached a crucial phase in which changes in
the tempo and scale of the war are envisioned. In
which direction these changes will go probably de-
pends very much on the success or lack thereof of
VC/NVN efforts during the next few months. Based
on the position that the VC/NVN have taken in this
campaign so far, they appear to have committed
themselves to unattainable ends within a very
specific and short period of time.
12. Despite the apparent lack of realism in
their goals, it would be illusory to assume that
the higher VC/NVN echelons have no realistic objec-
tives in this campaign. These real objectives are
still obscure, but based on present information,
it appears that VC/NVN strategy in the winter-spring
campaign involves the following three related stra-
tegic options--
A. A serious effort to inflict unacceptable
military and political losses on the
Allies regardless of VC casualties
during a U.S. election year, in the
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hopes that the U.S. will be forced to
yield to resulting domestic and interna-
tional political pressure and withdraw
from South Vietnam. This would probably
involve the commitment of at least some
elements of the NVA's reserves to South
Vietnam.
B. Negotiations after a major military and
political effort to place themselves in
as advantageous a position as possible.
C. Reversion to a relatively low-intensity
stage of warfare after having inflicted
maximum casualties on the Allies and
pre-empting any major allied offensive
campaign.
These options are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
but the degree of success attained by the VC/NVN in
the winter-spring campaign will probably determine
which strategy will be emphasized.
13. In this context, the winter-spring cam-
paign appears to be an attempt to utilize to the
maximum possible extent current VC/NVN resources in
North and South Vietnam in an attempt to place max-
imum pressure on the Allies to come to an agreement
on terms favorable to the Vietnamese Communists. It
is doubtful if the higher VC/NVN echelons seriously
expect to be able to accomplish all of the tasks
they have enumerated for their troops. They may feel,
however, that at current rates of attrition the pres-
ent scale of the conflict cannot be continued for
much longer in any event, and that a retrenchment to
a lower-intensity form of struggle will probably be
inevitable unless there is a major change in the
situation. Any such retrenchment would probably in-
volve the dismantling or scaling down of many pres-
ent VC/NVN organizational components -- military,
political and economic -- since they would not be
necessary for support of a much reduced level of
activity.
14. If the VC/NVN view the situation in this
light, it is probably to their advantage to use their
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present apparatus to the fullest extent in hopes of
fundamentally reversing current trends before attri-
tion renders such an attempt impossible. This could
explain the risk they are taking in promising their
followers and cadres victory within a short period
of time. This tack has the effect of bolstering
morale in the short run for an all-out effort. It
does, however, run a high risk of engendering seri-
ous disillusionment and disaffection among the VC/
NVN rank and file when the promises are not fulfilled.
Even if the VC/NVN fail in this endeavor, however --
so the reasoning goes -- they would hopefully have
at least inflicted serious damage to Allied military
units and the GVN infrastructure, pre-empted any
major offensive plans the Allies may have had for
the current dry-season, and placed themselves in
a better position to continue a long-range struggle
with a reduced force. The cost to themselves would
be substantial, but one they would ultimately have
to pay anyway.
15. If this speculation is correct, then op-
portunities for negotiations would be most likely if
the winter-spring campaign enjoyed unexpected suc-
cesses and would be designed largely to facilitate
acceptance by the Allies of the VC/NVN's major ob-
jectives -- withdrawal of U.S. troops and organi-
zation of a so-called "coalition government" under
the control of the NFLSV. Barring this, the pros-
pects of negotiations to settle the war would de-
pend on the situation prevailing at the particular
time, and the VC/NVN assessment of it. We are un-
able to estimate what this might entail, but both
external and internal factors would be involved.
We do believe, however, that it is unlikely that
the VC/NVN would opt to negotiate unless they
could do so with some aura of success, or at least
the semblance thereof, to place before the world
and their followers. They have already paid too
high a price to negotiate a defeat. We believe
that they would prefer instead to let things drag
on and on at reduced levels, rather than to nego-
tiate under such adverse conditions.
16. In sum, the one conclusion that can be
drawn from all of this is that the war is probably
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nearing a turning point and that the outcome of the
1967-68 winter-spring campaign will in all likelihood
determine the future direction of the war.
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III. The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Position On
Coalition Government
1. The National Front for the Liberation of
South Vietnam (NFLSV) called for the creation of a
coalition government in its original 10-point mani-
festo at the time of its creation in 1960. At the
beginning of 1962, the Communist Lao Dong Party re-
named its component in South Vietnam the People's
Revolutionary Party (PRP) and stated that the imme-
diate task of the PRP was to unite the forces strug-
gling to liberate Vietnam and "to set up a broad
democratic coalition government that will achieve
national independence and democratic freedom." (1)
Although the emphasis on coalition government waxed
and waned during 1963, immediately prior to and
following the fall of the Diem regime the coalition
theme was again stressed. On 11 September 1963,
for example, the NFLSV sent a three-point peace
plan to the United Nations which called for "an end
to American military assistance, withdrawal of Amer-
ican forces, and a coalition government of political
and religious organizations."(2)
2. In retrospect, it appears that Hanoi read
the failure of the NFLSV to take over South Vietnam
at the time of Diem's overthrow as the failure of
political and diplomatic tactics. The "general up-
rising" and "coalition" government themes went into
eclipse, and the military road was taken. Hoc Tap,
North Vietnam's authoritative army journal, stated
in July 1964: "It is necessary to smash the admin-
istrative machinery...This revolution can and should
be settled only by the use of revolutionary acts
and the force of the masses to defeat enemy force.
It absolutely cannot be settled by treaties and
accords.. .It is impossible to count on 'talks' and
'negotiations' as advocated by the modern revision-
ists."(3)
1. Douglas Pike: Viet Cong--The Organization and
Techniges of the National Liberation Front of
South ,-?:etnam.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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3. III 1965, however, U.S. military support
for South Vietnam changed the character of the war.
The 1966 resolution of the Central Office for
South Vietnam (COSVN) -- the Lao Dong 12th Resolu-
tion -- while emphasizing protracted military
struggle, kept the "coalition" option open in
its references to the need to intensify "the front
for national unity" and by calling for a struggle
to "demand the withdrawal of American troops, to
overthrow the lackey regime, and to establish a
national democratic coalition government." As
early as October 1966, there were reports of
interest in reviving the democratic party in antici-
pation of a general attack and a general revolt,
then scheduled for early 1967, which would re-
sult in the formation of a coalition government
in liberated provinces. Courses on the 12th
Resolution for North Vietnamese Army personnel
in September 1966 in Quang Ngai Province included
the disclosure by a lieutenant colonel, political
officer for the school, that "If combat did not
result in a complete VC/NVN victory, it would at
least give the VC/NVN an upper hand when enter-
ing negotiations for a coalition government, to
be held in 1967."
4. Ba Tra, deputy chief of intellectual
proselyting for VC Military Region 4 at the time
of his arrest on 26 May 1967, explained that the
PRP had abandoned the notion of forming a
resistance government and, instead, was concentrat-
ing on a coalition government which would depend
to a large extent on the cooperation of sympathetic
individuals outside of the NPLSV. He claimed that
the idea of a coalition government mentioned in
the 1966 PRP central committee resolution was dis-
seminated to all levels from province committee
up, but was not mentioned to lower levels. Ba
Tra said that the policy of neutralist peace was,
according to the VC/NVN "in keeping with the bal-
ance of forces in the world and in the country
between the two parties." He also added that the
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NFLSV was no longer enough but would give way to
a coalition front wider than the NFLSV which would
back up the coalition government. The important
problem for the VC/NVN, he emphasized, was to con-
trol the lower levels of government, especially
"to tightly grasp the hamlet council which is the
base." The line described by Ba Tra, referred
to below as the 13th Resolution, was formulated
in the fall of 1966 and discussed with the Soviet
Union and Communist China in January 1967. It
was disseminated to COSVN in February 1967. The
major additional clarification of policy was that
North Vietnam formalized its neutral stand in the
Sino-Soviet dispute, and that volunteers would
not be accepted from either the Soviets or the
Chinese. According to Ba Tra, the Lao Dong delega-
tion to Moscow gained immediate Soviet approval
of the resolution, but the delegation to Peking
ran into strong Chinese opposition to North Viet-
nam's acceptance of negotiation as a contingency
policy.
5. In May and June 1967, a series of politi-
cal reorientation courses were held throughout
South Vietnam on the 13th Resolution. At some of
these, guarded references were made to negotiations
and coalition government. There were also oblique
references to the conditions under which the new
policy would be implemented. A notebook captured
in July 1967, for example, describing a study
course held from 7 to 21 May 1967 at which the
COSVN directive was discussed, indicated that the
ultimate objective was a general counter-offensive
and a general uprising. This would be done even
if U.S. troop strength was raised to 600,000 men,
but "changes will be made if the number of U.S.
troops surpasses this limit." Similarly, there
was mention of coalition government, in the sense
of local VC administration linked to non-VC admin-
istration in Saigon -- a common theme as is re-
flected in a captured VC/NvN notebook containing
notes of a June 1967 training course: "Our
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strategy involves the simultaneous conduct of war
and negotiations....Victory will be achieved
through a general offensive uprising....Despite
the existence of a central government, the govern-
mental infrastructure should be in our hands....
Even in the event of peace negotiations, our ef-
forts must be directed toward creating military
and political conditions which favor our subse-
quent general offensive and uprising. If a peace
table materializes, our political attacks will
be targeted at the U.S. and the puppet governments.
Our efforts will then be devoted to the isolation
of the U.S. and acquisition of the sympathy of
the countries of the world. It is imperative
that we hit the enemy harder before engaging in
any negotiations." A document captured on 27
August 1967, otherwise undated, stated: "There
may be a turning point in 1967 because peace nego-
tiations may take place....In order to come to peace
negotiations and negotiate successfully, we should
kill more enemy soldiers, coordinate the three-
pronged attack, and increase diplomatic activities.
That is the only way to obtain peace. On the other
hand, we should admit the fact that negotiations by
no means satisfied our basic purpose. We only re-
gard it as a victory in diplomacy, a sort of strata-
gem in support of our three-pronged attacks and
activities of our legal agents...."
6. The communique published by the extra-
ordinary congress of the NFLSV, which adopted the
new program of the NFLSV on 20 August 1967, called
for a "National Democratic Coalition Government,"
and seems in retrospect to have initiated a new
phase in the treatment of coalition government.
The new program itself did not mention coalition
government as such. In terms of ultimate goals,
insisting on the absolute monopoly of the NFLSV, it
is a "hard line" program, but it did attempt to
broaden the appeal of the Front, with specific
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attention to the sensitivities of "capitalists,"
landlords, intellectuals, and religious communities.
Ralliers questioned about its significance, how-
ever, found little that was new in the program,
and internal, cadre-oriented propaganda concern-
ing the program has been relatively low key in
South Vietnam itself. The "reindoctrination"
courses stress Party resolutions and directives.
Documents captured in November 1967, dated 2
October 1967, still speak of "lack of complete
information" on the new political program of the
NFLSV. According to these documents, how-
ever, the new program should be studied since
it calls for an "anti-American struggle for
national salvation," promotion of peace and neutral-
ity, and confirmation of the NFLSV as the legiti-
mate and sole representative of South Vietnam.
These documents also refer to the mission of the
NFLSV in establishing a democratic coalition
government and state that the "NFLSV political
platform" should be studied in preparation for the
1967-68 winter-spring campaign. In this regard,
it is interesting to note the recent comments of
NVN Premier Pham Van Dong to Le Nouvel Observateur
concerning the requirements for negotiations. (12)
Phath Van Dong stated that NVN's four points of
April 1965 were still in effect, as a basis for a
political settlement, and that unconditional cessa-
tion of all acts of war against NVN was the
condition for initiating talks. To the question,
"And what is the position of the Front?" he
replied, "It has been expounded in a fundamental
and comprehensive manner in its political program
made public last August," and he referred to its
effect on world opinion and to its mobilization
of "all strata" in South Vietnam.
7. Beginning about September 1967, the
concept of a coalition government has been heavily
emphasized by the VC/NVN in the context of their
impending "winter-spring campaign." The breadth
of the appeal and the depth of the indoctrination
concerning it seemed to make a qualitative leap.
A letter dated 18 September 1967 (apparently be-
tween unit commanders -- commo-liaison, command,
12. FBI'S Daily Report, 20 November 196?
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and political problems are also discussed) out-
lined the VC/NVN's goals in late 1967 and early
1968 by stating that: "This is a historical
phase, and the immediate goal for the entire Party
during this phase consists of the withdrawal of U.S.
forces and the forming of a People's Democratic
Coalition Government." Another key document 3.5(c)
contains notes on a reindoctrination course ap-
parently held in September 1967.The notes 3.5(c)
of the course, which covered a 19;7:10SVN resolu-
tion, began with the disarming observation that
"The guidelines of the 12th Resolution remain un-
changed; only the situation is new." The basic
appeal enunciated during the course was that the
VC should "concentrate forces to defeat the enemy
in his limited war and force the establishment of
a People's Democratic Coalition Government with
members of the Front as the nucleus." Apparently
the VC/NVN found grounds for optimism in the course
of the war and the troubles confronting the U.S. at
home and abroad. In any event, the VC/NVN stated
that "From these points, we judge the enemy to be
defeated." During the course, the VC/NVN spelled
out in considerable detail the nature of a coalition
government. The most striking feature was that the
VC/NVN held that "The coalition government may in-
clude a non-revolutionary element as president.
But he must follow the essential line of action as
stipulated by the Front." The VC/NVN appear to
have gone to some length to explain to the cadres
that a coalition government was not a sell-out:
"A coalition government opens the way to attaining
our revolutionary goals. What is important is that
we must have tight control over the government,
the laborers, and agricultural workers. It does
not matter if there are a few notables at the top.
The main lines of the Front's policy must be followed."
In short, the VC stated that "Our party will exer-
cise overall control over it, and if our agents
are firmly established and if they properly carry
out the principal lines of action of the Front, the
Party will lead the revolution to the final objec-
tive...." It was noted that "At first, the cadres
felt anxious when hearing about the coalition gov-
ernment, but after the study, they became aware of
its importance and appeared to be full of confidence."
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8. The VC/NVN also appeared to modify their
stand toward the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the
creation of a coalition government. They stated that:
"The immediate objectives as set forth by the Party
at this time are 'suitable' because the Americans
are being defeated and the puppet forces are deter-
iorating. But we are not strong enough now to deal
them a lethal blow." Moveover, the COSVN resolu-
tion discussed at the reindoctrination session ex-
horted that: "The people's democratic revolution
must not draw a line between its short range objec-
tives and its long range ones, because neutrality
is close at hand. From democratic independence we
move to socialism... .We must take risks and form a
coalition government without having to wait until
the Americans have completely pulled out...."
A troop indoctrination lesson dated 1 September 1967
and captured 25 November 1967 stipulates that the
VC "do not appreciate a neutral regime which is
usually regarded as the third political solution
by capitalists." Rather, the goal is to attain
"not any type of coalition government, but a condi-
tioned one, a coalition government with the key
role to the NFLSV after the withdrawal of U.S.
aggressors, Only such a coalition government will
be able to reunify the country and im lement social-
ism in both parts of the country.
9. The unrealistic military goals of this
"winter-spring campaign" were tied to the establish-
ment of a coalition government in a report from an
official Vietnamese Security Service field office
in Kien Hoa Province, based on a "penetration agent"
who had obtained the information on 24 October 1967:
"During this phase, military victories should be won
to change the actual balance of force and to expand
our scope of control in the countryside. Three
quarters of the actual GVN-controlled areas should
be liberated, and 30 percent of ARVN posts and guard
houses should be crushed in order to enforce the
withdrawal of Allied forces and the establishment
of a coalition government." Another mid.-No-
vember report from an official Vietnamese Security
Service field office in Tay Ninh Province, from a
"regular informant" who had studied the documents
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concerned and discussed them with his superiors, states
that only the first phase of the 1967-68 winter-spring
campaign, for October 1967 to March 1968, has been pre-
pared so far. Plans for the second phase, from April
to June 1968, will be drawn up later "in accordance with
the situation." This This report describes the two im-
mediate targets o the struggle as follows: (1) To
use all forces to weaken the Americans' will to invade
South Vietnam and to force them to pull out of SVN, and
(2) To force the U.S. to accept the Front as the only
representative of the South Vietnamese people and to
form a coalition-democratic-peaceful-neutral government
in which the NFLSV is the principal element. American
troops must be withdrawn, the report continued, and
"The internal problems of South Vietnam must be resolved
by the South Vietnamese people." Admitting that the
VC cannot completely destroy the American troops, the
report stated that causing the U.S. "heavy failures"
will force withdrawal and recognition of the Front.
10. On the subject of negotiations, the VC/NVN
characteristically engaged in a question-and-answer ap-
proach. Thus, they asked: "If the Americans recog-
nize the NFLSV, do we negotiate with them?" The
answer was: "The NFLSV will negotiate, but we will
not neglect our objectives -- the withdrawal of the
American troops during a fixed short period of time
and the formation of a coalition-democratic-peaceful-
neutral government of which the NFLSV is the principal
element....At the central level, the coalition govern-
ment will include elements of all religions and may
include a number of puppet elements. At zone level
there will be limited coalition. At province level,
the coalition government authorities may include, ac-
cording to the local situation, representatives of
the people. At the village level the authority must
be entirely elected by the people. The Party must hold
the people's organizations at this low level in order
to back up the high level in the correct implementation
of Party policy...." In part, the above report seems
to describe in a believable fashion the "layered"
nature of the coalition envisaged by the VC/NVN. The
report, however, then goes on to repeat the unrealistic
military goals of wearing down the U.S., destroying
ARVN, and bringing about a general uprising, adding that
these "three conditiois.out1ine the policy of the Party.
drawn up a year ago."
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11. Despite public statements that the upcoming
U.S. elections make no difference in their war plans,
the VC/NVN appear to put some weight on the elections
in timing their moves. For example, the report from
Tay Ninh states that "Johnson wants to settle the Viet-
nam problem soon so that he can win the election." (20)
This theme is repeated in a recent report from Long
Khanh Province which states that the VC/NVN's purpose
in the winter-spring campaign is to force the U.S. to
approve VC/NVN conditions toward peace negotiations.
The report goes on to add that the VC/NVN believe
that President Johnson will lose in the next elec-
tion and that the new President will not dare con-
tinue the war in Vietnam.
12. It appears that the VC/NVN emphasis on co-
alition government is, at least in part, preparation
for a potential negotiating move. Should they reach
a point, through intensified military action, where
they have made gains -- particularly if they have
inflicted substantial casualties on Allied forces and
expanded VC/NVNIcontrol in the country-side -- the
VC/NVN might conclude that they were in an advantage-
ous bargaining position. Then, in effect, the VC
would be applying the strategy described in a speech
given by North Vietnamese Army General Nguyen Van
Vinh, Deputy Chief of Staff of the NVA, to a meet-
ing of the COSVN Congress in April 1966. From Vinh's
vantage, the war would proceed through (a) the
fighting stage; (b) the stage of fighting while ne-
gotiating; and (c) negotiations and the signing of
agreements. After this, the question of whether war
would resume would depend on the balance of forces.
If Communists could dominate the situation without
war, they would not resort to military tactics anew;
if they could not, they obviously would return to
military action. On the basis of captured
documents, and on the basis of tactical and stra-
tegic considerations as viewed by U.S. military
observers, the "choice point" now seems to be on or
before March 1968.
20.
Ibid.
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13. If talks were held, the minimum initial
demands to be made by the VC/NVN would, on the basis
of the above, probably include (a) a time-table for
the withdrawal of significant portions of U.S.
troops; (b) the continued control of the VC/NVN ad-
ministrative apparatus at local levels where it exists;
and (c) recognition of some members of the Front in
Saigon. In return might be a cessation of hostili-
ties, a withdrawal of a portion of NVA troops (prob-
ably without public admission inasmuch as there has
been no public admission of their presence), and a
qualified avowal of allegiance to the office, if
not the person, of GVN authorities above the province
level. In making these concessions, the VC/NVN would
probably feel that in the ensuing period, and prob-
ably in a relatively brief time, they could bring
about civil disorder of sufficient magnitude to
bring in a government which they could completely
dominate.
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