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July 15, 2019
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July 22, 2019
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Publication Date: 
October 31, 1953
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15677563].pdf245.47 KB
��r � �Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 //) If � SEC TOP S INFORMATION CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. *3 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. [I DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S 0 NEXT REVIEW DATE- /-�0 9 AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE: "Paheir-9. REVIEWER Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CO2970165 /Off 31 October 1953 Copy No. 3.5(c) 4..1. TOP RET SE TY INFORMATION f / 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165 ling# SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) SUMMARY SOVIET ,UNION 1. Soviet medium bombers fly into Poland (page 3). FAR EAST SZBritish propose Korean unification in five stages (page 3). j",Rhee rejects mutual defense pact with Nationalist China (page 4). Yoshida plans drastic action against South Korea (page 5). NEAR EAST - AFRICA 5. Political considerations still impede Iranian oil settlement (page 5). afole Iranian minister of court reportedly may resign (page 6). 33(h)(2) EASTERN EUROPE Call-up of Yugoslav reservists apparently continuing (page 7). -2 3.5(c) 31 Oct 53 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165 ' Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165 Nave 1 lir K.t, I SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) SOVIET UNION Soviet medium bombers fly into Poland! on 28 October at least 14 multi-engine aircraft, probably TU-4 medium bombers, flew from the Second Long Range Air Army bases at Poltava and Zhitomir in the Ukraine to an as yet undetermined air- field in Poland, where they apparently landed. Comment! This flight of TU-4's, the largest yet noted over any European Satellite, may be connected with intensified air training activity which has been noted in the European USSR since mid-October. Together with a recent round-trip flight of nine TU-4's from Zhitomir to eastern Poland, this flight may indicate that Soviet medium bomber training activities, which have been confined to the Soviet Union and in rare instances the adjoining waters, are being extended to eastern Europe. FAR EAST British propose Korean unification in five stages: The British position paper for the Korean political conference calls for establishing a unified and neutralized Korea in five successive stages, according to the Ameri- can embassy in London. The steps would be internationally super- vised elections in all of Korea; establishment of an all-Korean govern- ment; unification; neutralization guarantees by the great powers plus Korea; and finally withdrawal of foreign troops. The paper also states that the UN should resist any proposal by the Communists for the formation of a joint North-South Korea government along the lines they have proposed for Germany. If unification is impossible, the British suggest a modus vivendi to permit withdrawal of at least part of the UN forces and the creation of a buffer zone in central Korea under a joint or neutral commission. 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 31 Oct 53 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165 � Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165 NC I SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) Comment: The latest Communist proposals on Korea and Germany have called for unification through the creation of a joint legislature, which would then formulate plans for "free" elections, and this again seems to be the likely pattern. The Communists may propose, however, that troop withdrawal be accomplished prior to any discussions on unification. Elections to cover all of Korea would be opposed by President Rhee, who insists that the 100 vacant seatig in the South Korean legislature be filled by elections limited to the north. The remaining 150 seats are occupied by assemblymen largely under Rhee's controL 3. Rhee rejects mutual defense pact with Nationalist China: On 29 October President Rhee informed Ambassador Briggs that he had rejected as "impractical" a Chinese Nationalist proposal for a mutual defense treaty be- tween Formosa and South Korea, and had suggested instead a joint statement or declaration to the non-Communist Asian peoples. He told the Chinese emissary that, since the Nationalists "occupy no mainland territory," it made little sense to speak of Nationalist assistance to South Korea and that the latter was too preoccupied with fighting aggression to help the Nationalists invade the mainland. Comment: Chiang had previously stated that since both South Korea and Nationalist China draw their strength from the United States, a bilateral pact would have little value unless It included American guarantees. There is no evidence available to Indicate the reason for this Chinese Nationalist initiative. Both Chiang and Rhee would favor a multi- lateral Pacific pact similar to NATO in which the United States was a party. 4 TOP ET 31 Oct 53 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165 jr.....--erCL.A.0 1 3.5(c) SECURITY INFORMATION 4. Yoshida plans drastic action against South Korea: An official of the Japanese Foreign Ministry 3.3(h)(2) on 30 October made an "urgent secret appeal" to the American embassy for help in dissuading Prime Minister Yoshida from ordering retalia- tion against South Korea for the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels and their crews. He stated that Yoshida had rejected the ministry's advice, and instructed it to prepare plans for the expulsion of the Korean minis- ter and closing of the mission, the use of force, and the arrest of Korean residents in numbers equal to the detained fishermen. These plans would be presented to the cabinet on 3 November. A second official later informed the embassy that Yoshida had already instructed the foreign minister to ask for the Korean minister's recall. Both officials urged immediate American intercession as the only recourse. Comment: Both Japan and Korea have indi- cated to American officials that they desire a renewal of negotiations with Americans participating as official observers. Since preconference concessions probably are a prerequisite for any reasonable assurance of success, drastic Japanese action would seriously jeopardize resumption of the talks. Yoshida's sudden move may be designed to meet expected Diet criticism. NEAR EAST - AFRICA 5. Political considerations still impede Iranian oil settlement: � Prime Minister Zahedi told Ambassador Henderson and Herbert Hoover, Jr. on 28 October that it would be extremely diffi- cult for him to agree to an oil settlement which placed ranian oil production under foreign control. Negotia- tions for reestablishment of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran would be impossible, although Iran might be willing to sell its prod- ucts to a group of distributing companies in which AIOC played a minor role. - 5 - TO CRET 31 Oct 53 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165 Az, SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) Zahedi also emphasized the difficulties he would face if he accepted the formula in force elsewhere in the Near East, which would split the oil profits evenly between Iran and an operating company. The prime minister suggested that it would be easier for the Iranian government if negotiations were carried on through the International Bank rather than directly with a group of operating companies. Comment: Zahedi's approach to the oil negotiations appears to reflect essentially the same political considerations as governed Mossadeq's actions. While Zahedi may be willing to reach an agreement on the basis of a commer- cially feasible arrangement, he would face considerable opposition unless Iranian public opinion were first prepared for it. 6. Iranian minister of court reportedly may resign: Iranian minister of court Hossein Ala may resign because of personal friction with the shah, The shah reportedly reappointed Ala to the post after the fall of Mossadeq in order to "rehabilitate" Ala's prestige, but now wants a less conservative man. Ala Soheili is reportedly being considered for the post. Comment: Hossein Ala, a former Iranian ambassador to the United States, has been a staunch sup- porter of the shah and a capable adviser. Soheili, who has the reputation of being pro-British, was the Iranian ambassador in London in 1950 and 1951 and remained in England after diplomatic relations were broken off. He returned to Iran following Mossadeq's ouster and immediately announced that he was a candidate to succeed Zahedi as prime minister. - 6 - TO RET 31 Oct 53 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165 �410,, 1 U SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) 7. EASTERN EUROPE 8. Call-up of Yugoslav reservists apparently continuing: special commissions have been going from village to village in central Yugoslavia, possibly as late as 27 October, to con- script men, horses and vehicles for military use. Comment Previous reports have indi- cated that the call-up of reservists,n� while extending to various parts of the country, has been concentrated in the northwest area. It has been estimated that as many as 100,000 have already been called up. Yugoslav troop strength in the area around Trieste is currently estimated at 44,000 with an additional 5,000 in Zone B. - 7 - CRETI 31 Oct 53 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2970165