CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/01/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977763
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: January 27, 1960

/-/ � Approved for d ri01E
3.5(c)
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DECLASSIFilli
CLASS. CHMLD TO& Ti I It
NEXT Fir.VIVid 4T14,010
AUTHt Nil 744
DATE!
6 JUN 1980
NEVIEWEti
3.3(h)(2)
27 January 1960
Copy No.
CENTRAL
67
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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27 JANUARY 1960
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Bloc shows displeasure with Qasim; Prague
broadcast attacks Iraqi Communist splint-
er group apparently favored by Qasim. 0
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nehru reportedly considering a meeting
with Chou En-lai over border dispute;
however, any move in this direction prob-
ably awaits results of mid-February talks
with IChrushchev.
Ne Win and Chinese Communists drafting
a boundary "agreement"; although terms
may permit continued Chinese stalling on
final settlement, an "agreement" might
assist Peiping in ettin Nehru - Cho
En-lai talks.
Iraq--Public allegations implicating high
regime officials in October attempt a-
gainst Qasim likely to create new crisis.
French Army in Algiers reportedly re-
fuses to use force against settler insur-
gents; De Gaulle, faced also with threats
of resignation by Soustelle and other min-
isters, calls cabinet meeting for today.
III. THE WEST
�Bolivia- Clash between left- and right-
wing miners leads to mobilization of
rural militia and threat of widespread
violence.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 January 1960
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Sino-Soviet Bloc - Iraq: The first signs of bloc dis-
pleasure with Qasies apparent effort to split Iraqi Com-
munist ranks by supporting a dissident Communist faction
In its bid for legal recognition have appeared in Czech
propaganda. The Czech press and radio on 20 January at-
tacked Qasim indirectly by accusing this Communist splinter
group of conspiring with "right-wing parties" to "disorient
the workers." Moscow, in the past, has used Eastern Euro-
pean propaganda media to convey its reactions on issues
when it prefers not to commit itself directly.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
India - Communist China: risTehru apparently is con-
sidering meeting with Chou En-lai in April or May in an
effort to break the present deadlock in the Sino-Indian bor-
der dispute. Although Nehru has previously insisted that
the Chinese withdraw from Indian-claimed territory and ac
cept the McMahon line as pre-conditions to a ministerial
meeting,, he apparently now intends,
to relax these demands. This shift in posi-
tion probably is tentative pending talks with Khrushchev in
mid-February. It may be the result of advice from his am-
bassadors to Moscow and Peiping, now in Delhi, and may also
reflect additional Soviet persuasive efforts by the Voroshilov-
Kozlov party now touring India. Peiping, which has persistently
called for a top-level meeting to reach "agreement on basic
principles," would view as a concessi7 any such change in
Nehru% positionq (Page 1)
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*Burma - Communist China:
7TeVin's negotiations on the
Sino-Burmese border problem are proceeding smoothly. The
Burmese apparently feel that China has made concessions
and that the remaining differences can be referred to a "joint
commission." A "draft agreement on the boundary and friend-
ship treaty" was expected to be concluded before the Burmese
delegation left Peiping on 28 January. Regardless of the pros-
pect of future Chinese stalling tactics in the joint commission,
the conclusion of an "agreement" would assist Peiping in its
efforts to get a meeting between Nehru and Chou En-lai
Iraq: Chief of State General Rubai, military governor
General Abdi and several high Iraqi security officials have
been accused Col. Mandawi's People's Court of having been
privy to the attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Qasim last
October. Testimony on 25 January by a defendant claimed
that they planned to take over the government following Qasim'
death. These charges, Eyhich may have some substanc_O ar
likely to erestp s new oolitic-al rrisis in the Oasim regime.
quick trip
to Algiers yesterday, reportedly told De Gaulle that the army
in Algeria is no longer reliable and will not use force against
the settler insurgents. The question of using force had split
the French cabinet on 25 January and several ministers who op-
posed such action, including Deputy Premier Soustelle' have
threatened to resign. De Gaulle presumably will have to deal
with these threats at the cabinet meeting scheduled for today.
Soustelle, who had planned to resign yesterday, postponed ac-
tion& assurance from Debi-6 that De Gaulle will state publicly.
--without revoking his declared self-determination policy for
Algeria--that the government will work for the "Frenchificatiorit
of Algeria:1
The "Kiiropean extremists barricaded in downtown Algiers,
meanwhile, have built up their numbers from 1,000 on 24 Jan-
uary to about 4,000, and apparently are counting on the reluctance
of the French army to attack them to induce a statement from De
Gaulle pledging a "French Algeria." (Page 2)
27 Jan 60
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III. THE WE ST
Bolivia: All rural militia units in the Cochabamba
valley of central Bolivia have mobilized, and widespread
violence threatens. Considerable unrest has arisen from
' bitter rivalry between the two wings of the governing Na-
N''
intionalist Revolutionary Movement over selection of pres-
idential and congressional nominees at its convention
15-21 February. This led on 23 January to a violent three-
hour battle in a key mining town between left- and ri ht-
wing factions of the miners' militia.
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27 Jan 60
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL AMA- AFR.TC A
Nehru Considers Meeting' With Chou En-lai 'in April
a'rime Minister Nehru reportedly is considering invit-
ing Chou En-lai to New Delhi just before or just after the
East-West summit meeting in an effort to break the Sino-
Indian border deadlock. The Indian leader is said to be
willing now to relax his demand that the Chinese withdraw
from Indian-claimed territory and accept the McMahon line
before any such ministerial meeting takes placf.
rffhis shift in view is probably tentative, pending discus-
sions with Khrushchev in mid-February and a reassessment
at that time of Indian public opinion. In order to appear re-
sponsive to Khrushchev's advice Or assurances, Nehru might
reply to Peiping's 26 December note with a mere acknowledg-
ment at this time and wait until after the Khrushchev conver-
sations to return his ambassador to Peiping to make arrange-
ments for the meetin_e,
kiehru's reported shift regarding pre-conditions may be
the result of advice he received from his ambassadors to
Peiping and Moscow. It may also reflect additional persua-
sive efforts by the Voroshilov-Kozlov party now in India. Any
announcement indicating such a shift in Nehru's thinking would
be widely criticized within India as a retreat from a just posi.,
tioN
be Chinese, who have persistently called for a top-level
meeting unfettered by any "prior conditions" which would hamper
their bargaining position, would regard such a shift by Nehru
as a concession. Chou has already implied that "activities
hostile to Sino-Indian friendship" might preclude India as a site
and expressed a preference for meeting in some third coun-
try, possibly Burma_13
27 Jan 60
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L-IVI 16.1-4
Nosy Noof
French Army Reportedly Refuses to Use Force Against
Algerian Settlers
kremier Debra and Minister of the Armed Forces Guil-
laumat, following their visit to Algiers on 26 January, re-
portedly told De Gaulle that the army in Algeria was no longer
reliabi
the premier told General Challe that he had orders to fly in
security companies from France to clear out the insurgent-
occupied areas of Algiers; a paratroop general warned Debre�
however, that the army would not permit these companies to
use force against the insurgents:]
The European extremists barricaded in downtown Algiers,
meanwhile, have built up their numbers from 1,000 on 24 Jan-
uary to about 4,000, and appear to be procuring supplies from
outside the barricades. They are apparently counting on the
reluctance of the French Army to attack them to induce a state-
ment from De Gaulle pledging a "French Algeria." Demonstra-
tions in sympathy with the Algiers insurgents have taken place
in numerous Algerian cities, including Oran, Bone, and Con-
stantine; none of these appear to have gotten out of control,
however, and rightists in outlying areas will probably be gov-
erned by the outcome in Algiers.
The US Consul General in Algiers reported on 26 January
that most French authorities there believe it is now clear that
it would be impossible to apply the self-determination policy for
Algeria announced by De Gaulle on 16 September, Marshal Juin
is reported to have urged De Gaulle to modify _his policy at least
to the extent of assuring the European settlers they will not
be "left in the lurch" by the French government
Debra yesterday
assured Soustelle, who together with several other cabinet mem
bers had threatened to resign, that De Gaulle will state pub-
licly--though without revoking his self-determination policy--
that the French government and people desire and will work for
the "Frenchification" of Algerifl,
In view of the French cabinet's split on 25 January on the
question of using force against the settler insurgents, De Gaulle
may be obliged to give such assurances to avoid the collapse of
27 Jan 60
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the Debra government. Such a gesture would probably satisfy
most of the military dissidents and influence them to try to per-
suade the settler insurgents to abandon their barricades. Pre-
mier Debra, in his appeal to the settlers to lay down their armss,
cited De Gaulle's earlier explanation that the entire military,
economic, and social program being carried out in Algeria is
designed to ensure the permanence of French presence there.
As a further compromise gesture, De Gaulle might elaborate
on the reference to partition he made in his 16 September speech
announcing his self-determination plan.
An alternative for De Gaulle would be to invoke the provi-
sions of the constitution which gives the president full powers
in a national emergency. He might accompany any such action
with announcement of a plan to go to the people in a referendum
to seek long-term dictatorial powers. Even with such a dra-
matic gesture, however, he would still face the problem of
imposing his will on the army.
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III. THE WEST
Widespread Violence Threatens in Bolivia
All rural militia units in the Cochabamba valley of cen-
tral Bolivia have mobilized, and widespread violence threat-
ens. Considerable unrest has arisen from bitter rivalry
between the two wings of the governing Nationalist Revolu-
tionary Movement (MNR) over selection of presidential and
congressional nominees at its convention 15-21 February.
This led on 23 January to a violent battle in the mining town
of Huanuni� formerly a stronghold of the IVINR right wing but
now in control of Communist-led miners. Celestino Gutierrez,
leader of the right-wing miners, was lynched, ten others were
killed, and 32 were injured.
American Ambassador Strom notes that the violent death
of Gutierrez will intimidate all anti-Communist labor leaders
if moderate President Siles allows it to go unpunished. &les,
however, has thus far ordered the armed forces to keep out of
Huanuni. Followers of right-wing leader Guevara are press-
ing him to resign as foreign minister over the incident, but he
has thus far insisted he cannot leave his post on the eve of
Mexican President Lopez Mateos' visit beginning 30 January.
CONFIDENTIAL
27 Jan 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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No#
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Expcutive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
� The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
� Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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