CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/10/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977791
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: October 14, 1960

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14 October 1960
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
74
IVIELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO, Pt"
NO �MANGE PLASS. X
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NEXT REVIEW DATE: JOAO
AUTH: HR 104
DATE:
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14 OCTOBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR--Central committee reportedly to
meet today.
new
phase of violent guerrilla warfare in South
Vietnam.
Iranian "good-will mission" may go to
Moscow, but Tehran officials claim no
political agreement involved.
UAR--Nasir goes to Syria to cope with
cabinet crisis involving Sarraj.
Libyan Parliament attacks corruption of
Kubar government; no-confidence vote up
for debate.
Congo�Situation in Leopoldville continues
uneasy; Lumumba's African allie
wr,rkincr town rri h .s restoration.
Laos--Government decides to move to
Luang Prabang; may seek Soviet loan if
US aid not forthcoming.
�Japan- Ikeda government seeks to avoid
isolation from neutral Afro-Asians; press
calls for "independent" foreign policy.
III. I"' F. WEST
()Tensions in France over Algeria encnur
age rightist plotting against De Gaulle
�Argentine crisis eased but not yet re-
solved.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 October 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: A Soviet party central committee meeting has
been Tined for 14 October, according to the Polish Embassy
counselor in Washington. Khrushchev is expected to arrive
back in Moscow late that afternoon. In any event, some high-
level party meeting is almost certain to take place following
his return to Moscow, presumably to consider events at the
UN and to discuss tactics toward China at the forthcoming
bloc meeting in November. The dlsturb1n situation in
agriculture might also be brought up. Page 1)
North - South Vietnam: North Vietnam in late August or-
dered Communist guerrilla units in South Vietnam into a new
phase of "violent" warfare.
--in-
structs these units to "wreak havoc.. .annihilate .. wipe out
... and assassinate." Hanoi bases
its instruction on an assessment that "the revolution has en-
tered a critical stage... we have a greater capability than the
enemy." During September, following the issuance of this or-
der, several Communist attacks were conducted in a region
previously quiescent. _Prior to its issuance, North Vietnamese
spokesmen, convinced that the internal situation in South
Vietnam was moving rapidly against President Diem, told In-
dian and Canadian officials that Diem's regime would be top-
pled by April 1961. (Page 2)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
*Iran.. USSR : Wan may send a good-will mission to the
Soviet Union in the near future to discuss economic relations
between the two countries. However, in discussions with US 7
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Cand British officials, the Shah and other Iranian officials
insist that no political agreements or statements will be
made.
The Shah has been anxious to make some gesture to
placate the USSR without endangering his CENTO position
or the Iranian-US bilateral treaty. Continued efforts by
the Soviet Union to obtain political concessions from Iran
will probably be largely unsuccessful as long as the Shah
retains his confidence in Western support
VAR: Nasir
intended to go to Syria either that night or
the following morning to attend to a "serious crisis in the *-14.4
Syrian cabinet revolving around Sarraj." The cabinet fric-
t' ons which led to the shake-up of 20 September, in which
literior Minister Sarraj seemed to gain strength by his ap-
pointment as cabinet chairman, apparently have not ended.
14asir now may be faced again with the problem of risking
continued dissension by defending the unpopular Sarraj, on
whom he depends for the strict control of internal security
in Syria'
Libya: Opposition pressures have built up further as
a result of parliamentary assaults on corruption in Prime
Minister Kubar's government. If, in the face of this oppo-
sition, King Idris persists in retaining Kubar and other
ministers, a situation threatening the monarchy itself may
develop. The normally supine Libyan lower house has voted
overwhelmingly to demand cancellation of the contract for
construction of the Fezzan road�a major economic devel-
opment project--and to have scandals investigated by a par-
liamentary committee. A vote of no confidence, which has
the backing of a majority of the lower house, is to be de-
bated on 18 October. (Page 4)
14 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Republic of the Congo: Colonel Mobutu's 13 October
statement that he will not attempt to arrest Lumumba
so long as he remains in his residence may preserve the
uneasy political equilibrium in Leopoldville. There is
speculation in Leopoldville that Mobutu may reconvene
parliament with a view, to stripping Lumumba of his par-
liamentary immunity. UN officials have stated that Lu-
mumba cannot be legally arrested until such action is
taken. ,
UAR Ambassador Glialeb in Leopoldville continues to
urge on UN representative I7,val policies designed to re-
store Lumumba as premier. he
has characterized Dayal as favoring a reconciliation among
Lumumba, Katanga President Tshombe, and other anti-
Lumumba factions exclusive of President Kasavubu. Dayal
reportedly advocates the reopening of parliament in the be-
lief, that anti-Lumumba sentiment among the deputies might
be neutralized by prior reconciliation between Lumumba and
certain of his opponents.
Dayal agreed that a cabinet reshuffle by Lumumba prior
to the convening of parliament would "gather the deputies
around Lumumba acrain pvean if Hip imnerialists attembt
tt hrihn thcim
'
tober to move the government to Luang Prabang, reportedly
within the next ten days. The cabinet also reportedly deter-
mined that Laos would seek a loan from the USSR if the United
States did not give aid for the armed forces and the police.
Soviet Ambassador-designate Abramov arrived in Vientialie
on 13 October as scheduled. Page 5)
e
Japan: �The Ikeda government is re-examining its rela-
tionship with the neutral Afro-Asian nations to avoid being
isolated from them. The Japanese press is stressing the y
growing prominence of the Asian-African bloc in the United -6,-A-cc.,
69 (<
14 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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(_Nations as a third force which offers Japan a positive alter-
native for independence from both the Soviet and the United
tates power blocs. The press is urging that Japanese
iplomacy be more independent and that it adopt what the
ress terms a more "realistic" position on the admission
f Communist China to the UN
Page 6)
III. THE WEST
France: Rising tensions in France over the continuing
stalemate on Algeria are encouraging extreme rightists to
plan for early action against the Fifth Republic. Possibly
the most serious of a number of recently reported plots
links Jacques Soustelle with several military officers prom-
inent in the May 1958 Algerian coup. The plotters envisage
seizing be Gaulle and are preparing plans to take over key
government ministries. The existence of such plotting is
known to security officials, but even some of these are re-
ported involved.
rEx-Premier� Pinay, whom some of the plotters hope to
make De Gaulle's successor, is playing down the likelihood
of a military seizure of power, but has warned US officials
that the political situation is deteriorating rapidly.
(Page 7)
*Argentine Situation: �President Frondizi has not yet
fully resolved the crisis sparked on 11 October by an army
demand that he change some of his advisers and policies. The
crisis was eased on 12 October by his radio appeal for public
support of constitutional government and by subsequent mil-
itary communiques endorsing constitutional procedures, but
some difficulties may arise from negotiations over the army
demands and from probable shifts in some army commands.
Army Commander in Chief General Carlos Toranzo Montero,
probably the army's most influential general, retains his post,
14 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
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he was ex-
cluded from a meeting of army chiefs on the evening of
12 October, and Toranzo considers this tantamount to
being relieved of command.
IV . SIL/IN IL:AIN LN'ILIiNSr
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Nato Country Reactions to Certain Forms of US Nuclear
Assistance, viz, Aid to the French Nuclear Weapons Program
Through Transfer of Information and Materials, or Outright
Transfer to France of US Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Sys-
tems, or US Support for Creation of a Multilateral NATO Nu-
clear Capability. SNIE 20-2-60. 11 October 1960.
14 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF
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'NOW' *NO
Soviet Central Committee Reported Ready to Convene
A Soviet party central committee meeting has been called
for 14 October, according to the counselor of the Polish Em-
bassy in Washington. A meeting of the Russian Republic Su-
preme Soviet, originally scheduled for 18 October, was post-
poned until the 25th, possibly to permit scheduling of a party
gathering. Khrushchev is expected to arrive home late in the
afternoon of 14 October, leaving him very little time for con-
sultations if a meeting convenes on that date. In any case, a
high-level party conclave is almost certain to take place
following his return to Moscow.
The urgent problem presented by the further deterioration
in Sino-Soviet relations over the past month while Khrushchev
was in New York would appear to be a necessary subject for re-
view soon after his return. There are reliable reports that a
preparatory committee for the forthcoming world Communist
meeting to be held during the November anniversary celebration
will convene this month. Hungarian party chief Kadar is appar-
ently returning to Moscow with Khrushchev, suggesting that he
will participate in preparing a position on intra-bloc problems.
A great deal of other unfinished business awaits Khru-
shchev's return. He has been outside the USSR since 9 Sep-
tember and away from Moscow for almost two thirds of 1960.
The disturbing situation in agriculture, for instance, is another
likely subject for discussion.
There is no indication how Khrushchev's New York venture
is being interpreted among his presidium colleagues; his per-
sonal conduct of foreign policy might be subject to some criticism.
Soviet press coverage of his trip, however, has portrayed him as
the single most outstanding world leader today and an "indefat-
igable fighter for peace."
14 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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North Vietnam Orders Violent Guerrilla Warfare
In South Vietnam
Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam have been or-
dered by Hanoi into a new phase of "violent" warfare. North
Vietnamese instructions to "wreak havoc, annihilate, wipe
nut_ and assassinate"
anoi '5
assessment of the internal political and security situation in
the South --an assessment that "we have a greater capability
than the enemy. . . . We will jolt him until he is destroyed."
Local South Vietnamese administrative officials are specifi-
cally marked for assassination.
The campaign of terror outlined is part of
a two-pronged military-political offensive and is intended to
culminate in revolution. At the North
Vietnamese party congress in early September, Le Duan, sec-
ond only to Ho Chi Minh in party rank and a former guerrilla
leader in the south, detailed the political aspects calling for a
broad united front against South Vietnam's President Diem. As
envisioned by Hanoi, this front would combine Communist and
non-Communist opposition elements in the South to overthrow
Diem and establish a coalition government:Communists re-
cently have been reported making overtures to South Vietnamese
dissatisfied with Diem, I and, as part of its political effort, Hanoi
has tried to set South Vietnamese business interests against Diem
by offering a trade agreement sure to be rejected by Saigon.
North Vietnam's top political general, writing at the same
time as the party congress, gave an ideological justification for
guerrilla violence.CIn early August, North Vietnamese spokes-
men told Indian and Canadian officials that Diem would be top-
pled from within by April 1961, when elections are scheduled to
be held in South Vietnami
The Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam, who have been
estimated to number about 5,000 but who may be adding to their
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numbers. have sharnlv intensified activity since late 1959.
During the same period, the
number of clandestine Communist radio stations in South
Vietnam with direct links to Hanoi has tripled. The expan-
sion, chiefly in the southernmost part of the country, con-
tinued during September, and communications have in-
creased significantly in recent weeks.
President Diem plans to step up military countermeas-
ures; a worsening of the security situation would further abet
the political discontent he faces in urban as well as rural
areas. Recently he failed to take advantage of an opening ad-
dress to the National Assembly to propose any administrative
or social reforms callm_f_n_r_hu-r-nrciP�aovernment as well as
opposition elements.
14 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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Further Pressure in Libyan Parliament for Removal
Of Kubar Government
Public and parliamentary opposition to the Kubar govern-
ment in Libya has sharply increased following the exposure of
flagrant corruption among high-level officials. Indignation has
focused on a new facet of the scandal connected with government
financing of the Fezzan road project--a scandal in which Prime
Minister Kubar is implicated, along with Abdullah Abid, a mem-
ber of the ruling Senussi family. This affair caused sharp crit-
icism in the press last month, and a majority of the members of
Parliament signed a petition requesting King Idris to call an ex-
traordinary session.
The King, who in July had sent a letter to government offi-
cials calling for action to stamp out corruption, ordered Par-.
liament to reconvene on 3 October. Shortly, before the session
began he replaced four cabinet ministers but retained Kubar and
others involved in the scandals. After two preliminary meetings,
the House of Deputies on 10 October voted overwhelmingly in fa-
vor of a resolution demanding cancellation of the road contract
and calling for a full investigation by a parliamentary committee.
A majority of house members also backed a resolution for a vote
of no confidence in the Kubar government. In line with constitu-
tional provisions, this is to be debated in a subsequent session
scheduled for 18 October.
If the King ignores Parliament or orders it dissolved and
continues support of Kubar, he will risk a further build-up of
antigovernment pressures endangering the monarchy itself. While
Libyan security forces appear capable of controlling any imme-
diate antigovernment moves or demonstrations, an issue has been
created in which a number of diverse groups may be able to find
common around for an eventual attempt to overthrow the regime.
CONFIDENTIAL
14 Oct 60
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The Situation in Laos
Premier Souvanna Phouma and his ministers, at a cabinet
meeting on 12 October, decided to move the government from
Vientiane to the royal capital at Luang Prabang. Minister of
Finance Inpeng was instructed to make the necessary arrange-
ments for the move, expected to be completed within ten days.
He was also instructed to arrange for the transfer of funds in
the National Bank to Luang Prabang. Various Lao leaders in
Vientiane have been considering such a move for some time as
a means of getting out from under the immediate influence of
Captain Kong Le, of drawing the King into more active partici-
pation in government deliberations, and of providing General
Phoumi with a face-saving alternative to Vientiane should he de-
cide to drop his opposition to the government.-
1.4t the same meeting, the cabinet reportedly also determined
that it would seek a loan from the USSR if the United States failed
to give aid for the armed forces and the police. Soviet Ambas-
sador-designate Abramov arrived in Vientiane -on 13 October as
scheduled. According to the press, his arrival was the occasion
for an airdrop demonstration by Kong Le's 2nd Paratroop Battalion.
The Thai acting foreign minister's announcement in Bangkok
that the Thai Embassy has been instructed to evacuate all Thai
nationals from Laos as soon as possible is likely to lead to addi-
tional tension with the Souvanna government. Premised on the
assertions that the situation was worsening and that civil war was
inevitable, Bangkok's action will probably be construed by Sou-
vanna as another effort to discredit his regime. Implementation
of the evacuation order will probably be limited largely to Thai
nationals in Vientiane; neither government is believed to have ac-
curate information on the location of Thais in other parts of Laos.
reports the existence of scattered opposition by district chiefs
to the Pathet Lao there. Resistance to the Pathet Lao is prob-
ably still largely unorganized, however, and the Pathet Lao ap-
pear to exercise firm control over Sam Neua town and Muong
Peun to the Southwest. Meanwhile, the Laotian Army has report-
edly launched a counter-offensive to regain territriry Inca- th the
Pathet Lao in southeastern Phong Saly Province.
� SECRET
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Neutralist Sentiment Gaining Strength in Japan
LThe Ikeda government is re-examining its relationships
with the Afro-Asian nations. The Japanese press is stress-
ing that Tokyo has unrealistically supported the US in the cur-
rent session of the UN General Assembly and risks being iso-
lated from the growing third-force movement as represented
by the Afro-Asian bloc. Publications are asserting that a sub-
stantial third force is emerging, citing as evidence the increase
of the Afro-Asian bloc from 29 to 46 members in the UN and
the resolution sponsored by five neutral nations calling for di-
rect negotiations between President Eisenhower and Premier
Khrushchev.
Newspapers state that on the issue of war and peace, nations
whic do not belong to the Western or Communist camps need no
longer accept "the fate forced on them by the big two." Editori-
als are urging that Japan's future diplomacy, inside and outside
the UN, be more independent and that particularly on the ques-
tion of Communist China's admission to the UN, Japan adopt a
"realistic" position.
At the same time, the Japanese Socialists have hailed the
British Labor party conference's call for a renunciation of nu-
clear weapons and its criticism of NATO as strengthening their
own neutralist policy. These developments have given new re-
spectability to the Socialists' neutralist doctrine as they prepare
for elections to the lower house of the Diet next month.
Japanese neutralist sentiment already is believed to have
gained considerable ground as a result of the crisis surround-
ing ratification of the new US-Japanese security treaty earlier
this year. Undoubtedly, a large measure of Japanese "neutral-
ist" sentiment stems from a noticeable revival of national pride,
which is chafing from alleged "subservience" to the US.
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Rightist Plotting Against De Gaulle
1,flising apprehensions in France over the continuing stale-
mate on Algeria are..encouraging extreme rightists to plan for
early action against the Fifth Republic. French public opinion
on Algeria is becoming increasingly polarized between leftists,
who are pressing De Gaulle to negotiate with the Algerian rebels,
and rightists, who are determined to keep Algeria French. Both
the elements are angered by De Gaulle's refusal to abandon his
policy of self-determination for Algeria, and general opposition
to some of his major economic and foreign policies is mounting. \
The most serious recently reported plot links Jacques Sous-
telle to a number of military officers�including Generals Salan
and Jouhaud and Colonels Godard and Trinquier--who were prom-
inent in the May. 1958 coup in Algiers. Until his break with De
Gaulle at the time of the January insurrection, Soustelle was re-
garded with suspicion by such officers. The Soustelle-military
group claims to have a 40-man ex-paratrooper commando force
ready to rush the Elysee Palace, official residence of the French
President, and seize De Gaulle. The plotters also have a com-
mittee, including officers with extensive security experience,
working out plans to seize key government ministries. The tim-
ing of any such moves would depend on when liaison between metro-
politan France and Algeria has sufficiently organized army and
rightist groups.
police and administrative centers
in Paris are so located and staffed that a take-over would be pos-
sible with relatively small effort, if skillfully timed and coordi-
nated. The existence of current plotting against the regime is known
to French security officials, but even some of these have been re-
ported involved. /
Ox-Premier Antoine Pinay, ousted as finance minister by
De Gaulle in January and regarded by some plotters as the pos-
sible head of a successor regime, is playing down the likelihood
of a military seizure of power. However, he has warned US of-
ficials that France has reached an impasse over Algeria and that
the Political situation in France has "deteriorated rapidly."
SEC
14 Oct 60
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*me Rightist
-
Rightist Plotting Against De Gaulle
Rising apprehensions in France over the continuing stale-
mate on Algeria are.encouraging extreme rightists to plan for
early action against the Fifth Republic. French public opinion
on Algeria is becoming increasingly polarized between leftists,
who are pressing De Gaulle to negotiate with the Algerian rebels,
and rightists, who are determined to keep Algeria French. Both
� the elements are angered by De Gaulle's refusal to abandon his
policy of self-determination for Algeria, and general opposition
to some of his major economic and foreign policies is mounting.
The most serious recently reported plot links Jacques Sous-
telle to a number of military officers�including Generals Salan
and Jouhaud and Colonels Godard and Trinquier�who were prom-
inent in the May 1958 coup in Algiers. Until his break with De
Gaulle at the time of the January insurrection, Soustelle was re-
garded with suspicion by such officers. The Soustelle-military
� group claims to have a 40-man ex-paratrooper commando force
ready to rush the Elysee Palace, official residence of the French
President, and seize De Gaulle. The plotters also have a com-
mittee, including officers with extensive security experience,
working out plans to seize key government ministries. The tim-
ing of any such moves would depend on when liaison between metro-
politan France and Algeria has sufficiently organized army and
rightist groups.
police and administrative centers
in Paris are so located and staffed that a take-over would be pos-
sible with relatively small effort, if skillfully timed and coordi-
nated. The existence of current plotting against the regime is known
to French security officials, but even some of these have been re-
ported involved.
Ex-Premier Antoine Pinay, ousted as finance minister by
De Gaulle in January and regarded by some plotters as the pos-
sible head of a successor regime, is playing down the likelihood
of a military seizure of power. However, he has warned US of-
ficials that France has reached an impasse over Algeria and that
the nolitical situation in France has "deteriorated rapidly."
14 Oct Oct 60
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NV 11-1L41 `f I It7.L.NV,
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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