CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/10/19

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02977795
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
March 17, 2020
Document Release Date: 
March 26, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 19, 1960
File: 
Body: 
Approved / TOP SECRET 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 19 October 1960 uopy No. C t) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN ,gt3T� 44:k ifs EVIEWEii -T-OP-SEGRET- 1WWWZMW7i ern, Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO29777950 er/Z/Z/ZWZrZZ, Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977795 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977795 4��� ����� 8././ Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977795 19 OCTOBER 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC II. ASIA-AFRICA South Vietnamese cabinet changes an- nounced yesterday seem insufficient to stop growth of political opposition to Diem regime. Situation in Laos. Qasim again reported target of assassina- tion and coup plots in Iraq. Nasir's pleas for "unity" and personal at- tacks on Husayn suggest he is genuinely concerned over separatist sentiment in Syria; Amman reported uneasy, with expectations of further serious UAR- Jordan trouble. 0 Power struggle in newly independent Gabon could lead to "complete breakdown of authority" there. Situation in the Congo. Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977795 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977795 Ski CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 19 October 1960 DAILY BRIEF I THE COMMUNIST BLOC II. ASIA-AFRICA South Vietnam: The cabinet reshuffle announced yester- day apparently represents a gesture by President Diem toward meeting some of the criticism from within and without govern- ment circles over his authoritarian leadership. It is also pos- sible, however, that Diem may take this opportunity to remove officials critical of him. In any event, the changes announced, which affect four ministries, do not suggest any intention by Diem to relax his personal control over certain key ministries or any significant weakening of the influence of his chief political ad- viser, his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. Unless Diem is prepared to follow up with more sweeping measures to win public support, the political opposition to his regime will probably continue to grow. (Page 1) Laos:CKing Savang now seems more likely to intervene di- rectly in the political crisis in Laos. According to Defense Secretary General Ouane, Savang will shortly proclaim himself "supreme commander" and make public a letter of resignation already sent by Ouane to Premier Souvanna Phouma. The King and Ouane seem to be hoping that this will pave the way for Sou- vannais resignation and the establishment of a military regime. Ouane also states that Souvanna is requesting, through the So- viet delegation now in Vientiane, the return of the International Supervisory and Control Commission to LaosTil (Page 2) Iraq: Anti-Communist civilian and army elements in Iraq, believing Prime Minister Qasim has shifted to the left in recent weeks, are reported to be planning action against him in the near TOP SECRET AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977795� /j/ .�/ A, (t), , /"F 'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977795 % ituf-T-OP-SE-CLRET- future. One civilian Arab nationalist group is said td,be plotting to kill him by destroying his car with bazooka fireT1 at the same time, some disgruntled army officers alleg- edly are planning a coup. Qasim has weathered several coup attempts and one assassination effort. (Page 3) UAR-Jordan: During his current visit to Syria, UAR (0/< President Nasir is using sharp personal attacks on Jordan's King Husayn in an effort to bolster the flagging enthusiasm in Syria for the Egyptian-Syrian union. Nasir's demagogic tactics and repeated pleas,2for "unity" suggest he is genu- inely concerned over the growing separatist feeling in the UAR's Northern Region. gri Jordan, Nasir's attacks on Husayn have aroused a popular pro-Nasir reaction among Arabs of Palestinian West Jordan. Amman is reported uneasy, with expectations of further serious Jordan-UAR trouble. Husayn, meanwhile, has sought increased British assistance to stave off an im- endin financial crisis in the Jordanian Army} (Page 4) Gabon: Gabon, one of the eight French Community states c7.A1 which became independent in August, is in the throes of an in- ternal struggle for power which could, the American charge ,a,ctek-4-0--,0-6 in Brazzaville reports, lead to a "complete breakdown of au- thority." Although information from this country is sparse, the position of conservative, pro-French President Leon M'Ba reportedly is being strongly challenged by influential elements within his regime headed by National Assembly, President Gondiout and Foreign Minister Gustave Anguile. (Page 6) (Map) *Republic of the Congo: Although the political stalemate in Leopoldville continues, UN officials' protection of Lumumba has tended to erode Mobutu's position. Recent setbacks for Mobutu include UN representative Dayal's refusal to oust Lu- mumba from the premier's residence in Leopoldville,Cas well 19 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF ii -TOP-SECRET ;Ap�p�rzzo�v�eTI/TWka";;;. 2E0/03/13 CO2977795r , , Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977795 TOP SECR Nage as UN Under Secretary Bunche's stated hope that "in a matter of weeks" the Congolese parliament might be re- convened and a government created "which the UN could support:2 Mobutu stated on 17 October his opposition to a reconvening of parliament and his intention continuin7 "army rule" at least until the end of the year. 19 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET 111 AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977795 A Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977795 J.EL:Itt 1 Nor' �No/ Cabinet Reshuffle in South Vietnam The cabinet reshuffle announced in Saigon on 18 October appears to be a gesture by President Diem to deal with dis- satisfaction in and out of government circles over the worsen- ing security situation and over his own authoritarian rule. New appointments to the defense and interior ministries, coupled with plans to reinforce military intelligence and command func- tions, are probably meant to strengthen the campaign against the Communist guerrillas; changes in the information and jus- tice ministries are probably aimed more broadly at political discontent. The changes, however, do not suggest any intention by Diem to relax his tight control or to weaken the role of his brother and chief political adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, a primary target of crit- icism. Diem's retention of the defense post for himself and his tendency to control provincial appointments through instructions to the Ministry of Interior may deny effective authority to the new appointee:sy_AlSoc, the information ministry is to be replaced by a directorate-general, presumably to function under the pres- idential secretary, raising doubt that the replacement of the responsible minister will result in the reforms of censorship and control demanded by Diem's critics. The ministerial chang- es are among several long sought by Ngo Dinh Nhu, who had been under sharp criticism from the previous incumbents. As such, they may be the prelude to further moves by Nhu to remove his opponents in the government. Unless Diem is prepared to follow up the reshuffle with broa er measures to combat rural discontent and to open up channels for responsible criticism, political opposition will probably continue to grow. sweeping changes in Diem's military as well as civilian entourage were needed to prevent the collapse of the overnment. if so inclined, he could take over the government ours with his own troops:- -SECRET_ 19 Oct 60 CFNTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977795 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977795 SECI