CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/10/20

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977796
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: October 20, 1960

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20 October 1960
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
TELLIGENCE
BULLFTIN
DOCUMENT NO. V3
NO iN CLASS.
fJ
TO: IS $
1.1ATE:
ALITli: 1416 TO-2
A a JUN
DAT 75),?rinEyiEwERI
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1 ur SLUKET Alw
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20 OCTOBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev, talking with Turkish foreign
minister at UN, proposed mutual military
withdrawal from common frontier, .men-
tioned possibility of large-scale Soviet
aid to Turkey.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in Laos.
Cypriot officials voice concern over coun-
try's economic problems; Vice President
Kuchuk expresses fear government may
be forced to accept Soviet aid.
Leaders of former French territories in
Black Africa to meet in Ivory Coast next
week; conference will focus largely on
Algerian problem.
THE WEST
0
Castro says he believes Sino-Soviet bloc
will win East-West ideological struggle
and hence it is necessary for him to
align Cuba with the Communist countries.�
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, \
�Training of Cuban pilots in Czechoslo-
vakia
another shipment of military cargo
from Soviet bloc to Cuba noted; Havana
reportedly plans recognition of East Ger-
man regime.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
20 October 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Turkey:C_Khrushchev, during a meeting with
Turkish Foreign Minister Sarper at the UN, suggested that
the USSR and Turkey withdraw military forces several hun-
dred kilometers from their common border and allow in-
spection of the demilitarized zone, ,He also mentioned the
possibility of large-scale Soviet aid to Turkey. The pro-
posal for a military withdrawal is similar to one made to
Iran in July, which the Shah rejected. While Moscow prob-
ably does not expect Ankara either to accept such a special
military arrangement, the proposal follows other Soviet ef-
forts to encourage closer ties with the new Turkish regime,
including several letters from Khrushchev, suggestions for
increased contacts, and offers of economic aidj
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: The Pathet Lao agreement on 18 October to turn
back Sam Neua Province to government control fulfills a
precondition set by Premier Souvanna for substantive talks.
Government control of the province, however, will likely be
only nominaL Pathet Lao terms for an over-all settlement--
which include a coalition government and integration of armed
elements�probably represent a maximum bargaining position.
It is likely that the immediate aim of the Pathet Lao is to re-
sume legitimate political activity so as to take advantage of the
present situation. (Page 1)
Cyprus: Cypriot officials are expressing concern over the
country's mounting economic problems and the possibility of
Soviet moves to exploit the situation. Rumors that the USSR is
I.
II
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about to offer over
ziiderable. discueesion
Vice Presidentlaeeiee,,.
fears that the count:::
prepa7anda may force
-for more Western aid
�
(Page 3)
"French" Africre-,
fere-Ince Lai former 21
scheduled to convene �:1e
October, will focus la -
may result in the namir
Gaulle a "liberal
or:L;anized by Ivory Cca
...tects the mounting cone::.
can leaders over the
may make it impossille
the Algerian issue CO211.: .7
ican Embassy in Paris
and possibly entirely,
not maintain solidarity _
in aid have aroused con
:es and official circles.
. 0.-..eereee:ed to a US offacial.
.7,1.!d the continuing Soviet
7overnment,-which would ore- -
accept Soviet assistance.
ace: The "summit" con-
ter�tories in Black Africa,
Ivery Coast at Abidjan on 24
ce the Algerian problem, and
e'ielegation to urge on De
in "--,eria. This conference,
.reee,ier Houphouet-Boigny, re
ce: many French-speaking Afri-
ect �hat nationalist pressures
thcrn to support France when
ei a vote in the UN. The Amer-
.317C3 France may cut drastically,
Inacial aid to states which do
o it. (Page 4)
I -2:1:r. , TIE', WEST
Cuba: Fidel Castro
"Eilieves capitaI a s e.i its way out aria that the
United States is "finish: as a great power. Stating that he
had no intention of leti.ire:- up in his attacks on the United States,
he expressed confidence chat the Sino-Soviet bloc would win to-
day's ideological strurejtle, and said it was therefore necessary
for him to align Cuba with the Communist countries. Althougn
Castro admitted that the general economic situation in Cuba
was "bad' he praised the operations of the Cuban Petroleum
Institute undpr th guidarce of "excellent" Soviet technicians.
) (Page 5)
20 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF
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400
IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of findinr7, by its Watch Committee, the
United States Intelligence oard concludes that:
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc c�.',:.ntry intends to initiate hos-
tilities against the United States or its possessions
in the immediate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to ini-
tiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US
20 Oct 60 �
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llies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the imme-
diate future.
There have been no significant new developments in
the Berlin situation in the past week.
C. Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/
Communist hostilp artinn enntinnP fn axial- in Lana and
South Vietnam
.-
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DAILY BRIEF iv
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I I nuivi
The Situation in Laos
The Pathet Lao agreement, signed in Vientiane on 18 Oc-
tober, to restore Sam Neua Province to government control
fulfills one of two preconditions set by Premier Souvanna Phou-
ma for substantive negotiations. The other precondition was
a cessation of Pathet Lao attacks on Laotian Army posts.
the Pathet Lao negotiators had
agreed to stop attacks on areas loyal to the Souvanna govern-
ment but reserved the right to decide for themselves which
area fell within this category. Although Pathet Lao compli-
ance on both of these points will probably be only nominal,
Souvanna is likely to construe full acceptance and thus be will-
ing to proceed with negotiations in Vientiane.
The Pathet Lao radio on 17 October broadcast a new version
of Pathet demands for a settlement with the government,
including unification of "all patriotic armed forces" and in-
clusion of the Pathet Lao's legal political front--the Neo Lao
Hak Sat party (NLHS)--in a coalition government. These de-
mands probably represent a maximum bargaining position. The
Pathet Lao may be willing to defer entry into a coalition gov=
ernment if Souvanna offers assurances of early elections. The im-
mediate Pathet Lao aim is probably to resume normal politi-
cal activity through the NLHS so as to take advantage of the
present favorable climate for such activity.
Apparently at the premier's instigation, the National As-
sembly has passed a resolution condemning Communism and
stating that Pathet Lao functionaries would be integrated into
the government structure only if they forswear allegiance to
a foreign ideology. The Laotian UN delegate's strong attack
on the USSR in the General Assembly's administrative and
budgetary committee on 18 October may also have been stimulated
by Souvanna for the same purpose.
The First Military Region, with headquarters at Luang
Prabang, is reliably reported to be planning to send a delega-
tion to Savannakhet within a few days to coordinate plans with-I
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Nee ,�41
General Phoumi for a contemplated effort to gain control of
Vientiane. The attack, scheduled to begin in a week, reported-
ly will involve diversionary action by Phoumi's troops south-
east of Pak Sane aimed at luring Captain Kong Le's paratroop-
ers out of Vientiane, followed by an uprising of anti - Kong Le
forces within the capital. It is problematical whether this plan
e capabilities of the cooperating groups.'"
a high-level representa-
tive of the Diem government has contacted Prince
Boun CK1M in Savannakhet indicating South Vietnam's readiness
to furnish "much military equipment" to Phoumi's troops. The
South Vietnamese Government is also described as ready to
send 10,000 troops into Laos if the "situation becomes more
advantageous and if they attack Savannakhpt "
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20 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTFI I ICIFNCF RI II I FTIN
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Cypriot Leaders Express Concern Over Bloc Aid Offer
Unconfirmed reports that the Soviet Union is about to of-
fer Cyprus over $80,000,000 in economic aid are causing con-
cern among Cypriot Government leaders. According to one
report, Andreas Ziartides, one of the five Communists in the
50-member House of Representatives, will announce details
of the offer on his return from a visit to Prague. The Commu-
nist deputies are expected to follow up the announcement by
placing before the House the entire issue of Soviet aid, AGnd
Cypriot Communists are reported to be organizing agitation
and demonstrations to force government acceptancej
Rumors of impending bloc aid offers have been circulating
in Nicosia since a visit to Cyprus in early September by,:thq
Soviet ambassador to Greece, who at that time expressed his
government's willingness to extend economic aid "without strings."
Rumanian and Hungarian diplomats have since visited the island
and made similar offers of economic and technical aid.
President Makarios, Vice President Kuchuk, and other
Cypriot leaders have expressed fear that present economic
conditions will make it difficult to reject firm bloc offers. Un-
employment is reported increasing daily, a drought has dras-
tically curtailed the production of certain cereal crops, and sur-
pluses of citrus and vine-, products continue to increase.
Makarios and Kuchuk frequently have indicated their inten-
tion of relying on the West for aid. Britain, Greece, and Turkey
have all promised assistance in limited amounts. A UN economic
team is examining the island's economy, and it is expected that
the UN Technical Assistance Program will supply help over the
next two years. For the immediate future, however, Cypriot
officials appear to be relying heavily on the outcome of current
negotiations with the United States for about 4,000 tons of PL-480
grain.
SEGRET-
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"French" African Leaders to Confer on Algeria
A new initiative toward resolving the Algerian conflict
seems likely to result from the conference of leaders of for-
mer French territories in Black Africa which is scheduled
to begin on 24 October in Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory
Coast. Invitations to the meeting, organized by Ivory Coast
Premier Houphouet-Boigny, apparently have been sent to the
heads of 12 of the 13 "French" African states which became
independent earlier this year--including Cameroun and Togo
but not the Malagasy Republic and most of them are expected
to attend or send representatives. Mauritania, which becomes
independent on 28 November, and Guinea, which Houphouet hopes
can be induced to re-establish close ties with other former French
territories, may also be represented.
The meeting is aimed primarily at concerting policy with a
view to heading off a UN vote on a strong Algerian resolution--
such as one endorsing the Algerian rebels' call for a UN-super-
vised plebiscite in Algeria. Houphouet and other pro-French
leaders have displayed increasing concern over such a develop-
ment, observing that no African leader could survive if he op-
posed an Algerian resolution. Present indications are that the
meeting will result in the naming of a delegation charged with
urging a "liberal solution" on De Gaulle and also aim at agree-
ment on tactics to be pursued at the UN.Clenegal's UN represent-
ative has already indicated his preference for a resolution based
on De Gaulle's repeated calls for a cease-fire and directed to-
ward encoura ing a resumption of direct talks between France
and the rebels.
Should the "French" Black African states not support France
against a strong Algerian resolution, the American Embassy in
Paris believes the French Government may curtail drastically,
and possibly cut off entirely, the economic aid on which all these
states depend. Direct French assistance amounted to over $200,-
000,000 in 1960. Houphouet stated in August he had been told flatly
by two high-ranking members of De Gaulle's regime, under cir-
cumstances which suggested De Gaulle's concurrence, that all
economic and technical assistance would be cut off from African
states which voted against France on the Algerian question.
-CONFIDENTIAL-
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Fidel Caste� C,*(tetne......
In epten:ii.
C
CAQS
tro reportedly
lycq-ne
the United States le "
it is corruot, two-fet
deeneeracy is realty e
in up in his atiese
." the United State
ceeptet 'A conlidenct
ioiojca wat. anti
Cuba with the cox-nine
Cactro has appointed
Cuba has become the
recognition to North
Castro went to c,
as the rising leader 3
that only by taking an
Ctates could he keep
these areas. He spe
e rietanCOUrt 70"'-
:::.a.'pnleilt, saying tha.,.
could "undermine tete
Lllees."
m is on the way out, that
'a major world power, that
kt;incere,, and that American
n. : 'ee said he had no intention of
n its "present state of confu-
..tept on the defensive, He
L'he :hao-Soviet bloc would win the
7C: deemed it necessary to align
ece :,:ecies. Since this conversation,
iih.le.e,dor to Communist CThina, and
net -oloc nation to afford diplomatic
ttera.Jc lengths n describing himself
ein ...ie,rica and Africa, and he steed
eempeornising attitude toward the United
tvi.,:e his obligation to the peoples of
:retlicated concern about the attitude
eeed. in Venezuela toward the Castro gov-
eee Venezuelans vere not with him, he
ezeonete.y. . and bring them to their
Castro said that he felt he had Cuba "very well in hand po-
litically," and scoffed at reports of differences among regime
leaders. He said he was unconcerned about the large number of
defe.ctors among his original supporters, since "only the weak
ones" Were taking such steps. lie emphasized that the people's
militia, which he assorted would be reliable and well trained,
would make any armed aggressors "extremely sorry for their
efforts."
Castro admitted that Cuba's economic situation was :bad and
that considerable difficulty was being experienced in "production,"
His comments on Soviet technical. assistance were enthusiastic,
however, and he praised the Soviet technicians guiding the opera-
tions of the Cuban Petroleum Institute. ,"With all these excellent
people in Cuba;' he said, "we will defeat the corrupt capitalistic
:western."
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E:ov1et 1310c Atlanta.ly
Cuban pilots are engaged in flight training in
Czc-choslovakia. Between eight and 15 Spanish-speaking pilots
Inve been noted in exerc5, including practice take-offs and. -
landings, during which identified Spanish terms were
tr;ed to designate partiLLI,,i: movements. The type of aircraft
involved has not been c nirsed. More than 100 Cubans were
reportedly sent to Cy.-ici,:;iaval,Lia in July and August for vari-
ous types of military including flight and mainte-
m,hcatraining on bloc a.:1-:-.raft. This information suggests that
bloc military aircraft, already in Cuba, can be e>;nected
to arrive by the time this training is completed. �
Recent reports state the two Soviet vessels which de-
livered arms to Cuba during the first ten days of October carried
antiaircraft artillery, Czech machine guns and ammunition, at
least 100 jeeps. nroba.bly more tanks, and other unidentified
equipment.
. The Soviet merchaa, Atlarsk left the Black Sea on 3
October carrying the fou:Lh zr,:jor shipment of bloc arms to
Cuba since early September. al the ship's 8,000 tons of carao,
more than 2.400 tons is ;.-~awn to be materiel.
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111 Lai 1 1 1-1 I.
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense�
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
-r-F-144c-ALTLA I.
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