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October 24, 1960
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Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 3.3(h)(2) ur 51ECRET 3.5(c) 24 October 1960 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT re6 NO au,a.ri.un IN CLASS. Ar CLA5s. T %IA 0 NEXT i'L.V1.',JV DATE: IFIP 20/0 AUDI' HD TO.2 DA,Ap JUN 1980 DEVIEWENt 4 0 /4117/// iApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799W Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 II %Jr- ZrL Ns G. II Approved f7r-lerea;e7252-6-71:5713 CO2977799 �T-14�prov�e711Or�R7lTase: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 Name 24 OCTOBER 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet aid to Guinea to include more mil- itary equipment, increased assistance for establishing state farms, and IL-18 civil aircraft I I. ASIA-AFRICA Situation in Laos. Situation in the Congo. III. THE WEST Austrian Chancellor Raab to try to re-form People's party - Socialist coalition govern- ment; effort may be protracted. Most Latin American governments seem to feel US action on exports to Cuba was justified, but some critical views noted as well as some expectations of strong ad- verse public reactions. 0 Bolivian President says he is under heavy pressure as a result of leftist activities and Communist bloc offers of aid. 0 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 4 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 'LAO UP OrA.,nr, Nal CENTRAL INTELLIGEN TIN 24 October 1960 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-Guinea: Moscow's expanding aid program in Guinea will include the supply of additional military equip- ment and increased assistance for establishing state farms, The new $21,500,000 credit extended to Guinea during President Sekou Toure's visit to the USSR early last month raised Moscow's total aid to Guinea to more than $55,000,000, and may allow for some Soviet participation in Toure's Konkour River hydroelectric and aluminum development scheme. the Soviet Union also will provide IL-18 turbo- prop civil aircraft to Guinea under a separate agreement. (Page 1) IL ASIA-AFRICA Laos: cing Savang has signed an ordinance accredit- ing the Soviet ambassador and has scheduled an audience )? with him on 26 October. Savang had stalled signing the CA. I if ordinance for ten days, apparently hoping that Souvanna's ,��L neutralist government would fall q Souvanna reportedly now is in Luang Prabang, where he will probable attempt to shore up his position with General Ouane and other officers who, earlier at leaiat, had been close to an open break with his government. Lin Vientiane, there are reports that Kong Le may be planning an early attack on General Phoumi's de- fense line in central Laos: (Page 3) *Republic of the Congo: New outbreaks of mutiny and dis- order in the Congolese army reportedly have occurred in Leopold- ville and in the provincial capitals of Stanleyville and Coquilhatville. Mobutu has flown to Coquilhatville in an effort to restore order there. He is reported to be near the breaking point, and his decision to 1 -TOP-SECRETT A - Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 IVOF present his ezn.-n- � - motivated partly Leopoldville In any influence in Congo7.en The latest outbreak nif' has made no attempt - MC and pro-LumuMbn government which .we:.nn (Page 4) UN headquarters may have been escape from the pressures in hn may not be able to retain any .rs once he has left the country. violence which the UN apparently complicate efforts of the s to reconstitute a ConFrolese clude Lumumba. THE; WEST Austria: Folle.vir.T.�: Pren.ident Schaerfts refusal to ac- cept his resignation c P Oct:17-x-:r, Chancellor Raab has � agreed to try to re-estn.bli.sh t.T-e People's party - Socialist coalition government. A rotrcted effort niay be necessary, since the long-stanciii, n'ntierences of the two.parties over fi- nancial policy have beconle more severe in recent. months. The dispute with Italy thn South Tirol�currently under discussion in the Unito:1 ;n.tioris--may be exacerbated during maneuvering for the fern.7.ation of a new government, since both parties may try to outdo each other in seeking public sup- port on the Tirol issue. (Page 5) Cuba: While the majority of Latin American governments seems to feel that the US was justified in imposing an embargo on most exports to Cuba, official circles in Mexico and Chile are critical, viewing tho US action as giving Castro an impor- � tant propaganda advantpge in the hemisphere. Other govern- ments, while sympathetic, are concerned over what they expect will be a strong adverse., reaction in. Latin American public opin- ion. The Canadian press, meanwhile, has been unanimous in applauding Prime Minister Diefenbaker's announcement that 24 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF ii Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 � Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 NOV haz no harcTo on .Cann emi er�of imposing any cm- tr2...de." 6) Presidert !las told US Ambassador Strom that he is under increa. Joolitical and economic � prsure as.a result o tivity by extreme leftists 2:11,1 Communists, who .1:! ::-Jrculatin9.- the story that ho is b:-.raying the Bolivian Paz seemed genuinely disturbed, and Strom "L -.Ae had "never found him upset - � b,-:...,fore." Paz said his on t.,7;T as made oarticUlarly dif- ult by Communist bic.�' of a tin smelter and other economic aid at a 41-1 p ea.sury is empty. (Page8 ) 24 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF iii Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 TOP SECRET Moscow Expands Its Aid Program in Guinea The Soviet Union, expanding its economic aid program in Guinea, extended an additional $21,500,000 credit during President Sekou Toure's visit to the USSR in early Septem- ber The new credit, which may allow for some Soviet participation in Toure's Konkoure River hydroelectric and aluminum project, calls for increased Soviet assistance in developing state farms. Under the USSR's $35,000,000 credit extended last year, Soviet specialists already are preparing plans for a 17,300-acre government-owned rice plantation. Peiping may consider the Soviet plan to aid Guinea in es- tablishing a state rice farm as infringement in a field in which the Chinese feel themselves more competent to render techni- cal assistance. Since June, about 60 Chinese rice specialists have been in Guinea to assist in modest rice-production proj- ects. Additional personnel may well be sent under the $25,000,- 000 interest-free credit granted Guinea during Toure's visit to Peiping last month. The Soviet credit also provides for the supply of more mil- itary equipment to Guinea. A Soviet arms shipment was deliv- ered to Conakry in September, presumably under the credit extended by Moscow last year. Under a separate agreement, apparently yet to be concluded, the Soviet Union will supply Guinea with an unspecified number of IL-18 turboprop civil aircraft, This agreement�presumably to be similar to the recent Soviet pact with Ghana�probably will call for a wide employment of Soviet technical personnel in the operation of any international civil airline Conakry may establish. Under such an arrangement with Czechoslovakia earlier this year, Guinea contracted to purchase four twin-engine IL-14s for its nascent domestic civil airline. Guinea still has not decided how to utilize about $15,000,000 in aid extended under the new Soviet l'OP-SteRE-77 24 Oct 60 CENTRAI INTFI I inFKR-F RUH FTIN Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 �srOP SECRET credit. According to numerous press announcements, Soviet technicians apparently have begun only in the past few months the initial stages of the wide variety of projects called for un- der Moscow's original $35,000,000 credit. Specific projects under Peiping's new $25.000.000 credit aniarently have not yet been scheduled. 24 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 SECRET Nol Situation in La King Savang has signed an ordinance accrediting the Soviet ambassador and has scheduled pn audience with him in Luang Prabang on 26 October. The King had stalled signing the ordinance for ten days, apparently in the hope at Souvanna's neutralist governmegt would topple. Savang reportedly told that he had no al- ernative but to accept the Soviet envoy, even though he felt that this would open the door to Soviet infiltration, propagan- da, and subversion, which, he said, Laos is too weak to 1 Mt. re- Souvanna reportedly left Vientiane on 22 October for a visit to Luang Prabang and two provincial capitals in north- ern Laos. He probably is attempting to shore up support for his government from General Ouane and other officers in Luang Prabang who, at least earlier, were close to break- ing openly with Vientiane. Souvanna may also wish to consult with provincial officials on the Pathet Lao military effort in northern Laos. iNith Souvanna and General Ouane out of Vientiane, Kong Le is free of any restraining influence. Reports indicate that Kong, who has been described as politically unsophisticated, has ex= tensive contact with Pathet Lao sympathizers. On 22 October, he reportedly allowed Colonel Singkapo, a ranking Pathet Lao officer, to address a meeting of Laotian Army officers in Vien- tiane on the subject of neutrality. Rumors continue to circulate that Kong, possibly in cooperation with the Pathet Lao, may be planning an attack on General Phoumi's defense line in central Laos. A Laotian Army patrol investigating the loss of a post in the southern province of Attopeu was attacked on 16 October by Pathet Lao troops wearing new uniforms. The Pathets, who previously have withdrawn in the face of Laotian Army probes, apparently had been resupplied and possibly reinforced. Troops under General Phoumi's control are considered capable of con- trolling only the principal towns in Attopeu Province, while the Pathets have freedom of movement t �Sfe-RET- 24 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 SECRET Situation in in the Congo New outbreaks of mutiny in the Congolese army reportedly have occurred in Leopoldville and in the provincial capitals of Stanleyville and Coquilhatville. Disorderly Congolese troops have terrorized the African quarter of Leopoldville and have routed the police patrols of provincial governor Kamitatu. The UN, which earlier authorized joint patrols in the capital of its troops and Kamitatu's police, apparently has withdrawn its forces. Mobutu has flown to Coauilhatville in an effort to restore order there.( he was not concerned over the army's loyalty; he apparently is de- pending on the 5,000-man force based at Thysville to regain control of Leopoldville. Mobutu apparently has vague plans f protesting the activities of Ghana, Guinea, the UAR, orocco, and the UN command during his projected visit to N headquarters; however, he reportedly is near the breaking oint, and his decision to present his case personally at the may have been motivated partly by a desire to escape the pressures in Leopoldville:2 In any case, most observers in Leopoldville question whether he will retain any influence in Congolese affairs once he has left the country. The latest outbreak of army violence will complicate the UN's efforts to bring about a peaceful reconciliation of political factions. The UN, under heavy pressure from such pro- Lumumba states as Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR, apparently has reached the conclusion that a solution to the stalemate in Leopoldville is impossible unless Lumumba and his followers are allowed to participate in the government. However, un- rest in the capital would probably prevent any attempt to re- convene the Congolese legislature, and the UN command's failure to take action against the mutineers could compromise its re utation wi � -S-EC-R-E-T--- 24 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 The Austrian C715inet Crisis ollowing President Schaerf's refusal to accept his res- ignation on 22 October, Chancellor Julius Raab is working to re-establish a coalition of the same two parties which formed the previous government- Raab's right-center People's party and the Socialist party led by Vice Chancellor Bruno Pitter- mann and Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky. A protracted ef- fort may be necessary to bring the parties together again; long-standing differences over financial policy have become more severe in recent months, and the coalition split came after failure to agree on the 1961 state budget. There has been a deficit of approximately $80,000,000 in the budget both last year and this year, and inflationary pres- sures have been on the rise. In the face of this, the Socialists are advocating a $40,000,000 increase in pensions, out of total planned budget expenditures of about $950,000,000. The Peo- ple's party has not objected publicly to the pension increases but wants to finance them mainly by an increase in contribu- tions, whereas the Socialists propose an increase in taxes that would fall primarily on the well-to-do. Raab had for some time been considering retirement from politics because of ill health. If Raab fails to form a new gov- ernment now, the Socialists may be asked to try because of the close balance of power between the two parties in parliament. The People's party has 79 seats in parliament, the Socialist par- ty 78. The remaining eight seats are held by the right-wing, pan-German Liberal party. The cabinet negotiations may indirectly exacerbate the dis- pute between Austria and Italy over the South Tirol--the issue of the rights of the German-speaking population in this area of Italy-- which is currently under discussion by the UN General Assembly's Political Committee. In the maneuvering to form a new govern- ment, both sides may strive to gain public support by outdoing one another with extreme statements on the Tirol issue CONFIDENTIAL 24 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 tiro" Reactions to New US - .tio, s on Experts to Cuba - While the majerity c: .tin etnierican governments ap- nears to feel that the I.Tett- Stenes was justified in imposing an embargo on most ee: to Cuba, official circles in Mex- ico and Chile are tar ,7rititeel attitude toward the US ace titee, victeirg it as an 7; an,� propaganda advahtage for Castro in the hemisphere-, The Ecuadorean fete minister and Bolivian President az, while sympathetic -ice ':e 'JS position, have also expressed concern over what they c Ct ill be a strong negative reac- tion in public opinion ilatet .erioret the hemisphere. Venezuelan toident Betancourt, a clies the Bolivian President, warned feet the US move will be etrongly criticized unless further: ac- ten is also taken against the Trujillo dictatorship in the Domin- ican Republic: The 13reitiiian attitude seems complicated by the hopes apparently ha-ted both by the Kubitschek adminis- tration and by Presicieniet:iectOuadros of effecting a reconcil- iation between the atec and the Castro regime. Some of the Latin American governments expressing sym- ehy for the United States move may see it as obviating the need or their participating in any juture multilateral sanctions against the Castro regime. Venn eeatin American leaders prefer to re- gard the Cuban issue as a bilateral problem between the US and 'Min. The Ecuadorean foreign minister frankly stated that a number of Latin American governments are too weak to run ahead of public opinion on this issue. In Canada, the press has unanimously applauded Prime Min- ister Diefenbalter's announcement that "Canada has no intention Ivhatsoever of imposing any embargo on Canadian goods in Cuban trade." The Canadian press was critical of the United States em- bargo action, and is .eethor.ting the government to stand firm against any interference with exports and re-exports by subsidiaries of US firms in Canada. � In a 4 October report on the Canadian Gov- ernment's concern about the Possibility of US restrictions against p. 24 Oct 60 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO29777691- Page 6 40/01krpproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 NOP the _A n--; . a7:nate the issue aioparticula.rly considering the " Oil 20 Octob3r, Ra "--.7e hardly need more id a military veatur: Guatemala. . . is the cause niftli2Mr commence,?, that i was a uie when the Canadians JS fIerce over their economy or.ol measures to combat this in- reacted to the US move with: ;-rviectace that the US ruling circles , to. strangle Cuba just as they stran- , time it will be different. Cuba's workinr? r inst cola- 24 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE R1111 FTIKI Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 krof Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 SLCKET Bolivian President Under Leftist Pressures (President Paz told US Ambassador Strom on 19 October that heavy political and economic pressures are building up against him as a result of recent activities by Communists and extreme leftists, who are circulating the charge that he is betraying the Bolivian revolution. Paz seemed genuinely disturbed, and Strom notes he had "never found him upset be- fore." The President said his position was being made extreme- ly difficult by Communist bloc offers of a tin smelter, tin con- centration plants, a sugar refinery, and assistance in aerial photography at a time when he is faced with an empty treasury and is under economic necessity to raise rates on the govern- ment-operated railway and government-produced gasoline. The Soviet offer to aid Bolivia's tin-refining induStry has received wide publicity. A Czech offer of a sugar refinery in Paz' home district was reported by the Cuban press service on 7 August but has not been widely acclaimed in Bolivia. The offer of as- sistance in aerial photography may have been included in one of several Communist overtures concerning aid for the petroleum industry. L.A. Bolivian senator who recently returned from the Soviet bloc expressed, what the American Embassy in La Paz feels may be widespread sentiment, that the nationalization of the tin mines-- a primary objective of Bolivia's sweeping revolution in 1952--"will never be truly completed until Bolivia has its own smelter." The president of the National Council of Agrarian Reform is n6w in Communist China, according to Bolivian press reports. The possibility of further contact between high-ranking Bolivians and Communist China is suggested by the action of Bolivia's left- ist vice president, Juan Lechin, who recently decided not to can- cel a reservation for travel to Hong Kong. Peiping had as whether Lechin wanted to cancel or keen his reservation-,-, -SEGRE-T-_ 24 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 Nee '%�.+Od THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONteivrATIAL Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977799 rtzziew /7/74:1314,(