CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/10/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977799
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: October 24, 1960

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24 October 1960
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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Name
24 OCTOBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet aid to Guinea to include more mil-
itary equipment, increased assistance for
establishing state farms, and IL-18 civil
aircraft
I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in Laos.
Situation in the Congo.
III. THE WEST
Austrian Chancellor Raab to try to re-form
People's party - Socialist coalition govern-
ment; effort may be protracted.
Most Latin American governments seem
to feel US action on exports to Cuba was
justified, but some critical views noted
as well as some expectations of strong ad-
verse public reactions. 0
Bolivian President says he is under heavy
pressure as a result of leftist activities
and Communist bloc offers of aid. 0
TOP SECRET
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'LAO UP OrA.,nr, Nal
CENTRAL INTELLIGEN TIN
24 October 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Guinea: Moscow's expanding aid program in
Guinea will include the supply of additional military equip-
ment and increased assistance for establishing state farms,
The new $21,500,000 credit extended to
Guinea during President Sekou Toure's visit to the USSR
early last month raised Moscow's total aid to Guinea to
more than $55,000,000, and may allow for some Soviet
participation in Toure's Konkour River hydroelectric and
aluminum development scheme.
the Soviet Union also will provide IL-18 turbo-
prop civil aircraft to Guinea under a separate agreement.
(Page 1)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: cing Savang has signed an ordinance accredit-
ing the Soviet ambassador and has scheduled an audience )?
with him on 26 October. Savang had stalled signing the
CA. I if
ordinance for ten days, apparently hoping that Souvanna's ,��L
neutralist government would fall q Souvanna reportedly now
is in Luang Prabang, where he will probable attempt to shore
up his position with General Ouane and other officers who,
earlier at leaiat, had been close to an open break with his
government. Lin Vientiane, there are reports that Kong Le
may be planning an early attack on General Phoumi's de-
fense line in central Laos:
(Page 3)
*Republic of the Congo: New outbreaks of mutiny and dis-
order in the Congolese army reportedly have occurred in Leopold-
ville and in the provincial capitals of Stanleyville and Coquilhatville.
Mobutu has flown to Coquilhatville in an effort to restore order there.
He is reported to be near the breaking point, and his decision to
1
-TOP-SECRETT
A
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present his ezn.-n- � -
motivated partly
Leopoldville In any
influence in Congo7.en
The latest outbreak nif'
has made no attempt -
MC and pro-LumuMbn
government which .we:.nn
(Page 4)
UN headquarters may have been
escape from the pressures in
hn may not be able to retain any
.rs once he has left the country.
violence which the UN apparently
complicate efforts of the
s to reconstitute a ConFrolese
clude Lumumba.
THE; WEST
Austria: Folle.vir.T.�: Pren.ident Schaerfts refusal to ac-
cept his resignation c P Oct:17-x-:r, Chancellor Raab has �
agreed to try to re-estn.bli.sh t.T-e People's party - Socialist
coalition government. A rotrcted effort niay be necessary,
since the long-stanciii, n'ntierences of the two.parties over fi-
nancial policy have beconle more severe in recent. months.
The dispute with Italy thn South Tirol�currently under
discussion in the Unito:1 ;n.tioris--may be exacerbated during
maneuvering for the fern.7.ation of a new government, since
both parties may try to outdo each other in seeking public sup-
port on the Tirol issue. (Page 5)
Cuba: While the majority of Latin American governments
seems to feel that the US was justified in imposing an embargo
on most exports to Cuba, official circles in Mexico and Chile
are critical, viewing tho US action as giving Castro an impor- �
tant propaganda advantpge in the hemisphere. Other govern-
ments, while sympathetic, are concerned over what they expect
will be a strong adverse., reaction in. Latin American public opin-
ion. The Canadian press, meanwhile, has been unanimous in
applauding Prime Minister Diefenbaker's announcement that
24 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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NOV
haz no
harcTo on .Cann
emi
er�of imposing any cm-
tr2...de."
6)
Presidert !las told US Ambassador Strom
that he is under increa. Joolitical and economic
� prsure as.a result o tivity by extreme leftists
2:11,1 Communists, who .1:! ::-Jrculatin9.- the story that ho is
b:-.raying the Bolivian Paz seemed genuinely
disturbed, and Strom "L -.Ae had "never found him upset
- � b,-:...,fore." Paz said his on t.,7;T as made oarticUlarly dif-
ult by Communist bic.�' of a tin smelter and other
economic aid at a 41-1 p ea.sury is empty.
(Page8 )
24 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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TOP SECRET
Moscow Expands Its Aid Program in Guinea
The Soviet Union, expanding its economic aid program
in Guinea, extended an additional $21,500,000 credit during
President Sekou Toure's visit to the USSR in early Septem-
ber
The new credit, which may allow for some Soviet
participation in Toure's Konkoure River hydroelectric and
aluminum project, calls for increased Soviet assistance in
developing state farms. Under the USSR's $35,000,000 credit
extended last year, Soviet specialists already are preparing
plans for a 17,300-acre government-owned rice plantation.
Peiping may consider the Soviet plan to aid Guinea in es-
tablishing a state rice farm as infringement in a field in which
the Chinese feel themselves more competent to render techni-
cal assistance. Since June, about 60 Chinese rice specialists
have been in Guinea to assist in modest rice-production proj-
ects. Additional personnel may well be sent under the $25,000,-
000 interest-free credit granted Guinea during Toure's visit to
Peiping last month.
The Soviet credit also provides for the supply of more mil-
itary equipment to Guinea. A Soviet arms shipment was deliv-
ered to Conakry in September, presumably under the credit
extended by Moscow last year.
Under a separate agreement, apparently yet to be concluded,
the Soviet Union will supply Guinea with an unspecified number
of IL-18 turboprop civil aircraft, This
agreement�presumably to be similar to the recent Soviet pact
with Ghana�probably will call for a wide employment of Soviet
technical personnel in the operation of any international civil
airline Conakry may establish. Under such an arrangement with
Czechoslovakia earlier this year, Guinea contracted to purchase
four twin-engine IL-14s for its nascent domestic civil airline.
Guinea still has not decided how
to utilize about $15,000,000 in aid extended under the new Soviet
l'OP-SteRE-77
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credit. According to numerous press announcements, Soviet
technicians apparently have begun only in the past few months
the initial stages of the wide variety of projects called for un-
der Moscow's original $35,000,000 credit. Specific projects
under Peiping's new $25.000.000 credit aniarently have not yet
been scheduled.
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SECRET Nol
Situation in La
King Savang has signed an ordinance accrediting the
Soviet ambassador and has scheduled pn audience with him
in Luang Prabang on 26 October. The King had stalled
signing the ordinance for ten days, apparently in the hope
at Souvanna's neutralist governmegt would topple. Savang
reportedly told that he had no al-
ernative but to accept the Soviet envoy, even though he felt
that this would open the door to Soviet infiltration, propagan-
da, and subversion, which, he said, Laos is too weak to 1
Mt.
re-
Souvanna reportedly left Vientiane on 22 October for a
visit to Luang Prabang and two provincial capitals in north-
ern Laos. He probably is attempting to shore up support for
his government from General Ouane and other officers in
Luang Prabang who, at least earlier, were close to break-
ing openly with Vientiane. Souvanna may also wish to consult
with provincial officials on the Pathet Lao military effort in
northern Laos.
iNith Souvanna and General Ouane out of Vientiane, Kong Le
is free of any restraining influence. Reports indicate that Kong,
who has been described as politically unsophisticated, has ex=
tensive contact with Pathet Lao sympathizers. On 22 October,
he reportedly allowed Colonel Singkapo, a ranking Pathet Lao
officer, to address a meeting of Laotian Army officers in Vien-
tiane on the subject of neutrality. Rumors continue to circulate
that Kong, possibly in cooperation with the Pathet Lao, may be
planning an attack on General Phoumi's defense line in central
Laos.
A Laotian Army patrol investigating the loss of a post in
the southern province of Attopeu was attacked on 16 October by
Pathet Lao troops wearing new uniforms. The Pathets, who
previously have withdrawn in the face of Laotian Army probes,
apparently had been resupplied and possibly reinforced. Troops
under General Phoumi's control are considered capable of con-
trolling only the principal towns in Attopeu Province, while the
Pathets have freedom of movement t
�Sfe-RET-
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Situation in in the Congo
New outbreaks of mutiny in the Congolese army reportedly
have occurred in Leopoldville and in the provincial capitals of
Stanleyville and Coquilhatville. Disorderly Congolese troops
have terrorized the African quarter of Leopoldville and have
routed the police patrols of provincial governor Kamitatu. The
UN, which earlier authorized joint patrols in the capital of its
troops and Kamitatu's police, apparently has withdrawn its forces.
Mobutu has flown to Coauilhatville in an effort to restore
order there.( he
was not concerned over the army's loyalty; he apparently is de-
pending on the 5,000-man force based at Thysville to regain
control of Leopoldville. Mobutu apparently has vague plans
f protesting the activities of Ghana, Guinea, the UAR,
orocco, and the UN command during his projected visit to
N headquarters; however, he reportedly is near the breaking
oint, and his decision to present his case personally at the
may have been motivated partly by a desire to escape the
pressures in Leopoldville:2 In any case, most observers in
Leopoldville question whether he will retain any influence in
Congolese affairs once he has left the country.
The latest outbreak of army violence will complicate the
UN's efforts to bring about a peaceful reconciliation of political
factions. The UN, under heavy pressure from such pro-
Lumumba states as Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR, apparently
has reached the conclusion that a solution to the stalemate in
Leopoldville is impossible unless Lumumba and his followers
are allowed to participate in the government. However, un-
rest in the capital would probably prevent any attempt to re-
convene the Congolese legislature, and the UN command's
failure to take action against the mutineers could compromise
its re utation wi
�
-S-EC-R-E-T---
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The Austrian C715inet Crisis
ollowing President Schaerf's refusal to accept his res-
ignation on 22 October, Chancellor Julius Raab is working to
re-establish a coalition of the same two parties which formed
the previous government- Raab's right-center People's party
and the Socialist party led by Vice Chancellor Bruno Pitter-
mann and Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky. A protracted ef-
fort may be necessary to bring the parties together again;
long-standing differences over financial policy have become
more severe in recent months, and the coalition split came
after failure to agree on the 1961 state budget.
There has been a deficit of approximately $80,000,000 in
the budget both last year and this year, and inflationary pres-
sures have been on the rise. In the face of this, the Socialists
are advocating a $40,000,000 increase in pensions, out of total
planned budget expenditures of about $950,000,000. The Peo-
ple's party has not objected publicly to the pension increases
but wants to finance them mainly by an increase in contribu-
tions, whereas the Socialists propose an increase in taxes that
would fall primarily on the well-to-do.
Raab had for some time been considering retirement from
politics because of ill health. If Raab fails to form a new gov-
ernment now, the Socialists may be asked to try because of the
close balance of power between the two parties in parliament.
The People's party has 79 seats in parliament, the Socialist par-
ty 78. The remaining eight seats are held by the right-wing,
pan-German Liberal party.
The cabinet negotiations may indirectly exacerbate the dis-
pute between Austria and Italy over the South Tirol--the issue of
the rights of the German-speaking population in this area of Italy--
which is currently under discussion by the UN General Assembly's
Political Committee. In the maneuvering to form a new govern-
ment, both sides may strive to gain public support by outdoing
one another with extreme statements on the Tirol issue
CONFIDENTIAL
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Reactions to New US - .tio, s on Experts to Cuba -
While the majerity c: .tin etnierican governments ap-
nears to feel that the I.Tett- Stenes was justified in imposing
an embargo on most ee: to Cuba, official circles in Mex-
ico and Chile are tar ,7rititeel attitude toward the US ace
titee, victeirg it as an 7; an,� propaganda advahtage for
Castro in the hemisphere-,
The Ecuadorean fete minister and Bolivian President
az, while sympathetic -ice ':e 'JS position, have also expressed
concern over what they c Ct ill be a strong negative reac-
tion in public opinion ilatet .erioret the hemisphere. Venezuelan
toident Betancourt, a clies the Bolivian President, warned
feet the US move will be etrongly criticized unless further: ac-
ten is also taken against the Trujillo dictatorship in the Domin-
ican Republic: The 13reitiiian attitude seems complicated by
the hopes apparently ha-ted both by the Kubitschek adminis-
tration and by Presicieniet:iectOuadros of effecting a reconcil-
iation between the atec and the Castro regime.
Some of the Latin American governments expressing sym-
ehy for the United States move may see it as obviating the need
or their participating in any juture multilateral sanctions against
the Castro regime. Venn eeatin American leaders prefer to re-
gard the Cuban issue as a bilateral problem between the US and
'Min. The Ecuadorean foreign minister frankly stated that a
number of Latin American governments are too weak to run ahead
of public opinion on this issue.
In Canada, the press has unanimously applauded Prime Min-
ister Diefenbalter's announcement that "Canada has no intention
Ivhatsoever of imposing any embargo on Canadian goods in Cuban
trade." The Canadian press was critical of the United States em-
bargo action, and is .eethor.ting the government to stand firm against
any interference with exports and re-exports by subsidiaries of
US firms in Canada. � In a 4 October report on the Canadian Gov-
ernment's concern about the Possibility of US restrictions against
p.
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the _A n--; .
a7:nate the issue
aioparticula.rly
considering the
" Oil 20 Octob3r, Ra
"--.7e hardly need more
id a military veatur:
Guatemala. . .
is the cause
niftli2Mr
commence,?, that i was
a uie when the Canadians
JS fIerce over their economy
or.ol measures to combat this in-
reacted to the US move with:
;-rviectace that the US ruling circles
, to. strangle Cuba just as they stran-
, time it will be different. Cuba's
workinr? r inst cola-
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Bolivian President Under Leftist Pressures
(President Paz told US Ambassador Strom on 19 October
that heavy political and economic pressures are building up
against him as a result of recent activities by Communists
and extreme leftists, who are circulating the charge that he
is betraying the Bolivian revolution. Paz seemed genuinely
disturbed, and Strom notes he had "never found him upset be-
fore."
The President said his position was being made extreme-
ly difficult by Communist bloc offers of a tin smelter, tin con-
centration plants, a sugar refinery, and assistance in aerial
photography at a time when he is faced with an empty treasury
and is under economic necessity to raise rates on the govern-
ment-operated railway and government-produced gasoline. The
Soviet offer to aid Bolivia's tin-refining induStry has received
wide publicity. A Czech offer of a sugar refinery in Paz' home
district was reported by the Cuban press service on 7 August
but has not been widely acclaimed in Bolivia. The offer of as-
sistance in aerial photography may have been included in one of
several Communist overtures concerning aid for the petroleum
industry.
L.A. Bolivian senator who recently returned from the Soviet
bloc expressed, what the American Embassy in La Paz feels may
be widespread sentiment, that the nationalization of the tin mines--
a primary objective of Bolivia's sweeping revolution in 1952--"will
never be truly completed until Bolivia has its own smelter."
The president of the National Council of Agrarian Reform
is n6w in Communist China, according to Bolivian press reports.
The possibility of further contact between high-ranking Bolivians
and Communist China is suggested by the action of Bolivia's left-
ist vice president, Juan Lechin, who recently decided not to can-
cel a reservation for travel to Hong Kong. Peiping had as
whether Lechin wanted to cancel or keen his reservation-,-,
-SEGRE-T-_
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONteivrATIAL
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