CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/03

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02977804
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RIPPUB
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U
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13
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March 17, 2020
Document Release Date: 
March 26, 2020
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November 3, 1960
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Approved for Release. 2020/03/13 CO2977804 ftir? / 3 November 1960 Copy No. C 7 4 CE\TRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NP. 3 (OlAk2E 1:! GLASS. Xr I uELLAS'ii-TED 3.3(h)(?),d 3.5(c) PUSS: GLOMEO TO: TS S C I.EXT REVIEW DATE; _zoo_ AUTH: HR 702 DATe4 n90 REVIEWER: �TOP�SECRET� / zzz jApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C 02977804/M7,MM MZ7 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 NW" TA CO cre�cary Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 "ApprovedIor Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 New' 3 NOVEMBER 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Moscow apparently has accepted Iranian proposal for "good-will mission" to USSR headed by Premier Sharif-Emami II. ASIA-AFRICA Gursel regime in Turkey, its prestige damaged by political trials and university dismissals, faces prospect of increasing organized opposition. Situation in the Congo. III. THE WEST Leftists in El Salvador launch bid for power; situation appears heading for open clash between military and mobs stirred up by leftist agitation. Possible threat to Panama's newly in- stalled Chiari administration seen in activities of country's powerful Arias Madrid family. Tnr, crivr.T Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 w-z,� z � _ Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 V � NIS TOP SECRET viar. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 3 November 1960 DAILY BRIEF I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-Iran: The Soviet Union apparently, has accepted an Iranian proposal for the dispatch of a "good-will mis- sion" to the USSR headed by Prime Minister Sharif-Emami. Soviet officials have renewed an Invitation, for a visit by the Shah's sister. Although the tim- ing of the visits does not appear to have been worked out, Soviet policy makers probably hope such exchanges will bring about a more favorable climate for eventual Iranian willingness to make concessions to Soviet demands for a guarantee against foreign military bases of all types on Iranian soil. L_Sharif-Emarni has claimed to an American official that he is firmly resolved to refuse to discuss "po- litical" matters in Moscow.j (Page 1) II. ASIA -AFRICA Turkey: The Committee of National Union (CNU) which (c,, "6XL' has ruled Turkey for over five months now faces the pros- pect of increasing organized opposition. The prestige of the Gursel regime has been somewhat damaged by its handling zi A)- of the current mass political trial of former 1VIenderes gov- ,le ernment officials, as well as by the widely criticized recent dismissal by the CNU of nearly 150 faculty members of Tur- key's five universities. As long as the bulk of the military establishment remains loyal, however, the CNU should have little difficulty in controlling the country, although force may be necessary. (Page 3) � TOP SECRET pproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 � TOP SECRET %aro �41�9 Republic of the Congo: The projected trip to New York by UN representative Dayal-,who is expected to leave Leopoldville shortly appears designed in part to permit him to lend support to UN charges that Belgium and "independent" Katanga are obstructing the UN mis- sion in the Congo. Dayal is bringing pressure for a negotiated political set- tlement on all factions, but especially on anti-Lumumba -1/1-A;' elements. Dayal stated he had sent enemies of President Tshombe on a "conciliation" mission among warring Katangan tribes- men "in order to weaken Tshombe's position." Criticism by UN officials of the influx of Belgian returnees to the Congo stems in part from their belief that Belgian techni- cians are a major prop for the Tshombe regime and there- fore an nhstarlp fn Cinnan unity III. THE WEST El Salvador: Communists and other leftist elements launched a strong bid for power on 1 November, less than a week after the military coup that ousted the Lemus admin- istration. Their demands, circulated in street manifestoes and radiobroadcasts, include the elimination of the military from the government. Ex-President Osorio, the military figure who masterminded the 26 October coup and sought to win backing from the leftists by having them included in the provisional government, now is reliably reported to be un- easy and not in full control. The situation appears moving rapidly toward an open clash between the military�which, according to sources of the US Embassy, is rent by inter- nal dissension�and civilian mobs stirred up by leftist agi= tation. (Page 4) � Panama: Activities of the powerful Arias Madrid fam- ily are causing political uncertainty which could split Pres- ident Chiari's weak coalition and threaten his month-old 3 Nov 60 DAILY BRIEF ii LU TOP SECRET AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804r A Nrnid 'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 TOP SECRET Now administration. Influential ex-Presidents Arnulfo and Harmodio Arias and Harmodio's sons are exploiting the deep-seated social discontent in the country to arouse students and the restless lower classes and to obtain the ouster of National Guard Commandant Col. Bolivar Val= larino, who, despite his general unpopularity, has for some time been one of the major forces for stability in Panama. (Page 5) 3 Nov 60 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804r �TA�ppToved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 Niwir wry USSR Apparently Agrees to Iranian Good-Will Mission The Soviet Union has apparently accepted an Iranian pro- posal, first made to the Soviet ambassador in Tehran in early October, to send a "good-will mission" headed by Prime Min- ister Sharif-Emami to the USSR. Soviet officials have also renewed an invitation for a visit by Princess Shams, sister of the Shah and honorary head of Iran's public aid organization. No date has been set for the visits. Since the breakdown of Soviet-Iranian negotiations for a nonaggression pact and the conclusion of the US-Iranian bilateral defense pact in early 1959, relations between the USSR and Iran have been strained over the issue a Iranian participation in de- fense arrangements with Western countries. The Shah has of- fered on a number of occasions to give the USSR a guarantee to ban foreign missile bases from Iranian soil, while Khrushchev has demanded--as the price of "normal" relations--that the guar- antee be extended to exclude foreign military bases of all types. Last April, Moscow rejected Iranian proposals for a similar good- will mission to be headed by ex Foreign Minister Aram and for a meeting between the Shah and Khrushchev, unless the Iranian Government would first agree to make concessions on the issue of banning foreign military bases. When Sharif-Emami replaced the stanchly anti-Communist Eqbal as prime minister late in August, the USSR relaxed its propaganda attacks on the Shah and the regime's policies and the Soviet ambassador returned to Tehran. Moscow may also have decided to drop its demand for concessions prior to any good-will visit in the hope that a more favorable political climate would eventually result in Iranian willingness to yield on the issue of foreign military bases. Khru- shchev told the Iranian foreign minister in a talk in New York that an Iranian concession on this point is necessary for "normal" relationi.1 Sharif-Emami has told Western officials that he considers im- proving relations with the USSR one of the most important tasks �71714--SEC-RET- 3 Nov 60 CEMTD AI IMTDI I itIckirc RI II I CTIM Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 �Ti(tppr�rove'd rilod-ar Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 muse facing his government, but that he is not willing to impair Iran's ties with the West. Lille prime minister, who has dis- played reluctance to head the mission, told an American of- ficial that he intends to avoid any discussion of political is- sues. TOP SECRET 3 Nov 60 rFkITD Al IkITCI I urtckit-c nu uu CTIKI --Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 Page 2 Approved for14-ereL-s-e-:720/03/13 CO2977804 Turkey's Miluiotry Regime Losing Popular Supprirt The Committee of National Union (CNU) is being widely criticized in Turkey and faces the prospect of increasing or- ganized resistance. Popular criticism currently ranges from expressions of general disenchantment to organized conspiracy. ithe most recent plot, reported to include re- tired army officers, air force noncommissioned officers, and civilians, led to several arrests and prompted special security measures throughout the military establishment. The plotters reportedly had planned to overthrow the CNU between -28'October,and 1 Novembefj Discontent has also apparently increased among the peasants and in intellectual circles, contributing to the gen- eral atmosphere of uneasiness. There is no indication to date that the regime's conduct of the mass political trial of former Menderes government officials has succeeded in dis- pelling any of Menderesipopularity. In fact, the CNU's at- tempt to propagandize the trial has caused more damage to the prestige of the interim regime than to that of its pred- ecessor. Nearly 50 of the accused face possible death sen- tences, and concern over the fate of ex-Premier Menderes is common to most expressions a discontent. rGeneral Gur- sel and Foreign Minister Sarper, fully aware of the foreign as well as domestic impact of political executions, are working discreetly to avoid death sentences-.1 The final decision will rest with a majority vote of the entire membership of the CNU, among which there appears to be considerable support for the proposed executions. The CNU is also being strongly criticized for the recent dismissal of nearly 150 faculty members from Turkey's five universities. The dismissals were followed by numerous faculty resignations and student boycotts in protest of the government's action. In the face of the strong protest, the CNU is apparently reconsidering its action. If the regime continues to lose prestige, support for the CNU may also diminish among the military, enhancing the pos- sibility of further instability. As long as the bulk of the army remains loyal, however, the CNU should be able to maintain con- trol, although force and further repression may be necessary 3 Nov 60 rrku-rrt A I IkIrIII kl,r ni 11 n�rn, s-"-Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 Nor Salvadoran Communists Join in Strong Leftist Bid for Power Communists and other leftist elements in El Salvador launched a strong bid for power on 1 November, less than a week after the military coup that ousted the Lemus adminis- tration. Leftist demands, circulated in street manifestoes and in Communist-prepared radiobroadcasts, call for the imme- diate elimination from the governing junta and the cabinet of the "tools" of ex-President Osorio, who, they charge, is re- sponsible for "all the political, moral, and administrative ills" of the country. The three military members of the six- man junta and the three military cabinet members are all known supporters of Osorio, who is probably the most influ- ential military figure in the country. The demands, therefore, are in effect a call for the removal of all military officers from leading positions in the civil government. Under pres- ent circumstances, this would mean turning the regime over to the highly articulate leftists, who are strongly influenced by the Communists. Osorio, who as president from 1050 to 1956 inaugurated moderate reforms designed to alleviate the country's deep- seated socio-economic problems, masterminded the coup against Lemus. He retains wide popularity among lower in- come groups and sought to win leftist backing for the junta by having leftists included in the provisional government. Osorio apparently intended to play a dominant role in the provisional government from behind the scenes. Now, however, he is reported to be very uneasy and worried, and his friends fear he may lose control. The situation appears to be moving rapidly toward an open clash between the military and the civilian mobs stirred up by Communist agitation. Although the military is-sthil the major force in the country, sources of the American Em- bassy claim that the army is split with internal dissension and may be seriously weakened. Unless Osorio or another pop- ular military figure shows decisive leadership in meeting the leftist challenge, the Salvadoran Government could soon be- come completely dominated by pro-Communist elements. Such a development would have very serious implications for the stability of other Central American governments, particularly Guatemala and Nicaragua. 3 Nov 60 CEIrrrn A I ikrrri I at"%nkir.r ni II I criki Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 Page 4 Ar1 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 Political AgiL,.On in Panama .4re Activities of the powerful Arias Madrid family are caus- ing political uncertainty and instability in Panama which could split President Chiari's weak coalition and threaten his month- old administration. Through Finance Minister Gilberto Arias, who represents the family's strong influence in the coalition, many strategic government posts have been filled by known leftists and sedi- tious elements. Although he denied on 28 October that he was advocating revolutionary overthrow of the government, Roberto Arias has been ranting about the inevitability of social revolu- tion to Panama's restless students and lower classes since his return from political exile a few weeks ago. Roberto led an abortive revolt against former President de la Guardia--whose am- bassador in London he had been--which coincided with a Cuban- sponsored expedition against Panama in the spring of 1959. He is closely associated with irresponsible pro-Cuban revolution- aries, boasts of his friendship with Fidel Castro, and is known to be in contact with the Cuban Embassy in Panama. Behind his sons is powerful lawyer, publisher, and business- man Harmodio Arias, himself a former president who for 40 years has plotted with and used any group he considers useful to his de- termination to dominate the country. Also recently returned to political activity is Harmodio's half brother Arnulfo, a demagogic political strong man who re- tains strong popular appeal despite having twice been ousted from the presidency. Although Arnulfo usually operates as a lone wolf, he has worked with Harmodio when it suited their purposes. The activities of the Arias group are strengthened by owner- ship of three newspapers and some radio stations which they use for all-out campaigns such as the current one to oust National Guard Commandant Bolivar Vallarino, who has in recent years used his power to maintain Panamanian political stability. President Chiari may soon be forced to break with the Arias forces, although such action might bring down his government. He will probably postpone his plan to reorganize the unpopular Guard and to transfer Vallarino, for fear of losing his strongest support. CONFIDENTIAL 3 Nov 60 CE NI' A I 11.1�1�1 1 1/%1.1.I I ni II I r���� n Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 11 1 " 1 L1.11-a 11 1 1It Li Nesse VOW THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977804 c