CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/10

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02977809
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RIPPUB
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U
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11
Document Creation Date: 
March 17, 2020
Document Release Date: 
March 26, 2020
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Publication Date: 
November 10, 1960
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PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15798940].pdf490.36 KB
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Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 Novi I %or- acuitc 'MY �P 10 November 1960 Copy No. C CENTRAL 75 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO 9 NO DNANGE IN CLASS. 174 DiCLASSIFIED CLASS. clisINGill TO IS S C IL,1111:Vi BATE' 14-2 1 0 JUN 1980 DATE; NEVIEViEFI3 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c), f TOP SECRET .......... AI Ar f Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809/ A Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 . Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 SECRET 'Nompiv 10 NOVEMBER 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR attempts to mollify De Gaulle on policy toward Algeria but retains free hand to aid rebels. II. ASIA-AFRICA Europeans in Algeria increasingly bitter over De Gaulle's policy; extremists may be encouraged by sudden protest resigna- tion of the number-tvio French civil offi- cial there. 0 Belgian Communists, with Soviet support, reportedly plan base in Ghana for sub- versive operations aimed at the Congo. Japanese expected to begin production from Persian Gulf offshore oil conces- sion early next year. III. THE WEST Italy�Failure of national government coalition to control important city coun- cils in local elections may eventually pose new cabinet crisis. 0 0 SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 %Id IUU LUI(L CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 10 November 1960 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *USSR-France-AlgeriaCSoviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, In a talk with French Ambassador Dejean on 5 November, maintained that it is not the USSR but France that has shifted its policy on Algeria. Gromyko repeated Khrushchev's ob- servation in New York that the USSR, in extending de facto recognition to the Algerian rebel regime, had only gone as far as De Gaulle on the question of recognizing the provisional Algerian government. Soviet leaders probably still hope to avoid provoking an open break with Paris for the immediate future, and assurances of this type appear primarily designed to mollify the French while retaining for the USSR a free hand to aid the rebels. In addition to recent well-publicized ship- ments of relief supplies and small quantities of nonmilitary, equipment, Moscow is likely to supply the rebels with at least small quantities of light arms and ammunition and possibly some "technical personnel," and to give strong diplomatic and propaganda support for the Algerian proposal for a UN-super- vised referendum in Algeria:7 IL ASIA-AFRICA Algeria: De Gaulle's 4 November speech has created a feeling of bitterness and depression among members of the European community in Algeria, according to the American consul general in Algiers. Although popular demonstrations have been few and the powerful Front for French Algeria has reportedly urged the Europeans and loyal Moslems "to clench fists and wait," the sudden resignation of Andre Jacomet, the second-ranking civil official in Algeria, shows serious con- cern over De Gaulle's policy and may encourage extremists VP -TOP-SEGRET r � > Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 �1.011 SECRET *eV' and some elements of the army to overt action against De Gaulle. The rebel provisional government, now meet- ing in Tunis, will probably continue to assess Algerian reaction before making any official comment on the speech. (Page 1) *Republic of the Congo:/he Belgian Communist party, which in the past has had a primary responsibility for the development of Communist assets in the Congo, plans to es- tablish in Ghana a base for propaganda operations and for the indoctrination of selected Congolese leaders, Two Belgian Communists who visited Moscow in late October reportedly received a promise of "all necessary, aid" for the establishment of such a center, whose activities would include publication of a newspaper. The projected center appears to be one effort to counter Mobutu's expulsion of bloc diplomats and techni- cians in mid-September, a move which jeopardized Commu- nist propaganda and penetration operations in the Congdi (Page 2) *Japan - Persian Gulf Oil: Japanese oil interests in the Middle East are expected to begin production from their off- shore oil concession in the Persian Gulf near Kuwait in early 1961. It is estimated that by 1963 this production will amount to 30 percent of present Japanese requirements. The crude probably will be refined and marketed almost totally in Japan In a determined effort to cut Tokyo's foreign exchange costs for petroleum, whicti in 1959 amounted to $385,000,000. v III. THE WEST Italy: The Italian Communist party will be encouraged by its gains in the 6-7 November local elections to press the Nenni Socialists to abandon their "autonomist" policies and return to close cooperation with the Communists because their combined electoral strength has almost reached that of the 10 Nov 60 DAILY BRIEF ii --T-OP�SEeRET- AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO297780e 0 A 'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 411.10 ur %NO Christian Democrats. The government coalition parties won a slim nationwide majority but failed to gain control of such Important city councils as those in Rome, Genoa, Venice, Florence, and Naples. If the Christian Democrats form mu- nicipal alliances outside the pattern of the national govern- ment coalition, Fanfani's minor coalition partners may threat- en a cabinet crisis. (Page 3) IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS he conclusions with respect to initiation of hostilities re- main unchanged. The following was approved as Conclusion D'.3 (There are indications that, unless some progress is made in the near future toward a negotiated solution of the Algerian roblem, the Algerian rebels will request military aid from e Sino-Soviet bloc and that transit rights for such aid will be ranted by one or more of Algeria's North African neighbors. I requested to send such aid, the bloc would be likely to com- ply to the extent of arms and some technicians. In this event the French would probably try to seize bloc arms shipments and might attack depots of bloc arms on Tunisian and Moroc- can territory: 10 Nov 60 DAILY BRIEF -726 TOP SECRET A Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 Now CONFIDENTIAL 'vir Algeria President de Gaulle's 4 November speech has cre- ated a feeling of bitterness and depression among mem- bers of the European community in Algeria, who, ac- cording to the American consul general in Algiers, feel tricked and betrayed. The Europeans are particularly in- censed because of their belief that the option for a French Algeria has disappeared from De Gaulle's thinking in re- gard to a referendum on self-determination in Algeria. Popular manifestations of opposition to the speech have been limited to easily controlled street demonstra- tions, mostly in heavily European Oran; the powerful Front for French Algeria has reportedly urged the Eu- ropeans and loyal Moslems to "clench fists and wait." Ur- gent sessions of reserve officer and veterans associations have been reported since the speech, and French security officers have expressed concern over these meetings. The general Moslem reaction has been cautious. The resignation of Andre Jacomet, the second-ranking civil official in Algeria, took place without warning at a meeting of leading French officials presided over by Del- egate General Delouvrier. Jacomet's somewhat dramatic gesture--he has since been summoned to Paris and "dis- missed" by the government--is evidence of the state of mind among those who must implement De Gaulle's Algerian policies, and may encourage the extremists and some ele- ments of the army to overt opposition to De Gaulle, The Algerian provisional government, now meeting in Tunis, maintains its official silence on the speech, but the rebel minister of information indicated on 8 November that he might soon be able to inform the American Embassy in Tunis of the government's reaction. There are signs that Tunisian President Bourguiba wants the rebels to keen men all possibilities for negotiation with France. --CONFIDENTIAL 10 Nov 60 CENTRAI INITFI I InFtWF RI III MN] Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 �reW Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 SECRET Noir Belgian Cthnmunist Party Mapping Operations Against Congo (Moscow has promised two Belgian Communist party officials, Albert Deconinck and Jean Terfve, "all neces- sary aid" for the establishment in Ghana of a propaganda and indoctrination center aimed at the Congo, Activities at the projec e base--which would operate as a "studies center" for Congolese--would include propaganda, indoctrination of "progressive" Congolese, and publication of a newspape6 EPrior to the Congo's independence on 30 June, the Belgian party and the Czech Consulate in Leopoldville ap- pear to have shared responsibility for Communist prop- aganda and penetration efforts, with the Belgian Commu- nists operating primarily among Congolese visitors to Brussels. It appears likely that Communist efforts in the Congo have been seriously hampered by Colonel Mobutu's expulsion of bloc diplomats and technicians in mid-September. if Lumumba re- gains power, Soviet and Czech specialists are prepared to return to Leopoldville "at once0 �SEeRE-T-- 10 Nov 60 CENTRAI INITF1 I inpmrr RI III Prito Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 CONFIDENTIAL Italian Local Elections The Italian Communists made gains in the nationwide lo- cal elections held from 1 to 7 November. Interest in the vot- ing for provincial councils�always an indicator of party strength for the country as a whole--was heightened this year because television for the first time played an important part in a political campaign and the appeal of the party chiefs to a national audience emphasized broad issues. The ruling Chris- tian Democrats and their center party allies in the national coalition�the Democratic Socialists, the Republicans, and the Liberals--retained a margin of popular support, but the total Communist and Nenni Socialist vote nearly equalled that of the Christian Democrats, whose percentage was down 2 percent from the national elections of 1958. Nenni may argue that his policy of political independence from the Communists did not prevent the Socialist party from holding its own in the voting--as the party left wing had sug- gested it would. Nevertheless, the party's failure to make sub- stantial gains will put him under strong pressure from the left wing to renew close ties with the Communists. This issue may cause trouble at the next Socialist party congress, planned for January or February. The Christian Democrats and their coalition allies failed to gain a majority on the provincial councils of such important cities as Venice, Naples, and Genoa. Deadlocks in the coun- cils have in the past been resolved by having a government commissioner appointed who is responsible to Rome. The Christian Democrats may try to avoid this unpopular step by making alliances with parties to the right or left of the national coalition. Alliance with the neo-Fascists, however, would be strongly opposed by the Democratic Socialists, while alliance with the Nenni Socialists would be anathema to the Liberals. If the Christian Democrats persist, a cabinet crisis might en- sue. CONFIDENTIAL 10 Nov 60 CENTRAL INTELLIC;FNCT RI III FTIKII Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 IA I L.01.-�1 'V 1 I '1 L. 'Nor? THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 r/Z Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809 'quire TOP SECRET ',Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977809'. 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