CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977810
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 11, 1960

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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
forCUMENT No, /t1
COANCE IN CLASS, X
H DECLASSIFIFD
CHANern TO: TS $ C
Uri- REVIEW nATE: 2.0/0
MN; HR 70.2
10 JUN 1980
1,4TE1 REVIEWER:
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11 NOVEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in Laos.
South Korea--Unification with neutraliza-
tion advocated by vocal minority in South
Korea.
Japanese patrol boats protecting fishing
vessels from South Korean seizure au-
thorized to fire in self-defense.
Iraq--Qasim regime arrests ten prom-
inent Communists.
III. THE WEST
Bolivian President, facing continued eco-
nomic difficulties and pressure from left
to seek Soviet help, planning fake coup as
excuse for declaring "state of siege."
LATE ITEM
()Reported coup in South Vietnam.
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*Japan - South Korea: Japanese patrol boats in the vicinity
of the "Rhee Line" in the Korean Strait have been authorized
to shoot in "emergency self-defense" if necessary during op-
erations to protect Japanese fishing vessels from South Korean
seizure. This reversal of a standing prohibition against use
of arms undoubtedly stems from a 2 November machine-gun
attack on a Japanese patrol vessel. The Ikeda government,
however, remains intent on improving relations with South Ko-
rea through negotiations for an over-all settlement of differ-
ences
*Iraq: The Qasim regime has dealt the Iraqi Communist
party another blow by arresting ten prominent Communists,
including at least one central committee member. This move,
following the harsh suppression of Communist-inspired riots
from 5 to 7 November, is likely to induce other key members
to go underground. If Qasim endorses this action, this may
placate dissatisfied anti-Communist elements who have felt that
his recent policies have been too favorable to the Communists.
III. THE WEST
Bolivia; President Paz Estenssoro may be planning to
engineer a fake leftist coup attempt against his own govern-
ment to provide an excuse within the next two weeks for decla-
ration of a state of siege. Paz has been unsuccessful in his
efforts to improve Bolivia's critical economic condition in his
first three months in office. Although he apparently prefers
Western assistance, he faces strong political pressures to seek
Soviet economic help and raise wages despite a threat of re-
newed inflation.
11 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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LATE ITEM
*South Vietnam: According to information available
as of 0400 on 11 November, President Diem appears to
have turned over, control of the South Vietnamese govern-
ment to the armed forces following an assault on the
presidential palace led by paratroop battalions with lit-
tle opposition from forces other than the presidential
guard. According to some reports, at least 30 persons
were killed. The coup leaders, who have some support
from Diem's civilian political opponents, are considered
to be non-Communist and claim that their purpose is to
strengthen the country's effort to combat Communist dis-
sidence and subversion. They appear to include profes-
sional army officers who have been voicing concern over
the adverse effect of political interference on military op-
erations. They have also criticized Diem's nepotism and
authoritarian measures as hampering his ability to main-
tain popular. support. There is no evidence that the Corn-
mtmists had any part in the coup, but Communist guerrillas
may attempt to take advantage of the confusion by striking
at governmental centers. (Page 1)
ii NOV 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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LATE ITEM
Reported Military Coup in South Vietnam
(Based on information available as of 0400 hours EST, 11 No-
vember)
President Ngo Dinh Diem has reportedly lost control of
the South Vietnamese government to the armed forces fol-
lowing a military coup staged in the early hours of 11 No-
vember. The coup effort apparently was spear-headed by
four paratroop battalions which attacked the presidential
palace at 0300 hours local time and overpowered the presi-
dential guard battalion after several hours of heavy fighting;
army, navy and police forces in the Saigon area seem either
to have joined the coup or offered only passive resistance.
According to some reports, at least 30 persons were killed
in the fighting. The coup group appears to be in control of
key military and communications installations and has an-
nounced the formation of a ruling revolutionary council. The
president had earlier called for army reinforcements from
outside the Saigon area, but there is no indication that his
appeal has been acted on. As of 1050 hours, firing in the cap-
ital city had substantially subsided. Reportedly, president
Diem has not been harmed.
The military action reportedly was headed by Capt. Du
Quoc Dong, said to be a competent US-trained officer in com-
mand of the 1st Airborne Battalion. The position of armed
forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen, Le Van Ty is unclear; he has
been variously reported to be under arrest and to have been
named president pro tem.
sweeping changes were needed in Diem's military
and civilian entourage to prevent the government's collapse
and boasted that if so inclined, his paratroops could seize the
government in four hours. He has been reported to be in full
command of the coup forces. A civilian lawyer and leader of
an anti-Diem group, Hoang Co Thuy, claims to be political
adviser to the group, and to have supporters among uncoordi-
nated oppositionist labor and religious factions.
Key figures in the coup are considered to be non-Commu-
nist and have claimed on the Saigon radio that the purpose of
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their action is to strengthen the campaign against Commu-
nist guerrilla activities because of Diem's ineffectiveness in
dealing with the situation. No actions have been reported
against foreigners and the group has allegedly stated that it
desires American and Japanese aid.
In recent months, opposition as well as some govern-
ment circles have increasingly vented long-standing griev-
ances against repressive measures of the Diem government
and Diem's authoritarian rule through a family clique which
fostered favoritism and corruption. Certain professional
army officers were particularly bitter over political inter-
ference in command assignments which they felt interfered
with the army's effectiveness against the Communist dissi-
dents. They had also increasingly expressed concern that
Diem's failure to make sweeping reforms was creating a
dangerous political situation in Saigon and contributing to
rural apathy which favored the Communist guerrillas. Re-
cent gestures by Diem have been inadequate to rally popular
support and to contain Communist guerrilla activities which
have been spreading to previously quiescent areas of the coun-
try.
While there is no evidence of North Vietnamese involve-
ment in the coup, Hanoi has embarked on an intensive effort
to topple Diem, urging stepped-up guerrilla terrorism and
offering to cooperate with any groups politically opposed to
Diem. Hanoi has had a coup in mind, but it does not appear
that the leaders of the revolutionary committee meet North
Vietnam's criteria for a group which can be led into a coali-
tion government and eventually absorbed by the Communists.
A successful coup would tend to confirm Hanoi's belief that
the situation in the South is ripe for Communist exploitation.
In this respect, the Communist guerrillas may move quickly
to strike at government administrative centers while the ef-
fectiveness of South Vietnam's army is reduced by confusion.
Thus far, Moscow radio has limited its reporting on the situa-
tion in South Vietnam to quoting western press coverage. Hanoi
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has reported briefly and without comment quoting Saigon
Radio.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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