CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/03/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02980789
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 11, 1954

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: t9 00.9
MTH: HR 70-2
DATE: REVIEWER:
DOCUMENT NO. _re
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. French authorities in Indochina predict Communist bid for "free
elections" (page 3).
2. Burmese government party opposed to negotiated settlement in
Indochina (page 3).
3. Burma trade talks with Moscow and Peiping near completion (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Shah angered by Zahedi's rigging of elections and criticism of army
(page 5).
5. Revolutionary Command Council plans to avoid elections in Egypt
(page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Work resumed on several Satellite industrial projects (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7.
8.
LATIN AMERICA
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. French authorities in Indochina predict Communist bid for "free
elections":
French authorities in Saigon believe
that Communist spokesmen at Geneva
will demand the holding of elections in
Vietnam without outside interference,
The authorities state that
tne viet Minh would undoubtedly win such an election held imme-
diately after a truce.
Bao Dal's continued refusai to noia elections for a national assembly
has weakened the position of his government and increased the pos-
sibility that non-Communist Vietnamese will respond to seemingly
reasonable Communist election proposals.
These French officials also believe that
failure of the Geneva conference would probably be followed b a
stepped-up Communist military effort in Indochina.
fears in this regard may make t e French more
susceptible to Communist propaganda.
2. Burmese government party opposed to negotiated settlement in
Kyaw Nyein, leading member of Burma's
Socialist Party, which controls the govern-
ment, told Ambassador Sebald in Rangoon
on 9 March that his party believes negotia-
tions with the Viet Minh in Indochina would be a fatal mistake. He is
convinced that the popularity of Ho Chi Minh is such that the Viet Minh
would win any national election.
According to Kyaw Nyein, the Burmese
Socialists consider it essential that a strong Magsaysay-type national
leader be found who would not be tied to Bao Dai and would be capable
of developing a genuine independence movement in Vietnam.
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Sebald believes that Kyaw Nyein feels it
essential that the French military effort continue until nationalist
military and political forces are sufficiently strong to assume full
responsibility.
Comment: Kyaw Nyein's realistic re-
marks are the strongest indication yet that the Burmese government
has reversed its original view that the Viet Minh is essentially a
nationalist movement not dominated by Moscow. They undoubtedly
reflect the fear that a French withdrawal would increase the Commu-
nist threat to Burma.
3. Burma trade talks with Moscow and Peiping near completion:
Negotiations for trade agreements with
Communist China and the Soviet Union
are practically completed and will be
announced shortly, according to Burma's
acting foreign minister. He described the pacts as "enabling" agree-
ments, on the basis of which individual transactions will subsequently
be negotiated.
The official stated that Burma is primarily
interested in finding new markets for its rice. The basic agreements,
however, will include "strategic materials," the nature of which he did
not specify. He was confident that Burma would not be "caught in the
Communist economic net."
Comment: Burma initiated the trade talks
last fall when it had large stoAs of unsold rice on hand. The sale of
a large part of these stocks to India has at least temporarily reduced
the pressure to find new markets. Rice is currently one of Peiping's
major exports and it is unlikely the Communist countries will take
enough of Burma's rice to� reduce its dependence on traditional customers.
Burma does not produce significant quantities
of any strategic materials that the Orbit urgently requires.
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Noe
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Shah angered by Zahedi's rigging of elections and criticism of army:
Minister of Court Ala told Ambassador
Henderson on 6 March that relations
between the shah and Prime Minister
Zahedi were extremely tense. Zahedi
"had had the impudence" to criticize the state of the Iranian army
and high-ranking officers in a letter to the shah, who reportedly
was infuriated. The shah informed Zahedi that he would not be
allowed to exercise any influence over the armed forces.
Ala also said that Zahedi had rigged the
elections in such a brazen manner as "to alienate the decent elements
of the country and damage the reputation of the shah." In the face of
the shah's advice, according to Ala, Zahedi was filling the Majlis and
Senate with corrupt and notoriously pro-British individuals.
Comment: The shah assumed active
control of the armed forces when Mossadeq was removed, and Zahedi
has been by-passed on nearly all army matters. The political activi-
ties of Chief of Staff Batmangelitch, who has attempted to undermine
Zahedi's position, have contributed to the hostile relations between the
shah and the prime minister.
Despite serious friction over election
tactics and army control, the shah and Zahedi are dependent on each
other in the present situation. Barring a sudden break because of
personal pique, they will probably continue working together,at least
during the imminent oil negotiations.
5. Revolutionary Command Council plans to avoid elections in Egypt:
The Revolutionary Command Council will
not permit elections in Tune for a constituent
assembly, as publicly announced, except in
the "hiffhlv unliknlv" rivpnt that it f.nrt frt-pc.c."
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Comment:
indicated that the council1�las no intention of relinquishing any
authority to an elected assembly, despite the current lip service
given to restoring constitutional government by 23 July 1954, the
second anniversary of the coup deposing Farouk.
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Work resumed on several Satellite industrial projects:
work has been resumed on six
Rumanian hydroelectric power stations,
se e al of which are located in one of the major Rumanian coal-
producing areas.
Comment: The projects now being
resumed in Rumania and Bulgaria form an important part of their
new investment programs, which call for the concentration of heavy
industrial investment in the key mining and power sectors where
critical shortages exist. When the "new course" was announced in
the Satellites in late 1953, construction on a number of major projects
was halted, pending a reduction and reorientation of the investment
program.
There have been no reliable reports,
however, of a resumption of work on such long-term projects as
the Danube-Black Sea Canal.
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WESTERN EUROPE
LATIN AMERICA
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