THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (WEEKLY) - 1967/11/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02983807
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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460" SeCrti
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
The Situation in South Vietnam
(Weekly)
150
6 November 1967
No. 0375/67
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3.5(c)
WARNING
This document contains inforination affecting the national defense of the
United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the
1iS Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or
wceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
OF,OLIP 1
,XCLUDEI. FROM AUTOMATIC
IOWNU'IADENO AND
)Et,LAWIFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(30 October - 5 November 1967)
CONTENTS
Section
POLITICAL SITUATION
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT II
Communist counteractions to Revolutionary
Development; Anti-RD activity; Internal
countermeasures; Communist proselyting.
ECONOMIC SITUATION III
Prices; Currency and gold; Rice situation;
Decentralization of tax authority; Corn
imports.
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)
Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency
Prices (graph)
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I. POLITICAL POLITICAL SITUATION
New Government's Status
1. Shortly after his inauguration on 31 October,
President Thieu announced the appointment of Nguyen
Van Loc as prime minister, and at resignation ceremonies
for the Ky cabinet and the Directorate, he requested
that the cabinet stay on in a caretaker capacity un-
til Loc has formed his government.
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the cabinet cabinet would be selected by 29 October, but no
appointments have as yet been announced.
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SUCTRET"
5. In the first step of the government's anti-
corruption drive, the Saigon Special Court on 28 Octo-
ber sentenced former Binh Dinh Province chief Lt. Colo-
nel Tran Dinh Vong to death on charges of corruption
and embezzlement. Vong's execution was to have oc-
curred within 24 hours of his sentencing but it has
been stayed pending review of his appeal on 29 October
to Thieu for clemency.
6. Also sentenced were a South Vietnamese Army
engineer officer, a sergeant, and a former Binh Dinh
district chief, who received life imprisonment, and
a second district chief, who received a four-year
prison term. In addition, seven hamlet and village
officials from Binh Dinh received sentences ranging
from one to three years, and three were acquitted.
Charges against all 14 officials centered on the em-
bezzlement of public funds intended for construction
of the Phu Cat Airfield in Binh Dinh.
Buddhist Activities
7. Buddhist activities during the were high-
lighted by the self-immolations of a monk in Quang
Ngai city on 31 October and a nun in Nha Trang the
following day. Both left letters condemning the
government's recognition of the moderate Buddhist
charter and calling moderate leader Thich Tam Chau
a "traitor to Buddhism." The nun's suicide was
followed shortly by an announcement to the press
that militant Buddhist patriarch Thich Tinh Khiet
had vowed to sacrifice himself unless the government
revokes the moderates' charter. One of the militant
leaders, Thich Thien Hoa, reportedly told newsmen
that both Khiet and another of the older monks, Thich
Hai Trang, are ready to take the "extreme step" un-
less some government action is forthcoming. It re-
mains to be seen whether the two monks will actually
carry through with their threats.
8. Police in Hue are convinced that the Viet
Cong are involved in local "struggle" activities.
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-FrEC�R-er
Aire
9. There is additional speculation that followers
of the militant and the moderate Buddhist factions
are heading for a break from their respective leaders,
Thich Tri Quang and Thich Tam Chau. Lower house dep-
uty Ho Huu Tuong, who is also vice-rector of the
Buddhists' Van Hanh University, told an embassy of-
ficer on 2 November that a personal reconciliation
between the two leaders is unlikely because of their
intransigent stands on the charter issue.
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Lower House Deputy Convicted
12. A provincial court has annulled the election
of a lower house deputy, but it is not yet clear whether
he will finally be barred from taking his seat in the
house. According to a Saigon Post account, the Special
Court of Kien Giang ProVince disqualified Ta Ngoc Mai,
sentenced him to three months' imprisonment, and im-
posed a fine of 20,000 piasters for violation of the
election law. Mai, along with four campaign workers
who were also convicted, was charged with using "armed
pressure" on voters. Almost 40 persons, including
the provincial judge, reportedly witnessed the inti-
midation attempts.
13. The Post item did not mention under which
article of the election law Mai was convicted. In
view of the sentence and fine imposed, it appears
his conviction was for carrying a weapon into a poll-
ing place. If so, he will be allowed to defend him-
self before the lower house, which will have the final
say on whether he is to be seated. Other election
law articles, under which Mai may have been convicted,
carry heavier sentences than that meted out to him
and would require a new election within three months.
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II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
The enemy forces in South Vietnam
have stepped up their military campaign
against the government's Revolutionary
Development programs. While the reaction
has been against all RD programs, the
RD teams, and in recent months the Chieu
Hoi centers, have increasingly become
targets of the enemy's forays. The Com-
munist apparatus has apparently under-
taken several internal countermeasures
designed to consolidate their organiza-
tion, release more people for combat or
combat support missions, and enable the
infrastructure to strengthen its posi-
tion in the rural areas. Communist pro-
selyting continues to utilize traditional
techniques of propaganda, persuasion,
and, when necessary, selective terrorism.
The Communists in South Vietnam have
shown a remarkable organizational re-
silience and flexibility and, within cer-
tain limits, appear to demonstrate a
high degree of adaptivity to differing
local situations.
Communist Counteractions to Revolutionary Development:
Anti-RD Activity
1. Since late 1966 an increasing number of re-
ports,
ave in icate deep Communist concern over
the possibility of government success with the Revolu-
tionary Development (RD) programs. In addition to
concern over the grass roots activities of the RD
teams themselves--which represents the first appar-
ently effective challenge to the enemy apparatus at
the hamlet level--these reports and documents also
reflect the Communists' growing uneasiness over such
related programs as the Static Census Grievance Cadres
(SCGS), the refugee program, and the Chieu Hoi ("Open
Arms") campaign.
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2. During 1967 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Army (VC/NVA) troops in South Vietnam have stepped
up their activities directed at countering the RD
program, using their military forces to strike at
the RD teams and supporting troops--especially the
Regional and Popular Forces. They have also con-
ducted forays against Chieu Hoi centers and reset-
tlement hamlets in the hope of causing the abandon-
ment of them. When they have failed to dislodge
the people from these centers, the Communists have
attempted to reactivate or establish covert cells
in them. Communist forces have tried to infiltrate
covert supporters into the RD cadre ranks or into
the village/hamlet administration organization.
They have also heavily employed terrorism against
the National Police, Hoi Chanh (ralliers), and vil-
lage/hamlet officials. The enemy seems aware that
there is a definite relationship between successful
RI) programs, in particular the cadres and Open Arms
aspects, and an increased flow of information about
his activities.
3. The threat posed to the local Viet Cong
political apparatus by the government's nation-
building efforts has forced the Communists to devote
more of their energies to combatting these programs
Success in anti-RD operations has also assumed
greater psychological importance for the enemy as
he has become somewhat less able, except perhaps in
I Corps, to conduct successful large-scale military
operations. Successful counter-RD actions enable
the enemy to retain his prestige with the rural popu-
lation and to inflict continued attrition on the weak-
est link in the GVN organization--low-level leader-
ship.
4. During 1966 there were about 25 significant
enemy attacks against the RD teams or People's Action
Teams, and a total of 593 cadre members were killed
by Viet Cong actions. The majority of the incidents
took place in areas where inadequate security was a
major factor. Usually, teams were exposed to enemy ac-
tivitybybeing placed in hamlets where the securing
forces were understrength, inadequate, or simply non-
existent. Provincial officials were by and large
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poorly informed as to the correct use of the teams
and often tended to use them as static security
units.
5. In 1967 there has been a marked increase
in incidents directed against the RD programs. In
the first nine months of 1967, there were about
900 incidents directed against the RD teams alone,
and approximately 487 cadres have been killed thus
far. In all but three months this year, I Corps
has had the largest number of anti-RD incidents.
6. The principal enemy military effort against
the RD program appears to be by Viet Cong local
force units. Hamlet and village guerrillas in con-
tested areas support anti-RD operations and often
work in conjunction with the local forces. Prior
to April 1967, there were few reports of the use
of enemy main force troops against RD teams, but
main force employment in this mission has reportedly
sharply increased since then, especially in the
coastal areas of I, II, and southeastern III Corps.
In keeping with the enemy's previous tactics in
other fields, specific anti-RD agencies are appar-
ently being established. Such an agency has been
reported in the III Corps province of Long Khanh,
while "special action" companies and/or sapper units
appear to have been assigned a specific counter-RD
mission in other areas.
7. As one means of encouraging their forces
to step up anti-RD activity, the Communists have
established new honorific titles such as "Determined
to Win Fighters" which carries status equivalent
to the title "Elite Fighters Against US Aggressor."
This award is made to Viet Cong units or individuals
who play significant roles in actions against RD
teams.
8. The enemy strategy appears to be to force
the Free World military forces to deploy against
the main force units in sparsely populated areas
such as the Demilitarized Zone, the western high-
lands, and northern III Corps, and to prevent ade-
quate protection of the RD programs in the lowlands
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and delta areas. This strategy, with some varia-
tions, was used against the French from 1946 to 1954.
Internal Countermeasures
9. In order to insure the continuation and
development of their movement, the Communists have
apparently made several shifts in their apparatus
to counter the allied troop build up and the RD
programs. They appear to be putting increased em-
phasis on guerrilla warfare and military/civilian
proselyting activities in order to consolidate their
hold on the countryside. Furthermore, reported ad-
ministrative and/or territorial changes affect a
large part of the Viet Cong-provincial structure.
Some of these changes are evidently designed to
streamline and reduce the Communists' administrative
overhead and release more men for military service.
Other reports refer to a movement of cadres from
higher to lower echelons in an apparent effort to
strengthen Communists' organizations and revitalize
their leadership at the lowest levels.
10. Over the past year, there have also been
some indications that a number of district and vil-
lage cadres have been demoralized by allied mili-
tary pressures, by the prospects of fighting what
they believe will be a protracted war, and by the
government's "Open Arms" program. Agents have also
alleged that North Vietnamese cadre members spec-
ializing in antipacification activities were being
infiltrated to replace the "demoralized" cadres and
those lost to normal attrition. "Purges" of cadre
have reportedly occurred in many provinces. These
alleged difficulties in replacing personnel and in
obtaining qualified cadre may be borne out by what
appears, in some areas, to be an increaS'ed Communist
reliance on the recruitment of women and youths for
village guerrilla units and village/hamlet organiza-
tions.
11. The amount or degree of support the Com-
munists have in an RD area, combined with their es-
timate of what resources the GVN will put into the
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area, usually determines whether or not the Commu-
nists will withdraw their overt apparatus in the
hamlets and villages. Secret party and Liberation
Front members are reportedly being designated in
rural areas to serve as stay-behind forces should
the government establish itself.
12. In some areas, partly to counter RD pro-
grams and to retain the sympathies of the peasants
and landowners. the Communists have reportedly had
to reform--or occasionally reduce--some of their
taxes. The initiative in land reform has by and
large always been with the Communists and there have
been a few reports of their accelerating this pro-
gram. Moreover, some reports have been received
of Communist village/hamlet elections, in an attempt
to discredit or blunt government election efforts.
Communist Proselyting
13. The Communists have shown a remarkable
organizational resilience and flexibility and, within
certain limits, appear to be highly adaptible to
differing local situations. There has been and still
remains a lack of detailed information on Communist
political action/armed propaganda units. These units
apparently change their modus operandi to conform to
local situations; however, captured documents and
interrogation reports have yielded some information
on these cadres and units.
14. Agit/Prop Teams (AP)--also referred to as
task teams, assault propaganda teams, political ac-
tion units, and armed propaganda units--may be the
Communists' closest organization to the GVN's RD
teams. The APs are probably targeted against con-
tested or GVN-controlled villages and hamlets. Gen-
erally, they enter a hamlet--usually at night--as-
semble the residents, and spread leaflets and ban-
ners, collect information, and conduct propaganda
and civilian/military proselyting activities.
15. In their proselyting, the AP teams attempt
to recruit villagers for military units, urge those
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AN,
with relatives working for the government to per-
suade their relatives to desert or act as agents in
place, and occasionally extract money or goods from
the villagers. Where security conditions permit,
the AP teams are often accompanied by cultural or
entertainment groups, whose shows are geared to dis-
crediting the government and extolling the Viet Cong.
16. The AP units apparently seldom engage in
terrorism, this probably being left to district com-
mittees using local guerrillas or "special cell"
members. The professional entertainment, propa-
ganda, and/or proselyting cadres who may be part of
these agit/prop units rely almost exclusively on
propaganda and persuasion. The presence of their
weapons, although for defensive purposes, can still
serve to coerce or intimidate local people into co-
operating. Depending on their particular modus
operandi and the degree of security in the area,
the AP unit may have dispatched members ahead of
them to prepare the people for their arrival and/
or collect information about the local area. The
units may revisit the hamlet or village frequently,
and may leave elements of their unit behind to es-
tablish Liberation Front associations and/or a
party infrastructure.
17. The Communists usually make a distinction
between full-time AP units and those organized on
an ad hoc basis to carry out a propaganda mission
against a specific target. Analysis of available
information indicates that the majority of propa-
ganda activities probably conducted by the Viet Cong
in government areas and possibly conducted in heavily
contested areas are carried out by the latter units.
While propaganda disseminated in this manner may
lack a certain degree of professionalism--but not
necessarily effectiveness--it gives the Viet Cong an
instant response to a local incident, something the
government often lacks. The control cadre for an
ad hoc team may be drawn from district or province
propaganda-indoctrination sections or perhaps front
sections, and other members of the team can be from
sections of the party committee of the village in
which the ad hoc team is to operate. These teams
are oftentimes protectedby an element of the vil-
lage guerrilla unit. Where government security is
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effective, the Viet Cong will resort merely to dis-
seminating propaganda leaflets to night or using ter-
rorism.
18. Full-time agit/prop units appear to be
concentrated in--but not limited to--the northern
half of South Vietnam.
19. There are some indications that full-time
units in heavily contested areas--such as Binh
Duong Province--are required to support the military
forces in combat operations, but the nature or de-
gree of their involvement is uncertain. Provincial
battalions in Quang Nam are reported to have an
Armed Propaganda Team under the battalion's direc-
tion with a Psychological Warfare/Entertainment Team
directly under the Provincial Committee.
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III. ECONOMIC SITUATION
The Saigon retail price index continued
steady on 23 October for the third consecu-
tive week at a level 29 percent higher than
on 3 January. Free market currency and
gold prices were mixed. US officials
estimate Vietnam will have to import 900,000
metric tons of rice in 1968, compared with
projected arrivals of about 760,000 tons
this year. A critical shortage of rice
may develop in I and II Corps unless ships
can be found to transport stocks from
Saigon. The GVN has transferred all land
and property tax authority to local govern-
ing bodies. The US will finance increased
imports of corn for animal feed in order
to encourage livestock production.
Prices
1. Retail prices in Saigon remained steady
during the three weeks ending 23 October at a level
29 percent higher than at the beginning of the
year. Food prices were generally stable on 23
October as rice prices were unchanged and increases
in the prices of beefsteak, chicken, and shrimp
were offset by lower prices for lean pork and many
vegetables. Non-food prices were unchanged except
for an increase in the price of laundry soap. The
price of soap has risen 13 percent since 25 Sep-
tember, reportedly because of a serious shortage
of coconut oil. (A table of weekly retail prices
in Saigon is included in the Annex.)
2. Prices of US-financed imports also con-
tinued steady during the week ending 24 October
as they have since mid-September. Slight increases
were registered for condensed milk, wheat flour,
chemicals, and iron and steel products, but these
were balanced by declines in the prices of cement
and rayon yarn. The price of wheat flour has risen
steadily since the end of September because of
declining stocks and low arrivals.
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Currency and Gold
3. Free market currency rates in Saigon de-
clined on 23 October, while the price of gold leaf
was unchanged. The price of a US ten dollar bill
declined one piaster to 151 piasters per dollar,
and the price of MPC (scrip) fell three piasters to
113 piasters per dollar. (A graph on monthly and
weekly currency and gold prices is included in the
Annex.)
Rice Situation
4. US officials currently estimate that
Vietnam will require about 900,000 metric tons of
imported rice in 1968, compared with projected
arrivals this year of about 760,000 tons and actual
imports of 434,194 tons in 1966. The requirement
for 1968 assumes that consumption in Saigon and
26 rice deficit provinces will continue to rise,
reaching a total of 1,050,000 tons, of which an
estimated 250,000 tons will be provided by
deliveries of domestic rice from the delta. Al-
though deliveries from the delta to Saigon are
expected to be slightly higher in 1968 than in
1967, there apparently are no firm estimates of
total rice production for the crop year 1967/68.
Rice production has declined for three years, and,
according to the Embassy, prospects for the 1967-
68 crop seem mixed. Certain delta provinces
probably will have larger crops because of better
weather and the incentive provided by higher rice
prices in 1967. However, the shortage of manpower
will continue to cut into both the area cultivated
and the quality of cultivation. A recent study
in the delta by US technicians reportedly states
that because of the war and the draft, the lack
of security, and heavy migration to urban areas,
old men and women and children are often the only
available farm labor. Some provinces report that
lack of experienced rice transplanters is resulting
in lower yields. Moreover, in I Corps, continued
intensive military operations probably will further
reduce production and increase import needs there.
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5. Rice import requirements for 1967 were
originally estimated to be about 850,000 tons, but
arrivals will fall well below this level due to
procurement and shipping delays. Through September
about 660,000 tons arrived in Vietnam and a maxi-
mum additional 100,000 tons may arrive from the US
and Thailand before the end of the year. As a
result of past and possible future delays in the
arrival of imports, the projections for year-end
stock levels in Saigon and the rice deficit prov-
inces have steadily declined.
6. A critical shortage of rice in I and II
Corps threatens to develop because the GVN Minister
of Transport, apparently as a result of pressure
from the Vietnam Shipowners Associations, has
prohibited the use of foreign flag vessels for
coastal shipping. These vessels were mainly
chartered by USAID to move government rice from
Saigon to central Vietnam. US officials have been
able to persuade the Minister of Commerce to circum-
vent the ban by hiring a foreign flag ocean-going
vessel on 10 October to transport 10,000 tons of
rice to Da Nang. The Embassy expects the GVN to
withdraw its interdiction, which also affects the
movement of other US aid goods to central Vietnam,
and then hopes to negotiate a new charter agreement
which will preclude such restrictions in the future.
Unless more rice can be shipped from Saigon, how-
ever, in addition to imports scheduled to arrive
directly at up-country ports, stocks in I and II
Corps may dwindle to 2,000 tons by the end of
December. Estimated consumption for these prov-
inces is roughly 40,000 tons per month.
Decentralization of Tax Authority,
7. Just prior to the Thieu-Ky inauguration
the government issued a decree transferring all
land and property tax authority to local units of
government effective 1 January 1968. The GVN
Minister of Finance will set broad minimum and
maximum tax rates for different categories of pro-
perty, but within these guidelines each local
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governing body down to the village level will have
the power to levy and collect its own taxes. None
of the revenue will go to the national government.
Under the present system, administered by the
Central Tax Directorate, there have been two sets
of land and property taxes--a nationwide base tax
and a surcharge imposed by the local governments.
Collections from the former went into the national
budget, while revenues from the surcharges went to
the local governments. The base tax rate has been
relatively low and provided less than one percent
of the GVN's total domestic tax revenues in 1966.
The local surcharges have varied considerably by
area, ranging from 100 percent and 50 percent of
the base tax for provinces and villages, respectively,
in central Vietnam to 20 percent and 10 percent in
southern Vietnam. Although the national government
may not be losing much in revenues, US officials be-
lieve that in giving over some measure of tax
authority it will greatly strengthen the local levels
of government.
Corn Imports
8. Arrangements were completed in October to
increase Vietnam's imports of corn for animal feed,
to broaden the market, and to begin importing corn
on a commercial basis. In the future corn will be
imported by the GVN Agricultural Development Bank
and sold without restriction as to distributor or
end-user at a price close to that on the open
market. Since 1963 Vietnam's imports of corn,
provided under US grants, have amounted to approxi-
mately 117,000 metric tons and were sold at
artificially low prices mainly to small marginal
farmers and certain large commercial farms in the
Saigon area. The new agreement calls for 60,000
tons to be imported through the end of 1968 under
an arrangement similar to that for rice; the GVN
pays for the imports with piasters, and a certain
percentage of these so-called counterpart funds are
reserved for US uses in Vietnam.
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9. The long-range purpose of enlarging the
import program is to expand livestock production
through the greater use of corn for animal feed.
In 1966 Vietnam produced 35,000 tons of corn, but
almost none of it was used for animal feed. The
main livestock feed is rice bran, of which supplies
are insufficient and high-priced. The price set
for the new shipments is intended to minimize the
cost to pork and poultry producers while encourag-
ing domestic feed grain production. If firm markets
for corn can be established and farmers begin using
corn as a regular part of the feed diet, officials
hope that production of both livestock and corn
will increase.
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TABLE
Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon/
13 June
196612
3 Jan.
1967
2 Oct.
1967
9 Oct.
1967
16 Oct.
1967
23 Oct.
1967
Index for all Items
173
225
295
290
291
290
Index for Food Items
190
2.42
,334
326
326
324
Of Which:
(In Piasters)
Rice-Soc Nau (100 kg.)
1,250
1,700
2,400
2,400
2,300
2,300
Pork Bellies (1 kg.)
90
130
200
180
200
200
Fish-Ca Tre (1 kg.)
130
150
230
220
220
220
Nuoc Mam (jar)
70
90
150
150
150
150
Index for Nonfood Items
140
122
222
225
227
228
Of Which:
(In Piasters)
Firewood (cu. meter)
360
560
500
500
500
500
Cigarettes (pack)
10
14
14
14
14
14
White Calico (meter)
27
33
42
45
45
45
Kerosene (liter)
7.8
10.5
9
9
9
9
a. Data are from USAID sources. For all indexes 1 January 1965 = 100.
b. Price level just prior to the 18 June devaluation.
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500
400
300
200
100
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'lbw" Are
Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
PIASTERS PER US DOLLAR
I I I I I 1 1 I I
1964
1966 1967
AUG SEP
T967
0.1611111e610016
GOLD: Basis gold leaf worth $35 per troy ounce
-.. US $10 GREEN
US $10 MPC Military Payment Certificates, (scrip).
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