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January 27, 2020
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January 30, 2020
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May 24, 1958
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 TOP SECRET lip) c / 24 May 1958 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. I NO CHANC: IN CI 1.,..9.aX I I 12/.-.C. D cL uA,r.H.,-nTO Tw NP:i REVIEW DATE: _ AUTH: 2 DA TOP SECRET A REVIEWER: =L. J. Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 10, 24 MAY 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC � Soviet air exercises in Arctic lasting longer than nrevious activity of this nature. 0 Bloc reactions to Soviet-Yugoslav dispute reveal marked differences I n tone. Tito may seek to promote ties with Nehru and NasLr to counter bloc pressure against him. IL ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon - Military stalemate and political impasse continues; UAR � support for opposition may be: stepped up. Sudanese officials fear Egyptian subversion against government. UAR may be plotting to incite Kurdish tribal disturbances in Middle East; Iraq, Iran, and Turkey planning pro- test to UN Security CounciL 0 TOP SECRET Indonesia - Central government official indicates willingness to discuss "settlement" with dissidents. 0 Japan - Kishi victory will strengthen his hand in foreign policy; pressure for more trade with Communist China will continue. French commander in Tunisia urges early withdrawal of troops, except from Bizerte, as only way to avoid bloodshed. Algerian military and civilian ex- tremists prepared to accept prolonged stalemate with Paris. III. THE WEST France - Pflimlin's majority in danger amid signs of more political support for De Gaulle. 0 West German foreign minister believes De Gaulle's accession to power in Paris would be "catastrophe" for Germany. @ Panama - Although national guard con- trols situation, further trouble still Possible. Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 x� N. Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 ���, ������ A. it 411.9 �11119 s /JO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 24 May 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet Arctic air activity: Sizable numbers of jet medium bombers, principally from Long Range Air Force bases located in the Soviet Far East, have been conducting exercises involving bases in the eastern and central Arctic. This series of exercises began in mid-April, and has con- tinued beyond the usual termination date of comparable ac- tivities in past years. The bulk of these flights apparently are familiarization flights with most aircraft remaining on Arctic bases for not more than a day or so. (Page 1) (Map) Bloc-Yugoslav dispute: Bloc reactions to the Soviet- Yugoslav dispute reveals differences of views among the satellites regarding a future course toward Belgrade. The public position taken by Poland contrasts markedly in tone with those of Moscow, Peiping and the "hard-line" satel- lites, although Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Rumania have shown an inclination to adopt a more conciliatory at- titude than Moscow toward Belgrade. (Page 2) Yugoslavia: Tito may again attempt to promote his concept of a Yugoslav-Egyptian-Indian grouping of uncom- mitted nations as a counter to adverse Soviet bloc foreign policy initiatives toward him in the wake of the Moscow- Belgrade ideological rupture. Tito has reportedly sent letters to Nehru and Nasir regarding his dispute with the USSR. Belgrade was greatly encouraged by Nehru's de- fense of its stand against the Soviet Union, and Nasir on --Tep-SEGRETT-- Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 %I horLIVA %LA his return from Moscow told Ambassador Hare that he intends to visit Tito "unofficially" in July. II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon: The Egyptian Embassy in Beirut on 22 May forwarded to Cairo a plan of action which proposed that the principal dissident armed groups in northern, eastern and southern Lebanon converge on Beirut and demand that Pres:- ident Chamoun resign within 24 hours. Syrian agents are reported to have made a large de- livery of arms to Lebanese dissidents on 22 May. The military situation has been generally quiet, with the gov- ernment forces apparently inactive against the dissidents who hold Balabakk and part s of Tripoli. (Page 3) UAR-Sudan: Sudanese officials are concerned that lithe UAR is successful in its opposition to Chamoun in Lebanon, Nasir may next move against Prime Minister Khalil's government. Egyptian bribery of members of Par- liament taken together with southern Sudanese resentment of Khartoum could weaken the pro-Western coalition in the parliamentary session just begun. (Page 5) UAR-Kurdish tribes: The UAR may be planning to incite Kurdish tribal disturbances on the frontiers of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. According to information reaching the Iranian government' UAR officials have been in contact with Kurdish tribal leaders, and the subject of an independ- ent Kurdistan was discussed by President Nasir during his trip to the USSR. King Husayn of Jordan states that Turkey, Iran, and Iraq are planning to protest to the UN Security Council against U4Ra1temnts to create an independent Kurdish republic. (Page 6) (Map) 24 May 58 DAILY BRIEF U. N�N 1,w Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 N Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834- kiise ktios0 Indonesia: Deputy army chief Col. Jani expects the dissident capital of Menado to fall within two weeks. He also states that army headquarters is willing to discuss a settlement with the dissidents but would insist on dictat- ing the terms. (Page 7) Japanese general elections: Despite Sino-Soviet ef- forts to undermine his position, Prime Minister Kishi's con- servative Liberal-Democ4tic party won a large majority in the general election of 22 May. He will be encouraged to continue his policy of cooperation with the United States. While Kishi will be subjected to pressures to improve trade relations with Peiping, the election results should enable him to ao slow in making political concessions, (Page 8) Tunisia: The French commander in Tunisia urges that the evacuation of all French forces in Tunisia, ex- cept those at Bizerte, begin immediately "as the only means to avoid future incident's which could lead to blood- shed." He believes that the majority could be withdrawn within two weeks, About 13,000 of the 22,000 French forces in Tunisia are based at Biz,erte. Algeria: There are signs of splits within the ranks of the civilian and military extremists. All elements seem prepared to face the prospect of a prolonged stale- mate between Algiers and Paris, and there is talk of eventual secession. The army's primary political in- terest in the dispute continues to be to bring about a change in the regime in Paris. General Salan com- mitted 1irnf&f even Mnr xplicitly to this view on 23 May. (Page 9) 24 May 58 DAILY BRIEF iii X Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 III. THE WEST 1� 6 France: Pflimlin's proposals for strengthening the executive have run into major opposition in the National Assembly, and discussion of the issue has been postponed. This action suggests stronger opposition from the Inde- pendents, more of whom now tend to support General de Gaulle. Should the Independents withdraw their support, Pflimlin would have to depend on the Communists to main- tain a majority. In this connection, French press reports suggest that the Communists may be under pressure from Moscow to withdraw their support from Pflimlin. (Page 10) West Germany: Foreign Minister Brentano believes that the consequences of De Gaulle's coming to power in France could be "catastrophic" for Germany and would be interpreted by the German public as marking the complete failure of Bonn's foreign policy. He feels that De Gaulle would try to replace'Diropean integration arrangements with new bilateral economic and political agrmnfs with er which Bonn would have to refuse. (Page 11) Panama: Although the national guard controls Panama City under virtual martial law --following the violence which took several lives on 22 May--there may be further serious trouble. Opposition groups hoping to oust President de la Guardia will probably continue their efforts. Although the disturbances have still had no anti-American overtones, they coilld be channeled in that direction at any time. (Page 12) 24 May 58 DAILY BRIEF iv --Top SECRET N*4 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 TOP SECRET BaranavIchi OLenyo Ufa eee ee. AREA INVOLVED IN RECENT SOVIET LRAF EXERCISES IN ARCTIC (MID.APPIL 195$ TO DATE) � EASTERN/CENTRAL ARCTIC BASES USED FLIGHT ROUTES (SCHEMATIC) FLIGHT ROUTE (SCHEMATIC) STATUT -TOP-SECRET_ yi Shmldto rain� nadyrkenInko .Maritirne BaseVIAdIvIok Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Nuri I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet Long Range Air Force Arctic Activities Approximately 60 Soviet Long Range Air Force BADGER (TU-16) jet medium bombers and one BEAR (TU-95) heavy bomber have conducted a series of exer- cises involving the Eastern and Central Arctic bases of Tiksi, Mys Shmidta, and Anadyr/Leninka since mid-April. Of this total, as many as 50 BADGERS deployed from bases located in the Far East, the remainder from bases located in the western USSR. Most deployments have been of short duration with little or no local flying from forward bases, suggesting that these operations were related primarily to unit mobili- ty, route navigation, and base familiarization training. On several occasions, the aircraft remained at the Arctic bases less than 24 hours. Numerous delays in scheduling, however, were noted during these operations. These appeared to be caused, in most instances, by unfavorable weather. Compared with Arctic training activity in 1956, 1957, and an earlier phase during 1958, these recent operations engaged more aircraft, involved the LRAF units based in the Far East to a greater extent, and have continued be- yond the usual termination date for such exercises. SECRET-TOP- 24 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 I...WI NI 11.� 1-41 II 1 I .C7.L. ire Satellites Differ on Yugoslav Question Hungarian, Rumanian and Polish comments on the Mos- cow-Belgrade dispute have emphasized "comradely criti- cism," They have avoided vituperation and, although fully adheringtobasic bloc positions on "revisionism," have called for further interparty talks and continuance of amic- able government-to-government relations. This reaction-- which in the case of Hungary admittedly reflects "conster- nation" of party members over Yugoslav developments�is significantly different from the uncompromising stand taken by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Comment in the official Hungarian party newspaper of 21 May, while closer to the Kremlin's position than Warsaw's guarded defiance, is nonetheless conciliatory. It calls for further discussions with the Yugoslav party "as between comrades" and warns Hungarian party members not to "backslide" to the vituperative line of the 1949 Cominform resolution against Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the Hungarian article does condemn the Yugoslav party for its "anti-Marxist views," admits the 1948 resolution expelling Belgrade from the Cominform was "essentially" correct, and alleges Yugoslavia approved of the Hungarian revolution. Rumania, like Hungary, apparently still desires to avoid direct involvement in the dispute. The official Ru- manian comment on the Yugoslav question issued on 18 May avoided polemics while carefully siding with Moscow on the ideological questions in dispute. Polish comment goes much further, approaching open disagreement with the Kremlin's line and even hinting that Moscow does not fully support the Chinese Communist de- nunciation of Tito. An 18 May article in Swiat i Polska, un- official organ of the Foreign Ministry declared that the Poles considered the isolation of Yugoslavia in 1948 "unjustified." 24 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approvedi for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 NNW' 'gore II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanese Situation in light of the imminent arrival of American tanks and President Chamoun's con- tinued resistance, opposition elements should be given arms to "enter the capital by force, even if it led to a clash with the army." equipping the forces of Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt; Maruf Sad, a Shia Moslem from Sidon; Sabri Hammadah, a Balabakk Shia; and Sulayman Franjiya, a Tripoli Moslem. a concerted march on Beirut, which has failed to materialize. renewed fighting in Tripoli pin down army units there who might otherwise join in the de- fense of Beirut. Syrian intelligence is reported to be using Sirghaya, a Syrian town on the Lebanese border near Balabakk, as a center for arms shipments to dissident forces. The town is also being used as a point where Syrian commandos in s- ant parb assemble for incursions into Lebanon. flientions Syrian soldiers in mufti heading for Kamal Jumblatt's castle in the Bayt ad-Din region. The military situation in Lebanon remains in a state of suspension. In the Balabakk area, the army appears to be following a passive course, and no action has been taken to recapture the town. The arrival of Egyptian Brigadier-General Abd al- GhaffitY�. a guerrilla warfare specialist, in Damascus on 24 May 58 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved !or Release: 29119/08/20 CO2985834 21 May supports a number of reports predicting an im- mediate intensification of UAR interference in Lebanon. The political situation is still deadlocked. the opposition has rejected a compromise solution where- by General Shihab would become prime minister and � Chamoun serve out his term of office. Prime Minister Sami Su111 has declared that his cabi- net "cannot ask for the amendment of the constitution" so that President Chamoun can serve another term. Like- wise, Sulh declared that he cannot accede to demands that Chamoun resign. A late press report from Cairo asserts that a "popu- lar government" has been formed in south Lebanon and that its forces will march on Beirut "within two days." While this claim may be a form of psychological warfare against the Lebanese Government, it may indicate that the UAR is about to initiate such a movement. The existence of a "Free Lebanese Government" with Nasir's covert support would serve as an effective rallvin point for antigovernment ele- ments. 24 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 AMU., Alft aft 1.9 PIN Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Nole Egyptian Activity in the:Sudan The UAR's subversive campaign against Sudanese Prime Minister Khalil's pro-Western government may be gaining strength, and events in Lebanon have apparently shaken the confidence of high Sudanese officials in their ability to resist a possible Egyptian effort to vverthrow Khalil's coalition. The Saudi Arabian ambassador in Khartoum stated on 20 May that he had "incontestable proof" that the UAR Embassy was "Vuying" members of the Sudanese Parliament and will make some move against the government within two weeks. The speaker of the Su- dan's house of representatives has informed the US Embassy of the "gloomy" state of mind of many of his colleagues and of his fear that the Sudan might be next if Nasir wins out in Lebanon. Egypt was apparently unchastened by the setback in prestige it suffered in the Sudanese border dispute last Feb- ruary and Khalil's subsequent parliamentary election victory over the pro-Egyptian National Unionist party. Subversive activities have not slackened, and bribery may well have increased. Disaffection of a relatively small number of members in the all-important house of representatives would threaten the slim majority now held by Khalil's Urn- ma party in coalition with the People's Democratic party (PDP), which has its own small but troublesome pro-Egyp- tian wing. Egypt is also reported to have been active in the south- ern Sudan, where resentment toward the central government is of long standinv. Members of the Southern delegation in Parliament, on whom the coalition also depends for support, walked out of the 22 May session in protest against Litc form of the new constitution now being written. Their dissatisfac- tion with the government's stand against regional autonomy may make them amenable to Egyptian advances. 24 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 SAUDI ARABIA SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 RI A Os al 11. � mmrt �Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 UAR May Attempt to Exploit Kurdish Nationalism President Nasir of the UAR and Kamal Rifat, director of Egyptian clandestine operations, met early this spring with Kurdish leaders in Syria and may be planning disturbances among the Kurdish tribes in frontier areas in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, luring his recent trip to the USSR, Nasir discussed with Soviet leaders an independ- ent Kurdistan which would include some 20,000 Kurds in the USSR. While the UAR and the USSR may consider the Kurds available for propaganda, intelligence, and diversionary purposes, most of the Kurdish tribes are reported disil- lusioned with past exploitation of their desire for a nation- al state. An estimated total of 3,500,000 Kurds live in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, largely in the area be- tween the Euphrates River and the Zagros Mountains. Turkey, Iran, and Iraq are each preparing to protest in the UN Security Council alleged attempts by the UAR to encourage the creation of an independent Kurdish republic. Iran in particular is sensitive to Kurdish nationalism be- cause Mullah Mustafa Barzani, leader of the the Barzani Kurdish tribe in Iraq, helped organize a Soviet-sponsored Kurdish republic in Iran in 1945-46. When the incipient republic was overthrown by Iranian troops, Barzani and some of his followers fled to the USSR and are believed to be located in the USSR near the western Iranian border. There were unsubstantiated rumors during the Turkish- Syrian crisis last fall that Barzani and armed Kurds were in Syria. information being received regularly in Iraq indicated a iCurdish revolt was likely. 24 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Now' Indonesian Situation Indonesian army officials expect the dissident capital of Menado in North Celebes to fall to government forces within two weeks, Government aircraft reportedly bombed Menado again on 23 May. The government has further strengthened its position by relieving the commander in South Celebes, Lt. Col. Andi Mattalatta, who had been sympathetic to the dissidents and had failed to take action against revolutionary officers travel- ing through his territory. He has been replaced by Lt. Col. Andi Jusuf. Colonel Jani told the American army attache army headquarters is willing to negotiate with the dissidents but that the army will dictate the terms. Army Chief of Staff General Nasution is reported working toward the reorganization of both the army and the country's political system, with anti-Communism and the dissolution of political parties as his basic policies. Nasution, however, must obtain the support of President Sukarno if he expects to implement his plans. Nasution is also said to be seeking the cooperation of Colonel Kawilarang, former military attache to Washington who joined the dissidents, in order to facilitate the reintegration of dissident areas. The second major shipment of bloc arms is en route to Indonesia. A Soviet vessel loaded with 1,500 tons of mili- tary equipment, apparently including at least five more jet fighter aircraft, left the Black Sea on 21 May and is expected to arrive in Indonesia by mid-June. A second small Soviet tanker left the Black Sea on 19 May "to be delivered to the Indonesians," suggesting that it, like the ten small Soviet cargo vessels delivered in March and April may be sup- plied under the $100,000,000 Soviet credit. The first tanker is expected to arrive in early June and the second by mid- June. They are to replace Western vessels on interisland runs. A second group of IL-141s was scheduled to leave Irkutsk for Peioinz on 21 May on the first le 2 of the flight to Indonesia. TOP SECRET 24 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Nome Japanese Election Results Japanese Prime Minister Kishi's Liberal-Democratic party, according to unofficial returns on the 22 May elec- tion, retained its large majority in the powerful lower house of the Diet by winning 287 of 467 seats. The Socialists, in winning 166 seats, gained eight seats and continued the trend of increasing their Diet representation and percentage of popular vote. The expected addition of in- dependent conservatives to the ruling party, however, would leave the distribution of seats relatively unchanged. The Com- munists lost one of their two seats. The Conservatives' election victory, in the face of Sino- Soviet efforts to undermine Kishi and his policies, should strengthen Kishi's control of the government and enable him to continue his policy of cooperation with the United States. The full extent of his strength, however, will be shown by his success in gaining the support of all conservative fac- tions in the new, cabinet to be formed after the Diet is con- voked about mid-June. He appearsio have a good chance of achieving wide cooperation. The election results should enable Kishi to resist mak- ing political concessions to Peiping in return for trade with Communist China. The conservative mandate also should al- low him to proceed with the hnild-un and mndprniz don of Ja- pan's defense forces. 24 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 11.1" Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Situation in'llgeria There are increasing indications of friction and dis- cord within the ranks of the dominant military and civilian extremists in Algeria and also between these elements and more moderate leaders who have been caught up in the re- cent developments there. General Massu, head of the original Algiers Commit- tee of Public Safety and now also a cochairman of the all-Al- geria committee formally launched on 23 May, was recently quoted as saying he was "fed up with the civilian trash" now in control of the central government building in Algiers, and one of the paratroop colonels involved in the plotting which preceded last week's takeover has spoken disParagingly of his associates. Early this week a sharp and extended disagreement over the attempt by two Poujadist National Assembly deputies to enter Algeria reportedly occurred between extremist sup- porters of Iacques Soustelle, ostensible civilian leader of the ruling junta, and military authorities acting under orders of General Salan, the top French commander in Algeria. moderate elements and "hotheads" are also competing for control in many of the cities and villages throughout eastern Algeria. The American consul general in Algiers reports that as the stalemate continues, extremist civilian elements among the resident Europeans are beginning to envisage with equa- nimity a prolonged split with metropolitan France and even eventual secession. The army's only political objective, how- ever, continues to be to bring about the desired change of re- gime in Paris, a goal to which General Salan committed him- self more explicitly than heretofore when on 23 May he issued a statement saying the new all-Algeria committee had been formed to facilitate the establishment in Paris of a "govern- ment of public safety presided over by General de Gaulle." The Algiers leaders are not known to be planning to initiate in the near future any further action of a drastic nature to achieve this objective, but pressure for such action--which could conceivably take place in Tunisia, Algeria or France-- may mount if the stslemate is nf limp' chiral-inn I 24 May 58 " -SECRET- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: 207-9/08/20 CO2985834 %roe Noe III. THE WEST The French Crisis Premier Pflimlings proposals for strengthening the execu- tive power appear a,lfeadST' to be running into major parlia- mentary opposition. The decision of the National Assembly's steering committee to postpone discussion of the issue un- til 27 May probably reflects the basic distrust on the part of many deputies of any move curtailing their own power, and may also indicate stronger opposition from the Independ- ents than was anticipated. The Independents, including their top leaders Pinay and Senator Duchet, appear to be sliding more toward De Gaulle as the only alternative to a popular Front. According to some press reports, the French Commu- nists are under pressure from Moscow to withdraw their support from Pflimlin. Since Soviet and French Communist propaganda has been proclaiming that Communist support for Pflimlin in the assembly has saved the Republic, it would be difficult for the Communists to reverse their posi- tion. They might, however, find a pretext in the constitu- tional issues arguing that they have always opposed strengthen- ing the executive. There is renewed speculation that Pflimlin will make contact with De Gaulle this week end to discuss "the steps by which the general could assume power" if President Coty were to call him to form a National Union government. Although Pflimlin still has a chance to retain office himself, a split or even a relative strengthening of the left in his broad parliamentary support would bolster the case of those urging a De Gaulle solution. SECRET 24 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 erritirrr Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Nal Nve Bonn Foreign Minister Fears Consequences of a De Gaulle Government West German Foreign Minister Brentano told the Amer- ican ambassador on 20 May he believes a De Gaulle govern- ment in Paris would want to conclude bilateral arrangements with West Germany, the USSR, and other states in place of the multilateral agreements built around European integra- tion and NATO. The consequences for West Germany, he said, would be "catastrophic" and would be interpreted by the German public as complete failure of Chancellor Ade- nauer's foreign policy. Brentano feels that Bonn's reliance on NATO and Euro- pean integration would force it to reject any such bilateral political arrangements with or financial aid to a De Gaulle government. Such a refusal, he fears, would increase na- tionalist propaganda and anti-German sentiment in France 1 to a point where it might 1 estrov all grains made in Franco- German rapprochement. SECRET 24 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: ET9/08/20 CO2985834 New, Nue Panama Still Tense The state of siege declared on 22 May in Panama has not eliminated antigovernment activity in the capital. A disruptive general strike called by students and joined by several unions continues, and unidentified mob leaders have threatened renewed violence. At least 500 rebellious students are in control of the national university area--which is out- side national guard jurisdiction--although many took refuge in the Canal Zone when armed hoodlums turned student demon- strations over school administration into rioting and terrorism. The agitators who incited the crowds in Panama City and Colon reportedly were armed and directed by various groups anxious to oust President de la Guardia for business or politi- cal reasons and further to discredit the unpopular guard by goading it into repressive measures. These opposition forces are disparate in motive and distrustful of one another and would probably have difficulty working together. However, their ini- tial success in arousing the public may encourage them to new efforts. They have often resorted to attacks on the United States position in the Canal Zone for political purposes in the past and have used De la Guardia's moderate approach to US relations against him. National Guard Commandant Bolivar Vallarino, who evi- dently made the decision to impose martial law and censorship, has arrested some of the alleged agitators and appears to be the strongest figure in Panama at present. He may insist that De la Guardia make some cabinet changes to ensure loyalty within the administration ranks. 24 May May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 12 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834 14., 1 ,I.L.R1-di V 41 StIL DISTRIBUTION THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Operations Coordinating Board Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834