NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY APRIL 11, 1977[SANITIZED] - 1977/04/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02986714
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: April 11, 1977

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01602986714
The
National Intelligence
Daily
3.5(c)
Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only
TOP SECRET
Copy No. 261
MONDAY APRIL 11, 1977
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 083
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THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
3.5(c)
MONDAY APRIL 11, 1977 3
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Argentina: Support for President Videla
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President Videla, beginning his sec-
ond year at the head of the Argentine
government, has apparently overcome
the divisiveness in the armed forces that
for a time threatened to cause him con-
siderable difficulty. Only a few weeks
ago there was widespread talk of im-
pending changes, possibly to include the
replacement of Videla himself either as
President or as a member of the ruling
junta. Such talk has now ceased. In the
face of newly reaffirmed army support
for the President, both the navy and air
force, which from time to time have ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with him, have
fallen into line, at least for the present.
The strengthening of Videla's position
means a considerable gain for those of-
ficers who, like him, favor a relatively
moderate approach to governing.
Videla and the junta marked the first
anniversary of their takeover with
characterically austere statements and
low-key public observances. The Pres-
ident's address to the nation pointed to
the progress that has been made during
the past year in controlling the leftist sub-
versives and in improving the economy.
As is his custom, he promised nothing ex-
cept that the armed forces would not be
deterred from pursuing economic and
political success.
Videla made it clear that he believes the
junta has accomplished enough in its first
year so that a new, more constructive
phase can begin. This phase entails no
"electoral schedule," as he put it, but
does envision a "fluid dialogue." In other
words, there will be no early return to
free-wheeling politics, but civilian
opinions on a variety of subjects will now
be welcome through informal channels.
Videla's Style
On March 15, Videla assembled all
army generals to review the government's
performance during the past year and to
outline its plans for the future. The Presi-
dent evidently anticipated criticism of his
performance, and he skillfully neutralized
it. The session, which lasted an entire
workday, was a resounding success for the
President. He was able to assuage the air
force and navy leaders by stressing the
supremacy of the interservice junta and
playing down his own role.
The President announced at the
meeting that the government structure,
with himself remaining as chief executive
and army commander in chief, would con-
tinue through March 1979. He refuted the
notion, widely discussed among Argen-
tines in recent months, that he would
relinquish either the presidency or his post
in the three-man junta.
Videla himself may have had a hand in
encouraging the public discussion. He
probably judged that such a "debate"
would do him no harm and might even
help. Subsequent developments have
borne this out. In the first place, no
serious contenders to replace him
emerged. Second, no really damaging
criticism of him came to the surface dur-
ing the meeting, even though some in-
dividuals indulged their own personal dis-
like of him. Finally, no substantially
different ideas of how to solve Argentina's
problems were brought forth.
The process seems to have
demonstrated that the present govern-
ment, with Videla at the top, is still the
most desirable choice and perhaps the
only practical one. The "debate" may
also have served as an escape valve for
Argentina's highly politicized citizenry,
deprived for the past year of normal out-
lets for political expression.
The Government and Labor
The ascendancy of Videla and his
moderate line will have an important im-
pact in the crucial area of
government-labor relations, where a
definite policy has yet to be enunciated.
The military has been unable to agree
on how to treat organized labor. Union
activities have been suspended since the
coup. Some military men believe labor,
the long-time stronghold of Peronism,
must be permanently shorn of its potential
political power. Others, including Videla,
favor an accommodation with organized
labor.
Developments on the labor scene over
the past year have worked to the advan-
tage of Videla and weakened the
arguments of those calling for punitive
measures. There have been numerous
violations of the junta's ban on strikes,
but the government has not used force,
nor has labor defied the junta on the
massive scale some officers anticipated in
a year of imposed economic austerity.
As a result, the way now seems clear for
the emergence of a labor policy that is not
as vindictive as the so-called hardliners
would want. The new labor code, which
will still be restrictive, will probably allow
unions to join together in federations, but
President Videla
they would be prohibited from open
political activity. There will probably be
no provision for still larger groupings like
the Peronist General Workers'
Confederation, through which labor long
flexed its political muscle.
The General Workers' Confederation
will not have government backing, as it
did during the Peron regimes, but it will
probably not be specifically banned, as
some officers have recommended. Videla
presumably hopes the workers will
recognize and accept the new law as a
compromise that will permit the unions
some, but by no means all, of their ac-
customed importance.
The Government and Civilians
Conditions also seem favorable for im-
plementing Videla's policy of encouraging
communication with representative
civilians. At the meeting with army
generals, the President indicated his inten-
tion of pursuing this course but made it
clear that he envisions no program for-
mally reincorporating civilians into the
governing process. This is in keeping with
Videla's public statements on the role of
civilians; he has repeatedly declared that
he has no timetable for the re-emergence
of an elected legislature or free political
parties.
Civilian opinion leaders will be disap-
pointed�but not surprised�that the
political "opening" many of them had
begun to predict some weeks ago is not
around the corner. Most of them will take
heart, however, at least privately, in the
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fact that it is Videla, not a hardline
general, who is clearly in the driver's seat.
Counterinsurgency
The strengthening of Videla's hand
does not necessarily mean that the junta
will greatly improve its record on human
rights. When it comes to the pursuit of
leftist guerrillas�the issue that has
generated almost all the alleged
abuses�Videla is not, and cannot afford
to be, any less tough than the
"hardliners."
The President may attempt to make
sure that the security forces pay more
attention to legal guarantees. To justify
such a stance to the "hardliners," Videla
could argue that combating the subver-
sives, obviously hurt by the government's
tough campaign so far, no longer requires
the harsh measures employed at the
height of the fight.
A resurgence of the terrorists�who are
by no means out of business�would,
however, rapidly undermine any effort to
moderate the procedures used in the
antiguerrilla struggle and oblige Videla
to take tough measures.
The activism that Videla has displayed
in foreign diplomacy has helped the
President's position at home. He has
visited the capitals of Chile, Peru, and
Bolivia, and he plans trips to Venezuela
and Paraguay.
The point Videla seeks to make is clear:
after a period of enforced withdrawal
from hemispheric affairs because of
political turmoil at home, Argentina is
now ready to claim its rightful place as an
important regional power. The message
Videla carries to the heads of other
authoritarian governments in the area is
one of solidarity in the face of inter-
national pressure for greater respect for
human rights.
The austere General Videla is well
suited to the task of rebuilding his coun-
try's influence without antagonizing
Brazil, the historic rival that has pulled
far ahead of Argentina by almost any
economic or other measure. With his
reserved style, Videla seeks to assure the
Brazilians that his country is not out to
make gains at their expense. For the mo-
ment, at least, the Brazilians probably
take him at his word, seeing virtually no
prospect for Argentina to contest serious-
ly the regional dominance Brazil has es-
tablished.
The importance of Videla's diplomatic
ability and style is not lost on his
military colleagues at home. His success
has more than outweighed the resentment
some navy men may have felt over his up-
staging the foreign minister, a rear ad-
miral.
Outlook
The military consensus that Videla has
established is fragile. The officers who
have in the past been the most
troublesome to Videla, navy chief Ad-
miral Massera, for example, are quiet, at
least for now. Still, Massera has a long
history as a "spoiler," and he is not likely
to remain in the background indefinitely.
Political conditions in the country
could change, perhaps rapidly, with dis-
ruptive effects on military unity. Organ-
ized labor, for example, may react violent-
ly if a new labor code is not forthcoming
soon or if it is enacted and, in their view, it
is too restrictive. Terrorists may launch
a spectacular last-ditch offensive. Such
events could give new force to the hardline
officers and weaken Videla.
Videla realizes the frailness of the con-
sensus among his fellow officers. He will
continue to move with great caution on all
fronts in order to preserve it. Policy-
making and policy implementation will
continue to be slow and cumbersome. It
has taken many months for the junta to
come as far as it has in devising a new
labor code. It would be difficult for it to
decide how to handle fast-breaking
problems.
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