WEEKLY SUMMARY APRIL 2, 1976[SANITIZED] - 1976/04/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02987069
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: April 2, 1976

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Weekly Summary
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CI WS 76-014
No. 0014/76
April 2, 1976
3.5(c)
Copy N 2 67
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pi% Am,
The W EKLY SUMMARY, ksued every Friday mo fling by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signifi-
cant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic %search. the Office of Strategic
Research, the Office of Geogrophic and Cartographic
Research, and the Diredorate of Science and Technology.
Warning Notice
igence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEll)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c) Un uthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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15 Argentina: Coup in Perspective
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Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly
Summary,
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Nur' -SEeRET NINO'
ARGENTINA: COUP IN PERSPECTIVE
Everything Argentina's military junta has said
and done indicates careful advance preparation
and an eye for public relations. The officers
handled the actual take-over skillfully, and they
have since worked to maximize public accep-
tance while making the sweeping changes they
view necessary.
The new military leaders are utilizing the
temporary political calm between Peron's depar-
ture and the start of their own policy initiatives to
project an image of moderation and build pop-
ular support. Public relief with the ouster of the
chaotic Peron government, combined with the
junta's campaign to attract sympathy, has created
a honeymoon period during which shortcomings
are being overlooked.
Emphasis on Conciliation
The officers' public statements emphasize the
need for conciliation while eschewing vengeance
and totalitarian designs. The junta very quickly
eased the press censorship it had imposed,
removed roadblocks, and reduced the
prominence of armed troops, all in an effort to
restore normalcy. Moreover, the junta has replac-
ed an interim, all-military cabinet with a perma-
nent one featuring two civilian ministers. The
government has also imposed a token price
decrease on certain consumer staples.
The coup itself was the culmination of a
process that began long ago and benefitted from
near-unanimity of opinion among the military
and from general public acquiescence. In full
view of everyone, the armed forces for many
months planned the details of how they would
overthrow Maria Estela Peron. The former
government was powerless to check the officers,
who viewed each new misstep by the inept Peron
as one more in a long list of reasons justifying her
ouster. By delaying as long as they did, the armed
forces hoped to give the administration every
possible chance either to reform or completely
discredit itself. Judging by the lack of resistance
and some laudatory press comment following the
coup, the military succeeded in the latter objec-
tive.
The take-over was accompanied by articulate
but relatively brief statements of its justification
and aims. The proclamation of the coup concen-
trated on the "exhaustion" of all constitutional
measures, a clear reference to repeated failures
by civilians�notably congress�to remove Peron
or at least curtail her authority. The proclamation
appealed to Argentines' weariness of violence,
noting that the civilians' inability to solve basic
problems only "increased extremism of all sorts."
Revitalizing Constitutional Institutions
In its list of "basic objectives," the junta
sought to play down its obvious national security
concerns. It gave top billing to "revitalizing" con-
stitutional institutions by placing the national in-
terest above all particular interests. The new
government placed the enforcement of "Chris-
tian morality" second, and only then listed
eradication of subversion. The intent here was
clearly to demonstrate that the junta has all-en-
compassing goals and that the terrorists do not
have the power to monopolize the government's
attention. The coup leaders may intend this
message as much for their hard-line colleagues
and subordinates as for the general population.
In a related public relations effort, the junta
distributed information packets to foreign
military attaches containing a statement of the
"philosophy" of the military revolt and a
biography of President Videla. Both are long,
detailed statements designed to place the
take-over in the best possible light. Videla is
described as an outstanding career army officer,
but more important, he is painted as a man u-
niquely able to bridge individual interests
and take a global view of important problems.
Junta Institutionalizing Its Rule
The officers have already begun to in-
stitutionalize their rule. Though they collectively
have sweeping powers, they have set up a system
..ssemr"
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orms.,
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Agosti
Videla
that seeks to minimize the influence of any one
man, while striving for consensus. The three-
man junta, composed of Videla, navy chief Ad-
miral Emilio Massera and air force chief General
Agosti, appoints the president but retains
supreme authority. The President is to work close-
ly with a nine-man legislative council composed
of senior officers of the three services. The coun-
cil will serve to communicate the views of the
armed forces to the junta and the President and is
to have a strong voice in the promulgation of
laws. At least initially, the net effect seems to be a
diffusion of authority and the representation of
numerous points of view.
The fact remains, nonetheless, that an un-
elected military regime once again controls
Argentina and will soon be judged on its record.
To ensure control, the junta has replaced virtually
all officials at the national and regional levels with
military men. Congress has been disbanded, all
political activity has been suspended, and major
labor organizations have been placed under
Massera
Pk?
government control. A few splinter parties have
been banned outright. A state of siege is in effect,
and perpetrators of violence can be shot on sight.
Stiff jail terms or the death penalty are to be
meted out by military courts to those who seek to
cripple public services.
The officers are stressing their intention to re-
tain an evenhanded stance by avoiding extreme
repression, but problems in several areas could
quickly put their equanimity to the test. Also,
there is by no means complete unanimity within
the military behind the idea of moderation. The
virulent terrorist movement has already sought to
provoke the junta by renewing its violent cam-
paign. The terrorist rampage, possible civilian op-
position from the ousted Peronists, or early
economic reverses could reinforce the arguments
of those officers who advocate more stringent
measures. Indeed, the very ease with which the
military came to power could make even slight
setbacks in any area extremely difficult to explain
away.
--SE-eltEr
Pac- 1g 1/1/CLel V CI litAKA A 17V nr 9 76
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