NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 17 FEBRUARY 1978[SANITIZED] - 1978/02/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02991301
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: February 17, 1978

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 002991301
The
National Intelligence
Daily
3.5(c)
Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only Copy No.
, )6
FRIDAY 17 FEBRUARY 1978
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 040
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FRIDAY 17 FEBRUARY 1978
engaVgNORTMAMEMTNINIABINIMPSINMEE
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THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
ISEIRMOURUMIONEENEINUMMUSIMMEEMERMINNIMESIMENTMOMONEMMEM
Argentina: Admiral Massera's Activities
Many Argentines are intrigued by
the activities of Admiral Massera, a
member of the three-man governing
military junta and commander of the
Navy. Because Massera has been a
frequent critic of President Videla and
has done a great deal of politicking out-
side the junta, speculation is rife that he
is trying to undermine Videla, perhaps
with the hope of ultimately becoming
President himself. In nearly two years
of such activity, Massera has not come
visibly closer to that goal�if indeed
such is his intention�but he has at
times been a serious hindrance to the
President.
Massera has a complex personality,
and the fluidity of Argentine 3
politics�which obliges any political
figure to change tactics fre-
quently�makes it doubly difficult to
assess his intentions. There is no doubt,
however, that Massera is ambitious, is
highly regarded by the Navy men he com-
mands, and has at least some civilian
following. Because he is intelligent and
politically shrewd�perhaps more so than
Videla�it would be wrong to dismiss the
admiral's machinations as futile.
Massera is politically active outside the
military as well as within it. He has been
making political contacts among a variety
of civilian groups, but this is not unusual
for an Argentine military man, even if he
is not seeking to propel himself into
higher office.
Even while publicly condemning
Peronism and organized labor for
aggravating Argentina's problems,
Massera has increased his contacts with
the very Peronists and labor chiefs he at-
tacks. Again, the contradiction is not un-
usual in the context of Argentina's
politics.
In recent weeks, he has been reported to
be widening his contacts to include Jewish
and civil rights organizations, and may
also be connected with a newly created
civic group said to be designed to enlist
public support for him. Lest such pursuits
mark Massera as a would-be grass-roots
politician, he is careful to mollify his
critics in the military by frequently at-
tacking what he calls the "populism" of
Videla and the President's chief sup-
porter, Army Chief of Staff Viola.
The Human Rights Issue
Massera appears to be trying to exploit
US concern for human rights. A story in
the Washington Post on 27 January
reported his assertions that he would halt
human rights abuses if he became presi-
dent and that he was eager to talk with
President Carter to stress his concern for
human rights. Here, the admiral is being
particularly self-serving; the record on his
human rights position is clearly contrary
.3(b)(1) Members of the Argentine military j.unta. From left to
Lieutenant General Agosti, President Videla, and Admiral Massera.
right,
to what he now professes.
he has been
an obstacle to Videla's own attempts to
ease political repression.
Almost from the advent of the junta
nearly two years ago, Massera has been
taking potshots at Videla both publicly
and privately. At times, he has withheld
Navy cooperation, as when he refused to
provide Videla with a list of persons
detained by the Navy.
That the admiral has the sympathy of
at least some military men outside the
Navy is probably best evidenced by the
fact that Videla has never seriously ex-
plored ways to unseat Massera. At the
same time, Massera appears to have a
good sense of how hard he can press at
any particular moment, and when he
should back off and let the dust settle.
Massera has aimed his criticism at both
the style and substance of Videla's
policies. When the President proclaims
the need for "dialogue" with represen-
tative civilian groups, Massera accuses
Videla of capitulating to the very forces
that created the chaos that obliged the
military to intervene in 1976. Massera has
asserted all along that Videla is not harsh
enough in the treatment either of leftists
or of corrupt Peronists and labor leaders.
Massera appears to be behind the rough
treatment the Navy metes out to those it
detains in the campaign against terrorism
and corruption.
Massera has so far avoided being
branded a chronic malcontent. This is
partly because he does not keep up a
steady barrage, but it is also because he
picks with care the issues he seeks to ex-
ploit. He focuses on problems of concern
to all Argentines and comes across as a
man who has serious thoughts on the ma-
jor issues of the day. Videla and his sup-
porters cannot easily put aside Massera's
call for no-holds-barred repression of
terrorists. Nor is it easy to ignore the ad-
miral's criticism of the economic austerity
program, which, he points out, dis-
criminates against working people by
placing restraints on wages but not on
prices.
Promoter of Navy Interests
Massera remains acutely aware that his
main constituency is still the Navy, and he
is an active promoter of its interests. The
Army has always been by far the most
powerful and influential of the services,
but Massera has worked hard to secure
for the Navy an important role in ma-
jor issues. Thus, he has actively in-
volved the Navy in the counterinsurgency
campaign and portrayed his service as
much more disposed than the Army to get
the job done quickly and thoroughly.
Massera also has the Navy in the thick
of the process of drafting a new basic
law defining the ultimate political role
of labor, a key political force during
the Peron regimes but now in virtual
limbo.
It is more difficult to assess how
Massera views his and the Navy's in-
terests in the context of Argentina's 200-
mile territorial sea claim and in its dis-
putes with Chile and the UK. Massera
certainly realizes that such issues present
an opportunity to expand Navy influence
by stressing to his countrymen the need
for a stronger Navy to back up a strong
stance.
Although the Chileans, for example,
reportedly think Massera stands in the
way of a more conciliatory Argentine
position on the Beagle Channel dispute,
there is little evidence one way or the
other. Massera's public remarks on the
subject are highly nationalistic, but no
more so than those of many other Argen-
tines.
Massera, at the very least, aims to keep
himself in the limelight and to maintain as
wide a spectrum of contacts as possible so
that whether the political climate becomes
more or less authoritarian, he will have
proper presidential credentials. He in-
tends also to make life as difficult as he
can for Videla and his supporters so that
the President�and the Army�will be
seen in the worst possible light and he and
the Navy, by comparison, will look good.
Massera is probably not actively seek-
ing to bring down the government. The
Army is simply too powerful�and
relatively united�to permit it. Massera
realizes that the Army would use any sign
of a conspiracy to discredit him and the
Navy. It is one thing for Massera to
criticize or to say that he could do a better
job of governing Argentina; it is quite
another to try to subvert a government
that is, after all, not widely unpopular and
is viewed as seriously taking on, however
imperfectly, the tasks that need doing.
If Massera indeed hopes to become
President, his best hope lies in building the
foundation for an eventual civilian can-
didacy�something he is clearly doing.
The chances for an early return to civilian
rule are slim, however, and Massera will
have a long wait. During that time, the
national political situation could, and
probably will, change significantly and
Massera could well disappear from the
political scene.
For now, Massera-52 years old�is
facing mandatory retirement from active
duty this fall. The other junta members
also are subject to mandatory military
retirement, but considerably later. When
he retires, Massera will lose the power
that comes from being commander in
chief of the nation's number-two military
service. While he still retains the
prerogatives of his position, he can be ex-
pected to cut as wid,- .,,,ath as he can.
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