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August 27, 2020
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May 12, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815566].pdf800.81 KB
I N'411.' ,ftrrLie-P-s-Ec-RET- 12 May 1961 Copy No. Ce:/ CENTRAL TELLIGENCE BULLETIN --TOP-SECREr- A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 N IF ear imege � la Gi I -Tep-sEettET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 ihaikopprov.ed forReleaseii.?022/08/11 CO2992201 12 May 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos. (Page t) 2. Congo: UAR names ambassador to Stanleyville regime. (Page it) 3. Iran: New prime minIster moves to prevent former of- ficials from� leaving country. (Page it) 4. Cuba: High level of bloc shipping to and from Cuba since late last year. (Page it) 5. Dominican Republic: Trujillo regime initiates amnesty as gesture to appear more democratic. (Page tit) 6. UAR: Military mobilization exercise under way. (Page tit) -TOP-SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 AllApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 BURMA CHINA hong Sal), PHOG SALY *Dien. Bien Phu Nam Tho�Na Mo NAM THA ; * A�1,uong Sal L Chau Nam Bac LUANG PRA ANG uong Hotjila,Lu g Prabang SAYABOURY Muon � ....) Kassy .../. �Ban Ta � Viang , Vang Vitir'lgir7a , '''''g ' �Tha Thom amone4 c ...r.,/- 41. -"����\.. \ VIE N T I ANE 1:14Borikhan Ban Hiss Heap � Pak Sane .,..1 NORTH VIET Sam Neua � SAM NEUA "7. XIENG mu-0 Soul PLari rn:s d e sK �H nU BA� nN G / Phov Khavn, Khouong Vientiane THAILAND NORTHERN LAOS GOVERNMENT Forces in KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact a,MKONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS ROAD TRAIL P � ROUTE NUMBER 610512 510 STATUTE MILES 109 AM � nh ,r Kam Kent KHAM ty-fo'U"Ar&E Nhommardt Thakhek 11.0 Mahaxay Hanoi �Pha Lane Tchepon-e Savannakhet - � ft Miicirtg Mine SAVANKAKHET 000 o SOUTH VIETNAM 12 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 No11 I Nil 1ori 14.1,1,-.11, A I. A-.1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 12 May 1961 DAILY BRIEF *Laos he ICC, following a brief visit by the three corn- missioners to Xieng Khouang where they had "successful" pre--44.,&4/.el-a--L4.,/ liminary talks with Souvanna Phouma and Souphannouvong, has 4' sent a report to the Geneva conference co-chairmen�the USSR . 6A. and the UK--but it is uncertain yet whether this amounts to formal verification of the existence of a cease-fire in Laos. /?,s Chief delegates representing the Boun Oum government and 3 Souvanna met at Nam one on 11 May but failed to agree on a site for holding both political and military talksj Li a rgxcept for continued attacks on the Meo base at Pa Dong no/ and scattered guerrilla actions elsewhere, the major opera= t/ tional areas remain quieg rt3t, There is evidence of friction in D5 0-; z Phong Saly province between the Pathet Lao and troops loyal to Souvanna Phouma. Airlift flights are scheduled through 12 May. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) TOP SECRET / / � � / //,,x Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 OApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 . !FM Ban razzavi!le Republic of the Congo LIBERIA 200 INDIA � Gemena Scattered MOBUTU 3,400 EQUATEU MOBUTU 800 800 Coquilhatville � Boende MOB UTU Leopoldvi ...di Air sville Mate Scatte orces DVILL Ike la Francqui Luluabourg Bakw Luputa GHANA 1600 Approximate area nominall controlled b : 12 May 61 inc u e Wt. � GIZEN0A 7,000 ' MALAYA 470 LIBERIA ETHIOPIA nleyville ETHIOPIA MALAYA 300 INDIA ngolo NIGERIA TSHOMBE ,000- ..Tfts-a hville NIGERIA Usumbura Tanganyika IRELAND 650 SWEDEN 650 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 Approved for Release: aiavw11 c02992201 titS ongo: airo has appointed an ambassador to the Gizenga re- gime.' the ambassador is already en route to Stanleyville. Although many Communist and Af- rican states regard Gizenga's regime as the legal Congo gov- ernment, only Mali and Yugoslavia have opened embassies in Stanleyville, and only Mali has a resident ambassador. Cairo's action may prompt other pro-Gizenga states to follow suit. continued efforts by the Gizenga regime to expand its foreign trade. Oizenga al- luded again to "large economic and financial problems" facing his government, "to contact the German financial group which is buying the cotton from us to advance us 200 million francs." (Backup, Page 4) (Map) Iran: .1rime Minister Amini, apparently in a move to pre- vent officials from leaving the country to avoid charges of cor- ruption, has instituted rigorous controls on the issuance of pass- ports and exit visas. The government is also reported to be planning measures to prevent the transfer to capital abroad. There are unconfirmed reports that a number of officials of the previous government have been arrested, including former Prime Minister Eqbal, former Minister of the Interior Alavi- Moqadam, the former intelligence chief for the supreme com- mander's staff, General Haj All Kia, and former Minister of Finance General Ali Akbar arciarn3 he government's economic development program, an on 11 May, calls for a new tax program and control of inflation, and highlights the need for carrying out land re- form, legislation for which has already been enacted but has not been enforced. Amini has appointed a competent, pro-- Western official, Safi Asfia, as deputy prime minister and director of the Plan Organization, the body which will 3dmin- istpr the peonomic develonment nroera.mi uommunist Bloc - tsupa: in meeting its extensive eco- nomic commitments to the 0a,stro regime, the Sino-Soviet bloc has maintained a high level of shipping to and from Cuba 12 May 61 DAILY --T-OP�SEGRETT Th- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 // Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 14g I &a 1.1.4 11 since late last year. Bloc and bloc-chartered vessels have been in Cuban waters constantly and about 35 are currently en route to Cuba from the bloc. Since the beginning of 1.961 at least 180 voyages by Soviet, East European, and Western merchant ships have been made, delivering bloc cargoes to Cuba. Fulfilling the contracts to supply more than 4,000,000 tons of petroleum and to buy 4,000,000 tons of sugar in 1961 will require roughly 300 tanker voyages to Cuba and more than 4 -cargo voyages in the other direction. (Backup, Page 5) Dominican Republic: The Trujillo regime has launched another of its periodic efforts to convince foreign opinion that it is becoming more democratic. The lower house of the Trujillo-dominated legislature approved a measure on 10 May granting a blanket pardon for opposition elements, at home and in exile. The upper house is likely to endorse the meas- ure. The maneuver is unlikely to trap many Dominican dis- sidents, who remember that such tactics in the past have been followed by ruthless suppression. It is aimed primarily at reducing the isolation to which the regime has been subjected by the other American republics since last summer when it was unanimously condemned for suppressing human rights at home and for intervening in the affairs of other countries. This followed a Dominican attempt to assassinate the Vene- zuelan President; 6.1 UAR: The planned UAR military mobilization exercise involving units of both the First (Syrian) and Second (Egyp- tian) Army has begun. the movement of an Egyptian artillery battalion to Syria beginning that day. sup- plies including considerable quantities of anti-tank mines, wire obstacles, and bridge equipment had been dispatched from Egypt to arrive in Syria no later than 13 May. Air force particIpation in the exercise was noted in connection with Egyptian practice radar tracking on the evening of 10 May. The Israelis, who have very good intelligence on UAR military 12 May 61 DAILY BRIEF iii TO SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 rer Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 wz ...3E.A.,rtE. I developments, have probably already instituted a limited, pre- cautionary alert. INTELLI E REPORTS AND ESTIMATES (Available during the preceding week) French Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Delivery Capabili- ties. Ti. S. I. B. SNIE 22-61. 9 May 1961. 12 May 61 DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET Ii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 _ _ Situation in Laos Pathet Lao troops were "putting pressure" on several villages in the province which were occupied by troops loyal to Souvanna. Colonel Khammouan,who sup- ports Souvanna, It was all right for the Pathet Lao to propagandize for their party--the Neo Lao Hak Sat--"but let us not have . any pressure from armed groups." the Pathet Lao were under orders from their commanders "to cease all pressure on villages occupied by us,' Should such friction continue between the two rebel forces, it could have a significant effect on the degree of cooperation between the Souvanna Phoun7 and Pathet Lao delegations at Geneva. King Savang, opening the National Assembly on 11 May, reaffirmed his support for the present government and dis- missed Souvanna's pretensions as "legal" premier. In his address, the King urged Sihanouk to continue his efforts to achieve international recognition of Laotian neutrality. Pos- sibly in quick reaction to this peace offering, Sihanouk an- nounced that he will attend the Geneva Conference after all. At about 1:00 A. M. on 11 May in Vientiane, Major Eckarath, an aide and confidant of General Phoumi, was shot and killed by unknown assailants. Eckarath, oneof the more competent officers in the Lao army, was a relative of the King and Souvanna's nephew. He was director of plans and operations in the Defense Ministry. It is not known whether his assassination was politically inspired. Phoumi says he will leave on 12 May for Geneva. He believes Souvanna and Souphannouvong will be showing up at Geneva and feels the three might meet there. Phoumi told Ambassador Brown on 11 May that Souvanna had contacted him to suggest a meeting in Phnom Penh, which Phoumi said TOP SECRET 12 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 *AMP/ A %OA 16.71..4..411-4 I would be agreeable to him. a desire by Boun Oum to meet with Souvanna and Sou- phannouvong, expresses Souvanna's willingness to meet either at the Plaine des Jarres or at Phnom Penh. Uh. e Indian delegation to Geneva appears to be going with little preparation and no major proposals to advance. Krishna Menon, who departed for Geneva on 11 May to lead the delega- tion, indicated in conversation with US Embassy officials in - New Delhi that the Indians would not raise any provocative questions. He agreed that the problem of a coalition govern- ment--presumably including Souvanna and Pathet Lao reprem sentatives�shouldbeworkedout by the Laotians without outside interference. Menon said he planned to be away from the con-- ference much of the time--presumably leaving Commonwealth Secretary Gundevia in charge. While this also suggests that New Delhi does not plan any major move at this tin2.9 Menon told the press that Nehru would go to Geneva "if the necessity arose." Krishna Menon is likely to play an active mediatory role while he is present, and probably will focus his efforts on reconciling the American and Soviet positions with regard to the establishment of a neutral Laos. The Indians may go out of their way to cooperate with Soviet delegates as a part of their continuing effort to counter Chinese Communist influence. 8 May broadcast by the North Vietnamese - dominated National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) calls on the 14-nation Geneva Conference to "hear the serious accusations of the people of South Vietnam vis-a- vis the American imperialists' policy of aggression in South Vietnam." Hanoi, which usually publicizes such statements by the Front, has not yet been this specific, but on 9 May,it . did broadcast a NFLSV demand that the Geneva Conference co- chairmen "take appropriate measures to prevent US maneuvers against the South Vietnamese people." last year that the Front was ordered into being by TOP SECRET 12 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 I Hanoi; the North Vietnamese advertise it as a spontaneous movement of South Vietnamese "patriots." Bloc airlift operations on 10 May involved a total of 22 sorties. Of this number at least five Soviet IL-14s were noted in flights from Hanoi to the Nam Bac area north of Luang Prabang and return. On the same day six other bloc transports flew round-trip flights between Hanoi and Xieng Khouang. A similar opera- tion was carried out in late April. These flights to southern North Vietnam suggest logistical support operations for Com- munist forces in southern Laos and possibly South Vietnam. A Soviet AN-12 was scheduled from Irkutsk to Peiping on 10 May. This AN-12, which has been previously involved in Soviet airlift support operations, is probably destined for North Vietnam. TOP SECRET 12 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 2 WA Nape � The Situation in the Congo About 17 countries�mainly from the bloc and the radical African states have "recognized" Gizenga as the head of the legal Congo government. They have for the most part not opened embassies in Stanleyville, partly because the UN rec- ognizes Kasavubu as the Congo's chief of state and partly be- cause of Stanlevville's isolated location. the UAR ambassador will be accompanied by a staff of five. 'Ehe American Consulate in Elisabethville reports that as yet there has been no sharp reaction on the part of the Katanga government or population to the news of Tshombe's imprison- ment and arraignment. The Elisabethville radio, however, has characterized the Leopoldville government as "having made a mockery of all human decency... by falling on the only man who managed to save what could be saved in a country delivered to the incompetent hands of a gang of apprentice sorcerers." � The Leopoldville radio, for its part, has interspersed its programs with appeals to Katanga for calm) TOP SECRET 12 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 ....1L.4%-.111.1-i I Noe Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 '44010 Bloc Maintains High Volume of Shipping in Cuban Trade Thus far in 1961, at least 200 cargoes of Cuban sugar have been loaded for delivery to the bloc. If shipment is continued at this rate, the bloc's purchase commitment for the year, can be fulfilled. Of the 180 deliveries from the bloc, about 80 were of petroleum and 7 of major arms. The bloc's trade with Cuba prior, to 1960 was confined to occasional sugar deals requiring relatively limited amounts of shipping. Since the conclusion of the first Soviet-Cuban economic agreements in February 1960, which were followed by similar agreements with the rest of the bloc, a large vol- ume of shipping has gradually developed. In July, when Castro seized the US and British oil refineries and the USSR assumed an obligation to supply all of Cuba's petroleum requirements, Soviet shipping to Cuba underwent a rapid build-up. Through the latter, half of 1960 the volume and variety of bloc goods moving to Cuba increased steadily, as did the volume of sugar moving to bloc ports. Finally, in December, when the bloc agreed to take as much as 4,000,000 tons of Cuban sugar in 1961, the number of bloc and bloc-chartered ships in the Cuban trade reached the high level which has since been main- tained with little change. The use of chartered Western vessels is vitally important to the bloc in providing its support to Cuba. A large part of the East European goods moving to Cuba, including machinery and equipment, consumer goods, and foodstuffs, is delivered on nonbloc ships, as are all of the Chinese exports to Cuba. Roughly half the Soviet petroleum being delivered to Cuba is shipped on Western tankers. Although sugar is being carried on many bloc vessels, more than half has been loaded aboard chartered Western merchantmen. Soviet petroleum deliveries have been more than adequate to cover Havana's requirements and recently have been reduced .12 May May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 1 NNW because Cuba's refining and storage capacity is inadequate to accommodate the previous rate of delivery. Shipments have averaged more than 300,000 tons a month since last August, but in mid-April the Cuban petroleum agency was forced to request a slowdown to 250,000 tons in April and May! Unless receiving capacity can be increased, deliveries will fall below the 4,400,000 tons scheduled for the year. � Communist China, although engaged in a massive grain import program requiring extensive chartering of Western vessels, has not neglected its commitments to Cuba. This year Peiping has delivered about 85,000 tons of rice and smaller quantities of corn, meat, and other foodstuffs. Most of the rice being shipped by the Chinese has come directly from Burma. This year more than 50 Western vessels have been chartered by the Chinese to pick up sugar in Cuba. --SECRET- 12 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN � Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 11-11., Now NNW THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201 TOP SECRET E-1 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2992201