CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/12/06

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02993695
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
March 17, 2020
Document Release Date: 
March 26, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 6, 1960
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15798987].pdf810.28 KB
Body: 
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 3.3(h)(2) 7 �t-urr�a-a�mc 3.5(c) 6 December 1960 copy No. / 5 CENTRAL IYTELLIGENCE BULLETIN OnWIMENT NO. 3/ PIAIANric iN CLASS. [X NECIirni PI SO W ASS. CIL.: NrIE:li TO: IS S FEU AliP4 NR 10-2 0 JUN 1980 PATE: iiEVIEWE 'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO29936957 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 ar,...r� � �����"�� LATE ITEM *International Communism: Although full analysis depends upon receipt of the complete text, judging from the 4,000-word Soviet summary, the 20,000-word statement which was hammered out in the three-week-long meeting of world Communist leaders In Moscow in November, seems to represent a tactical accord to present a facade of unity despite continuing evidence of Sib- Soviet disagreement. In dealing with the fundamental issues in dispute between the Soviet and Chinese parties, the summary suggests that the statement in most cases either contrives awk- ward formulations which conjoins the Soviet and Chinese positions on a given issue or relies on ambiguities which blur or evade the issue. The summary reaffirms a number of positions which the So- viet and Chinese parties have long agreed on. It reiterates con- fidence in the growing strength of the Communist world and the comparable disintegration of capitalism. It denounces imperialism in general, with specific emphasis on American imperialism, and condemns Western policies everywhere as aggressive. In contrast, the world Communist movement is presented as unified behind the concept of "peaceful coexistence," but the summary does not indicate whether the Soviet or Chinese interpretation of this concept is to prevail. For example, the summary reiterates the long-standing Sino-Soviet agreement that general war can be averted, but it does not deal with the disagreement on the important question of whether, as the Chinese contend,local wars should be expected and even, at time encouraged. Similarly, the summary blurs the questions of policy toward the governments of underdeveloped countries and the "liberation" movements there, The summary is very ambiguous on the key question of discipline of the world Communist movement-- permitting the Soviet party to continue to condemn "dogmatism and sectarianism" as a serious danger and the Chinese party to attack "revisionism" under the guise of denouncing Yugoslavia. The statement reaffirms the adherence of all parties to the decla- ration written at the conclusion of a similar meeting in Moscow in 1957, and even uses that declaration as a framework for the discussion. The 1957 declaration, however, was in fact relied upon by both Moscow and Peiping, emphasizing differing formulations in the decla- ration, in support of their differing positions on both domestic and foreign policy. Soviet and Chinese editorial interpretation of this latest statement should soon make clear whether--as seems likely-- Moscow and Peiping will again present their agreempnt diffprpntiv A Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 � � � - Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 6 DECEMBER 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR attempting to clear way in UN for top-level contacts with new US adminis- tration at special General Assembly meet- ing next spring. 0 Moscow and Cambodia formally announce accord on number, of foreign policy posi- tions in joint communique. Chinese Communists encountering "tre- mendous difficulties" in industry. II. ASIA-AFRICA UAR orders widespread press attack in Lebanon on policies of Iraqi Prime Min- ister Qasim; may foreshadow ne effort to hasten Qasim's decline. Situation in Laos 0 III. THE WEST ()Brazilian President-elect probably will institute major foreign policy changes, especially in colonial matters and Latin American economic development. �Guatemala- -Army unrest persists and new coup may be attempted soon. Trip Crro r Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 tow �feit'--43-ErKET- *Laos: LGeneral Phoumi has received information that military elements in Vientiane sympathetic to him plan to stage a coup in his behalf on the night of 7 December. The individuals involved are not specified, but plans for the coup are said to have been closely coordinated with represent- atives of Phoumi across the river in Thailand. Chances for a successful coup have probably been enhanced by the withdrawal of some pro - Souvanna Phouma forces from the capital and by Captain Kong Le's preoccupation with the Phoumi offensive in the Ca Dinh River area. Fighting meanwhile appears to have subsided in the Ca Dinh area. However, Kong Le and the Pathet Lao are re- portedly planning to withdraw their forces with the aim of luring Phoumi forward to a more vulnerable position; Kong Le then would make a stand somewhere east of Vientiane and would also attack Phoumi from the rearn III. THE WEST Brazil: resident- elect Janio Quadros apparently plans a more "independent" foreign policy for Brazil following his inauguration on 31 January. Changes will be especially marked in policy toward the European colonial powers and - in the field of Latin American economic development, accord- ing to Joao Dantas, an anti-US Brazilian publisher who some- - times acts as an emissary for Quadros. Dantas believes Quadros will soon make public an exchange of correspond- ence with Ferhat Abbas in which Abbas calls on Brazil for help in "completing decolonialization." Quadros, who is now in Spain, has turned down an informal invitation to meet with President-elect Kennedy in the US during the nreinaneural period. (Page 4, ef) Guatemala: Army unrest responsible for the abortive military revolt of 13 November still persists, and a new coup 6 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695V A A Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 true/ TOP SECRET may be attempted shortly. Two Guatemalan colonels told an American Embassy officer on 2 December that the army will oust President Ydigoras and assured him that their movement Is not Communist inspired, The replacement of the unpopular defense minister, who resigned on 23 November with the en- tire cabinet, would, however, tend to ameliorate army griev- ances and might forestall a revolt. Meanwhile, leaders of the three strongest opposition political parties, sensing the re- gime's weakness, signed a unity pact on 2 December in which � they agreed to support a new regime in which they would par- ticipate. They also agreed to reject dealing with "anyone as- sociated with international Communism." (Page 6) 6 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF iv --ToP-sEscREvr ikpproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO29936951 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 �C�ONFIDEIV/W-L Nape Moscow Presses for Special UN Session on Disarmament The Soviet UN delegation is attempting to clear the way for top-level contacts with the new US administration at a special session of the General Assembly next Spring. Chief Soviet delegate Zorin has contended in private talks that early completion of the debates on such "contentious items" as Tibet and Hungary before the new US administration takes office would improve the atmosphere for a US.Soviet rap- prochement. Zorin has suggested that, after a Christmas recess, the current assembly ,session reconvene on 3 Jan- uary to deal with outstanding issues except for disarmament. According to the current Soviet plan, discussion of disarma- ment would be carried over into a special session of the Gen- eral Assembly to be attended by the heads of government. Moscow apparently feels that a proposal for the heads of government to consider the issue of disarmament would com- mand wide support in the UN and be difficult for the West to reject. The main purpose of such a session from Moscow's viewpoint probably would be to provide an opportunity for Khrushchev to meet with the new President and lay the ground- work for a formal summit conference later in the year. The Soviet premier probably recognizes that his actions since the collapse of the Paris meeting have complicated the convening of another four-power conference this spring. an his recent talk with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev stated he was fully aware that an improvement of relations with the US would be a gradual step-by-step process3 A meeting with Western leaders at the UN would also provide Khrushchev with a justi- fication for further delaying unilateral action on the Berlin question. Since Afro-Asian opinion favored the abortive five-power resolution last September calling for renewed contacts between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev, the USSR probably feels these states can be brought into line behind a proposal for heads of government to attend a session on disarmament. During negotiations on the Soviet-Finnish communique of 24 Novem- ber, Moscow attempted unsuccessfully to gain Finnish agree- ment to a statement calling for a special assembly, session on disarmament. The Soviet-Cambodian communique of 3 Decem- ber contained the first formal nonbloc endorsement of the pro- posal for the special session. ttieft41:FETS1 1 LAL 6 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTFI I IMFKIrF RI III prim Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 �CONFIDENTIAL� vamp, Moscow Secures Cambodian Support on International Questions In a joint communique published on 3 December fol- lowing discussions between Prince Sihanouk and Soviet officials in the USSR, Moscow succeeded in identifying long-standing Cambodian positions with Soviet views on foreign policy. Agreement was expressed on the neces- sity for universal disarmament, the admission of Commu- nist China and Mongolia into the United Nations, and the need to adapt the UN to the "new conditions" which exist. Only Sihanouk's support for Khrushchey's plan to modify the UN structure is a new position for Cambodia. The statement, capitalizing on Sihanouk's apprehensions over � the critical Laotian situation, also advocated support for the Souvanna Phouma regime. While no mention was made of Sihanouk's hopes for a Cambodian-Laotian neutral zone, the anti-Western flavor of the communique contained in such expressions as "con- cern over foreign intervention" in Laos and a call for the liquidation of military bases on foreign soil appears to bear out other indications that Cambodia's relations with the West are again cooling. Sihanouk's position may be partly influ- enced by his desire for bloc assistance in financing Cambo- dia's ambitious five-year development plan, for which about a third of the cost is being sought from foreign sources. The communique" included a Soviet offer to construct as a gift a technical school in Cambodia, a project previously suggested by Sihanouk to the US for US consideration. The statement indicates that the USSR responded favorably to Sihanouk's overtures for increased economic assistance and that it is probably ready to extend credit and technical aid for specific projects which may be discussed in future talks. Moscow's only aid project in Cambodia is a gift hospital which was completed according to schedule last August. Sihanouk will probably play up domestically the USSR's response to his overtures and may make similar requests for assistance, in-. eluding aid for his proposed Phnom Penh - Sihanoukville rail- road, during his visit to Peiping. CONFIDENTIAL 6 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTFI I inFigrF RIII I FT1k1 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 SECRET -fte China Has Difficulty With Exports to Bloc Peiping is unable to satisfy urgent requests from bloc countries for late 1960 delivery of some industri 1 r no further iron ore should be expected from the Chinese this year because of "tremendous difficulties in their industry," He described the general situation as hopeless and reported that the Chinese refused to negotiate. Chinese inde- cision is ascribed to the fact that the 1961 economic plan is be- ing reworked completely and "they do not know what they have or what they will be able to release." Furthermore, shipments of rice and soybeans to the USSR are considerably below the quantities usually observed at this time of the year. Other agricultural exports are also expected to be reduced in volume. Peiping has invoked a force majeure-- an "act of God" clause--blaming situations beyond the control of either party--to cover its failure to ship agricultural prod- ucts to Hungary. A further decline in exports will worsen Chi- na's balance of payments position unless imports can be cut back. China's trade problems reflect internal economic difficul- ties and perhaps stalling tactics pending the outcome of talks with the USSR. The continuing delay in setting 1961 require- ments, however, will almost certainly lower the trade level for the first quarter of next year. Even if negotiations are ini- tiated in early December, as the Chinese reportedly promised the Bulgarians, Chinese procrastination will result in delay or cancellation of bloc delivery of such items as diesel re gates," machine tools and communic tions e �SECRET-- 6 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RIB I FTIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 eetiffiDENTTA�C Nee Brazilian Foreign raucy (-flanges Likely EPresident-elect (Tani� Quadros apparently plans a more "inapendent" foreign policy for Brazil following his inau- guration on 31 January. Changes will be especially marked in policy toward the European colonial powers and in the field of Latin American economic development, according to Joao Dantas, an anti-US Brazilian publisher who some acts as an emissary for Quadros and has been men- tioned as a possible cabinet member in the new regime. Dantas, who last week interviewed Algerian rebel leaders in Tunis at Quadros' request, believes Quadros will soon make public an exchange of correspondence with Algerian rebel leader Ferhat Abbas in which Abbas calls on Brazil for help in "completing decolonialization." Dantas said Quadros also plans "aggressive and constructive" anti- colonial action with respect to black Africa, including Por- tugal's Angola Quadros, who is now in Europe recuperating from an eye operation, has turned down an informal invitation to meet with President-elect Kennedy in the US during the preinaugural period, possible to call attention to campaign assertions that his regime would be "strictly independent." He reportedly plans to seek extensive US economic aid, but apparently believes that for domestic political reasons and for reasons of international prestige, he cannot afford to appear overly friendly toward the United States. In his only postelection press conference, he asserted several times that the United States "must become convinced of the indis- putable fact that Brazil in the very near future is to become a major power." This theme has been stressed by the in- cumbent Kubitschek government but never so openly or ex- plicitly.) Quadros, previously labeled a "Wall Street lackey" by the leftist press in Brazil, also promised during the elec- tion campaign to re-establish diplomatic relations with Mos- cow and to "recognize" Communist China. He has since) CONFIDENTIAL 6 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 NNW aiedged on these promises, possibly to maintain freedom as to conditions and timing. Public pressure for closer ties with the &no-Soviet bloc has been building up for the past several years in Brazil despite periodic Foreign Ministry warnings that this could imperil national secu- rity:3 EVice President Goulart, a leftist who is sparring with Quadros for influence in the new government, last week requested high-level interviews in Washington on 20 De- cember, but he has accepted invitations from Moscow and Peiping that may postpone or preclude his visit here. Since Goulart was re-elected to the vice presidency on an oppos- ing ticket and is not on good terms with the President- elect, his travel plans probably were not made at Guadrosi requesg CONFIDENTIAL 6 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 SECRET � Dissident Guatemalan oificers May Attempt Another Coup The dissatisfactions which led to the abortive military revolt of 13 November persist in the Guatemalan Army, and a new coup may be attempted shortly. A number of officers who were originally in on the November plot but subsequently backed out are being pressured to act against the regime now � or face exposure by the narticin ts in the revolt, The officers being black- mailed are said to number over 100 and to include some in key posts. Two Guatemalan colonels told an American Em- bassy officer on 2 December that the army will oust the Ydigoras regime and assured him that their movement is not Communist inspired. Another officer reportedly said that the army intends to establish a three-man military junta and then hold elections "as soon as possible." The extent of army dissidence is unclear, but if it is as widespread as claimed by the dissidents, it constitutes a clear threat to the President. The replacement of the unpopular de- fense minister, who resigned on 23 November with the entire cabinet, would, however, tend to ameliorate army grievances and might forestall a revolt. However, the scheduled trials of officers involved in the revolt may prove embarrassing to the President, and his repeated public references to the 13 November revolt as "Communist inspired" have undoubtedly aroused resentment in some army circles. Meanwhile, leaders of the three most important opposition political parties, sensing the regime's weakness, signed a unity pact on 2 December agreeing to support a new regime in which they would participate. These parties�the strong moderate left- ist Revolutionary party, the dissident wing of the late President Castillo Armast party, and a church-oriented group--also re- jected dealing with "anyone associated with international Com- munism." Although the Communists are apparently not directly involved in the current coup plans, they are aware of army unrest and, -SECRET -- 6 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 1.11 are "ready to participate in armed insurrection when action staxts."aro-Communist former Guatemalan President Arbenz, now in Cuba, emerged from a meeting with Fidel Castro in mid-November with the assurance that Castro wants to aid the Guatemalan insurrection, but "with the greatest discretion," -SECRET- 6 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGFNCE REILLFTIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 �etffirrivt-rm-A-L� vise THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 002993695 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695 / Tep�sEeRET-- / / / / / / / . / / r / / / / / / / / / / / / / / � / // e / . 0 , / s/ e / / / , � :or � I , r . ,, ; 2, - ��., o# I t7,, or, ,, / TOP SECRET % 1&01/ Approved_for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993695Weejernrnrnm I