CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/02/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02993978
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 14, 1954

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14 February 1954
Copy No, 84
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE. 4)00 9
AUTH: HR NO%
DATE: REVIEWER: ,
Oft
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Bidault believes Soviet weakness in Germany prevents agreement on
unity (page 3).
2.
FAR EAST
3. Civilian exchange program in Korea may break down (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Viet Minh to "threaten" Luang Prang and force withdrawal at
Dien Bien Phu (page 5).
5. Templer cool to Korean proposal of Asian anti-Communist alliance
(page 6).
6. India and Burma attempt to conceal true price in rice deal (page 7).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
. Egyptian vice premier expects to quash Soviet offer of aid (page L).
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GENERAL
1. .Bidault believes Soviet weakness in Germany prevents agreement on
unity:
2.
According to Foreign Minister Bidault, the
Western powers were wise to adopt the
position that a future German provisional
government should be free to assume what,
ever obligations of the two present regimes
c ose, since e weakness of the Soviet position in Germany pre-
vents Molotov from agreeing to this proposal. Molotov, he said,
could not "sacrifice to the cause of German unification" the weak
Soviet position in East Germany, which would be demonstrated and
confirmed by free elections.
Bidault added that the exposure of the insecure
Soviet position might eventually have repercussions throughout the
Satellites. He described the present situation in East Germany as one
born of the tensions that have "developed during the preceding years
between the German population and the Soviet occupation," about which
the conference can do nothing.
Comment: Bidault's analysis of the Soviet
dilemma supports the belief that the Kremlin's maneuverability on
the German issue is strictly circumscribed by the inherent weakness
of the USSR's position in Eastern Europe.
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FAR EAST
3. Civilian exchange program in Korea may break down:
In its first reference to the plan for an
exchange of displaced civilians on 1. March,
the North Korean radio on 11 February
stated that "there are hardly any" South
Koreans in the north, but there are "a number" of North Koreans
in the south.
The American embassy in Seoul comments
that the Communists are apparently laying the groundwork for a
propaganda attack on the UN Command and the Rhee government for
the small number to be returned north. The broadcast also suggests
that the Communists intend to deliver only a few South Koreans in
exchange.
Comment: Seoul officials have talked of
the return of 200,000 South Koreans from the north, while stating
that only 2,000 of the 800,000 North Koreans now in the south desire
to return. It is probable that refugees on both sides fear retaliation
if they register for repatriation.
a campaign is already under way in the south threatening
death to any person attempting to go north.
There is a strong possibility that the program
will break down amid mutual recriminations, and thus provide the
Rhee government with another occasion to discredit the belief that
Korean unification can be achieved through political negotiations.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Viet Minh to "threaten" Luang Prabang and force withdrawal at Dien
Bien Phu:
the
Viet Minh apparently intends to "threaten"
Luang Prabang, thereby causing the French
to reinforce the capital, and at the same time
to isolate Dien Bien Phu and force an evacua-
tion of its garrison.
On 12 February Cogny told the American
consul in Hanoi that he believes the bulk of the Viet Minh 312th and
316th Divisions was still in the Dien Bien Phu area, and that only the
308th Division, with some slight reinforcement, had moved into
northern Laos. He also stated that it is not clear whether the enemy
plans a major attack against Luang Prabang or only a feint.
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Comment: A prime objective of the Viet Minh
during the current campaign is undoubtedly to bring about the dispersal
and 'immobilization of French troops, which would enable it to expand
Its territorial gains and prevent the French from taking the offensive.
the 312th Division, and at least elements of the 316th, were
moving into northern Laos either to reinforce the 308th advancing on
Luang Prabang or to threaten other points. As yet, there has been no
contact with these units in Laotian territory.
5. Templer cool to Korean proposal of Asian anti-Communist alliance:
Sir Gerald Templer, the British high commis-
sioner in Malaya, informed the American
consul in Kuala Lumpur that South Korean
general Choi, now touring Southeast Asia
in the interests of an Asian anti-Communist
alliance, would be "hand-shaken and talked to" when he arrived in
Malaya, but would be advised to refer any proposals to the Foreign
Office in London.
The consulate believes that in addition to
the usual British reservations regarding a possible Rhee-Chiang
partnership, Templer has little confidence in any alliance primarily
dependent on Asian military forces, of which he holds a low opinion.
Comment: The American embassies in
Rangoon and Djakarta both report that it is extremely unlikely that
either Burma or Indonesia would participate in any regional under-
taking which was clearly anti-Communist, particularly if Rhee and
Chiang were involved.
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6. India and Burma attempt to conceal true price in rice deal:
The American embassy in New Delhi reports
that the price India is paying Burma for the
600,000 long tons of rice it recently purchased
will be announced as identical with that paid
by Japan and Ceylon, but actually will be less.
7.
The difference,
by credits from other Indian-Burmese financial transactions.
covered
Comment: Japan and Ceylon are the only
two countries to have made firm commitments for substantial
purchases from Burma's large 1954 rice crop, and both have most-
favored-nation agreements covering prices. India's purchase
involves Burma's carryover stock, much of which is in poor condition,
but its price is 30 percent less than that paid by the other two countries.
Should Japan and Ceylon discover this subter-
fuge, as is probable, and choose to retaliate by holding out for better
terms, Burma's surplus problem may again become acute.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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8, Egyptian vice premier expects to quash Soviet offer of aid:
Vice
Premier Nasr believes the USSR is insincere
in its reported willingness to provide financial
adte�hnical assistance if Egypt requests it,
Nasr, on his part will suggest that the USSR
send Egypt a letter formally offering such aid. He is not interested
in receiving Russian help because of its political implications, and
thinks his reply will end the matter.
Comment: Nasr's attitude may constitute
a major obstacle to an Egyptian-Soviet deal. The Soviet Union has
recently offered economic assistance to several Middle Eastern
and South Asian nations. It is unlikely that any Soviet aid would be
sufficient tci finance more than a small part of the projects Egypt
has planned, including a high dam at Aswan and other major works.
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