CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/02/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02993979
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 16, 1954

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3.3(h)(2)
16 February 1954 3.5(c)
Copy No. 84
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. ---/7
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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NExT REVIEW DATE: 0 0_9 � �
ALITH: HA 70-14.ck
DATE: V51EVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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%Imo" IN...Ls
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Comment on changes in South Korean army command (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Little information available to French on Viet Minh dispositions
(page 3).
3. French military chiefs visiting Saigon take defeatist attitude (page 4).
4. Increase in number of Viet Minh trucks reported (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Iran's new oil adviser optimistic over Abadan production facilities
(page 4).
6. Comment on appointment of new Libyan prime minister (page 5).
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FAR EAST
1. Comment on changes in South Korean army command:
The appointment on 14 February of
General Chong Il-kwon as South Korean army chief of staff and
the concurrent transfer of General Paik Sun-yop to command the
1st Field Army formalize command changes planned by President
Rhee since September.
The establishment of a tactical field
army reflects Rhee's eagerness to obtain tactical, if not strategic,
control over his military establishment, and could be the first step
toward the South Korean army's withdrawal from the UN Command.
It also emphasizes Rhee's inclination to follow policies independent
of American influence.
Chong has reportedly said several tithes
that he would not obey an order to carry out independent military
action. The army may become increasingly involved in domestic
politics, since Chong has political ambitions and extensive affilia-
tions with pro-Rhee politicians.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Little information available to French on Viet Minh dispositions:
French information on Viet Minh move-
ments and intentions in northern Laos
remains fragmentaryij
rand
there is insufficient information to indi-
cate whether the Viet Minh will attack
Luang Prabang.
The American army attach�n Saigon
also ttates that the French have little knowledge of enemy dispositions.
He adds that information on French Union forces has been very scarce
in the past two weeks and that the French have apparenUypiac
attaches in the category of newsmen.
just back from Hanoi and Luang Prabang, nowever, has told him that
the French withdrawal to Luang Prabang was a debacle and that General
Cogny had "guardedly confirmed this."
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3. French military chiefs visiting Saigon take defeatist attitude:
The American embassy in Saigon reports
that members of the French joint chiefs
of staff now visiting Indochina took a dis-
turbingly defeatist attitude toward the
Indochina war. General Fay, head of the French air force, obviously
regarded continuance of the French effort as futile. General Le Blanc,
chief of staff of the French army, stating that France should use its
officers and troops for NATO, appeared even eager to sum up reasons
why the war could never be won.
Comment: American field observers
recently commented that it is apparent that a negotiated peace is
now regarded by the French as the inevitable solution to the war,
and the only question remaining is the timing of negotiations.
4. Increase in number of Viet Minh trucks reported:
although
Chinese aid figures are incomplete for
recent months, the Viet Mirth has received
"many" new trucks and now has between
1,000 and 1,500.
Comment: During the past year there
has been a considerable improvement in Viet Minh transport capa-
bilities, with the number of trucks rising from an estimated 450 in
mid-1953 to about 800 toward the end of the year. The continuing
increase in the number of trucks received from Communist China
will enable the Viet Minh to handle greater amounts of Chinese aid,
which is still estimated at the relatively low rate of 1,000 tons monthly.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Iran's new oil adviser optimistic over Abadan production facilities:
Torkild Rieber, newly appointed oil
adviser to the Iranian government,
reports after a visit to Abadan that the
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equipment there is in surprisingly good condition and that Iran's
oil production could exceed the prenationalization level in two years.
The cost of restoring the Abadan plant is placed at between $25,000,000
and $30,000,000 over a two-year period. From 400 to 500 foreign tech-
nicians would also be required. Rieber was impressed with the Iranian
technicians and believes that a substantial number of them could be used
in high positions.
He believes that after 12 months an annual
rate of 15,000,000 tons of crude oil and 5,000,000 tons of refined products
can be reached. After 24 months the annual rate could be 20,000,000 tons
of crude and 20,000,000 tons of refined products.
Comment: Rieber's estimate of 40,000,000
tons per year after two years contrasts with the 33,000,000 tons achieved
by peak AIOC production in 1950. It is not likely that markets could be
found for such a large amount within two years without cutbacks by other
Near Eastern producers.
Iranian anticipation of oil sales of this magni-
tude is likely to cause adverse reaction in Tehran to any plan which en-
visages a more gradual return of Iranian oil to world markets.
6. Comment on appointment of new Libyan prime minister:
The appointment of Muhammad Saqizli, chief
of King Idriss' royal council, as prime minister of Libya is likely to
increase the difficulties for the United States in negotiating a Libyan
base agreement. There is no indication that Saqizli will give forceful
direction to the weak federal structure, suffering from rivalry between
the two major provinces, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.
Retiring prime minister Muntasser, a leading
Tripolitanian and the ablest figure in Libyan politics, long at Odds with
the king, is now the potential leader of a strong opposition. His replace-
ment by a prominent Cyrenaican apparently represents an increase in the
power of the king and can be expected to encourage separatist sentiment
and dissension in the more politically conscious and important province
of Tripolitania. American military interests are largely confined to this
province and, accordingly, added Cyrenaican influence in the federal
government will not facilitate base negotiations.
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