CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/02/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02993988
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 26, 1954

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3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
26 February 1954
616 (JAE/.
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO, a
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
Li DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DA 0 0 S
ALITH: HR 7
DATE: CO REVIEWER:
rl 4
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Turkey suspects Yugoslav motives in Balkan Pact (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Yoshida confident scandals will not compel his resignation (page 3).
3. Taipei presses for immediate security pact with United States
(page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Navarre criticizes Bao Dai for his inertia (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
5. Nehru receives news of military aid to Pakistan calmly (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Comment on situation in Egypt (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
7.
LATIN AMERICA
8. Plans for disturbances during Caracas conference reported (page 7).
LATE ITEM
9. Comment on Syrian revolt (page 8).
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GENERAL
1. Turkey suspects Yugoslav motives in Balkan Pact:
In conversations with the American army
attach�the Turkish deputy minister of
national defense and the acting G-2 of the
Turkish general staff indicated "deep dis-
trust" of Yugoslav motives in the Balkan
Pact. -
Turkey intends to postpone indefinitely
further military talks unless its suspicions are allayed.
Comment: This is the first occasion on
which Turkish officials have voiced any suspicion of Yugoslav motives
in Balkan Pact relations. These fears can have a damaging effect on
Balkan Pact planning. The scheduled tripartite military meeting has
been postponed until mid-March.
Greek officials, representing the third
partner in the Balkan Pact, have recently expressed confidence in
Yugoslavia's alignment with the West.
FAR EAST
2. Yoshida confident scandals will not compel his resignation:
On 25 February Prime Minister Yoshida,
through his foreign minister, informed
Ambassador Allison that the implication
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of lesser members of his party in the financial scandals will not
compel him to dissolve his cabinet. Yoshida, after a personal
investigation, is convinced that no member of the cabinet or top-
ranking official of the Liberal Party is involved and is confident
that he will weather the storm.
Comment: Since none of the conserva-
tive parties desires new elections at this time, Yoshida may be able
to survive the crisis by sacrificing a few relatively minor figures.
The fate of his cabinet, however, still hinges on the extent to which
top members may be implicated with indisputable legal evidence.
3. Taipei presses for immediate security pact with United States:
The Chinese Nationalist foreign minister
told the American charg�n 24 February
that this is the psychological moment for
concluding a mutual security pact between
his country and the United States. He argued that since the forthcoming
Geneva conference is regarded by many Chinese Nationalists as a step
toward admitting Communist China to the United Nations, the signing
of the pact would provide strong reassurance that the United States will
"not let free China down."
Comment: The Nationalists have long
been seeking such a pact to formalize the existing American commit-
ment to the defense of Formosa. They also have an abiding suspicion,
stimulated by the agreement on the Geneva conference, that the United
States may be induced by its major allies to compromise with the Chi-
nese Communists at Nationalist expense.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Navarre criticizes Bao Dai for his inertia:
General Navarre told Ambassador Heath
on 24 February that he would not be able
to "break the back" of Viet Minh resistance
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within 15 months as he had planned unless the Vietnamese government
provides him with the anticipated additional battalions "ready for
serious combat." He observed that a national war spirit could hardly
be expected when Bao Dai remained removed from his people, and said
that if he had the power, he would be tempted to order Bao Dai to take
up residence in Saigon within 15 days or relinquish his authority over
the Vietnamese government and army.
Comment: Bao Dal's policy is to move
gradually toward more direct and active leadership of the Vietnamese
government as that government increases in strength. There is little
prospect that the French can induce him to accelerate his pace.
SOUTH ASIA
5. Nehru receives news of military aid to Pakistan calmly:
Nehru's reaction was "surprisingly pleasant"
when Ambassador Allen informed him on 24
February that President Eisenhower's decision
to grant military aid to Pakistan would be an-
nounced the next day. In response to Allen's statement that the action was
in no way aimed against India, Nehru replied that he had never believed
the United States wished to harm India, but that he had been concerned
over possible Hindu-Moslem friction following the grant of aid.
Allen commented that Nehru might issue a
public statement strongly condemning the American action. The am-
bassador foresaw no serious public demonstrations, however, and hoped
that discussion on the subject would diminish in a few days.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Comment on situation in Egypt:
Relinquishment of all offices by Egypt's
President Mohammad Nagib on 24 February
and assumption of leadership by Colonel
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Abdul Gamal Nasr formalize a situation which has existed for several
months. This development is not likely to bring any immediate signifi-
cant changes in internal affairs or in foreign policy, since Nasr has
practically controlled both while the ill and discontented Nagib served
as the popular figurehead.
Nasr has been involved in the day-to-day
negotiations with Britain on the Suez issue. He believes that the pres-
ent regime has already gone further in making concessions to Britain
than any previous Egyptian government. It is doubtful that he will yield
any more in the absence of new British moves, but he will not necessarily
be more difficult. He may be expected to maintain internal order, pre-
ferring political and diplomatic measures to guerrilla warfare as a means
of bringing about a Suez settlement.
Without Nagib as a front, the military dictator-
ship may appear more starkly to be what it is. The absence of Nagib
may deprive the regime of considerable genuine popular support and
necessitate greater reliance on police measures. Lacking a counter-
balance, Nasr may become more arbitrary in his internal and external
relations, and there may be more friction within the governing army
clique.
WESTERN EUROPE
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Comment: Although Italian Foreign
Ministry officials recently told the American embassy that Scelba
planned to present the EDC draft bill to parliament "within three
or four weeks" after receiving a vote of confidence, Zoppi's state-
ments reported above are more in line with Rome's past and possibly
current position on this issue.
LATIN AMERICA
8. Plans for disturbances during Caracas conference reported:
Representatives of the four largest
Venezuelan political parties opposed
to the present regime met
to discuss plans for disturbances and
propaganda activities during the Inter-American Conference,
Among the projects discussed was a
general strike "if conditions permit." to of the
groups, the outlawed Democratic Action 1).--,7t7 and the Communists,
may attempt to create a "second Bogotazo" even though this apparently
was not discussed at the meeting.
The government is confident, however, that
it can thwart any of these plans. Police and army leaders reportedly
met to discuss preventive measures, including the
disposition of tanks and automatic weapons.
Comment: Representatives of these four
groups reportedly failed at a meeting to agree on a
joint attitude toward the Caracas conference. Since these four parties
include the moderate Christian Socialists and the Republican Democrats,
who together won a majority of the popular vote in the November 1952
elections for the present Constitutional Assembly, agreement among
them now on a joint position would create a situation potentially much
more explosive than would be likely from any plans for violence by the
Communists or the Democratic Action Party alone.
The security precautions taken by the govern-
ment for next month's conference far exceed those taken for the 1952
election and for the attempted general strike last year.
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LATE ITEM
9. Comment on Syrian revolt:
The ouster of President Shishakli by
an alliance of military and civilian
malcontents may plunge Syria into a
new struggle for power between the two elements, even though
it offers the prospect of restoration of the constitutional govern-
ment abolished five years ago. The military leaders, largely
unidentified, who were instrumental in removing Shishakli almost
immediately announced that they were returning the government to
the people and proposed former president Hashim al Atasi as a
possible new chief of state. The aged Atasi offers little more than
an official rallying point.
The years of tight dictatorship have
eliminated most of Syria's able politicians and have resulted in
the suppression of political parties. It will accordingly be dif-
ficult to re-establish bonafide constitutional government. Moreover,
the forces which overthrew Shishakli have no unifying element other
than opposition to his regime. There will be strong temptation for
Syrian army officers to continue the well-established pattern of mili-
tary dictatorship.
In the chaotic period ahead an opportunity
will be afforded for feverish maneuvering on the part of those opposing
and favoring union with Iraq.
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