CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/03/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02993995
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 18, 1954

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18 March 1954
Copy No. 84
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 6
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
1.1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 8 C
NEXT REVIEW DATE. �RD49
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: ja7/42lf_9,_ REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Big Communist delegations seen delaying Geneva conference
(page 3).
2. East Germans to break export contracts with West if necessary to
fulfill Soviet demands (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
3. IL-28's scheduled to fly on to Provideniya (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Viet Minh effectiveness at Dien Bien Phu surprises French (page 4).
5. American air maintenance personnel in Tonkin threatened (page 5).
6. Early elections in Vietnam seen essential (page 6).
7. High Indonesian officials attend Communist congress (page 6).
SOUTH ASIA
8. Karachi government losing in East Pakistan elections (page 7).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
9. Oil talks between AIOC and American companies deadlocked
(page 7).
10. Shah may pardon Mossadeq (page 8).
11, New Sudan crisis threatened by Unionist party demands (page 9).
. 12. Spain reported planning to set up independent sultan in Spanish
Morocco (page 9).
WESTERN EUROPE
13. Quick Saar settlement key to pre-Easter French EDC, debate
(page 10).
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GENERAL
1. Big Communist delegations seen delaying Geneva conference:
The Soviet and Chinese Communist delega-
tions to the Geneva conference will each
consist of 200 persons, according to the
Swiss Foreign Ministry protocol chief.
A United Nations official in Geneva sug-
gests the possibility that the Communists may be sending these huge
delegations for the deliberate purpose of causing organizational dif-
ficulties and thus delaying the conference.
Comment: The size of the Soviet and
Chinese delegations appears to reflect a common desire to be pre-
pared for every contingency at the conference, although a wish to
postpone it is conceivable.
2. East Germans to break export contracts with West if necessary to
fulfill Soviet demands:
The East German Foreign Trade Ministry
announced on 4 February that export con-
tracts with Western countries must be
broken if these obligations conflict in any
way with deliveries to the Soviet Union. This order will apply par-
ticularly to commodities manufactured by former joint East German-
Soviet enterprises which were recently returned to East German
ownership.
Comment: Such an order would be
contrary to the "new course" policy announced last summer. It
would seriously undercut East Germany's current efforts to increase
its trade with the West. Knowledge of the order would confirm sus-
picions of Western traders that East Germany will be unable to fulfill
export commitments.
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J I A.
SOVIET UNION
3. IL-28's scheduled to fly on to Provideniya:
Comment: From Provideniya these aircraft
would be able to cover most of Alaska.
they are part of a Soviet reconnaissance regiment which has been active
in relatively long-range flights.
These planes may have a reconnaissance
mission in the area, or they may be on a familiarization flight in
anticipation of the basing of jet light bombers in the Chukotsk.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Viet Minh effectiveness at Dien Bien Phu surprises French:
A high French official in Saigon described
the situation in Dien Bien Phu as "very
serious." Viet Minh losses have been
very heavy, but so have those of the French.
Navarre's staff is
appalled by the enemy's swift successes in overrunning French strong
points manned by tested troops, and by the concentration and accuracy
of Viet Minh artillery fire. t the first phase of the attack
had been "very bad" for the French. he eventual outcome
of the battle would depend on French air power, the ability of the French
to lift sagging morale, and the extent the Viet Minh command is willing
to take "murderous losses to crack battle troops."
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i 1 VE LiEk.C., A�
he Viet Minh
had decided to risk a maximum effort at Dien Bien Phu because it
recognized the "catastrophic" offoPt N1711 11 "3 11 "urgent victory would
have in Vietnam and France. ass of the stronghold
by the French would: reduce Vietnamese army morale, already low,
to the danger point; further damage French military morale, already
lowered by talk of an imminent truce; seriously discredit the strategy
of General Navarre; give the Viet Minh a tremendous boost in prestige
"perfectly timed with the Geneva conference," thus increasing the incentive
for defection by Vietnamese nationalists; and increase French domestic
pressure for direct negotiations with Ho Chi Minh.
the success of the first phase of the Communist attack
at Dien Bien Phu had shocked the French command, which is no longer
"supremely confident" of holding the fortress.
5. American air maintenance personnel in Tonkin threatened:
The American embassy in Saigon reports
that the road between Haiphong and nearby
Do Son airfield, where an American ground
crew of 100 men is stationed, was cut on the
night of 15 March by a detachment of 400 Viet Minh troops. Arms were
issued to the Americans and they stood guard duty during the night.
The embassy notes that evacuation of the
crew and their heavy equipment from Do Son would be difficult since
available transport aircraft are supplying Dien Bien Phu arid the runway
at Do Son is too short for C-119's or C-54's.
Comment: This threat to Do Son probably
is part of the continuing Viet Minh efforts to disrupt French air support
of Dien Bien Phu by attacking airfields in Tonkin. It is possible, how-
ever, that a calculated attempt is being made to embroil the Americans
in the fighting.
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NJ I. L.) IN.L.
6. Early elections in Vietnam seen essential:
Former Vietnamese prime ministers Huu
and Tam, in separate interviews with an
American official, strongly asserted that
Bao Dal's opposition to the growing popular
or elections Is weakening his regime. Huu said that if the
Geneva conference leads to an armistice and a plebiscite, "we are
lost." The only way he saw to head off a Communist victory was to
strengthen Vietnamese national leadership, while continuing the war
until a more solid basis for negotiations could be found.
Tam stated that it would be difficult to hold
elections prior to Geneva, but felt that an early announcement of a
definite date for elections would help.
Comment: The primary weakness of the
Bao Dal government stems from its lack of any elective base. Ambas-
sador Heath in Saigon recently suggested that elections be promptly
organized in Vietnam to strengthen the Western position at Geneva.
7. High Indonesian officials attend Communist congress:
The first article of business at the "recep-
tion" which opened a congress of the Indo-
nesian Communist Party on 15 March was
the reading of a letter from Prime Minister
Ali Sastroamidjojo indicating hope that the congress would produce
"beneficial results." In attendance were the deputy premier, two
cabinet officers and the chairman of parliament. Two of these men
made statements expressing gratitude for Communist support of the
government.
Ambassador Cumming comments that he
is "shocked" at the degree to which the government has lent official
support to this Communist meeting. He points out that it has been
customary for government officials to attend political party "recep-
tions." Only the Communist press played up the government's par-
ticipation.
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Comment: Despite the disclaimers of
Indonesian officials, the Communists have exploited, with consider-
able success, the government's dependence on their support ever
since it took office last July.
SOUTH ASIA
8. Karachi government losing in East Pakistan elections:
Early election returns from East Bengal,
Pakistan's richest and most populous
province, indicate that the ruling Moslem
League has been defeated by a wide margin in its attempt to win a
majority of the provincial assembly. The opposition United Democratic
Front (UDF) has won 70 of the 76 contests reported thus far for the 237
Moslem seats.
Comment: The Moslem League's failure
to meet local demands for greater autonomy and for a more vigorous
economic program apparently were stronger factors in the voting than
had been anticipated. The unpopularity of the local party leadership
also played a part.
American military aid to Pakistan was not
an issue in the campaign, although League leaders sought to use the aid
agreement to bolster their prestige.
The UDF is a loose federation of parties
with leftist tendencies but no common program, and the League may
be able to exploit the postelection splits which are almost certain to
develop. In any event, the position of the Karachi government will
be seriously weakened by defeat at the polls.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
9. Oil talks between AIOC and American companies deadlocked:
Discussions between the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company and five American oil companies
aimed at setting up a consortium to produce
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and market Iranian oil are deadlocked on the questions of financial
participation and of the compensation claimed by AIOC. Representa-
The American ambassador in London
expressed to Foreign Secretary Eden the apprehension that termination
of consortium negotiations might have "catastrophic" effects in Iran.
This view is shared by the British Foreign Office.
Comment: AIOC has long insisted on
compensation for loss of the profits it would have received if its
Iranian oil concession had continued until 1993. Such a claim would
almost certainly be rejected by the Zahedi government, and the other
proposed consortium members probably realize that AIOC's position
is unrealistic.
Iranian officials are anxious to negotiate
with a consortium, and the postponement or cancellation of a settlement
would be exceedingly damaging to Iranian political and economic stability.
Prime Minister Zahedi's tenure would be seriously threatened.
10. Shah may pardon Mossadeq:
The shah has agreed to pardon former prime
minister Mossadeq on 21 March, the Iranian
New Year
The shah reporteaty maae tne aecision at
the request of Ayatollah Borujerdi, the influential cleric and custodian
of the Qom Shrine.
The American embassy comments that the
source of this information did not mention how Mossadeq's subsequent
activity would be controlled, nor whether Prime Minister Zahedi had
been consulted.
Comment: This is the first report that the
shah is considering such action. Release of Mossadeq, now serving a
three-year sentence for treason, would probably be hailed by his sup-
porters as proof of his innocence. Unless his activities were circum-
scribed, he could be a rallying point for opposition to Zahedi, which
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vio0
has been ineffective so far. Freeing of Mossadeq at this time would
also complicate the oil negotiations.
Zahedi might consider the pardon of
Mossadeq as tantamount to repudiation by the shah.
11. New Sudan crisis threatened by Unionist party demands:
The executive committee of the National
Unionist Party, dominant party in the
Sudanese parliament, recommended on
14 March dissolution of the proindependence
Umma Party and its religious counterpart,
the Ansar sect. The committee also called for the arrest of all per-
sons who participated in the 1 March riot--presumably including Sayed
Siddik, the mandi's son and titular head of the Umma Party, who has
been publicly charged by the Unionists with responsibility for the riots.
Comment: Any attempt by Prime Minister
Azhari's government to implement its executive committee's recommenda-
tions is likely to cause the Umma Party to boycott the parliament and
precipitate a constitutional breakdown in the Sudan.
British officials have indicated that under
these circumstances the British governor general would assume the
"extraordinary powers" granted him under the Anglo-Egyptian agree-
ment of February 1953. Such action could lead to a general breakdown
of law and order in the Sudan and would cause a new crisis in Anglo-
Egyptian relations.
12. Spain reported planning to set up independent sultan in Spanish Morocco:
Spanish officials are planning to appoint the
khalifa of Spanish Morocco--now the Moroccan
sultan's representative-- as sultan of the
Spanish zone,
Top Spanish Moroccan officials believe that
the high commissioner is seeking authorit
r m iviaaria to name the khalifa as regent for the deposed sultan
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Agile
Comment: The appointment of the
khalifa as local sultan would abrogate treaty obligations between
France and Spain and set up an independent spiritual authority in
the Spanish zone.
The khalifa's appointment as regent,
however, would be more consistent with Madrid's current policy
of nonrecognition of the new sultan and its insistence that the unity
of Morocco be preserved. Even this measure would provoke strong
French protests and propaganda.
Serious consideration by Madrid of a
change in the legal basis of its protectorate is unlikely. Spain
will probably continue, however, its pressure on France in order
to strengthen its position in Morocco and reach a general settlement
of French-Spanish problems.
WESTERN EUROPE
13. Quick Saar settlement key to pre-Easter French EDC debate:
Ambassador Bruce in Paris fears that
French foreign minister Bidault's plans
for National Assembly debate on EDC
depend for their success on an "almost
overnight" settlement of the Saar issue.
Bruce considers such a quick settlement
unlikely.
Bidault proposes to set a date for the
debate only after all the assembly's preconditions for ratification--
including agreement on the Saar--are satisfied. He notes that the
government is still not firmly committed to beginning the debate
before Easter and that further delay may make debate before the
holidays virtually impossible.
Bidault has meanwhile assured Ambassador
Dillon that the Socialists have agreed not to press their demands for
prior assurances of "democratic control" of the European army.
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Comment: French-German talks on the
Saar are continuing at Bonn in an attempt to reconcile differences on
the Council of Europe plan. Agreement on a general outline of a Saar
settlement may be reached when Adenauer returns from Turkey late
next week, provided Bidault is able to assure him then of a definite
date for the EDC dabate.
There are indications that Laniel and
Bidault may be delaying because of a desire to announce the date
of the EDC debate as short a time as possible beforehand. They
apparently believe this would reduce the risks of a government
crisis before the debate begins.
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