[SANITIZED]NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY APRIL 27, 1976 - 1976/04/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02996470
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: April 27, 1976

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 CO2996470
The
National Intelligence
Daily
3.5(c)
Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only Copy No.
TUESDAY APRIL 27, 1976
VOLUME 3, NUMBER 99
3.5(c)
TOIECIfET
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2 TUESDAY APRIL 27, 1976
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
Argentina: Criticism of Videla
Officers of all three military services in
Argentina are said to be increasingly dis-
satisfied with what they view as President
Videla's overly conciliatory, indecisive
policies. The dissidents are urging tougher
measures against subversives and Peronist
labor leaders.
Videla's military
critics feel he has allowed only "halfway"
measures against the guerrillas, whose at-
tacks have mounted in recent weeks. The
officers want a free hand to use any means
to deal with not only the guerrillas, but
also individuals accused of other types of
crimes. This view
is said to be gaining favor in the
other services as well.
moderate policies could
weaken his authority
Videla's
eventually
there is considerable criticism of the
President's tolerant attitude toward the
ousted Peronists.
A number of officers reportedly feel
that Videla should completely repress the
Peronist movement by jailing its main
leaders and dismantling its labor
organization.
the army's III
Corps, is said to be the most prominent of
those who hold such a view.
Videla's fellow junta member, navy
chief Admiral Massera, reportedly also
believes that the government has been
acting indecisively. He has pointed to
failures to move against certain labor
unions and slowness in replacing many of
the ambassadors removed after the coup.
Massera has complained that army chief
of staff General Viola, a confidant of
Videla's, frequently intercedes to impede
actions that Massera and air force chief
General Agosti urge on the President.
Videla, as President, is acting in the
same deliberate fashion that characterized
his preparations for the coup. Faced with
3.3(b)(1)
Admiral Massera with President
Videla at rear
a guerrilla movement tliat has flourished
since the late 1960s, he is loath to commit
his administration to the unrealistic goal
of rapid solution of the problem.
Moreover, he fears alienating the
Peronists so completely as to drive at least
some into the arms of the terrorists.
Instead Videla clearly hopes to achieve
an early success with his innovative,
wide-ranging economic plan. A turn-
around for the economy would give his
administration momentum and reduce the
pressure to go all out to deal with security
problems. For the time being, Videla's
critics seem prepared to go along with
him.
TO1_,30A3�RET
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 CO2996470
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 CO2996470
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 CO2996470
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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 CO2996470
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