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January 27, 2020
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January 30, 2020
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September 23, 1958
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lee - Approved for Release. 2020/01/23 U029:33 TOP SECRET 3.5(c) 4,6 3.3(h)(2) 23 September 1958 Copy No. t, 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLA1%3 I 7 DEC' Ats:33(FIE�:0 TO: DA7r:: Al:VIEWER -TOP-SKIM- /We/Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO29966337 A Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 401% -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 TOP SECRET Niow 23 SEPTEMBER 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Taiwan Strait - Peiping issues "tenth warning" to US; Nationalist pilots initiate another action over mainland. Soviet weapons tests in Arctic area could include air-to-surface missiles. Joint GMIC-JAEIC statement on ex- plosion at Kapustin Yar--see page i II. ASIA-AFRICA Tension continues in Lebanon; Chris- tian-Moslem clashes likely if kidnaped Phalangist editor not released. 0 O Algerian rebels cautious toward UAR but Cairo not ruled out as possible seat of government. 0 Nash' moves to strengthen control over Syria. O Indonesian elections postponed; Com- munist reaction probable. 0 Laos - Opposition to monetary reform places prime minister in precarious position. III. THE WEST 0 Bolivian President likely to ignore legislative call to resume relations with USSR. LATE ITEM O USSR - Probable space vehicle launch- ing attempt at Tyura Tam missile range. 1 --,-- - ?Z- TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 14D Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO29966333 /�t, frarr two CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 23 September 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *Taiwan Strait situation: Peiping on 22 September ssued its "tenth Warning" against United States "provoca- ions." Nationalist pilots again took the initiative in an air lash on 20 September over the mainland near Kinmen. (Page 1) Soviet missiles: A Special Purpose Unit of the So- let Long Range Air Force, trained in the use of the Soviet- ermed "KS" air-to-surface missile, participated in a re- ent large-scale exercise by submarines and surface ships n the Norwegian Sea. The presence of this Special Pur- ose Unit in the Northern Fleet area suggests that a field evaluation of this missile may be included in the forthcom- ing test of "modern weapons" off Novaya Zemlya. (Page 3) Joint JAEIC-GMIC statement; At a meeting of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee on 22 September, the fol- lowing statement was agreed to: On 19 September 1958, a firing of a missile to an al- titude of 250 nautical miles occurred on the ICapustin Yar missile test range. the crew of an American aircraft operating at 40,000 feet, ap- proximately 600 nautical miles from the test range, TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 11.1 observed high in that direction a brilliant explosion, the light from which was still observed after 10 minutes, indicating a possible nuclear explosion. Present evidence from the Atomic Energy Detection System is still inconclusive as to the occurrence of a nuclear explosion at that time. Until further evi- dence and analysis are available, it is not possible to determine whether or not this nuclear test. IL ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon: Tension in Beirut remains high and is spreading into the countryside. Numerous pro- Chamoun Phalangists have made their way into Beirut, while others are encamped on the city's outskirts. Should the kidnaped Phalangist editor not be released by 23 September, clashes between Christians and Moslems are likely to occur despite the 24-hour curfew and government efforts der. Algeria: Algerian rebel leaders have indicated that their "free Algerian government" is dealing cautiously with the United Arab Republic, and denied that Cairo has been chosen as the seat of their government but did not rule it out. They claimed the announcement was timed to offset the effect of the Algerian vote on the French constitutional referendum. (Page 4) UAR: Nasir apparently will soon move toward strengthening his personal control over Syrian affairs by establishing a more centralized government in Cairo. He will probably use government reorganization as a means of placing further curbs on the activities of Syrian politicians who have been blocking the extension of his authority in Syria. (Page 6) 23 Sept 58 DAILY BRIEF ii 7 77/ qI :Approved for Releaselag01/23 c02666633' TOP SECRET rfir � Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 *41.0 '4ft�I Indonesia: The announced postponement for a year of national elections previously scheduled for September 1959 apparently is a major victory for the Indonesian Army and marks another step in its program to check growing Commu- nist party strength. It may precipitate a strong reaction from the Communists, whose hopes for national dominance had risen last year as a result of their sweep of the Javanese local elections. (Page 7) Laos: Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone is in a pre- carious political position as he begins negotiations with the United States over monetary reform. Strong opposition to devaluation exists within his cabinet and his parliamentary backing. (Page 8) IIL THE WEST Bolivia: President Siles is unlikely to carry out the resolution passed by the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies on 19 September calling for resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR. The chamber's action is part of a pattern of pressu relations in various Latin American coun- tries. (Page 9) LATE ITEM *Soviet space vehicle launching attempt attempted launching of a space vehicle, probably significantly different frornAhe Soviet Union's three previous earth satellites. Among the possibilities would be a lunar probe, launch and recovery of a satellite, or a limited reconnaissance satellite vehicle. 23 Sept 58 DAILY BRIEF 111 TOP SECRET %H AApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633v Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 4111% Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 *4.4 I. THE. COMMUNIST BLOC Taiwan Strait Situation In its "tenth serious warning" on 22 September, Com- munist China's Foreign Ministry claimed that "provocations by American naval and air forces have recently become in- creasingly serious," and that "brink of war" actions have "greatly aggravated" the present situation. Again there is no threat of counteraction. By attributing tension to Ameri- can actions, Peiping clearly hopes to win sympathy for its ostensible restraint and to bring increased international pressure to bear on the United States to make concessions at the Sino-American talks in Warsaw. American military advisers returning from duty on Kinmen report that the morale of the garrison is "excel- lent" and that the defenders would put up stiff resistance in the event of an assault. As of 21 September, however, only 30 days of food remained on an austere-consumption basis. Work on the Kinmen beaches has provided several dry-ramp landing slots for LSrs. Tracked vehicles now can use all beaches, two of which have 18 inches of crushed stone. The chief problem now appears to be the reluctance of Nation- alist captkins to bring their ships onto the beaches. A previously unreported air battle took place between Nationalist and Communist fighters on 20 September. Four Nationalist F-86 fighters covering a photo reconnaissance mis- sion in the Kinmen area attacked four MIG's which were re- turning to their base. two Communist aircraft may have been shot down. The the engagement took place over the mainland and that Na- tionalist aircraft were under orders not to engage, and there was confusion and delay in reporting the incident. several recent air combat reports have been deliberately obscured by the Nationalists to conceal the fact that their pilots provoked the engagements, TOP SECRET 23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 Approved for Release: 20201/01/23 CO2996633 %FL La....IA 1.1.4 %WI 10.1 contrary to agreements with American officials. One Na- tionalist air liaison officer believes the initiative was taken by the pilots themselves and not as the result of official or- ders, because the pilots are aggressive and confident of their combat abilities. TOP SECRET 23 Sept 58 CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 4110 Nktrof Soviet Air Force Missile Unit Participates in Naval Exercise A Soviet Long Range Air Force unit trained in the use of the Soviet-termed "KS" air-to-surface missile recently participated in a large-scale exercise of submarines and surface vessels by the Northern Fleet in the Norwegian Sea. The exercise involved the defense of the Kola Gulf area against "hostile" naval forces simulated by a cruiser and destroyer returning from visits to Norway and Sweden. In addition to meeting a barrier force of seven groups of opposing submarines, the "enemy force" was apparently subjected to simulated KS missile attacks on 18 September by aircraft of a Special Purpose Unit of the Long Range Air Force. There was probably some coordination between the submarines and the aircraft because an attack was apparent- ly made on the surface force some ten minutes after a sight- ing report by a submarine. This second association of the special unit with naval exercises suggests that the Long Range Air Force will be responsible for delivery of this weapon until Soviet naval air units, which are now training with the missile, achieve complete operational status. The presence of this Long Range unit in the Northern Fleet area suggests that it may also participate in the air and naval exercises scheduled from 20 September to 25 Oc- tober. These exercises will include the use of "modern weapons." An operational test of the KS missile equipped lear warhead may be included. -TOP SECRET 23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLICENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 711.4%.041,1.4 NOP� IL ASIA-AFRICA Algerian Rebel Government Mohamed Yazicl, minister for information in the pro- visional "Government of the Algerian Republic," indicated to American Embassy officials in Cairo on 20 September that it is dealing cautiously with the United Arab Republic. He claimed that the National Liberation Front (FIN) had been embarrassed by a UAR leak to the press some 48 hours prior to the proclamation of the regime on 19 September, and that the Algerians had maneuvered with the Iraqi ambassador In Cairo so that Iraqi recognition would precede that of the UArt; Yazid refuted with obvious resentment statements in the UAR press that Cairo has already been chosen as the seat of the new government, and also denied that a decision has been made to apply for Arab League membership. League affiliation may be one of the questions considered at the initial "cabinet" meeting on 26 September. All league members, ex- cept Lebanon, apparently had recognized the new regime as of 22 September. Tunisia, Morocco, and Kuwait have also recognized the rebel government, while the Pakistani �cloy- ernment, whose charg�n Cairo has called on the rebel � leaders, has urged American and Commonwealth diplomats to apply pressure on France to take immediate steps either toward independence or integration for Algeria, failing which Pakistan must recognize the FLN "government." Deputy Premier Krim Belkacem, who with Premier Abbas and Minister of Armament and Supply Mahmoud Cherif will establish himself in Tunis, informed Ambassador Jones in Tunis that the establishment of a provisional government had been demanded by the Liberation Army and "political workers" inside Algeria for its psychological impact on the French constitutional referendum, which in Algeria will be held from 26 through 28 September. Belkacem expressed astonish- ment and resentment at Tunisian President Bourguibats dis- pleasure over the proclamation of the government. -SEeRE-T- 23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 vary Nerl Belkacem's statement that the Algerian regime will not allow itself to come under the influence of any government probably can be interpreted as applying equally to Tunisia and the UAR: Belkacem admitted that the Algerians expected some em- barrassment from the FLN's relations with the Soviet bloc, but added that in their own interest this door must be left open. Cherif volunteered that the Algerians would continue their policy of "accepting only token Soviet bloc offerings as long as 'weapons and ammunition are available through Arab sources." Communist China on 22 September became the first non-Arab state to recognize the provisional regime. Yazid claimed that the Algerian leaders have no desire to embarrass the United States on the question of recognition, but believed the most "helpful" American attitude would be to maintain complete silence on the problem. Nevertheless, the rebel regime has formally requested recognition. Although France has warned that recognition of the Al- gerian regime would be considered an "unfriendly" gesture, a Foreign Ministry spokesman assured the American ambas- sador in Paris that there is "no question" of- recalling French ambassadors from Tunis or Rabat. The French Government, he said, would make every effort to ensure that recognition by Morocco and Tunisia would not result in such embarraSsing "practical consequences" as an exchan e of amb ss do SECRET 23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 A.111.416.01 %LI NNW Centralization of UAR Government Cairo press reports that President Nasir will soon centralize in Cairo the "planning, coordination, and execu- tion" of UAR policies probably presage a move to gain more effective control over Syrian affairs. Some Damascus news- papers, approving Nasir's reported plan, state that the cen- tral government will assume responsibility for all financial, monetary, industrial, and agricultural affairs for both regions. Nasir's most serious long-term problem is economic, and ac- tions taken thus far to coordinate the Egyptian and Syrian econ- omies have achieved little more than the creation of resentment in Syrian commercial and industrial circles. Attempts at tighter control may only intensify that feeling. Nasir has apparently found that even the limited degree of autonomy granted the Syrian region following union last February allowed too much freedom to groups and individuals resentful of Egyptian domination, both economic and political. Numerous reports that Nasir is dissatisfied with progress in the union, and his own overt criticism in his speech of 3 Septem- ber, suggest that he will act quickly to remove or curtail the Influence of those blocking the extension of his control. Syrian Vice President Hawrani, whose Baath party has thus far evaded compliance with Nasir's order disbanding po- litical groups, would probably be among the first affected by any change. Nasir is reportedly contemplating trial of Syrian politicians and officers for involvement with the Nun i Said re- gime in plotting against Syria, and might seek to include Hawrani. Nasir recently ordered the closing of the pro-Hawrani Damascus newspaper al-Rai al-Amm, and reportedly refused Hawrani's request that the Bath party be allowed to expand its propaganda activities to combat Communism in Iraq. Nasir presumably fears the natural attraction of Iraq for Syria, and is unlikely to countenance close cooperation between the two branches of the party even though Iraqi Baathists are now said to be strongly supporting union with the UAR. 23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 SEC '11107 Indonesian National Elections Postponed One Year Prime Minister Djuanda has informed the Indonesian Parliament that the national parliamentary elections scheduled for September 1959 are to be postponed for a year because of the continuing rebellion in Sumatra and Celebes., The decision appears to be a major victory for the Indonesian Army in its plans to check growing Com- munist party strength. Significant Communist gains, possibly giving the party a national plurality, had been expected in the 1959 elec- tions. The Communist party had won a plurality in the 1957 local elections in Java, where over 60 percent of Indonesia's population lives, and local elections else- where in Indonesia had also showed Communist gains. In contrast to the inactivity of the non-Communist parties, the Communists had already begun vigorous preparations for the next national elections. They can be expected to denounce the postponement as an obstruction of "the people's will," and they will undoubtedly continue pre- election activity if permitted to do so. They are likely to attempt to challenge the army's conservative leader- ship and then increase their efforts to undermine Chief of Staff Nasution and his supporters. Army leaders have stated privately that they are working toward a five-year postponement of elections. They feel they need this much time to stabilize the country and undercut Communist influence. the army intends further action against the Chinese community, including Communists. ;he present Indonesian political climate makes it necessary to take action against Na- tionalist sympathizers before moving against Chinese Commu- nist elements. 23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 10110 1111, New Laotian Government Faces Critical Test on Monetary Reform Issue � Laotian Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone is in a precar- ious political position as monetary reform negotiations begin with the United States on devaluation of the Laotian currency. Most of the deputies within the conservative Rally of the Lao People (RLP), which is the principal support of the govern- ment, profit from the present unrealistic official dollar ex- change rate and oppose devaluation. Disgruntled leaders within the RLP are working to overthrow Phoui on this issue by lining up RLP deputies to vote with the extteme leftist opposition. They charge that Phoui, prior to his investiture, misrepresented his position on devaluation to the RLP. In addition, the Communist-dominated Neo Lao Hak Zat's well-organized propaganda machine has successfully por- trayed reform as an inflationary measure aimed at the "little man," and some conservative politicians fear that a vote for devaluation would damage their prospects in the national elections in 1959. 23 Sept 58 � CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 %IVA J. 44...la I a %Pi Noi0 III. THE WEST Pressure for Closer Latin American Relations With USSR The resolution of the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies on 19 September calling for the resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR is unlikely to be carried out by moderate President Siles. Siles, in refusing to comply with the deputies' request, may cite the public accusations which he, the foreign minister, and the Bolivian lower house it- self have made in recent months that Soviet tin sales con- stitute economic aggression against Bolivia. At present, Czechoslovakia is the only bloc country which maintains a mission in La Paz. The request is part of a pattern of pressure for such relations in Latin American countries, pressure which is encouraged by a combination of Communists, ultranation- alists, tuld some economic groups who believe relations with the bloc will provide markets for surplus raw material pro- duction. In Brazil, in particular, there is political and business sentiment for closer relations with the USSR. Al- though most officials of Brazil's National Security Council are dubious about the wisdom of restoring diplomatic rela- tions, a number of prominent politicians continue to insist that such relations are necessary to Brazil's international prestige. The government wants closer trade relations with the bloc in view of the foreign exchange crisis and is sup- ported in this view by a number of coffee growers. In Venezuela, President Larrazabal said last July that the interim government would leave the question of es- tablishing relations with the USSR to the government scheduled to be elected in November 1958. Recently, a high official of the USSR Office of Cultural Exchange is said to have urged greater cultural exchange during an interview with Larrazabal, while a TASS representative in another re- cent interview sought the President's authorization to establish a permanent TASS office in Venezuela. 23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 :eV. Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633 -014 0/44 10�//1.! Of" ef/ e orj orj "dr r rj 11 71 -1-01)-SEC-11-ET- 461 4774,1/Z/Z/Zrjrzyz/Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633,zArzzA,A, , A. A, 44',/