CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/05/27
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Publication Date:
May 27, 1956
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
TOP SECRET
27 May 1956
Copy No. 103
S 5
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. )0
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NEXT REVIEW DATE.
CLASS. CHANGED TO T : S tiodi
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
lattP-S-EGREZ
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CONTENTS
PAKISTANI ATTACK ON AFGHAN FRONTIER POST PROBABLY
PRECLUDES RAPPROCHEMENT (page 3).
(7 2. LIBYAN PREMIER PROFESSES INABILITY TO HALT ARMS
FLOW TO ALGERIA (page 4).
%. JORDANIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
(page 5).
f\A/4.
SOME PROGRESS REPORTED IN FRENCH-ALGERIAN NEGO-
TIATIONS (page 6).
r/ 5. ANTI-RAKOSI SENTIMENTS SPREADING AMONG TOP HUN-
GARIAN LEADERS (page 7).
6. HUNGARY REPORTED REPLACING DISMANTLED BORDER
OBSTACLES ALONG AUSTRIAN FRONTIER
(page 8).
/7.
SOUTH KOREAN CABINET ISHAKEUP
(page 9).
f/8. USSR MAINTAINS PRESSURE FOR RELATIONS WITH
COLOMBO (page 10).
9.
ti 10.
SOVIET WARSHIPS TO VISIT YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA
(page 11).
POSSIBLE REOPENING IN YUGOSLAVIA OF THE DJILAS
CASE page 12).
27 May 56
* * * *
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(page 13)
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1. PAKISTANI ATTACK ON AFGHAN FRONTIER POST
PROBABLY PRECLUDES RAPPROCHEMENT
The reported large-scale Pakistani
attack on an Afghan frontier post on
20 May could prevent the meeting be-
tween Pakistani president Mirza and
Afghan king Zahir Shah scheduled for next month and would
appear to preclude any rapprochement between the two
countries if the meeting materializes.
Afghan foreign minister Nairn claimed
on 24 May that 800 Pakistani soldiers, with artillery prep-
aration and cover by two jet aircraft, had participated in the
attack. He said that Pakistanis were still in possession of
the post and asked the American ambassador in Kabul to
send the embassy's military attach�o the scene to verify
the facts.
Naim remarked that the incident had oc-
curred just when there had been hopes of reducing tension
between the two countries. He added cryptically that it
looked as if a "third element" might be playing a hand. It
is more likely that the attack was instigated by Karachi, pri-
marily in retaliation for an Afghan ambush of a Pakistani
patrol in the same general area on 19 April.
27 May 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
CONFIDENTIAL
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2. LIBYAN PREMIER PROFESSES INABILITY TO HALT
ARMS FLOW TO ALGERIA
Libyan premier Ben Halim informed
French minister Dumarcay on 22 May
that the Libyan government cannot con-
trol the transit of arms through Libyan
erruory to ALge'ria, according to Dumarcay. Ben Halim
claimed that the complicity in this arms traffic by junior
officers of the Tripolitanian police made official controls
useless. He also claimed to' be under great pressure from
the Egyptians to permit transshipments of arms, pleaded
that he "could not be a traitor to the Arab cause," and impli-
cated Tunisian premier Bourghiba in the traffic.
Ambassador Tappin comments that Ben
Halim, for domestic considerations, has apparently decided
to acknowledge the arms flow to Algeria, with the result that
arms shipments to Algeria are likely to increase sharply.
27 May 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 4
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3. JORDANIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Major General Nuwar, newly appointed
chief of staff of the Arab Legion, is now
consolidating his control of the Legion
with the corn slete support of King Hussain,
Plans for its ex-
pansion have been announced.
Nuwar has already promoted 11 officers
nel and Olans to jump six cap-
tains to lieutenant colonel. Some of these promotions are
in preparation for retiring some of the senior offi-
cers who still have a "Glubb taint."
The Free Officers' Movement headed by
Nuwar is 150 members, 30 of whom
form an "inner circle." Within the movement, however, a
faction is still plotting against Nuwar and the king,
Meanwhile this faction
plans terrorist activities against British bases in Jordan for
the purpose of discrediting Nuwar. This group is anti-Com-
munist, considers Nuwar pro-Egyptian, and is suspicious of
Cairo's intentions.
Nuwar favors accepting Egyptian financial support for the Legion,
27 May 56
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4. SOME PROGRESS REPORTED IN FRENCH-
ALGERIAN NEGOTIATIONS
Recent conversations in Geneva be-
tween French government representa-
tives and Algerian leaders were "gen-
erally successful," but many questions
remain open.
The
chief Algerian negotiator returned to
Cairo to consult with a leader of the
Aigerian National Liberation Front and is expected in Paris
early in June.
in Tangier, recent French-Algerian negotiations in Cairo
resulted in a French offer of limited internal autonomy, but
a request for a cease-fire was rejected by the Algerians.
Comment The French defense minister believes
the military situation is beginning to
look considerably better, with pacification of Algeria pos-
sible in a "relatively few months." The mayor of Algiers
now discounts such a possibility.
Premier Mollet will probably reflect his
defense minister's optimism in the impending debate on his
government's general policy. He is under increasing pressure
from all political groups, however, to present a detailed pro-
posal for an Algerian settlement, and the reported failure of
earlier negotiations in Cairo may induce him to offer more
far-reaching concessions in the hope of winning an early peace.
27 May 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 6
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5. ANTI-RAKOSI SENTIMENTS SPREADING AMONG
TOP HUNGARIAN LEADERS
Hungarian party first secretary Rakosi
is now faced with increased general dis-
content and disaffection and with a widen-
ing opposition within the party leadership,
in the opinion of the American legation in
Budapest.
Rakosi's latest major speech on 18 May
disappointed even the most cautious anticipations of his oppo-
nents, who had been expecting that some break with past harsh
policies would be announced.
The legation believes that a genuine liberal-
ization of Hungarian policy can be achieved only after Rakosi's
removal, and states that there are elements within the Foreign
Ministry and the party leadership that would welcome a Western
diplomatic offensive against Rakosi.
Comment Despite repeated and specific endorsement
of Rakosi by the USSR, which apparently
fears that his removal would only worsen the Hungarian politi-
cal situation, the strength of the anti-Rakosi faction has mounted
steadily since February. Rakosi's 18 May speech, reportedly
made in part as a result of pressure from the central committee,
included a perfunctory bow to his opposition, but did not contain
any significant policy change.
Unless willing to run counter to present Satel-
lite policy by granting Rakosi increased police powers with which
to subdue his party enemies, Moscow may be forced to reconsider
its support of an increasingly unpopular and unstable figure.
27 May 56
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NE
6, HUNGARY REPORTED REPLACING DISMANTLED BORDER
OBSTACLES ALONG AUSTRIAN FRONTIER
Comment
The Hungarian regime apparently feels
that a limited removal of border security
installations, coupled with the camouflaging or relocation of
those remaining, will satisfy its propaganda requirements
without significantly reducing the effectiveness of frontier
security.
The 9 May Hungarian announcement of the
impending dismantling of the "technical barrier along the west-
ern frontier" can be expected, however, to increase the number
of Hungarian escape attempts, already on the rise since the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria.
27 May 56
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4 cuAr LULA 1 1AL
7. SOUTH KOREAN CABINET SHAKE-UP
In a major postelection cabinet re-
shuffle, President Rhee has replaced
Defense Minister Son Won-il, Economic
Co-ordinator Paek Tu-chin, and the
ministers of finance, public health and reconstruction.
Since the election, Rhee has also replaced the home min-
ister and the director of the national police. The changes
appear to have been influenced in large degree by factional
considerations within the Liberal Party.
Appointment of two national assemblymen
to the Ministries of Finance and Public Health presumably re-
sulted from demands by Liberal Party assemblymen for in-
creased influence in the conduct of government. In a press
conference Rhee stated that he will attempt to strengthen the
Liberal Party, but that he contemplates no major changes in
government policies.
Replacement of Son and Paek may repre-
sent a further concession to sentiment in the assembly, Paek's
devious financial dealings have periodically come under fire
in the assembly, while Son was recently attacked in connec-
tion with a scandal in army procurement. The dismissal of
Son, an able and pro-American official, may represent a con-
cession to opponents of Rhee's defeated running- mate, Yi
Ki-pung, with whom Son was closely associated.
Appointment of Kim Chong-won ("Tiger
Kim") as director of the national police will probably arouse
resentment in view of Kim's history of ruthlessness, This ap-
pointment suggests that Rhee contemplates no change in his
methods of control, and it may, in fact, presage a tightening
of police controls.
27 May 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
irb APIT A T
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8. USSR MAINTAINS PRESSURE FOR RELATIONS
WITH COLOMBIA
Colombia broke relations with the USSR
in 1948 following the Bogota riot in which Communists par-
ticipated. Over the past year the local Communists, esti-
mated at about 5,000, have apparently become increasingly
involved in the guerrilla unrest which has troubled Colombia
for several years.
Colombia has no diplomatic relations
with any member of the Sino-Soviet bloc but earlier this year
exchanged consuls with Prague.
27 May 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
TOP SECRET
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Otk WINI1DLAIliAL
9. SOVIET WARSHIPS TO VISIT YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA
Comment
A Soviet naval squadron of one Sverdlov
class cruiser and two Skoryy class des-
troyers of the Black Sea fleet will pay
good-will visits to Split, Yugoslavia, from
31 May to 4 June and Durres, Albania,
from 5 to 10 June. The vessels are
scheduled to return on 12 June.
This will be the first Soviet naval visit to
Yugoslavia. Good-will naval visits were
made by the USSR to Albania in June 1954 and August 1955.
27 May 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11
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10. POSSIBLE REOPENING IN YUGOSLAVIA OF THE
DJILAS CASE
The public reply made in the Yugoslav
press on 20 May to a recent "personal
and confidential" letter from British
Labor Party secretary Morgan Phillips
r gar mg tne treatment accorded Milovan Djilas, suggests
that the former top Yugoslav political leader may again be
publicly attacked. Without revealing the text of Phillips'
letter, the reply sharply attacked it as critical of Yugoslav
foreign and internal policies.
Djilas wrote Phillips on 12 April of in-
creasingly harsh measures being taken against him, and
attributed them to "changes in the direction of Yugoslav
policy." A few days later his wife was charged with disturb-
ing the peace--a development Djilas had predicted in detail
as the regime's next effort to "destroy him politically by dis-
crediting him morally."
Djilas reportedly agreed last February to
write an article for an American magazine, which presumably
would contain his antiregime views. A series of articles at-
tacking the regime in early 1954 cost Djilas his party and of-
ficial positions. A year later he received a suspended sentence
for reaffirming his views to the Western press and calling for
an opposition Socialist party. Belgrade also may feel the need
to discourage any latent "Djilasism" within Yugoslavia which
could have been encouraged by the new line in Moscow.
A renewed attack on Djilas would have the
incidental effect of negating the efforts Tito has recently made
to counter Western Socialist suspicions before his Moscow visit.
27 May 56
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TOP SECRET
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 27 May)
Israel has reported that an Israeli tractor
driver was murdered on 24 May about 6 miles from the Jorda-
nian border� The American army attach�n Tel Aviv believes
that this incident will substantiate the official and public belief
in Israel that recent political and military changes in Jordan
will increase tension and incidents on the Israeli-Jordanian bor-
der. It may also reinforce the view of the Israeli army that re-
taliation ig thp rally noliry for holdinE down Arab border viola-
tions.
27 May 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 13
TD.R_SgPRET
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On 26 May, it was announced in Israel that
several roads in the southern part of the country would be closed
for certain hours from 27 May through 30 May. The roads to be
closed start at Beersheba and run south to a point near the El Auja
demilitarized zone and southeast for a few miles toward Jordan.
The announcement did not indicate the purpose of the road blocks,
but Israel has closed roads in the east for military movements and
maneuvers.
27 May 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 14
TOP SECRET
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