CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/03/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02997529
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: March 11, 1960

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3.5(c)
owl
11
March 1960
3.3(h)(2)
Copy No. C 68
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN-
DOCUMENT NO. /19
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6 JUN 1960
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by Shah has met strong opposition.
Algeria-USSR�Rebel leader in contact
with Soviet and Chinese Communist am-
rb.--Q-ark-an-r-1 in Cairo.
Japan--South Korean ambassador says
Seoul has promised release by end of
March of Japanese fishermen who have
completed prison sentences.
Indonesia accepts invitation to proposed
Havana economic conference of underde-
veloped countrie but delays decision on
r
cosponsorship.
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KIL I
11 MARCH 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Trade between USSR and Communist
China increased 35 percent in 1959.
East Germany appears to be attempting
to persuade other states to grant it recog-
nition. 0
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR First (Syrian) Army cancels alert
status.
Iran--Land reform bill personally backed
0
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�Burma to test samples of Soviet small
arms.
III. THE WEST
�De Gaulle to discuss with his top advisers
implementation of plans for an independ-
ent nuclear deterrent force.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
11 March 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Communist China: The extensive character of
economic relations between Peiping and Moscow is under-
scored by a statement of Soviet Foreign Trade Minister
Patolichev showing that trade between the two countries
rose 35 percent last year to more than $2 billion. Com-
munist China thus replaced East Germany in 1959 as the
Soviet Union's largest trading partner, accounting for some
R20 percent of all Soviet foreign trade. The USSR now ac-
counts for about one hall of Communist China's foreign trade.
(Page 1)
East Germany: Following up its announcement of recog-
nition by Guinea, the East German regime is reportedly tak-
714 _.,:tng steps which suggest that i,t is attempting to persuade other
Afstates to grant it recognition.
Foreign Ministry officials are being dispatched to Iraq
and Finland, while the East German roving "ambassador" to
, 3,. the Arab states was hastily recalled to Berlin from the Leip-
n
fi/' zig Fair and sent back to Cair.2j (Page 2)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAll-Israel: The reported cancellation of the UAR First
(Syrian) Army's alert status is further evidence of a relaxation
of tension. (Page 3)
Iran: he land reform bill to which the Shah has given
his personal backing has met strong opposition from a combi-
nation of landlords and religious leaders. Premier Eqbal has
failed to get support for the measure in Parliament. Forcing
the proposal through Parliament, which the Shah may feel im-
pelled to do, would further alienate a substantial portion of tla7
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FIaditional, supporters of the riegime, -while at the same t'
would not zain the support of liberal reformist elementli.
(Page 4)
Algeria-USSR:
making contact
with the Soviet and Chinese Communist ambassadors in Cairo
and referred to a proposed Algerian delegation to Moscow. The
rebels might hope to use reception of such a delegation in Mos-
cow to demonstrate that Khrushchev's visit to France does not
imply full support for De Ga,ulle's Algerian policy. The delega-
tion might also attempt to make arrangements for arms deliv-
eries from bloc countries. (Page 5)
*South Korea - Japan: kn the face of threatened Japanese
countermeasures, South Korean Ambassador Yu informed Jap-
anese officials on 10 March that Seoul has authorized him to
promise the release by the end of March of all detained Japanese
fishermen who have completed prison sentences for fishing with-
in the Rhee line. Tokyo, however, remains skeptical, in view
of Yu's record of unauthorized commitments and unfulfilled
promises:1
Tokyo informed its diplomatic missions that
if South Korea should "again dillydally" about the release, "we
shall have to give particular study to measures to protect our
fishing vessels and the matter of laying the problem before the
United Nations." (Page 6)
Indonesia-Cuba: Indonesia has accepted an invitation to
attend the proposed Havana economic conference of underde-
veloped countries next summer but is stalling on Cuba's request
that Indonesia cosponsor the conference,
President Sukarno is scheduled
to visit Cuba in early May and may discuss the matter at that
(Page 7)
time.
turma-USSR: The Burmese Government has decided to test
1) samples of six types of Soviet small arms offered last January.
the Burmese ambassador
11 Mar 60
DAILY
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RIEF ii
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in Moscow has been instructed to ask that the arms and ammu-
nition be dispatched by Soviet ship or aircraft direct to Rangoon,
thus avoiding "undesirable publicity." Burma may be consider-
ing purchasing these weapons for its police forces. which already
have small quantities of bloc materiel.
(Page 8)
III. THE WEST
France: De Gaulle is
to discuss wifWhis top financial and military advisers on 11 March
� the implementation of existing plans for development of an inde-
pendent French nuclear deterrent force. Military leaders, pro-
fessing to share the concern of civilian spokesmen over the ruinou
financial burden an independent nuclear program mould impose on
� France, and worried over the time needed to create it, are ready-
ing a proposal to revise NATO to internationalize the development,
production, emplacement, and use of modern weapons. Under
such a system France at least would have a greater voice in the
use of nuclear weapon_s3 (Page 9)
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Sino- Soviet Trade Rise Underscores Close Economic Relations
Between Moscow and Peiping
Despite evidence of political friction between the USSR and
Communist China, Peiping and Moscow continue to expand their
economic ties. Last year, trade between the two countries rose
35 percent to more than $2 billion. This total, which exceeds by
$250,000,000 the previously announced 1959 trade target, now
accounts for about 50 percent of China's total foreign trade and
20 percent of Moscow's.
In replacing East Germany as the largest single trading
partner of the USSR, China apparently put even greater empha-
sis on its trade with the USSR last year in order to continue debt
repayment and increase the flow of vital Soviet industrial materials,
equipment, and plants for the Chinese program of industrializa-
tion. During the latter half of 1958, the brisk economic activity
of the "leap forward" in China had already resulted in an 18-
percent increase in Sino-Soviet trade.
China's machinery and equipment imports alone from the
USSR in 1959 were valued at about $600,000,000, making up more
than half of total Chinese imports from the Soviet Union. Their
importance to Chinese economic plans is ample reason for Peiping
to nurture close economic relations with Moscow.
The 1959 increase in Soviet exports to China included large
shipments of Soviet goods on military contracts,
Although neither the total volume of
these shipments nor the type of goods is known, they probably in-
cluded machinery and equipment for the construction of military
production facilities rather than military end items.
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East German9..idoves to Secure Recognition Frvfn
Uncommitted Countries
Following up its announcement of de jure recognition by
Guinea, the East German regime is reportedly taking steps
which suggest that it is attempting to persuade nations to
grant recognition. Several high-ranking East German offi-
cials are being sent on special missions to uncommitted
countries,
Richard Gyptner, the regime's "ambassador to the Arab
states," cut short his stay at the Leipzig Fair and returned to
Cairo to begin a tour of a number of Middle East and African
countries. Wolfgang Kiesewetter, the Foreign Ministry's gen-
eral director, accompanied the East German trade representa-
tive to Baghdad when the latter returned to his post from a
visit to East Berlin. The purpose of Kiesewetter's trip was
not disclosed, but he will probably attempt to elicit some
measure of diplomatic recognition from Iraq. Another high-
ranking Foreign Ministry official will leave shortly for Fin-
land on an "important matter."
The Guinean ambassador, after calling on East German
President Neck, went to the Leipzig Fair and, on 9 March,
talked with party boss Walter 'Ulbricht. The latter attacked
Bonn's threats to sever relations with Guinea as "reminiscent
of the old colonial methods of German imperialists," and told
the ambassador that East Germany considers it is a "routine
matter for every state to establish relations with all other
states." The East German press has unleashed a scurrilous
campaign against West Germany for allegedly using "the most
filthy insults and evil racial discrimination" against Guinea
and all the African peoples.
Bonn has so far withheld action, pending official notifica-
tion of the Guinean move or clarification of ambiguous state-
ments of Guinean President Tour& However, the viest Ger-
man cabinet on 9 March authorized Foreign Minister von
Brentano to break diplomatic and economic ties with Guinea
unless Conakry indicates within 48 hours that it has not ex-
tended diplomatic recognition to the East German regime
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LUIVP II AL
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Arab-Israeli Situation
The tension arising from Syrian-Israeli border inci-
dents of last month has been considerably reduced by recent
relaxation of the UAR military posture. Some Egyptian Air
Force units deployed during the crisis have returned to their
permanent bases, and some ground units sent to the Sinai
Peninsula have also returned. Reliable sources reArt that
the Syrian Army alert has been canceled and various units
have been withdrawn from the Syrian-Israeli front. A recon-
naissance of Israel's northern border area and the Gaza area
to the south conducted by the American air attache in Tel Aviv
has revealed a "normal" situation. Egyptian forces still re-
main defensively deployed in large numbers in the Sinai, how-
ever, and serious incidents could still occur.
Despite the relaxation of border tension, the UAR press
and radio campaign against Israel has abated only slightly from
its peak earlier this week. Taking its lead from Nasir's inflam-
matory speeches in Syria, UAR Propaganda has viciously de-
nounced alleged Western ,involvement in recent crisis, the tri-
partite declaration a 1950 guaranteeing Arab-Israeli borders,
and Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's visit to the United
States. These attacks have been echoed throughout the Arab
world.
The Arabs appear deeply concerned over the possibility of
Israeli success in gaining assurances of new Western support,
particularly in connection with plans for diversion of the Jordan
waters. The Arab League, in meetings in Cairo which ended
early last week, reflected this apprehension by adopting a resolu-
tion to establish a "special organization" for "utilizing the waters
of the Jordan River in the interest of the Arab countries." Arab
fears that the West will furnish Israel with additional arms and
military equipment have also been widely expressed.
CONF
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time
Iranian Land Reforms Run Into Difficulty
Strong opposition has developed during the Shah's absence
from Tehran to the government-backed land reform bill now
before the Majlis. Landowners and religious leaders have much
to lose if the bill is passed and implemented. The American
Embassy in Tehran feels that the Shah and the opposition will
try to avoid a showdown, but that in any real test of strength the
Shah would probably, win. If he retreats�possibly dismissing
Prime Minister Eqbal as the scapegoat--and the land bill is de-
feated, the religious leaders may consider the time ripe to at-
tempt to regain their political power)
alie Shah began land reform with distribution of some
2,000,000 acres of crown lands in 1951. This project will prob-
ably be finished by the end of 1961. Distribution of some
6,500,000 acres of public land started in 1958. He now seeks
to distribute some 22,000,000 acres of private holdings, probably
in the belief that lack of land reform in Iraq was a main cause
of the revolution there3
[Ayatollah Borujerdi, Iran's religious leader, has warned
the Shah that distribution of land violates religious tenets and
could spark a broad general uprising. Ayatollah Behbehani, lead-
ing cleric in Tehran, supports Borujerdi. Shrines and other re-
ligious foundations control large areas of land, and the clerics
probably see their holdings as a target for distribution should the
other programs be successfug
e s sur e to pass the bill wouldprobably alienate many conserva-
tives who have traditionally been the mainstay of the monarchy,
without winning the Shah any significant support from liberal and
reform-minded elements who usually have rejected reform meas-
ures by the Shah as tactics designed to cover up his own corrup-
tion and derelictionsj
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Algerian Rebels May Send Delegation to USSR
Contacts between Algerian rebel Vice Premier Belkacem
Krim and the Soviet and Chinese Communist ambassadors in
Cairo appear related to a forthcoming Algerian mission to the
USSR and possibly Communist China.
"I saw the ambassador of Peo-
ple's China. The interview with the Soviet ambassador has al-
ready been requested.... Let me know immediately the compo-
sition of the delegation for the USSR and the approximate date."
Although the rebels have hitherto been wary in their con-
tacts with the bloc, they have lately stepped up efforts to "in-
ternationalize" the Algerian war. In January they indicated for
the first time that they would accept in the National Liberation
Army "volunteers" from Arab League nations. While the rebels
probably do not desire Communist volunteers, they face a serious
shortage of arms and ammunition within Algeria, and they may
seek to explore in Moscow the possibility of obtaining arms through
one or more of the European satellites. An Algerian mission to
Peiping was promised $5,000,000 worth of military aid in January
1959. Apart from some radio sets, however, little is believed
to have been delivered.
The rebels may also hope that the USSR, by receiving their
delegation, will demonstrate that Khrushchev's visit to France
does not imply full support of De Gaulle's Algerian policy. It ap-
pears unlikely that Moscow would offset Khrushchev's efforts to
cultivate De Gaulle before the summit conference by demonstra-
tive reception of an Algerian delegation.
the visit to Moscow is not yet set, and the
USSR may stall at least until after Khrushchev's visit to France.
Khrushchev on 31 October cautiously endorsed De Gaulle's Alge-
rian program. In December 1958, Algerian rebel leaders
stopped in Moscow on the way to Peiping, but apparenti
no official contacts with any of the Soviet leaders.
TOP ET
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South Korea Makes New Offer to Japan
[The Japanese Foreign Ministry has informed American
Ambassador MacArthur that it has recommended acceptance
of South Korean Ambassador Yu Tae-ha's offer on 10 March
to release by the end of March Japanese fishermen who have
completed their sentences for fishing within the unilaterally
imposed "Rhee line." The fishermen would be exchanged for
Illegal Korean entrants detained in Japan. Yu said his offer
had been authorized by Seoul. South Korea was unprepared
to commit itself at this time to the automatic release of fish-
ermen who completed their sentences in the future, but was
willing to continue negotiations for agreement to such a pro-
vision. Seoul now is holding 214 Japanese fishermen seized
in the disputed area, including 166 who have completed the
prison terms imposed by South Korean court/.
[japan, however, remains skeptical of Yu's offer in view
of his-record of unauthorized commitments and unfulfilled
promises. Tokyo informed its
diplomatic missions that if South Korea should
"again dillydally" about the release of the fishermen, "we
shall have to give particular study to measures to protect
our fishing vessels and the matter of laying the problem be-
fore the United Nations." Japan has
already announced that after 1 April, Japanese patrol boats in
the Rbee line area will mount three-inch guns, although there
is no indication that orders lifting restrictions on firing have
yet been issuesg
in a meeting with American Ambas-
sador McConaughy in Seoul,. Rhee made no specific commit-
ment on release of the fishermen. The preceding day the
South Korean acting foreign minister had strongly implied
that Japanese cancellation of the North Korean repatriation
program continued to be Seoul's prior objective. Ambassador
McConaughy inferred that the acting minister was paraphras-
ing Rhee's instructions to Yu' just prior to the latter's departure
for Toky,9
l'9SEC131E T
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Indonesia Willing to Attend Havana Conference
Indonesia apparently has some reservations about ac-
cepting Cuba's invitation to cosponsor the proposed Havana
economic conference of underdevelooed countries tentative-
ly scheduled for late summer.
Indonesia plans to attend the con-
ference "if it is held," but that cosponsorship "must be con-
sidered further." The Foreign Ministry stated that if Indo-
nesia acted as cosponsor, it would be "responsible for the
other Southeast Asian nations," apparently meaning that it
would be in the position of representing these governments
whether or not they attend.
The Philippines has decided not to attend, and Malaya is
not to be invited. [Thailand is not opposing the conference
but will not decide Eether to attend until it has a more defi-
nite understanding of what might be accomplish41 Other
Southeast Asian governments have not indicated-tEeir atti-
tude.
Indonesia's former chief UN delegate, Ali Sastroamidjojo,
visited Cuba in Ianuary�shortly before Castro proposed
the gathering--and apparently gave the Cuban Government
considerable encouragement on the subject of calling the con-
ference. President Sukarno is scheduled to visit Cuba from
9 to 14 May, at which time he will probably discuss the mat-
ter of Indonesia's cosponsorship. Other countries asked to
cosponsor the congress include the UAR, Mexico, and Ven-
ezuela, but none has committed itself.
According to present plans, the conference is to be com-
posed of underdeveloped Asian, African, and Latin American
nations which are members of the United Nations. Suggested
subjects for discussion include industrialization and consoli-
dation of national economy, agrarian reform, revision of
prices and markets for raw materials, and the use of inter-
national credit organizations.
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VIP"
Burma to Test Soviet Small Arms
The Burmese Government has decided to test samples
of six types of small arms which apparently were delivered
to the Burmese Embassy in Moscow early in February
the Burmese Govern-
ment, "after careful consideration from all angles," instruct-
ed its ambassador to request that the Soviet Government
ship the material direct to Rangoon by Soviet vessel or plane--
in order to prevent transit through any third country and thus
"preclude undesirable publicity." From the extended Bur-
mese deliberation, it appears that the USSR may have pro-
vided the initiative for this transaction.
The original Soviet package consisted of two units each
of two types of carbine, a rifle, two light machine guns, and
a heavy machine gun, as well as five "sets" of ammunition
per weapon. In order to test the three types of machine gun,
the Burmese Government is asking for an additional 10,000
rounds of ammunition for each.
Inasmuch as the basic equipment of the Burmese Army is
primarily of British origin and the army command is seeking
to standardize its equipment, the Soviet equipment probably
is not being considered for army use. Should the tests prove
satisfactory, however, some purchases might be contemplated
for Burma's police forces, which already have a limited a-
mount of bloc small arms and transport equipment. Burma
still has unexpended credits, resulting from the USSR's fail-
ure to fulfill its barter trade commitments.
T�F%SECrir'
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III. THE WEST
French Nuclear Deterrent Program
EIlhe implications of De Gaulle's plans to develop an in-
dependent French nuclear deterrent force,
have been under study by his
top financial and military advisers in preparation for their
meeting with him on 11 March to discuss implementation of
the program. Long-range plans call for creation of a nu-
clear striking force to include thermonuclear weapons and
to be "susceptible of being deployed at any moment and in
any place." De Gaulle expects to have Mirage IIT-A bombers
between 1963 and 1965 with IRBMs as the eventual delivery
weapon. Interest in developing an independent nuclear weap-
ons system stems from the conclusion of French officials
that France or French interests conceivably could become a
pawn in the battle between East and West, or that France's
allies might not risk defending France in certain circum-
stances where to do so would invite a missile attack on their
own territory/
[French economic experts have xpressed the
view that the cost of an independent nuclear program�which
they estimate would triple France's military expenditures--
would be a "ruinous" burden. Parliamentary discussion in
November of the 1960 budget, which contained some appropri-
ations for work on delivery systems as well as nuclear devel-
opment, revealed extensive concern among the deputies about
"how much time and money" the program would take and doubts
as to what purpose an independent nuclear "striking force"
would servg,
group of high-level military officers, who seem primarily
concerned over French vulnerability during the time required to
develop a national deterrent, have prepared an alternative plan.
It calls for a revision of NATO so that the development, produc-
tion, emplacement, and use of modern weapons would be con-
trolled by an international planning staff. Asserting that NATO
is based on an outmoded system in which these matters have]
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Lilemained under national control, the plan by implication crit-
icizes America's virtually unilateral control over NATO's ac-
tual use of nuclear weapons, Retired Air Force General
Gallois, the originator of the paper for the military group,
is well known as a proponent of "double control" of such weap-
ons, involving a shared control between the possessor and
the host country.]
at is most probable that the internationalization envisaged
by this plan would be limited to "nuclear" powers, which now
would include France. The importance France attaches to De
Gaulle's demand for tripartite coordination of global strategy
will be emphasized in a speech to be given in Germany on 11
March by French General Billotte. Billotte is expected to out-
line secret military conversations in 1947 which, he says, com-
mitted France; the UK, and the US to elaborate a common strat-
egy involving the "entire world" and specifically acknowledged
French responsibilities in the Mediterranean and Pacific areas
and in Africa]
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�10e
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Inteiligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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