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March 16, 2022
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August 5, 2016
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August 30, 1960
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[14877449].pdf477.71 KB
VIZZ/Zi ZZZZ ,Z7ZZZ/ZZZ/Z/Z/ZZ /1 7 Approved for..lelease: 2016/07/05 CO2.9.?7532 f. - I 30 August 1960 (b)(3)0 (b)(3)0 (b)(3)/ CO2997532,MMWZMMMA Copy No. C r J CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BU LLETIN Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 DOCUMENT NO. 52- NO [AMINE lii CLASS. n Of taSsFIFO NAls. Ci'71010ED M TS S rarr RUfiEV1 DATE: AUTO: MN 70-2 JLRt 143 REVEWERI Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 4.1p, The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with representatives of departments and agencies of the United States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable, the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk. Intellieence in this publication is based on all sources, including Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep- resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi- fication in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis. WARNING This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. 4r�rt.r rir�r Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 / Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 , %or z 10 Id CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 30 August 1960 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-Finland: Khrushchev may use his visit to Helsinki beginning on 2September to exploit Soviet claims of Scandinavian involvement in the U-2 incident. The visit was arranged at Soviet Initiative. Since there are no pressing bilateral problems, the main purpose of the trip may be to� provide an opportunity for the Soviet premier to reinforce his warnings of the dangers of Amer- ican policy for the Scandinavian countries and to expand his re- cent statements in Austria designed to intimidate neutral states into supporting the bloc campaign against US overseas bases. He also can be expected to reaffirm his peaceful coexistence policy and his continuing interest in high-level exchanges with free-world leaders. (b)(1 (b)(3 AApproved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 A A / 'Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 ' �4100 -SEeRET-- I an: The resignation of Premier Eqbal on 28 August is par o t e Shah's effort to salvage some of his seriously dam- aged prestige. The Shah is insisting that others must make "sacrifices" in order to relieve him of blame for the rigged and grossly mismanaged elections which are still going on in Iran. Sha.rif Emami, the newly appointed acting premier, has been minister of industry and mines. While the Shah's plan apparently is to allow the new parliament to convene on the basis of the current elections, amend the electoral law, and then hold new elections, he may come to feel that outright nullification of the present elections is necessary even though not as "legal" a course as he would prefer. III. THE WEST (b)(1) (b)(3) Italy: Walian Premier Fanfani has told the US ambassador In Rome that he hopes to hold the long-postponed nationwide lo- cal elections�involving more than 32 million voters--early in November. Prior, to the elections he expects passage of a re- vised electoral law, an aim of which would be to force a separa- tion between the Nenni Socialists and the Communists. Although Fanfani insisted that his party has "bounced back" in public es- teem and that the June-July disorders in Italy have boomeranged against the Communists, his estimate seems overly optimistic.7 30 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF A ',Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 11 A VP / � � 'Approve.CI for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 A LATE ITEMS Nor *Re ublic of the Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold appears hopeful. that firm UN resistance to Lumumba's pro- jected seizure of the Leopoldville airport will discredit Lu- mumba and bring about his downfall. On 27 August, a UN of- ficial stated that Hammarskjold had received a communication from Lumumba warning that he planned to take over Leopold- ville airport "within a week." On the same day, Hammarskjold affirmed that the UN would not yield control of the airport, which it has administered since the first of a series of assaults on UN personnel there on 18 August. Elsewhere, open resentment in the Congo Senate of Lu- mumba's authoritarian measures may lead to the arrest of op- position leaders. The premier has alleged that "loyal elements" desire the arrest of one opposition spokesman, Jean Bolikango,(b)(1) (b)(3) *Laos:'me aelicate process ot meeting a political settie- m,ent between the Souvanna Phouma-Kong Le group and General Phoumits countercoup forces has begun with the opening of the National Assembly session in Luang Prabang. The King's re= designation of Souvanna to form a new government is a gesture in support of Phourni's contention that Souvanna's original desig- nation in mid-August was illegal because the predecessor Som- sanith government had been forced to resign under duress. Sou- vanna must next negotiate the composition of his new cabinet, which could present serious diffieulties. If he tries to win a new vote of approval for the small and weak cabinet he organized in Vientiane two weeks ago, his compromise agreement with Phoumi will almost certainly break down. If, on the other hand, he is too liberal in granting cabinet portfolios to Phoumi followers, he is likely to in- vite the wrath of Captain Kong Le, whose military influence in Vien- tiane has diminished little, if any. he American embassy in Vien- tiane notes that Kong is still in a cocky mood and considers it en- tirely possible that he may follow the lead of the Pathet Lao in op- posing any settlement with the "Phoumi clique." A Pathet Lao broadcast of 28 August stated that whatever the assembly does in Luang Prabang, it will be against the will of the peop1.1 30 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF (b)(3)/ 4 (b)(3)1 (b)(1)r (b)(3) 4 (b)(;10 AApproved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 A Khrushchev v IfeLlgAset.:201 21/07/05 CO2997532, 1 uu CO Khrushchev m y use his visit to Helsinki on 2-5 September, In honor of Finnish President Kekkonen's 60th birthday, to ex- ploit statements in the Powers trial involving Finland, Sweden, and Norway in the U-2 incident. The visit was arranged on So- viet initiative and, since there are no critical bilateral prob- lems, its main purpose may be to provide an opportunity for the Soviet premier to reiterate his warnings of the dangers of American policy for the Scandinavian countries. He may also expand on his statements in Austria designed to intimidate neutral states into supporting the bloc campaign against US overseas bases. Khrushchev would hope that a repetition of this line, together with a warning that the USSR would not "remain idle" in the face of a violation of neutrality, will generate Scandinavian pressure on Norway to adopt a more restrictive policy on US bases. The Soviet announcement appears to have come as a com- plete surprise to high Finnish officials. While some of them interpreted the coming visit as a sign of Soviet good will, the fact that its scheduling appears to have been accomplished with little or no coordination with the Finns appears to have caused some uneasiness in Helsinki. Foreign Minister Toerngren has stated that no preparations had been made in Finland for the visit nor did he know what matters Khrushchev wished to discuss. One question which might be raised is that of Finland's re- lations with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Al- though the matter has been under consideration for several months, the Finnish Government has hesitated to proceed on grounds that there is some uncertainty regarding Moscow's at- titude toward Finnish membership in EFTA. President Kekkonen is reported to be pessimistic about the prospects for the West in the political and economic struggle with the bloc. Fearful that there is a real danger of war, partic- ular)y over Berlin, he regards it as imperative that Finland conduct a foreign policy having as its basic aim the development of "trustful" relations between the two countries. With this goal in mind, Kekkonen has actively encouraged increased trade, mil- itary, and cultural contacts with the USSR. This has been evi- dent most recently in Finnish moves to purchase increased quantities of Soviet military equipment and in a growing num- ber of exchange visits by military officials of the two countries. --CONMENUAL___ 30 Aug 60 CPKITD A I IMTFI I InCklf-P I:1111 I =TIM Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 (b (b 30 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 SECHE-T__ Shah Discharges Premier to Shift Blame for Rigged Iranian Elections Premier Eqbal% resignation on 28 August, after the Shah had publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of the parliamentary elections in progress since early August, is part of the Shah's plan to restore some of his severely damaged prestige. The Rah has been under considerable pressure from some of his principal advisers to declare the elections void and to dismiss Eqbal as the scapegoat. Eqbal, since he became pre- mier in early 1957, has been a faithful executor of the Shah's will. Because of this, he has become unpopular and has cre- ated enemies among the Shah's closest associates. Sharif Emami, the 51-year-old pro-Western minister of industry and mines, has been appointed acting premier. Apparently the Shah now plans to allow the new parliament to convene, to demand the passage of a new election law, and then dismiss it to hold new elections. The need for strong steps by the Shah to re-establish his authority and prestige, however, could convince him to take illegal measures, such as annulling the elections and assuming direct control of af- fairs pending elections. -SECRET__ 30 Aug 60 CFKITPAI IKITFI I InFkIrF 121111 PTIKI Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 SECR vow' (Italian Preinier Wants Nationwide Local Elections Early t In November In a talk with the American ambassador on 24 August, Pre- mier Fanfani stated confidentially that his Christian Democratic party has agreed on the desirability of holding nationwide local elections early in November. These elections have already been postponed twice, and Fanfani said his party now must show the country it has confidence in its own strength. He claims that his party has come back in public esteem and is more popular now than in the recent past, and says--with apparent overoptimism-- that the Communists have lost strength because of the degenera- tion of the June-July demonstrations against the neo-Fascists into Communist-led disorders. Parliament reconvenes on 5 September, and Fanfani believes that by early October he can secure passage of an electoral re- form law which would "force" the Nenni Socialists to run separate lists from the Communists,and the Monarchists to run separate from the neo-Fascists. Both Socialists and Monarchists have urged passage of the new law, which would drop the present ma- jority requirement and adopt a modified proportional system for the provincial elections.. Both parties indicated a degree of ap- proval of the present Christian Democratic government by abstain- ' ing rather than voting against it in the confidence vote on 18 July. Fanfani said Nenni "would get his throat cut" if he returned to his alliance with the Communists. The premier believes that 60 percent of the Socialist party hierarchy and an even larger pro- portion of the party's electorate support Nenni's stand favoring autonomy from the Communists. (b)(3) EeR (b)(1) (b)(3) 30 Aug 60 rPkITD Al MI= I inrkirc RI II I =TIM Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 Page 5 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 ralTVHDEALTIAL_ THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CO Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 002997532 Appro7d for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2997532 Vir----Ztaisigrti_ mor ;* of/. ,rJ ee ZAI;.13roved for Release: 2016/07/05 � a � 4 4 C 0 2997532 460Z/ZZA rjri,