CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02997532
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: August 30, 1960

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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intellieence in this publication is based on all sources, including
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
30 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Finland: Khrushchev may use his visit to Helsinki
beginning on 2September to exploit Soviet claims of Scandinavian
involvement in the U-2 incident. The visit was arranged at Soviet
Initiative. Since there are no pressing bilateral problems, the
main purpose of the trip may be to� provide an opportunity for the
Soviet premier to reinforce his warnings of the dangers of Amer-
ican policy for the Scandinavian countries and to expand his re-
cent statements in Austria designed to intimidate neutral states
into supporting the bloc campaign against US overseas bases. He
also can be expected to reaffirm his peaceful coexistence policy
and his continuing interest in high-level exchanges with free-world
leaders.
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I an: The resignation of Premier Eqbal on 28 August is
par o t e Shah's effort to salvage some of his seriously dam-
aged prestige. The Shah is insisting that others must make
"sacrifices" in order to relieve him of blame for the rigged
and grossly mismanaged elections which are still going on in
Iran. Sha.rif Emami, the newly appointed acting premier, has
been minister of industry and mines. While the Shah's plan
apparently is to allow the new parliament to convene on the basis
of the current elections, amend the electoral law, and then hold
new elections, he may come to feel that outright nullification of
the present elections is necessary even though not as "legal" a
course as he would prefer.
III. THE WEST
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Italy: Walian Premier Fanfani has told the US ambassador
In Rome that he hopes to hold the long-postponed nationwide lo-
cal elections�involving more than 32 million voters--early in
November. Prior, to the elections he expects passage of a re-
vised electoral law, an aim of which would be to force a separa-
tion between the Nenni Socialists and the Communists. Although
Fanfani insisted that his party has "bounced back" in public es-
teem and that the June-July disorders in Italy have boomeranged
against the Communists, his estimate seems overly optimistic.7
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LATE ITEMS
Nor
*Re ublic of the Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold
appears hopeful. that firm UN resistance to Lumumba's pro-
jected seizure of the Leopoldville airport will discredit Lu-
mumba and bring about his downfall. On 27 August, a UN of-
ficial stated that Hammarskjold had received a communication
from Lumumba warning that he planned to take over Leopold-
ville airport "within a week." On the same day, Hammarskjold
affirmed that the UN would not yield control of the airport, which
it has administered since the first of a series of assaults on UN
personnel there on 18 August.
Elsewhere, open resentment in the Congo Senate of Lu-
mumba's authoritarian measures may lead to the arrest of op-
position leaders. The premier has alleged that "loyal elements"
desire the arrest of one opposition spokesman, Jean Bolikango,(b)(1)
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*Laos:'me aelicate process ot meeting a political settie-
m,ent between the Souvanna Phouma-Kong Le group and General
Phoumits countercoup forces has begun with the opening of the
National Assembly session in Luang Prabang. The King's re=
designation of Souvanna to form a new government is a gesture
in support of Phourni's contention that Souvanna's original desig-
nation in mid-August was illegal because the predecessor Som-
sanith government had been forced to resign under duress. Sou-
vanna must next negotiate the composition of his new cabinet, which
could present serious diffieulties. If he tries to win a new vote of
approval for the small and weak cabinet he organized in Vientiane
two weeks ago, his compromise agreement with Phoumi will almost
certainly break down. If, on the other hand, he is too liberal in
granting cabinet portfolios to Phoumi followers, he is likely to in-
vite the wrath of Captain Kong Le, whose military influence in Vien-
tiane has diminished little, if any. he American embassy in Vien-
tiane notes that Kong is still in a cocky mood and considers it en-
tirely possible that he may follow the lead of the Pathet Lao in op-
posing any settlement with the "Phoumi clique." A Pathet Lao
broadcast of 28 August stated that whatever the assembly does in
Luang Prabang, it will be against the will of the peop1.1
30 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF
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Khrushchev m y use his visit to Helsinki on 2-5 September,
In honor of Finnish President Kekkonen's 60th birthday, to ex-
ploit statements in the Powers trial involving Finland, Sweden,
and Norway in the U-2 incident. The visit was arranged on So-
viet initiative and, since there are no critical bilateral prob-
lems, its main purpose may be to provide an opportunity for
the Soviet premier to reiterate his warnings of the dangers of
American policy for the Scandinavian countries. He may also
expand on his statements in Austria designed to intimidate
neutral states into supporting the bloc campaign against
US overseas bases. Khrushchev would hope that a repetition
of this line, together with a warning that the USSR would not
"remain idle" in the face of a violation of neutrality, will
generate Scandinavian pressure on Norway to adopt a more
restrictive policy on US bases.
The Soviet announcement appears to have come as a com-
plete surprise to high Finnish officials. While some of them
interpreted the coming visit as a sign of Soviet good will, the
fact that its scheduling appears to have been accomplished with
little or no coordination with the Finns appears to have caused
some uneasiness in Helsinki. Foreign Minister Toerngren has
stated that no preparations had been made in Finland for the
visit nor did he know what matters Khrushchev wished to discuss.
One question which might be raised is that of Finland's re-
lations with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Al-
though the matter has been under consideration for several
months, the Finnish Government has hesitated to proceed on
grounds that there is some uncertainty regarding Moscow's at-
titude toward Finnish membership in EFTA.
President Kekkonen is reported to be pessimistic about the
prospects for the West in the political and economic struggle
with the bloc. Fearful that there is a real danger of war, partic-
ular)y over Berlin, he regards it as imperative that Finland
conduct a foreign policy having as its basic aim the development
of "trustful" relations between the two countries. With this goal
in mind, Kekkonen has actively encouraged increased trade, mil-
itary, and cultural contacts with the USSR. This has been evi-
dent most recently in Finnish moves to purchase increased
quantities of Soviet military equipment and in a growing num-
ber of exchange visits by military officials of the two countries.
--CONMENUAL___
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SECHE-T__
Shah Discharges Premier to Shift Blame for Rigged
Iranian Elections
Premier Eqbal% resignation on 28 August, after the Shah
had publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of the
parliamentary elections in progress since early August, is
part of the Shah's plan to restore some of his severely damaged
prestige.
The Rah has been under considerable pressure from some
of his principal advisers to declare the elections void and to
dismiss Eqbal as the scapegoat. Eqbal, since he became pre-
mier in early 1957, has been a faithful executor of the Shah's
will. Because of this, he has become unpopular and has cre-
ated enemies among the Shah's closest associates. Sharif
Emami, the 51-year-old pro-Western minister of industry
and mines, has been appointed acting premier.
Apparently the Shah now plans to allow the new parliament
to convene, to demand the passage of a new election law, and
then dismiss it to hold new elections. The need for strong
steps by the Shah to re-establish his authority and prestige,
however, could convince him to take illegal measures, such
as annulling the elections and assuming direct control of af-
fairs pending elections.
-SECRET__
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vow'
(Italian Preinier Wants Nationwide Local Elections Early
t In November
In a talk with the American ambassador on 24 August, Pre-
mier Fanfani stated confidentially that his Christian Democratic
party has agreed on the desirability of holding nationwide local
elections early in November. These elections have already been
postponed twice, and Fanfani said his party now must show the
country it has confidence in its own strength. He claims that his
party has come back in public esteem and is more popular now
than in the recent past, and says--with apparent overoptimism--
that the Communists have lost strength because of the degenera-
tion of the June-July demonstrations against the neo-Fascists into
Communist-led disorders.
Parliament reconvenes on 5 September, and Fanfani believes
that by early October he can secure passage of an electoral re-
form law which would "force" the Nenni Socialists to run separate
lists from the Communists,and the Monarchists to run separate
from the neo-Fascists. Both Socialists and Monarchists have
urged passage of the new law, which would drop the present ma-
jority requirement and adopt a modified proportional system for
the provincial elections.. Both parties indicated a degree of ap-
proval of the present Christian Democratic government by abstain-
' ing rather than voting against it in the confidence vote on 18 July.
Fanfani said Nenni "would get his throat cut" if he returned
to his alliance with the Communists. The premier believes that
60 percent of the Socialist party hierarchy and an even larger pro-
portion of the party's electorate support Nenni's stand favoring
autonomy from the Communists.
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ralTVHDEALTIAL_
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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