[SANITIZED]NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY JUNE 9, 1976 - 1976/06/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02997885
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: June 9, 1976

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 CO2997885
3.5(c)
The
National Intelligence
Daily
Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only
WEDNESDAY JUNE 9, 1976
VOLUME 3, NUMBER 135
Copy No. 206
3.5(c)
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2 WEDNESDAY JUNE 9, 1976
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
AUSAREMZIMMEIUMMNIMIXAMEEMBICSIMMINGEMOZIRM
Argentina: Hard Line Pressed
Hard-line Argentine military officers
are trying to force President Videla to
take a tougher stand on subversion and a
variety of other issues. This could con-
front Videla with serious human rights
problems and divisions within the
military.
Videla and advisers who share his
moderate and methodical approach
toward national reform are trying to curb
the arbitrary arrests by police and armed
forces security services, compile a list of
those detained, and halt vigilante-style ac-
tivities against suspected and known
leftists by semiofficial death squads.
Some of Videla's subordinates also are
attempting to work with Peronist labor
and political leaders in the hope of even-
tually building a base of popular support
for the military government. To ac-
complish this they reportedly believe that
government economic policies will have to
become more "populist" in orientation
and provide for a more equitable distribu-
tion of wealth.
Hard-liners opposed to these and other
government proposals�ranging from
ambassadorial appointments to revising
foreign investment laws�include a
number of high-ranking army officers
who have a sympathetic junta member in
Admiral Emilio Massera.
Massera and his army colleagues do
not appear bent on ousting Videla as
President, but rather are determined to
force moderates out of the President's cir-
cle of advisers. Only then, they apparently
reason, can the government impose dis-
cipline on the labor force, destroy the in-
fluence of corrupt and irresponsible
politicians, and eliminate the well-en-
trenched leftists.
The junta's image is already suffering
from its inability to control right-wing
terrorism. Moreover, labor and political
leaders are increasingly concerned about
Videla's inability to enforce the moder-
ate line he promised on taking office
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01P
plan specifies that a minimum of 51 tons
of binary nerve agent (a mixture of two or
more non-toxic chemicals to form a toxic
agent) 50 tons of mustard gas and 23.5
tons of tear gas are necessary for an
acceptable defensive capability.
While the Nationalists have sufficient
qualified scientists and technicians to staff
their chemical warfare program, they are
dependent on foreign technology and
assistance to keep it going. They have
purchased chemical warfare technology
from Israel and West Germany and are
now seeking to expand foreign contacts
and working relationships with the
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden.
The Nationalist government concluded
an agreement with Israel in 1971, after be-
ing unable to purchase $2 million worth of
chemical warfare equipment from the US.
The agreement called for the construction
of a chemical laboratory to conduct
research and to produce chemical agents
and protective equipment. For the past
five years, the chemical research and
development program has been under the
guidance of Israeli scientists.
Development of the binary nerve agent
GB is complete, and pilot quantities are
being produced. Israel is assisting in
building facilities on Taiwan for produc-
ing the components of the binary agent
and probably helped build a mustard
production facility that opened in 1974.
plan calls for multiple rocket launchers as
the primary delivery system. Premier
Chiang Ching-kuo has called for a July
deadline for the development of a
prototype and wants the launchers ready
for use in June 1977. Other possible
delivery systems include the 4.2 inch mor-
tar, the 105-mm. and I55-mm. howitzer,
and the 8 inch gun. It is also possible the
Nationalists might develop some sort of
air-delivery system using either fighter
bombers or transports as platforms.
Significant problems have arisen in
mating the binary agent to a warhead. A
reliable method of mixing the chemicals
has not been found, and a major
aerodynamic stability problem has been
encountered. To date there have been
three test firings of the 4.5 inch rocket,
and results are said to have been "less
than satisfactory."
It is apparent that the development of
the Nationalists' chemical warfare
capability hinges on solving these
problems.
If production quotas and dates are met,
the Nationalists will have a substantial in-
ventory of chemical munitions by 1980. It
probably will take another five years,
however, to produce the quantities of
chemical agents and weapons that the
government believes are necessary to
repel an invasion of Taiwan.
Significant steps to upgrade its defen-
requested further procurements on an
urgent basis.
Peking's Priorities
Mainland China, on the other hand, ap-
parently has given chemical warfare a
lower priority. Chemical warfare
probably will play only a minor role in
any of its military plans for the next five
years. China is judged not to have a
sophisticated overall chemical warfare
program but does have the knowledge and
capability to upgrade its present program
if it should so decide.
China probably does have a small
stockpile of World War I-type chemical
agents and agent-filled munitions, but we
have no evidence to indicate that the
stockpile includes any of the modern
nerve agents.
We do not think Peking has the
capability to produce nerve agents, and it
probably would take some five years
before China could build production
facilities and supply chemical agents to its
military forces.
China's military forces receive
rudimentary training in chemical warfare
defense. They lack the equipment,
however, to provide them with more than
a limited capability to protect against, or
recover from, a chemical attack. Again, it
would take at least five years for the
mainland Chinese significantly to upgrade
their protective capabilities. (S NF/OC)
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)NESDAY JUNE 9, 1976 3
stic
idge, May 9
res (25 acres) of land around the
If-kilometer (0.3 mile) bridge and its
)proaches have been cleared to deter
errilla attacks.
The Beitbridge rail line has carried
ore than 70 percent of Rhodesia's
reign trade since the Mozambican
)vernment closed its border with
hodesia in March.
The other rail line �to South Africa
isses through Botswana and can handle
ily about a quarter of Rhodesia's trade.
necessary, Rhodesia could manage
ithout the Botswana line, but prolonged
terdiction of the Beitbridge route would
riously hamper trade and threaten
hodesia's economy.
The Rhodesians also believe their
perations across the border into Mozam-
�que are causing the insurgents
roblems. In these operations, Rhodesian
regulars, including former Portuguese
)Idiers from Angola and Mozambique,
nd ex-insurgents, are said to have killed a
gnificant number of guerrillas.
Some seniqr South African officials
eportedly believe that the Rhodesian
osition is worsening. South African
rime Minister Vorster last week reaf-
rmed his government's decision not to
ltervene militarily in Rhodesia even if in-
ocent civilians should be killed there.
TS RUFF NF/OC)
Mauritania
Polisario Attack
A brief terrorist attack yesterday in
Nouakchott, Mauritania, was apparently
carried out by Polisario Front guerrillas
opposed to the Moroccan-Mauritanian
partition of Western Sahara. It was the
first such incident in the city.
Polisario forces in recent weeks have in-
creased their activity within Mauritania
and probably will attempt further
operations in the capital. Although
Mauritanian officials are likely to in-
crease security measures in and around
the city, they will be hard put to forestall
such attacks because of the city's
vulnerability.
Nouakchott is on a flat plain extending
into the desert. Buildings within the
presidential compound, in particular, are
easily targeted from outside; they are
among the tallest in the city.
Mauritanian public reaction to the
guerrilla attacks is likely to be expressed
in a show of renewed support for the
government's policy of partition of
Western Sahara. President Ould Daddah
has wide support in the government and
with the general public. Any attempt by
Polisario guerrillas to use terrorism to try
to undermine the President is likely to
backfire. (C)
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if
Warsaw Pact. Because Moscow is mind-
ful of Jordan's close ties to the US, it
probably will be reluctant to supply these
weapons despite its eagerness to score a
political victory.
The Soviets reportedly told the Jor-
danians last month that they would not
supply sensitive weapons, and that the
Syrians would be considered the
"custodians" and provide maintenance in
Jordan for weapons that are provided.
For its part, Amman reportedly in-
sisted that Jordan have "complete con-
trol" over any air defense system installed
in Jordan, and that no Soviet advisers be
permitted in Jordan.
The two sides accepted these con-
ditions, apparently with the understand-
ing that Syrian officers would be allowed
to enter Jordan to maintain the Soviet
equipment, and that Jordanian officers
Clannifiad by 010725
Exempt from general
declasaification schedule of EQ. 11652
Exemption category 55 (1.2.3641
Declassification date impossible to determine
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involve
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIO
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal
willing to announce an agreement while
Husayn is in Moscow.
Despite his determination to push
ahead with his negotiations with Moscow,
Husayn has left the way clear for the
Saudis to reconsider their position and
offer to provide full funding for a US
Hawk system. The King last week sent a
letter offering to meet personally with
Saudi King Khalid, hoping that such a
meeting would provide Riyadh an oppor-
tunity gracefully to reverse itself.
The Saudis have not replied directly to
Husayn's letter. Crown Prince Fahd
yesterday sent word through the Jorda-
nian embassy in Jidda, however, that the
Saudis had "learned of a British offer
concerning air defense"�presumably
that involving a joint US-British
system�and hoped that it would be
acceptable to Jordan. (TSU NF/OC)
The National Intelligence Daily is prepared
Central Intelligence Agency in cooperation: yr
other US foreign intelligence organizations, Late.,
prepared by CIA alone are $o marked. Analytical-
ture articles are attributed to their _authors.
and control abbreviations
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Egypt now has enough equipment there
Memo. . .
From Page 1
on the other.
� Reprisals by Lebanese leftists and
Palestinians for perceived American
support of Syria.
� The withdrawal of protection by
Fatah and Lebanese Arab Army
elements providing security (such as
the military unit guarding the US em-
bassy) against local gangs.
The most serious threat is likely to be
the activities of armed lawless elements
until now kept in check by Fatah and the
Lebanese Arab Army. During the
breakup of the Lebanese army in April
and prior to the arrival of Lebanese Arab
Army forces, these elements extracted
protection money from foreigners in Ras
Beirut. Such demands could easily es-
calate into kidnapings, armed robberies,
and possibly killings.
Because of our association with the
Syrians in the eyes of Lebanese leftists
and Palestinians, Americans could also be
the target of reprisals. The extent of this
danger will in large part depend on
whether and how quickly the Syrians
move to take West Beirut and how
strongly the leftists oppose. (C)
ONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
European
Communists
Preparatory Meeting
The editorial commission seeking to
complete preparations for the proposed
European communist party conference
convenes today in East Berlin for a two-
day meeting. The Soviet delegation is led
by Politburo candidate-member
Ponomarev. The second-ranking Soviet
delegate, party secretary Katushev,
visited both Romania and Yugoslavia
during the past two weeks in an apparent
effort to iron out differences that have
prevented scheduling the conference.
The meeting in East Berlin has been
billed by participants as the "final"
negotiating session, but that assertion
may not hold true. In addition to Soviet
efforts with the independent-minded par-
ties, those parties have been engaged in a
last-minute flurry of consultations among
themselves. The latest such talks, con-
cluded only yesterday, were held in Rome
between Italian Communist leader
Berlinguer and Static Dolanc, the
number-two man in the Yugoslav party.
(C) -CIA, DIA, NSA-
?et Visits
3f the wishes of a minority.
Averoff's performance is a reflection of
Prime Minister Caramanlis' shift to par-
tisan politics in the face of challenges to
his leadership from the left. Caramanlis
reportedly was furious over leftist
Jemonstrations on Rhodes and Mykonos
ast month to prevent port visits by US
;hips, and noted that tensions with Turkey
make it imperative that the Sixth Fleet re-
main in the Aegean.
Greek security police clashed with
Jemonstrators on both Rhodes and My-
K.onos; the government eventually asked
.hat the ships leave to avoid more
;erious violence. In the Meantime, a
imited schedule of port visits has been
�esumed, including one, to a port near
Nthens last week, that was carried out
vithout incident. (S NF/OC)
Photography
o support 9 to 11 infantry battalions�a
eduction of three or four batallions since
/lay 20. Under the Sinai II agreement,
!;gypt is not allowed to have more than
...ight infantry battalions in the zone.
The Israelis did not appear to have any
excess equipment in their part of the zone.
In the Egyptian portion of the Sinai we
can identify with confidence equipment
for two mechanized and seven motorized
infantry battalions. In addition, there is
enough equipment for possibly two other
motorized battalions, but this equipment
is dispersed, and we cannot firmly identify
the units.
Since May 20 the Egyptians have con-
structed, but not occupied, three more
SA-6 sites in their limited-armaments
zone and refurbished another older site
that had deteriorated. The three new
positions bring to 11 the number of SA-6
sites constructed since Sinai II went into
effect in late February.
Although the Sinai 1 agreement
prohibited the construction of surface-
to-air missile sites in the Egyptian and
Israeli limited zones, the current Sinai 11
agreement bars only surface-to-air mis-
siles from the zones. (S NF SENSITIVE)
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NR