CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/09/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02998375
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: September 29, 1958

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29 September 1958
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
VFELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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29 SEPTEMBER 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR takes negative attitude toward
UAR request for MIG-19 fighters and
TU-16 medium bombers.
Soviet presidium member visiting
Cairo meets twice with two ministers
of Algerian government-in-exile.
Taiwan Strait - Air photography on
24 September shows some build-up
of artillery opposite Matsus.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Nasir proclaims land reforms in
Syria in effort to popularize UAR
Government.
Lebanon - President Shihab plans
special session of Parliament this
week; will request confidence vote
for Karame cabinet.
Burma - Army action greeted with
relief by general population.
0
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III. THE WEST
0 De Gaulle expected to come out against
"integration" of Algeria with France in
2 October speech.
�Panama - Attempt to oust President de
la Guardia and National Guard com-
manders reportedly to occur before 1
October.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
29 September 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-UAR:
Cairo in late July requested Moscow
for late-model military equipment, including MIG-19 fighters
, and TU-16 medium bombers. Moscow's refusal may refer
to this supplemental request. Moscow consistently has
turned down Cairo's requests for types of aircraft which hay
not yet been released in quantity to China or the satellites.
The USSR is continuing to supply Cairo with large quantities
of less advanced equipment.
USSR-Algeria: Heavy Soviet press attention to Mos-
cow's first public high-level contact with leaders of the newly.
formed Algerian provisional government suggests that the
USSR may adopt a firmer pro-Algerian line. Pravda and
other Moscow newspapers on 27 September gave heavy play
1 ' to two "frank and sincere" meetings in the UAR last week
between party presidium member M A. Mukhitdinov, who
has become a top Soviet spokesman on Middle Eastern and
Arab affairs, and two ministers of the Algerian governmeni
in-exile. Mukhitdinov has just returned from a nine-day
good-will visit to the UAR.
*Taiwan Strait situation: Air photos of Communist ar-
tillery positions on the Peiling Peninsula opposite the Matsu
Islands on 24 September show an increase to 153 from about
100 positions two months ago. About half of these positions
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contained guns, and there has been a considerable amount
of new activity in road building, construction of shelters,
AA positions, and radar facilities.
(Page 1) (Maps)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Syria: Nasir on 27 September promulgated land
reform laws on the Egyptian model for the Syrian region and at
the same time announced a unified state of emergency law for
the UAR reconciling separate emergency laws which had been
In effect for several years in the two countries. The new
'\ Syrian land reform law is intended to and will probably pop-
ularize union with Egypt among the Syrian masses and fur-
ther weaken the conservative landowning class, which is op-
posed to union and to the reforms of revolutionary Arab na-
tionalism. Cairo's proclamation of land reforms will also
cut the ground from under Syrian Baathist politicians, such
as Akram Hawrani, who have long advocated such reforms
but have resisted ith sir's order disbanding
political groups.
kL
Lebanon: President Shihab expects to call a special
session of Parliament this week to give a vote of confidence
to the Karame cabinet. He has threatened to dissolve Par-
liament and call new elections if it refuses approval. Am-
bassador McClintock believes that Karame will win by a "very
narrow margin." (Page 4)
Burma: General Ne Wines bloodless coup in Burma
has brought a sense of relief to the population and most non-
Communist leaders, regardless of their factional affiliation.
Recently surrendered members of the Communist People's
Comrade party have left Rangoon and gone back underground.
Ne Win may bring about reconciliation among the political
leaders whose feuding split the ruling coalition last June and
caused the recent political chaos.
(Page 6)
29 Sept 58
DAILY BRIEF
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III. THE WEST
France-Algeria: The new French constitution re-
ceived the expected overwhelming approval in the referen-
dum; there were no major incidents in either France or Al-
geria. De Gaulle may come out unmistakably against "inte-
gration" of Algeria with France in his scheduled 2 October
speech at Constantine. He plans to announce a sweeping
amnesty which would permit rebel leaders to campaign for
election to Parliament, and he would hold out the possibility
that he will seek to negotiate a broad settlement with the
Algerian elected representatives. However, Algerian ef-
forts to make independence a prerequisite to talks would be
rejected. (Page 8)
Panama: Panama's dangerously unstable political situa-
tion may reach a crisis before the National Assembly con-
venes on 1 October, with attempts to oust President de la
Guardia and the National Guard commanders. Opposition
politicians, led by Vice President Diaz, hope to achieve this
by exploiting student strike activities to create violence.
The government is prepared for trouble and may suspend
civil liberties. (Page 10)
29 Sept 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Maximum Range of Chinese Communist
Field Artillery Pieces
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152-mm Gun-Howitzer M1937
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait Situation
Air photos of Communist artillery positions on the
Peiling Peninsula opposite the Matsu Islands on 24 September
show an increase to 153 from about 100 positions two months
ago. About half of :these_ pdaitions contained guns, and
the-re. has been a considerable amount of new activity in
road building, construction of shelters, AA positions, and ra-
dar facilities. Other photo reconnaissance reports of 24 Sep-
tember showed no significant naval activity in the coastal
area, but gave no details.
Both Nationalist and Communist air activity declined on
26 and 27 September. No engagements were reported, al-
though there was one instance on 27 September when Commu-
nist fighters flew out over the strait in reaction to a Nation-
alist flight about 40 miles south of Chinmen. Communist
fighters generally have been restricted to the mainland, and
it is possible in this case that they were attempting to force
or entice the Nationalist flight over the mainland where larger
numbers of fighters were conducting the usual defensive pa-
trolling.
There is additional evidence that the Communists have
deployed LA 11 (FANG) piston-engine fighters to the Chinmen
area for use against Nationalist transport aircraft conducting
night air drops. The Nationalists believe there is as much as a
squadron of these planes at Chingvang airfield.
The Chinese Nationalist leadership, following a meeting on
26 September, was reported to believe that the position of the
Tan Islands is difficult but supportable. The main problem is
the water supply. Nationalist eight-inch howitzers were used
for the first time on 26 September, firing on targets on the
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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Lienho
Causeway
IAOTENG
CHINMEN
(QUEMOY)
Airstrip
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New
Weitou Peninsula. A half hour after they began firing, Com-
munist guns replied with a heavy barrage of almost 5,000
rounds against eastern Chinmen.
Information obtained from the Joint Commission on
Rural Reconstruction, a Sino-American civilian authority
which has supervised the development of the Chinmen economy,
indicates that civilian food stocks on the island are high follow-
ing a good harvest this year. The supply is believed to be ade-
quate to support the civilian population through next spring,
and it is believed that some food could be diverted to military
use without causing undue hardship.
Peiping issued its 15th and 16th warnings against US
"military provocations" on 27 and 28 September. On 28 Sep-
tember, Premier Chou En-lai told a banquet in honor of foreign
experts that the Chinese people "do not give up their efforts to
find a solution to the disputes between China and the United
States through peaceful negotiations." He also said, "If the
US imperialists insist on provoking war in order to carry out
their aggression on Quemoy and Matsu, the 600,000,000 Chi-
nese people, united as one and with the sympathy and support
of the whole camp of socialism and all peace-loving nations
and peoples, will definitely bring the US imperialists' ag-
gressive action to final and complete disaster."
Moscow continues to hint at the possibility that it will
send Soviet "volunteers" to aid Communist China, Soviet
Aviation on 27 September contained "troop indoctrination" ma-
terial on the Taiwan Strait situation. The American Embassy
reports that this material together with the Red Star hint on
25 September of Soviet volunteer pilots comprise the first in-
dications in the Soviet press that Soviet military personnel
are being psychologically prepared for possible service in
the Far East.
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I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanese Situation
President Shihab informed American Ambassador
McClintock that he expect&, ;to call a special session of the
Lebanese Parliament to give a vote of confidence to Tripoli
rebel leader Rashid Karame's cabinet this week. Shihab has
threatened to dissolve the chamber, which is dominated by
Chamoun supporters, and call new elections if the cabinet
is not approved. Ambassador McClintock believes that
Karame will win by a very narrow margin.
The new cabinet is composed of anti-Chamoun ele-
ments, including four members of the rebel camp, but only
two of these actively fought in the rebellion; all seven min-
isters opposed Chamoun's pro-Western foreign policy. An
eighth member, Charles Helou, who did not oppose this policy,
reportedly has withdrawn from the cabinet.
Karame advocates Lebanese subservience to UAR policy.
He is a great admirer of Nasir and recently described him as
a "superman." Philip Taq1a, the new foreign minister, is an
opponent of the Eisenhower doctrine and can be expected to
advocate a much more neutral foreign policy than his pred-
ecessor, , Charles Malik. In the technical sense, the cabinet
is well-qualified. Only Karame and Taqla are parliamentary
deputies.
Shihab appears to have maneuvered Parliament into
the position where opposition to the Karame cabinet will
face the deputies with the prospect either of losing their
seats in rebel-controlled elections, or having the number
of seats increased enough to override the present pro-
Chamoun majority. Shihab has indicated that he hopes the
legislature will grant him decree powers for six months,
whereby he could rule through a sympathetic cabinet with-
out the necessity of approval for policies which might be
opposed by the present Parliament.
President Shihab told the American ambassador on 26
September that the present commander of the gendarmerie
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"could not be trusted" and would be replaced. The pro-Western
gendarmerie commander carried out his duties very ably during
the recent rebellion, and his removal will be interpreted as
another sign that all members of the government who actively
opposed the rebellion will be ousted. His replacement commands
very little respect in the country. Shihab appears to be making
the same error in policy that contributed to the recent rebel-
lion--the exclusion of an important segment of the populace
from public office. Chamoun regards the Karame cabinet as
a capitulation to the revolution and can be expected to oppose
it.
Syrian Minister of Interior Sarraj recently informed a
European diplomat stationed in Damascus that "nothing would
stop the association of Lebanon with the UAR"
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Burmese Situation
General Ne Win's action on 26 September has brought
a sense of relief to the Burmese population and to most non-
Communist political leaders, regardless of their factional
loyalties. They probably feel that army control will end
the disastrous drift toward chaos and civil war. The care-
fully correct observance of constitutional procedures--30
days notice before Parliament meets and U Nu officially
resigns arid the six-month limit to General Ne Win's tenure
of the premiership--also serve to reassure the public of the
continuation of democratic processes. Ne Win's pledge to
exclude major political leaders from his cabinet is intended
to ensure the prospective government's impartiality.
The members of the People's Comrade party who had
surrendered recently are already leaving Rangoon and re-
turning to the jungle. The army, even before the June gov-
ernment crisis, was critical of Nu's generosity to surrendered
insurgents and fearful that Communists would use cached arms
to renew violence either before or during national elections.
Though Ne Win is pledged to continue general government
policies, terms for insurgent surrenders are expected to be
made much more stringent.
The long-contemplated army action apparently was
sparked by Home Minister Bo Min Gaung's plan to ensure
government party control over the army through the arrest
or retirement of top military leaders, including General Ne
Win. There seems to have been no prior collusion with Pre-
mier Nu's opponents, former deputy premiers Ba Swe and
Kyaw Nyein. However, Premier Nu's acquiescence to Ne
Win's demand for government control suggests Nu may have
recognized that his gamble to maintain parliamentary con-
trol through Communist-influenced leftists was failing and
that he welcomed reprieve from eventual parliamentary de-
feat. The coup relieves Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein of the ne-
cessity of voting against US aid to Burma to bring Nuts gov-
ernment down. The general approval given Ne Win's "selec-
tion" as incoming premier by newspapers supporting
CONFIDENTIAL
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both factions of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom 14eague
raises possibilities for reconciliation of the feuding leaders
prior to general elections, now projected for April 1959.
Neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China have
reacted as yet to the developments and there is no indica-
tion that there will be any immediate impact on Moscow's aid
programs in Burma. Any sudden change in policy toward Burma
would be politically embarrassing for both Moscow and Peiping.
Peiping, which has refrained from calling attention to border
clashes with the Chinese Nationalist irregulars and Burmese
tribal groups, is likely to maintain reserve pending clarifica-
tion of the new regime's policies. Any Chinese intervention
at this time would probably be covert and would be handled
through Burma's Communists.
CONFIDENTIAL
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III. THE WEST
De Gaulle May Advocate Liberal Algerian Policy
During his visit to Algeria scheduled for 2-3 October,
French Premier de Gaulle is expected to express himself un-
mistakably against the integration concept. He plans to an-
nounce a sweeping amnesty and his willingness to negotiate
eventually with Algerian elected representatives.
in nis speech at Constantine on 2 October, De Gaulle
probably will state that prison camps will be abolished and
a large number of Moslem political prisoners in France and
Algeria will be liberated; he may also encourage rebel lead-
ers, including members of the new provisional government, to
campaign for election to Parliament.
Definite repudiation of the concept of Algerian "integra-
tion" is almost certain to meet strong opposition, and even
such a long-time supporter of a liberal solution as Socialist
leader and Minister of State Guy Monet is worried that De
Gaulle may be "going too far too fast." French settlers in Al-
geria, whose doubts about De Gaulle's intentions have until
�now been held in check by fear of a large "no" vote in the ref-
erendum and by army pressure, may attempt to revive the
extremist demonstrations of last spring, with or without
army support.
De Gaulle has been tightening his control over the top
command of the army and may be willing to risk military
insubordination in Algeria in order to take advantage of a
highly favorable political situation. With a strong electoral
mandate behind him from the 28 September referendum and
full powers to govern until the new institutions are set up in
early 1959, De Gaulle is in a unique position to take and to
carry out unpopular decisions.
De Gaulle's intentions may be revised, however, in
view of Algerian Provisional Premier Fehrat Abbas' 26 Sep-
tember offer to "negotiate independence" with France, for
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De Gaulle's office has already announced that making Algerian
independence a orereauisit7 to talks would mean French rejec-
tion.
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Unstable Panamanian Political Situation
Agitation against President de la Guardia and the Na-
tional Guard by numerous Panamanian student and political
groups is threatening to get out of control and may lead to
violence similar to that which threatened the government
last May. Students are already on strike and are planning
to call for a general strike to bring pressure on the National
Assembly to demilitarize the guard, Panama's only armed
force. The assembly is scheduled to convene on 1 October.
Opposition politicians, led by disaffected Vice President
Diaz, evidently hope to use student actions as the basis for
a coup, which may occur before the assembly meets.
Some student groups are aware they may be exploited
and are determined to avoid violence�. which they fear might
provide the government an excuse to justify repressive
measures. However, these moderates do not control all
students, and resentment ggainst the oligarchy, represented
by the administration and the guard commanders, is part of
chronic and widespread political and economic unrest in
Panama. Competent observers feel that minority agitators
are determined and capable of causing violence in the near
future.
The government has denied that it plans to suspend
constitutional guarantees of civil liberties but is making
strenuous preparations to combat opposition wherever it
may break out. The American Embassy feels that discoveries
of additional arms caches like those uncovered in vast weeks
might lead to a suspension of guarantees.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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