CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/09/29

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02998375
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RIPPUB
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U
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20
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January 27, 2020
Document Release Date: 
January 30, 2020
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September 29, 1958
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Wi://////////////////////////////////// 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 3.5(c)s* Noe 29 September 1958 Copy No. C CENTRAL VFELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE- IN CLAY.j. t DECLASSFIED CLAZ3. CHANGED TO: TS NEXT REVIEW DAVE: AUTH- 7 TOP SECRET for Release: 2020/01/23 CO29983757/017/1/1/ /./ D A - PIEViEWER: Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 TOP 3iRET- Alk 40P-SfeltET- Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 1104 29 SEPTEMBER 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR takes negative attitude toward UAR request for MIG-19 fighters and TU-16 medium bombers. Soviet presidium member visiting Cairo meets twice with two ministers of Algerian government-in-exile. Taiwan Strait - Air photography on 24 September shows some build-up of artillery opposite Matsus. IL ASIA-AFRICA Nasir proclaims land reforms in Syria in effort to popularize UAR Government. Lebanon - President Shihab plans special session of Parliament this week; will request confidence vote for Karame cabinet. Burma - Army action greeted with relief by general population. 0 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 III. THE WEST 0 De Gaulle expected to come out against "integration" of Algeria with France in 2 October speech. �Panama - Attempt to oust President de la Guardia and National Guard com- manders reportedly to occur before 1 October. Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 1.../ A-I 1. L..1 1 11110� 4c2- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 29 September 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-UAR: Cairo in late July requested Moscow for late-model military equipment, including MIG-19 fighters , and TU-16 medium bombers. Moscow's refusal may refer to this supplemental request. Moscow consistently has turned down Cairo's requests for types of aircraft which hay not yet been released in quantity to China or the satellites. The USSR is continuing to supply Cairo with large quantities of less advanced equipment. USSR-Algeria: Heavy Soviet press attention to Mos- cow's first public high-level contact with leaders of the newly. formed Algerian provisional government suggests that the USSR may adopt a firmer pro-Algerian line. Pravda and other Moscow newspapers on 27 September gave heavy play 1 ' to two "frank and sincere" meetings in the UAR last week between party presidium member M A. Mukhitdinov, who has become a top Soviet spokesman on Middle Eastern and Arab affairs, and two ministers of the Algerian governmeni in-exile. Mukhitdinov has just returned from a nine-day good-will visit to the UAR. *Taiwan Strait situation: Air photos of Communist ar- tillery positions on the Peiling Peninsula opposite the Matsu Islands on 24 September show an increase to 153 from about 100 positions two months ago. About half of these positions TOP SECRET k\\ 14;;;;;Ii;"kM;7M131133M-Eiaai,k LII � Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 I �,../1 I %VI contained guns, and there has been a considerable amount of new activity in road building, construction of shelters, AA positions, and radar facilities. (Page 1) (Maps) IL ASIA-AFRICA UAR-Syria: Nasir on 27 September promulgated land reform laws on the Egyptian model for the Syrian region and at the same time announced a unified state of emergency law for the UAR reconciling separate emergency laws which had been In effect for several years in the two countries. The new '\ Syrian land reform law is intended to and will probably pop- ularize union with Egypt among the Syrian masses and fur- ther weaken the conservative landowning class, which is op- posed to union and to the reforms of revolutionary Arab na- tionalism. Cairo's proclamation of land reforms will also cut the ground from under Syrian Baathist politicians, such as Akram Hawrani, who have long advocated such reforms but have resisted ith sir's order disbanding political groups. kL Lebanon: President Shihab expects to call a special session of Parliament this week to give a vote of confidence to the Karame cabinet. He has threatened to dissolve Par- liament and call new elections if it refuses approval. Am- bassador McClintock believes that Karame will win by a "very narrow margin." (Page 4) Burma: General Ne Wines bloodless coup in Burma has brought a sense of relief to the population and most non- Communist leaders, regardless of their factional affiliation. Recently surrendered members of the Communist People's Comrade party have left Rangoon and gone back underground. Ne Win may bring about reconciliation among the political leaders whose feuding split the ruling coalition last June and caused the recent political chaos. (Page 6) 29 Sept 58 DAILY BRIEF ii Approved for Release: 20202023-802998375L \ Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 � �1110 '401; III. THE WEST France-Algeria: The new French constitution re- ceived the expected overwhelming approval in the referen- dum; there were no major incidents in either France or Al- geria. De Gaulle may come out unmistakably against "inte- gration" of Algeria with France in his scheduled 2 October speech at Constantine. He plans to announce a sweeping amnesty which would permit rebel leaders to campaign for election to Parliament, and he would hold out the possibility that he will seek to negotiate a broad settlement with the Algerian elected representatives. However, Algerian ef- forts to make independence a prerequisite to talks would be rejected. (Page 8) Panama: Panama's dangerously unstable political situa- tion may reach a crisis before the National Assembly con- venes on 1 October, with attempts to oust President de la Guardia and the National Guard commanders. Opposition politicians, led by Vice President Diaz, hope to achieve this by exploiting student strike activities to create violence. The government is prepared for trouble and may suspend civil liberties. (Page 10) 29 Sept 58 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET ZP\\PZ7e�cr for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 A1111% Ainik Maximum Range of Chinese Communist Field Artillery Pieces ---76.2-mm Gun M1936 152-mm Gun-Howitzer M1937 122-mm Corps Gun M1931 37 FOOC HOW 60103-28 80912 3 fLIENCHIANG (4' ifr %No CHUANSHICH ISLAND SANTU (MIXT EAST CHI .4 SEA )WAN ISLANDS TX DOGS) LAHGTA0 (LA.H.NE_ISLAND/6/ MATSU AREA � Selected Roads ....am*. Under Construction Statoto Was 10 Nautical Miles Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 i yr J.GlAxE., 1 NNW NNW I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Taiwan Strait Situation Air photos of Communist artillery positions on the Peiling Peninsula opposite the Matsu Islands on 24 September show an increase to 153 from about 100 positions two months ago. About half of :these_ pdaitions contained guns, and the-re. has been a considerable amount of new activity in road building, construction of shelters, AA positions, and ra- dar facilities. Other photo reconnaissance reports of 24 Sep- tember showed no significant naval activity in the coastal area, but gave no details. Both Nationalist and Communist air activity declined on 26 and 27 September. No engagements were reported, al- though there was one instance on 27 September when Commu- nist fighters flew out over the strait in reaction to a Nation- alist flight about 40 miles south of Chinmen. Communist fighters generally have been restricted to the mainland, and it is possible in this case that they were attempting to force or entice the Nationalist flight over the mainland where larger numbers of fighters were conducting the usual defensive pa- trolling. There is additional evidence that the Communists have deployed LA 11 (FANG) piston-engine fighters to the Chinmen area for use against Nationalist transport aircraft conducting night air drops. The Nationalists believe there is as much as a squadron of these planes at Chingvang airfield. The Chinese Nationalist leadership, following a meeting on 26 September, was reported to believe that the position of the Tan Islands is difficult but supportable. The main problem is the water supply. Nationalist eight-inch howitzers were used for the first time on 26 September, firing on targets on the --TOP-SEeRET 29 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 002998375 60103 A 80928 Lienho Causeway IAOTENG CHINMEN (QUEMOY) Airstrip Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 002998375 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 WA kJ L.-4%. el � 1-4 .L New Weitou Peninsula. A half hour after they began firing, Com- munist guns replied with a heavy barrage of almost 5,000 rounds against eastern Chinmen. Information obtained from the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, a Sino-American civilian authority which has supervised the development of the Chinmen economy, indicates that civilian food stocks on the island are high follow- ing a good harvest this year. The supply is believed to be ade- quate to support the civilian population through next spring, and it is believed that some food could be diverted to military use without causing undue hardship. Peiping issued its 15th and 16th warnings against US "military provocations" on 27 and 28 September. On 28 Sep- tember, Premier Chou En-lai told a banquet in honor of foreign experts that the Chinese people "do not give up their efforts to find a solution to the disputes between China and the United States through peaceful negotiations." He also said, "If the US imperialists insist on provoking war in order to carry out their aggression on Quemoy and Matsu, the 600,000,000 Chi- nese people, united as one and with the sympathy and support of the whole camp of socialism and all peace-loving nations and peoples, will definitely bring the US imperialists' ag- gressive action to final and complete disaster." Moscow continues to hint at the possibility that it will send Soviet "volunteers" to aid Communist China, Soviet Aviation on 27 September contained "troop indoctrination" ma- terial on the Taiwan Strait situation. The American Embassy reports that this material together with the Red Star hint on 25 September of Soviet volunteer pilots comprise the first in- dications in the Soviet press that Soviet military personnel are being psychologically prepared for possible service in the Far East. TOP SECRET 29 Sept 58 rCKITD AI !MITI I IMFKICP RI II I "11\1 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 ,60, .1 La 11La Ns, TOP SECRET 29 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 ornirl IT1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 .4�.4 'two' I I. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanese Situation President Shihab informed American Ambassador McClintock that he expect&, ;to call a special session of the Lebanese Parliament to give a vote of confidence to Tripoli rebel leader Rashid Karame's cabinet this week. Shihab has threatened to dissolve the chamber, which is dominated by Chamoun supporters, and call new elections if the cabinet is not approved. Ambassador McClintock believes that Karame will win by a very narrow margin. The new cabinet is composed of anti-Chamoun ele- ments, including four members of the rebel camp, but only two of these actively fought in the rebellion; all seven min- isters opposed Chamoun's pro-Western foreign policy. An eighth member, Charles Helou, who did not oppose this policy, reportedly has withdrawn from the cabinet. Karame advocates Lebanese subservience to UAR policy. He is a great admirer of Nasir and recently described him as a "superman." Philip Taq1a, the new foreign minister, is an opponent of the Eisenhower doctrine and can be expected to advocate a much more neutral foreign policy than his pred- ecessor, , Charles Malik. In the technical sense, the cabinet is well-qualified. Only Karame and Taqla are parliamentary deputies. Shihab appears to have maneuvered Parliament into the position where opposition to the Karame cabinet will face the deputies with the prospect either of losing their seats in rebel-controlled elections, or having the number of seats increased enough to override the present pro- Chamoun majority. Shihab has indicated that he hopes the legislature will grant him decree powers for six months, whereby he could rule through a sympathetic cabinet with- out the necessity of approval for policies which might be opposed by the present Parliament. President Shihab told the American ambassador on 26 September that the present commander of the gendarmerie -SECRET-- 29 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 0_=177) 7' Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 %NO "could not be trusted" and would be replaced. The pro-Western gendarmerie commander carried out his duties very ably during the recent rebellion, and his removal will be interpreted as another sign that all members of the government who actively opposed the rebellion will be ousted. His replacement commands very little respect in the country. Shihab appears to be making the same error in policy that contributed to the recent rebel- lion--the exclusion of an important segment of the populace from public office. Chamoun regards the Karame cabinet as a capitulation to the revolution and can be expected to oppose it. Syrian Minister of Interior Sarraj recently informed a European diplomat stationed in Damascus that "nothing would stop the association of Lebanon with the UAR" SECRET 29 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 ry rref� � � Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 Nri Burmese Situation General Ne Win's action on 26 September has brought a sense of relief to the Burmese population and to most non- Communist political leaders, regardless of their factional loyalties. They probably feel that army control will end the disastrous drift toward chaos and civil war. The care- fully correct observance of constitutional procedures--30 days notice before Parliament meets and U Nu officially resigns arid the six-month limit to General Ne Win's tenure of the premiership--also serve to reassure the public of the continuation of democratic processes. Ne Win's pledge to exclude major political leaders from his cabinet is intended to ensure the prospective government's impartiality. The members of the People's Comrade party who had surrendered recently are already leaving Rangoon and re- turning to the jungle. The army, even before the June gov- ernment crisis, was critical of Nu's generosity to surrendered insurgents and fearful that Communists would use cached arms to renew violence either before or during national elections. Though Ne Win is pledged to continue general government policies, terms for insurgent surrenders are expected to be made much more stringent. The long-contemplated army action apparently was sparked by Home Minister Bo Min Gaung's plan to ensure government party control over the army through the arrest or retirement of top military leaders, including General Ne Win. There seems to have been no prior collusion with Pre- mier Nu's opponents, former deputy premiers Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein. However, Premier Nu's acquiescence to Ne Win's demand for government control suggests Nu may have recognized that his gamble to maintain parliamentary con- trol through Communist-influenced leftists was failing and that he welcomed reprieve from eventual parliamentary de- feat. The coup relieves Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein of the ne- cessity of voting against US aid to Burma to bring Nuts gov- ernment down. The general approval given Ne Win's "selec- tion" as incoming premier by newspapers supporting CONFIDENTIAL 29 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 Arlimkrrytria-giktrryi A t Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 top/ VOIV both factions of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom 14eague raises possibilities for reconciliation of the feuding leaders prior to general elections, now projected for April 1959. Neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China have reacted as yet to the developments and there is no indica- tion that there will be any immediate impact on Moscow's aid programs in Burma. Any sudden change in policy toward Burma would be politically embarrassing for both Moscow and Peiping. Peiping, which has refrained from calling attention to border clashes with the Chinese Nationalist irregulars and Burmese tribal groups, is likely to maintain reserve pending clarifica- tion of the new regime's policies. Any Chinese intervention at this time would probably be covert and would be handled through Burma's Communists. CONFIDENTIAL 29 Sept 58 CFNTRAI INTFI I InFKICF RI 11 I FTIKI Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 rt Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 wirS III. THE WEST De Gaulle May Advocate Liberal Algerian Policy During his visit to Algeria scheduled for 2-3 October, French Premier de Gaulle is expected to express himself un- mistakably against the integration concept. He plans to an- nounce a sweeping amnesty and his willingness to negotiate eventually with Algerian elected representatives. in nis speech at Constantine on 2 October, De Gaulle probably will state that prison camps will be abolished and a large number of Moslem political prisoners in France and Algeria will be liberated; he may also encourage rebel lead- ers, including members of the new provisional government, to campaign for election to Parliament. Definite repudiation of the concept of Algerian "integra- tion" is almost certain to meet strong opposition, and even such a long-time supporter of a liberal solution as Socialist leader and Minister of State Guy Monet is worried that De Gaulle may be "going too far too fast." French settlers in Al- geria, whose doubts about De Gaulle's intentions have until �now been held in check by fear of a large "no" vote in the ref- erendum and by army pressure, may attempt to revive the extremist demonstrations of last spring, with or without army support. De Gaulle has been tightening his control over the top command of the army and may be willing to risk military insubordination in Algeria in order to take advantage of a highly favorable political situation. With a strong electoral mandate behind him from the 28 September referendum and full powers to govern until the new institutions are set up in early 1959, De Gaulle is in a unique position to take and to carry out unpopular decisions. De Gaulle's intentions may be revised, however, in view of Algerian Provisional Premier Fehrat Abbas' 26 Sep- tember offer to "negotiate independence" with France, for SECRET 29 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 Q ter114 r'rr Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 vmo' De Gaulle's office has already announced that making Algerian independence a orereauisit7 to talks would mean French rejec- tion. -SECRET- 29 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 41109 Nosie Unstable Panamanian Political Situation Agitation against President de la Guardia and the Na- tional Guard by numerous Panamanian student and political groups is threatening to get out of control and may lead to violence similar to that which threatened the government last May. Students are already on strike and are planning to call for a general strike to bring pressure on the National Assembly to demilitarize the guard, Panama's only armed force. The assembly is scheduled to convene on 1 October. Opposition politicians, led by disaffected Vice President Diaz, evidently hope to use student actions as the basis for a coup, which may occur before the assembly meets. Some student groups are aware they may be exploited and are determined to avoid violence�. which they fear might provide the government an excuse to justify repressive measures. However, these moderates do not control all students, and resentment ggainst the oligarchy, represented by the administration and the guard commanders, is part of chronic and widespread political and economic unrest in Panama. Competent observers feel that minority agitators are determined and capable of causing violence in the near future. The government has denied that it plans to suspend constitutional guarantees of civil liberties but is making strenuous preparations to combat opposition wherever it may break out. The American Embassy feels that discoveries of additional arms caches like those uncovered in vast weeks might lead to a suspension of guarantees. -SEeRE-T--- 29 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 Noe THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998375 - TOP SECRET ' efr# fr',00 e dfro 1 fry , ri 0 40 !fry 0470.0 0 fry fry erz ,./ 7 0/*/! /4 frY fry fr y fry ey // / er TOP SECRET 4 for Release: 2020/01/23 C 0299837FM,, Z /7,/, fir,zZA