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January 27, 2020
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January 30, 2020
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December 3, 1958
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Noe *Tor If 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3 December 1958 Copy No. C Go CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS CLASS. CHANCED To: NEXT RETEW OA I E: 4. ALITH: DATE. .4_ le_ REVIEWER TOP SECRET 1050701/13 80-29963647,41/ A �Fo. Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 ufIr- aird itad 3 DECEMBER 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR - Available evidence suggests launching attempt, poscao�, rvf vehicle in near future. KhrlIshchev to confer with Polish and East German leaders on Berlin tac- tics. Latest Soviet proposals at Geneva talks leave Communist position un- changed. Four Soviet sub chasers being de- livered to Indonesia. II. ASIA-AFRICA Sudan - Abboud rebuffing politicians' advice; regime pursuing independent foreign policy tactics. Cambodia presents its case against Thailand to Communist China and USSR. III, THE WEST De Gaulle's policy on Algeria may be hampered by overwhelming parlia- mentary sentiment for integration. French dragging feet in NATO as tactic to advance De Gaulle's tri- umvirate proposals. Bolivia - President Siles says USSR has offered aid to oil industry. Uruguay. - Colorado party defeated by protest vote; change in orienta- tion under National party considered unlikely. 0 Colombia - Government expects coup attempt by supporters of ex-dictator Rojas. Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 �. . Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 1. O kw, TOP SECRET ?? CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 3 December 1958 DAILY BRIEF L THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet missile activity: involving the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range indi- cate that a launching attempt may take place in the near future. Available evidence suggests that the next Soviet attempt will involve some tvne of space vehicle rather than an ICBM. I USSR.- Berlin: Khrushchev is scheduled to meet soon with Polish and East German leaders to discuss further tactics on Berlin. A Czech broadcast says Khrushchev, Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, and Ulbricht will "coordinate a political and diplomatic initiative for the solution of the Berlin problem and for relaxation in central Europe." (Page 1) USSR--Geneva talks: Soviet-bloc delegates in both Geneva conferences have introduced "declarations" sum- marizing bloc proposals and criticizing Western positions. These declarations, apparently designed for early publica- tion, represent further efforts to place the bloc in the strong- est possible position prior to proposals to end the talks or raise them to a higher level. The USSR's ostensible conces- sion in agreeing to include "basic provisions" on controls in a treaty on ending nuclear tests does not alter its basic position that the West must agree to a permanent and uncon- ditional cessation of testing before the details of a control system can be discussed. (Page 2) TOP SECRET AJp�p-rovedfor'Release: A . AidApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Jo USSR-Indonesia: Four Soviet sub chasers being towed by a merchant ship and three tugs cleared the Turkish Straits on 24 November and transited the Suez Canal on 30 November, apparently for delivery to Indonesia under its arms deal with the bloc. Under an $85,000,000 credit from Poland, Indonesia is scheduled to receive by the end of this year eight sub chas- ers from the bloc, the first four of which were delivered in mid-October. This credit also provides for Indonesia to re- ceive four destroyers and two submarines from the bloc Sudan:1 Recent decisions by the Abboud regime in itireign and domestic affairs reflect his independence from the influ- ence of old-line politicians. The regime has accepted the American aid program; recognized Communist China; stated Its intention to abide by the "neutralist" Bandung principles; and is considering a long-standing Soviet offer of assistance. The government has moved to curb pro-Communist and pro- TJAR publications. (Page 3) Cambodia: The Cambodian ambassador in Peiping has presented his government's version of the dispute with Thailand to the Chinese Communist government. Sihanouk's account has also been passed-to all diplomatic missions in Peiping, and has been transmitted to Moscow. This action may be a preparatory step by Premier Sihanouk in case he feels the need to reauest Peiping's support against Thailand. (Page 4) III. THE WEST France-Algeria: De Gaulle's maneuverability on Algeria may be severely circumscribed by the election of over 400 parliamentary deputies�out of a total of 546--who generally favor integration with France. With his prestige at a new high and his power to govern by decree extending for some time, he may, however, try to move rapidly toward a comparatively liberal solution. He may announce the long-rumored replacement 3 Dec 58 DAILY BRIEF -TOP SECRET ,Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 II V 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 4000 of Generals Salan and Massu and the re-establishment of civilian administration during his scheduled 3 - 7 December visit to Algeria. (Page 5) 0 1 C France-NATO: France's footdragging on key NATO mil- itary programs is apparently motivated by a determination to impress the United States and Britain with the seriousness of De Gaulle's proposals for tripartite global policy coordina- tion. Growing French nationalism, as shown in the 30 No- vember election results, will encourage De Gaulle to persist in this attitude even at the risk of further delay in NATO mil- itary projects and of political tension within the alliance. (Page 6) Bolivia: President Siles says that the USSR has offered large7"-g-'E)F., e assistance to Bolivia's national oil company. For- eign Minister Andrade, referring to a Rumanian UN proposal on oil development, has said that Bolivian public opinion is highly vulnerable to Soviet-bloc maneuvers because of the national oil eomnams failure to obtain loans from free-world sources (Page 7) Uruguay: The National party defeated the Colorado party in the 30 November elections on the basis of protest votes, largely on economic issues, rather than on a positive plat- form. Alter 93 years of Colorado party rule, considerable transitional confusion is likely, but Uruguay's foreign policy probably will not be basically altered. (Page 8) Colombia: The Lleras government expects the supporters of former dictator Rojas to attempt a coup, possibly within the next few days. Leaders of the plot recently claimed that the plans were in too advanced a stage to halt and indicated \ that the action would be timed for about mid-December. Rojas apparently has some support in the army, which is reported to be restive. (Page 9) 3 Dec 58 DAILY BRIEF lii TOP SECRET 4Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C'E998394 z r Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 NEW I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Conference May Be Held Warsaw Warsaw to Discuss Berlin Problem ' Khrushchev, Ulbricht, Gomulka� and Cyrankiewicz are to meet soon in Poland, according to a Czechoslovak station broadcasting to Italian Communists, to "coordinate a polit- ical and diplomatic initiative for the solution of the Berlin problem and for a relaxation of tension in central Europe." IChrushchev said on 10 November that he would soon return the visit of Polish leaders to the USSR, and an East German delegation headed by party boss Ulbricht is scheduled to visit Poland later this month. While Polish leaders have publicly supported Khrushchev's proposals on Berlin, many Poles are reported uneasy. Ithru- shchev may consider it necessary to reassure Poland that any changes in Berlin's status will not have an adverse effect on Poland's western borders. The conference probably will again call for a settlement of the German problem through the creation of a confedera- tion of the two German states, as recently suggested by East Germany. Moscow has said that it would be better to reach an over-all settlement on Germany rather than just the Berlin aspect, but that this is impossible so long as the West insists on free all-German elections. The Communist governments may take this opportunity to reaffirm previous bloc proposals to reduce tensions in Europe, such as the Rapacki Plan, and a nonaggression pact between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO. CONFIDENTIAL 3 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 woi Nome Bloc Delegates at Geneva Issue Declarations On Basic Proposals Soviet bloc delegates in both Geneva conferences have in- troduced formal "declarations" which apparently are designed for early publication and may foreshadow Soviet initiatives to end the talks or raise them to the foreign-minister level, On 29 November, the Soviet delegate to the nuclear test talks introduced a declaration which stressed the "merits" of the Soviet position and accused the West of evading an agreement by insisting on detailed discussion of a control system. After listing four major points in the Western position which "cast doubt on the successful completion" of the talks, the Soviet declaration stated that the USSR would not object to the inclu- sion of "basic provisions on control" in a treaty on the cessa- tion of tests. This ostensible concession was intended to re- move a weak point in the Soviet position--the vague relationship between the Soviet-proposed treaty and a protocol on controls. This latest proposal, however, does not alter the basic Soviet position that the drafting of a treaty, with only the briefest ref- erence to controls, must be completed before provisions for a control system can be discussed. In the conference on surprise attack, the Soviet delegate introduced a declaration on 28 November which spelled out bloc proposals linking "concrete measures" to reduce the danger of surprise attack with specific disarmament measures. The declaration repeated, with minor variations, long-standing So- viet proposals for ground control posts and aerial photography. These inspection measures, according to the declaration, would be valueless unless accompanied by "concrete" disarm- ament measures which would include reduction by one third of foreign forces in Europe and a ban on nuclear weapons and mis- siles in both parts of Germany. SECRET 8 3 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Page 2 c *4 rim, Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 II. ASIA-AFRICA Sudanese Situation Domestic and foreign policy decisions of the Sudan's new military regime under General Ibrahim Abboud reflect inde- pendence from the influence of old-line politicians and suggest the possible emergence of Abboud as a genuine "strong man." There is no indication of any organized opposition to the regime, although former Prime Minister Khalil and his Umma party are reported to be disturbed by Abboud's ignoring their advice. There may also be a group of disgruntled junior army officers. Abboud's cabinet has accepted the controversial American aid program and is likely to seek additional US assistance. A Soviet offer of assistance is also under consideration. On 29 November Foreign Minister Ahmad Khayr proclaimed the gov- ernment's intention to abide by the neutralist "principles of Bandung." At the same time, he announced its recognition of Communist China, a subject of contention between conserva- tive and radical elements in the now-dissolved Parliament. On 1 December Communist China responded favorably, announc- ing its decision to establish diplomatic relations. On the major problem of the division of the Nile waters, Abboud is quoted as saying that negotiations will be conducted between the Sudan and the UAR--excluding the United Kingdom. Abboud has indicated, however, he will accept the British arms gift prof erred to the previous government. The regime is maintaining close surveillance over press and political activities. It has closed the pro-Communist news- paper Al Midan and confiscated copies of the radical Cairo weekly Rose al-Yussif. On 29 November it arrested a number of leaders of Communist-front and labor organizations. 3 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Page 3 ry 1-1,^1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 %me Cambodia Enlisting Bloc Support in Dispute With Thailand The Sihanouk government has broadened the implications of the continuing Thai-Cambodian dispute by a prompt ap- proach to the Sino-Soviet bloc. Cambodian Ambassador Leng Ngeth in Peiping notified Phnom Penh on 28 November that he had submitted Cambodia's case to the Chinese Commu- nist Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to diplomatic missions in Peiping, and had met sympathetic response. On 29 No- vember, the Chinese Communist foreign minister stated that his country "is ready to help in every way to combat this injustice." Cambodia's ambassador to Moscow has also been supplied with an official version of the breakdown in relations with Bangkok. Cambodia's action provides a convenient means for the Sino-Soviet bloc to strengthen its identification with Cambodia's national interests at the expense of Western influence. Sihanouk, apparently surprised by the furore created by his precipitate decision to suspend relations with Thailand, now seems desirous of patching up the quarrel. However, the growing harshness of Thailand's.' terms�apparently stiffened by Marshal Sarit personally--is making such back- tracking increasingly difficult. Sihanouk's diplomatic action may well be a precautionary move against the possibility that relations with Thailand will deteriorate to a point where he feels compelled to seek more direct support from the bloc, ossibjv even ry equipment from Communist China. TOP SECRET 3 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 ry"rs Pr Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 %we III. THE WEST De Gaulle's Algerian Policy Complicated by French Election Results The election on 30 November of some 400 French deputies who generally favor integration of Algeria with France may have severely circumscribed De Gaulle's ability to solve the crucial Algerian problem, according to the American Embassy in Paris. The embassy considers that the result is a strong popular mandate for integration, and that the critical point is the extent to which De Gaulle will feel he can disregard it. There are indications that De Gaulle still intends to try to move rapidly toward a liberal solution. He retains power to rule by decree for some weeks, and the embassy doubts that Parliament, even if it were in session during this period, would or could block implementation of a given policy deter- mined by De Gaulle. be Gaulle plans following the elections to release the five Algerian rebel leaders imprisoned since 1956 suggests one way in which he may attempt to regain the initiative for contacts with the rebels. A civilian replacement is to take over the civil functions of General Salan, the French delegate general in Algeria. This may be announced, along with a general replacement by civilians, of army officers acting as prefects, in connection with the premier's 3-7 December visit. The transfer of General Massu is also likely to be announced. 3 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Nimie French Delaying NATO Programs French noncooperation on several key NATO military projects is admittedly motivated by a spirit of nationalism and by a determination to win acceptance of Premier de Gaulle's recent proposals that the Western Big Three coor- dinate their global policy and strategy. French staff officers at SHAPE have intimated to Norstad that it would be "useful" for him to see De Gaulle personally and he has requested an appointment before the NAC ministerial meeting scheduled later this month. France has lodged a reservation concerning plans for integrated NATO air defense, has refused approval of new projects required to implement the NATO new-weapons and atomic-stockpile program, and is holding up implementation of the "forward scatter" communications system. It has also long insisted on a special relationship with the US--equivalent to the US-UK arrangements--concerning joint control of IRBM's and of any NATO nuclear weapons stockpiled in France. French public opinion has allegedly been a major factor underlying De Gaulle's decision to request tripartite policy coordination. The American Embassy in Paris believes the impressive showing of the nationalistic New Republic Union party in the parliamentary elections will assure parliamentary support for the premier's efforts to enhance France's interna- tional prestige. De Gaulle is therefore likely to persist in obstructionism in NATO, despite the resulting political tension within the alliance. TOP SECRET Cr 3 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTFI I InFNCF RIII I FTIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Page 6 �e-tadcuavrri Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 New NIS Bolivia May Be Receptive to Soviet-bloc Gestures on Petroleum Financing Bolivian President Sues informed the American Embassy on 30 November that the Soviet Embassy in Argentina had offered large-scale assistance to YPFB, Bolivia's national oil company. Foreign Minister Andrade stated on 29 November that Bolivian public opinion was highly receptive to such proposals as the one made by Albania and Rumania in the UN for international coopera- tion in developing of ,the oil industry in underdeveloped countries. Andrade referred particularly to the failure of YPFB to obtain loans from private and public sources in the free world. Ambassador Bonsai comments that certain elements in the Bolivian situation favor Soviet-bloc efforts: 1) the gross value of mineral exports has decreased almost 70 percent in the past two years; 2) serious cuts in employment are in prospect; and 3) exploration by private foreign com- panies apparently has not produced results. All Bolivia's oil production comes from YPFB, which has made Bolivia a net exporter of petroleum in the past several years despite its small daily production, now running at about 102000, barrels. YPFB's general manager believes, on the basis of available information concerning promising geological structures, that the company's present production could be increased to 35,000 barrels per day in three years by an investment of $100,000,000. SECRET 3 Dec 58 CFMTPAI IKITFI I InFNCF RULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Page 7 L=1l!alMiMr/A1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Uruguayan Elections The victory of the conservative National party in Uruguay's 30 November elections, after almost a century of supremacy by the liberal Colorado party, stems mainly from widespread disillusionment over economic conditions. The Socialists and Communists made only small gains; the Communists polled some 3 percent of the vote. Within the National party, the faction led by 86-year-old Alberto Herrera has a clear lead in the nearly complete re- turns over the generally respected leaders of the Blanco Demo- cratic Union (UBD) faction and will control the nine-man execu- tive council which heads the government. Two referendums to change from the council system to a single president failed. A difficult transition period is in prospect since the Na- tional party has no specific program and little experience in governing. The American Embassy in Montevideo comments that the Herrera faction tends to be more demagogic and has fewer leaders of proven ability than the UBD. Martin Etchegoyen is expected to be the first president of the governing council. He is regarded as a front man for Herrera, who is sometimes unfriendly to the United States, However, Uruguay's foreign policy probably will not be basically altered. CONFIDENTIAL 3 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 %.1 Coup Attempt Expected in Colombia The Colombian Government expects the supporters of former dictator Rojas to attempt a coup within the next few days. Rojas has been the cause of considerable tension and government concern since he returned to Colombia on 11 Oc- tober, allegedly to clear his honor of charges of misconduct during his 1953-57 presidential term. Rojista leaders re- cently claimed that their plans for action against the Liberal- Conservative regime of popular President Lleras were too advanced to halt and implied the coup would take place in mid- December, when the Senate plans to begin prosecution of Rojas. Rojas, who placed the military in a privileged position during his presidency, is believed to have some support within the armed forces and possibly among the dissident Conserva- tive elements who oppose the incumbent National Front regime. The Colombian Intelligence Service, an army-controlled agency originally established by Rojas, may also be cooperating with the movement. Top-ranking officers, however, have thus far appeared to support Lleras, although the loyalty of air force commander General Pauwels and armed forces commander Gen- eral Gomez has been questioned. A Rojista coup attempt, designed to unseat Lleras but not necessarily to restore Rojas to power, would probably be ac- companied by considerable violence. Anti-Rojas sentiment among civilian groups probably continues strong. -SEeltET-- 3 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 (-1) t IAL '1/4.01 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Inte,,rior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director CONFIIVNTIA I. Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394 / "T-TOP-SEC-RET-- 4ftk / 4 I 7 / %?- / / 1 / / / 4, . / / / / $ 0 � / 1 V.4 0/ , I ///;5' 1 $ I TOP SECRET /�#4 ? zizemmrnmzjApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998394,rmwdrz,emmi4