CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/12/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02998395
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: December 4, 1958

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4 December 1958
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIY
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4 DECEMBER 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR promoting idea that its Berlin
plan will lead to solution of German
problem; many West Germans recep-
tive to negotiations on bigger issues. 0
Khrushchev gives impression USSR
may make some concessions on test
suspension issue.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon - Ex-President Chamoun
seeking Iranian 'd in for mint,- rr; ra-
military orce.
Tunisia - Bourguiba proposal to buy
up all foreign-owned farm land moti-
vated by concern over domestic pres-
tige.
Deepening split in Moroccan Istiqlal
party may force King to risk inter-
vention in political crisis.
�Greece anticipates UN rebuff on Cy-
prus issue; press denounces Ameri-
can attitude.
�All-African Peoples' Conference to
meet in Accra from 5 to 12 December.
0 Indonesia - Contest between army and
political parties for control of govern-
ment may be nearing showdown.
III. THE WEST
�Guinea applies for UN membership;
Canada favors prompt admission.
LATE ITEM
Colombia - State of seige declared;
former dictator Rojas arrested to
forestall expected coup attempt.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 December V.-)58
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Berlin - West Germany: Soviet diplomats have
hinted to West German opposition party leaders that the
USSR's plan for West Berlin would be followed by other
proposals, all of which are designed to reopen negotiations
looking toward demilitarization of Germany along lines of
the Rapacki Plan. Adenauer and opposition party leaders
have already agreed that an isolated solution of the Berlin
issue is not possible and that broader negotiations should be
sought. The US Embassy in Bonn feels that the 27 November
Soviet note on Berlin will greatly encourage those elements
in West Germany who favor some accommodation with Moscow.
(Page 1)
*USSR... -Nuclear Tests: From an extensive conversa-
tion with Ithrushchev on 2 December, Senator Humphrey gained
the impression that the USSR is seeking agreement on test
suspension and is prepared to make some concessions, but
that the Soviets do not expect to reach agreement on surprise
attack. Ithrushchev professed great concern over American
proposals to permit nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
While indicating a preference for a ban with no exceptions,
Khrushchev said there should at least be a limit on such ex-
plosions with provision for an equal number for each side.
Warushchev agreed that provisions for cessation of tests and
controls should be embodied in one document and said that he
has so instructed his delegation on 28 November.
TOP SECRET
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Watch Committee conclusion - Berlin: There is no
assurance that the USSR will wilt for the full six months'
period mentioned in the Soviet note on 27 November be-
fore transfering to the East Germans control over Allied
traffic to Berlin or undertaking harassment of some other
sort. The Soviet note, however, suggests that the USSR
intends to keep the Berlin problem in the political arena
for at least the immediate future
rc)
Watch Committee cqnclusion - Taiwan Strait: The
Chinese Communists retain the capability to initiate major
military action in the offshore islands area without prior
warning. However, the Communists do not appear to intend,
in the immediate future, to terminate the self-imposed
restriction against interference with resupply operations
on alternate days,.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon: Former President Chamoun is seeking Iranian
assistance to develop a paramilitary force of "12,000 to 15,000
youths" in anticipation of new civil strife which he believes may
begin in six months. Chamoun has been seeking to build up
a predominantly Christian party of his own, and previously re-
ceivedsomeJran.aiianrLThi1dh aid for his private organiza-
tions. (Page 3)
Watch Committee conclusion - Middle East: A deliberate
Initiation: of open hostilities in the Middle East is unlikely in
the immediate future, although the situation remains unstable
throughout the area. The Iraqi internal situation continues to
be potentially explosive and there are additional reports of plots
to overthrow the Qasim regime in the near future. Qasim is in
danger of becoming even more dependent on Communist support
inheintensygppwersiruggle.
4 Dec 58
DAILY BRIEF
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Tunisia: President Bourguiba's recent announcement
about buying up all foreign-owned farm lands may have been
motivated primarily by a desire to build up his domestic
prestige. He is currently on a tour of poverty-stricken
southern Tunisia, and he may have become convinced that
his popularity has declined. The announcement will add
to the fears of European landowners in Algeria who feel
that anything less than full integration of Algeria with
metropolitan France would place their property fin
jeopardy. (Page 4)
Morocco: The differences between moderates and left-
wing extremists within the dominant Istiglal party have
deepened and may ultimately lead to a breakup of the party.
Party leader Alla el-Fassi seems to have failed to form
a compromise cabinet which would replace the Balafrej gov-
ernment, whose resignation was announced on 3 December.
The King may have to assume a more direct role. He has
thus far hesitated to jeopardize his position thronah involve-
ment in the governmental crisis. (Rage 5)
Greece-Cyprus: The Greeks anticipate they will be
rebuffed by the UN on the Cyprus issue and the government
will try to divert public attention from this failure by a prop-
aganda campaign, marked by attacks on the United States.
Normally pro-American newspapers in Athens are already
denouncing the American attitude in the United Nations.
All-African Peoples' Conference: African nationalism
will receive another strong psychological boost when rep-
resentatives from.-nationalist parties and movements in inde-
pendent and dependent African territories meet in Accra from
5 to 12 December. The principal avowed purpose of this non-
governmental gathering--which appears likely to be heavily in-
fluenced by nationalist extremists and possibly pro-Communists
--is to prepare a :blueprint" for a "nonviolent revolution"
against colonialism and racial discrimination.
(Page 6)
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Indonesia: A 5 December meeting of President
Sukarno and key cabinet members may prove a turning
point in the contest for governmental control between the
army and political parties. Army chief Nasution is pressing
Sukarno to support the extension of martial law and to ap-
prove recommended changes expanding the army's role in
the cabinet and diplomatic fields.
(Page 8)
III. THE WEST
UN-Guinea: Guinea applied for UN membership on
/ 2 December. The Security Council will take action on
/ Guinea's application possibly as early as 8 December, with
0 General Assembly action likely on the same day. France
hopes to postpone Guinea's entry until next September, but
the Canadian UN delegation believes that any delay would
greatly harm the West's future relations with Africa.
(Page 9),
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LATE ITEM
*Colombia: President Lleras has declared a state of
seige throughout Colombia and arrested former dictator Rojas
as preventive measures against an expected coup attempt by
his supporters. The arrest will be a test of the loyalty of
the armed forces, in which Rojas is believed to %aye some
support. The Rojistas, however, may have trig.. tru provoke
the action as a means of touching off their oppoL tion move-
ment which they recently claimed was in i-nn nrhinnotari a Cino`n
to halt.
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Diplomats in Bonn Hint at Soviet Concessions
Soviet diplomats in Bonn are attempting to capitalize on
Moscow's Berlin proposals to stimulate interest among West
German opposition party leaders in disengagement, expanded
contacts with the East Germans, and bloc proposals for an all-
German confederation. In recent talks with Chairman 011enhauer
of the Social Democratic party and Erich Mende of the Free Dem-
ocrats, Soviet Ambassador Smirnov tried to convey an impres-
sion of Soviet flexibility, hinting that the recent notes on Ber-
lin would not be Moscow's last word if Western counterproposals
offered a basis for relaxing tensions in Europe. These moves
appear to be part of a broader Soviet effort to increase pres-
sure on the West for high-level talks on a general European
settlement in which Moscow would try to secure recognition of
the status quo in Eastern Europe.
The first secretary of the Soviet Embassy stated privately
that Khrushchev was using the notes on Berlin, which would prob-
ably be followed by further notes, to reppen East-West negotia-
tions looking toward demilitarization of Germany along the lines
of the Rapacki Plan. He said Moscow did not expect the West to
accept its terms and expected counterproposals since the West
could not agree to discuss Berlin as an isolated issue.
Moscow apparently hopes to use such hints of concessions
in return for West German withdrawal from NATO to encourage
Bonn opposition parties to challenge the Adenauer government's
basic foreign policy positions.
In an effort to establish an appearance of bipartisan policy
during the Berlin crisis, Chanpellor Adenauer met with opposi-
tion leaders 011enhauer and Mende on 1 December. They agreed
that an isolated solution of the Berlin problem was impossible
and that means should be sought to bring about broader negotia-
tions. It was also agreed that a united front internally was neces-
sary, and future meetings will be held to this end. There was,
however, no resolution of the basic differences in foreign policy.
--SEeRET--
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Ambassador Bruce feels that the Soviet approach will
encourage those elements in West Germany which support
various schemes for disengagement in central Europe as a
means of appeasing Moscow. He believes that considerable
public pressure will be generated in favor of reaching some
kind of accommodatiOn with Moscow through negotiations.
-SEffZET--
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II, ASIA-AFRICA
Former Lebanese President Seeks Arms From Iran
Former President Chamoun is attempting to obtain
Iranian assistance in developing a paramilitary force of
122000, to 15,000 youths in anticipation of renewed civil
strife, which he believes may begin within six months.
Chamoun's arms request may be in anticipation of new
parliamentary elections next spring. Chamoun requested
15,000 rifles and submachine guns and $450,000. Chamoun
has already organized a party which he says is national
in character, but which in fact is almost exclusively
Christian. The party already includes the well-disciplined
and well-organized paramilitary Christian Phalange led by
the cabinet minister Pierre Jumayyil. The anti-Nasir
antisectarian Social National party, also a strongly dis-
ciplined paramilitary group, cooperated with pro-Chamoun
forces during last summer's rebellion but has avoided com-
mitting itself to any alliance involving sectarian differences.
Chamoun and other anti-UAR elements received Iranian
and Turkish shipments of arms throughout the rebellion,
and small quantities have probably been landed secretly
along the Lebanese coast during the fall. A German mili-
tary instructor, employed by the Social National party last
summer, is apparently now training C amoun's paramilitary
group.
T0? 3ECRE
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Bourguiba's Expropriation Plan Arouses French
Tunisian President Bourguiba's surprise announcement
on 29 November that his government plans to purchase all
farm lands now held by non-Tunisians during the next
"three to four years" has drawn a vigorously hostile re-
action from French officials and from some of the 2,600
families of French origin in Tunisia likely to be directly
affected. Altogether, about 100,000 persons who have
retained French nationality are permanently domiciled
in Tunisia.
The counselor of the French Embassy in Tunis said
on 1 December that his government had already informed
the Tunisians that it would not "tolerate" the elimination of
the French farmers. He said their protection, alon_g with
that of other "productive" French members of the Tunisian
community, was the principal aim of France's "liberal"
program toward Tunisia. According to the counselor, many
settlers are talking of appealing to the French Army for
help if it is not forthcoming from the Paris government.
Bourguiba's current three-week tour of Tunisia's southern
provinces, where domestic elements hostile to his leadership
have always been strongest, may have convinced him that his
prestige has slipped seriously and could only be restored by a
dramatic and ultranationalistic gesture. His doubts that De
Gaulle can control the French Army and terminate the Algerian
conflict may also have helped precipitate the move.
The American Embassy in Tunis believes that even if
some loophole is left by which the settlers could continue to
use the land, Bourguiba's action is bound to have an unsettling
effect. This will be particularly true with respect to potential
foreign investors from whom Bourguiba has been seeking much-
needed capital. It will also increase the apprehension of French
landowners in Algeria that they would be subject to similar action
in an independent Algeria, and they can be expected to continue to
press for the complete intecyrAtion of Algeria into metropolitan
France.
-SEC-REZ
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Moroccan Government Crisis
The differences between moderate and left-wing factions
of the ruling Istiqlal party apparently have been intensified by
the futile attempt of Allal el-Fassi, the party's veteran leader,
to form a government to replace the Balafrej regime. El-
Fassi is reported to have included several left-wing leaders
in his proposed cabinet without clearing the list with the
present moderate premier, Ahmed Balafrej, who thereupon
refused to participate in the El-Fassi government. As a
result, El-Fassi is reported to be aligning himself with the
left wing, and the party may eventually split into two or more
political organizations.
Balafrej and the moderates still retain control over
party machinery, but the left wing can be expected to make
a strong bid during the Istiqlal congress in January to oust
him as secretary general.
King Mohamed V, who has maneuvered behind the scenes
in an effort to create a political party in competition with
Istiqlal, has hesitated to take a public position during the
prolonged governmental crisis, which has devolved largely
from the intra-Istiqlal struggle. He now may feel that he has
to intervene publicly in governmental affairs, thereby
jeopardizing the prestige of the throne, which is already under
attack from the pro-republic Istiqlal left wing.
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All-African People's Conference
The All-African Peoples' Conference which is to convene
in Accra, Ghana's capital, between 5 and 12 December will
provide African nationalism with another strong psychological
boost. It appears certain to be appreciably more inflammatory
and probably more stridently neutralist than was the meeting
of eight independent African states held last April, also under
the aegis of Ghana's ambitious Prime Minister Nkrumah.
According to conference organizers, invitations went
out to all "progressive" political parties and other organiza-
tions in both dependent and independent African territories
with the aim of assembling some 500 official delegates.
Fraternal delegates, representing sympathizing individuals and
groups outside Africa, and observers�including a delegation
from the USSR--have also been. invited.
The principal avowed purpose of the conference is to pre-
pare a "blueprint" and work out "Ghandi-like tactics and
strategy" to guide the African "nonviolent revolution" against
colonialism, racialism, and tribalism�terms of reference
which point to a conference focused primarily on sub-Saharan
Africa. Other topics on the provisional agenda include the
special problems of Africans in multiracial territories, the
"adjustment of artificial frontiers," and the "amalgamation
or federation" of independent African states.
The nongovernmental character of the conference and
anticipated preponderance of representatives from areas still
struggling to overthrow colonial rule will play into the hands
of nationalist and pro-Communist extremists. Nasir's UAR
appears to be readying a strong group, and the Afro-Asian
Solidarity Secretariat�despite basic hostility to the Accra
meeting as an unwelcome rival to its own Cairo-based
"peoples" movement--has announced plans to send a five-
member delegation, including nationals of the USSR and Com-
munist China. Many Jprominent moderate nationalists probably
will not attend, partly to avoid identification with what they be-
lieve will be minority positions.
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Moscow radio has already begun to exploit the con-
ference as a backdrop for its regular propaganda attacks
against Western "imperialism."
-SECRET.
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Possible Showdown Between Indonesian Army and Political
Parties
A showdown on the Indonesian Army's governmental
role, which has been gradually expanding at the expense
of political parties, may develop in a 5 December meeting
between President Sukarno and key cabinet officers. The
meeting has been announced as a discussion of ways to
achieve President Sukarno's onneppt of "guided democracy."
army chief Nasution is
prodding Sukarno to give strong support to the extension of
martial law and to his plans to broaden the army's participa-
tion in government. The meeting may also consider legal
measures to limit the activities of political parties.
The army, in addition to its broad powers under martial
law since March 1957, now has one cabinet post, is represented
in the National Council, and has assigned a ranking officer as
consul general in Singapore.
asserted that, beginning in January, they intend to place more
personnel in key executive, legislative, and diplomatic posts,
including all ambassadorships in Southeast Asia.
Strong opposition to the extension of martial law by some
leaders of the largest government party, the Indonesian Na-
tional party, could lead to the party's withdrawal from the
Djuanda cabinet. The outcome of the conflict may depend
largely on President Sukarno, who has so far apparently ap-
proved Nasution's reported plans for steering Indonesia be
tween the extreme Communist left and the extreme Moslem
right, but may fear a growing personal challenge from the
army chief.
-SECRET
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III. THE WEST
Guinea Applies for UN Membership
Guinea's formal presentation of its application for UN
membership to Secretary General Hammarskjold on 2 Decem-
ber makes any further delay:in UN action unlikely. Hammar-
skjold is unenthusiastic, but feels there is no way to avoid
calling a Security Council meeting, possibly on 8 December.
France hopes to postpone Guinea's membership by in-
ducing Western members on the Security Council to abstain
from voting, thereby withholding council endorsement of
Guinea's membership this year for lack of the required seven
affirmative votes. Thus far, only China is likely to join
France in not voting.
The Canadian UN deleption believes any "footdragging"
by the West would be a "catastrophic mistake" which would
prejudice future relations with Africa. The Canadians intend
to inform the French of the "absurdity" of their maneuver.
Although France has recourse to the veto to prevent
Guinea's entry, Paris seems unwilling at this time to take
such drastic ation,,
CONFIDENTIAL
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONF1DOIR'IAL
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