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December 4, 1958
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13.5(c) Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 I %or ZE�KIC-1- 3.3(h)(2) 4 December 1958 Copy No. C 61) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIY Q11% DCCUMNTNfl NO CHANGE IN r.I.P,8:1;. 1--IAN,:7iE,D TO: .rion"-'. DATE.T -TOP-SKR-ET- Approved for ielea-se7 10i0/-01/2-3 E0-29-98395Y, Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 -T.OP-S-EGRET- Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 , Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 VS-4 I 4 DECEMBER 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR promoting idea that its Berlin plan will lead to solution of German problem; many West Germans recep- tive to negotiations on bigger issues. 0 Khrushchev gives impression USSR may make some concessions on test suspension issue. II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon - Ex-President Chamoun seeking Iranian 'd in for mint,- rr; ra- military orce. Tunisia - Bourguiba proposal to buy up all foreign-owned farm land moti- vated by concern over domestic pres- tige. Deepening split in Moroccan Istiqlal party may force King to risk inter- vention in political crisis. �Greece anticipates UN rebuff on Cy- prus issue; press denounces Ameri- can attitude. �All-African Peoples' Conference to meet in Accra from 5 to 12 December. 0 Indonesia - Contest between army and political parties for control of govern- ment may be nearing showdown. III. THE WEST �Guinea applies for UN membership; Canada favors prompt admission. LATE ITEM Colombia - State of seige declared; former dictator Rojas arrested to forestall expected coup attempt. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 *me CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 4 December V.-)58 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-Berlin - West Germany: Soviet diplomats have hinted to West German opposition party leaders that the USSR's plan for West Berlin would be followed by other proposals, all of which are designed to reopen negotiations looking toward demilitarization of Germany along lines of the Rapacki Plan. Adenauer and opposition party leaders have already agreed that an isolated solution of the Berlin issue is not possible and that broader negotiations should be sought. The US Embassy in Bonn feels that the 27 November Soviet note on Berlin will greatly encourage those elements in West Germany who favor some accommodation with Moscow. (Page 1) *USSR... -Nuclear Tests: From an extensive conversa- tion with Ithrushchev on 2 December, Senator Humphrey gained the impression that the USSR is seeking agreement on test suspension and is prepared to make some concessions, but that the Soviets do not expect to reach agreement on surprise attack. Ithrushchev professed great concern over American proposals to permit nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. While indicating a preference for a ban with no exceptions, Khrushchev said there should at least be a limit on such ex- plosions with provision for an equal number for each side. Warushchev agreed that provisions for cessation of tests and controls should be embodied in one document and said that he has so instructed his delegation on 28 November. TOP SECRET 4ATI;ZZIgrici7;;/"E20li01/23-E'65E65 SwF Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 - . Watch Committee conclusion - Berlin: There is no assurance that the USSR will wilt for the full six months' period mentioned in the Soviet note on 27 November be- fore transfering to the East Germans control over Allied traffic to Berlin or undertaking harassment of some other sort. The Soviet note, however, suggests that the USSR intends to keep the Berlin problem in the political arena for at least the immediate future rc) Watch Committee cqnclusion - Taiwan Strait: The Chinese Communists retain the capability to initiate major military action in the offshore islands area without prior warning. However, the Communists do not appear to intend, in the immediate future, to terminate the self-imposed restriction against interference with resupply operations on alternate days,. II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon: Former President Chamoun is seeking Iranian assistance to develop a paramilitary force of "12,000 to 15,000 youths" in anticipation of new civil strife which he believes may begin in six months. Chamoun has been seeking to build up a predominantly Christian party of his own, and previously re- ceivedsomeJran.aiianrLThi1dh aid for his private organiza- tions. (Page 3) Watch Committee conclusion - Middle East: A deliberate Initiation: of open hostilities in the Middle East is unlikely in the immediate future, although the situation remains unstable throughout the area. The Iraqi internal situation continues to be potentially explosive and there are additional reports of plots to overthrow the Qasim regime in the near future. Qasim is in danger of becoming even more dependent on Communist support inheintensygppwersiruggle. 4 Dec 58 DAILY BRIEF TOP sE� AAPprovea for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998-395 A 11 Sol Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 A. 1111 Tunisia: President Bourguiba's recent announcement about buying up all foreign-owned farm lands may have been motivated primarily by a desire to build up his domestic prestige. He is currently on a tour of poverty-stricken southern Tunisia, and he may have become convinced that his popularity has declined. The announcement will add to the fears of European landowners in Algeria who feel that anything less than full integration of Algeria with metropolitan France would place their property fin jeopardy. (Page 4) Morocco: The differences between moderates and left- wing extremists within the dominant Istiglal party have deepened and may ultimately lead to a breakup of the party. Party leader Alla el-Fassi seems to have failed to form a compromise cabinet which would replace the Balafrej gov- ernment, whose resignation was announced on 3 December. The King may have to assume a more direct role. He has thus far hesitated to jeopardize his position thronah involve- ment in the governmental crisis. (Rage 5) Greece-Cyprus: The Greeks anticipate they will be rebuffed by the UN on the Cyprus issue and the government will try to divert public attention from this failure by a prop- aganda campaign, marked by attacks on the United States. Normally pro-American newspapers in Athens are already denouncing the American attitude in the United Nations. All-African Peoples' Conference: African nationalism will receive another strong psychological boost when rep- resentatives from.-nationalist parties and movements in inde- pendent and dependent African territories meet in Accra from 5 to 12 December. The principal avowed purpose of this non- governmental gathering--which appears likely to be heavily in- fluenced by nationalist extremists and possibly pro-Communists --is to prepare a :blueprint" for a "nonviolent revolution" against colonialism and racial discrimination. (Page 6) 4 Dec 58 DAILY BRIEF �T-0P�SECRET V74 (approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998gg/ A yr � � Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 A. 4400 Indonesia: A 5 December meeting of President Sukarno and key cabinet members may prove a turning point in the contest for governmental control between the army and political parties. Army chief Nasution is pressing Sukarno to support the extension of martial law and to ap- prove recommended changes expanding the army's role in the cabinet and diplomatic fields. (Page 8) III. THE WEST UN-Guinea: Guinea applied for UN membership on / 2 December. The Security Council will take action on / Guinea's application possibly as early as 8 December, with 0 General Assembly action likely on the same day. France hopes to postpone Guinea's entry until next September, but the Canadian UN delegation believes that any delay would greatly harm the West's future relations with Africa. (Page 9), (A� LATE ITEM *Colombia: President Lleras has declared a state of seige throughout Colombia and arrested former dictator Rojas as preventive measures against an expected coup attempt by his supporters. The arrest will be a test of the loyalty of the armed forces, in which Rojas is believed to %aye some support. The Rojistas, however, may have trig.. tru provoke the action as a means of touching off their oppoL tion move- ment which they recently claimed was in i-nn nrhinnotari a Cino`n to halt. 4 Dec 58 DAILY BRIEF iv A,Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395, // ii Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 %so L THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet Diplomats in Bonn Hint at Soviet Concessions Soviet diplomats in Bonn are attempting to capitalize on Moscow's Berlin proposals to stimulate interest among West German opposition party leaders in disengagement, expanded contacts with the East Germans, and bloc proposals for an all- German confederation. In recent talks with Chairman 011enhauer of the Social Democratic party and Erich Mende of the Free Dem- ocrats, Soviet Ambassador Smirnov tried to convey an impres- sion of Soviet flexibility, hinting that the recent notes on Ber- lin would not be Moscow's last word if Western counterproposals offered a basis for relaxing tensions in Europe. These moves appear to be part of a broader Soviet effort to increase pres- sure on the West for high-level talks on a general European settlement in which Moscow would try to secure recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe. The first secretary of the Soviet Embassy stated privately that Khrushchev was using the notes on Berlin, which would prob- ably be followed by further notes, to reppen East-West negotia- tions looking toward demilitarization of Germany along the lines of the Rapacki Plan. He said Moscow did not expect the West to accept its terms and expected counterproposals since the West could not agree to discuss Berlin as an isolated issue. Moscow apparently hopes to use such hints of concessions in return for West German withdrawal from NATO to encourage Bonn opposition parties to challenge the Adenauer government's basic foreign policy positions. In an effort to establish an appearance of bipartisan policy during the Berlin crisis, Chanpellor Adenauer met with opposi- tion leaders 011enhauer and Mende on 1 December. They agreed that an isolated solution of the Berlin problem was impossible and that means should be sought to bring about broader negotia- tions. It was also agreed that a united front internally was neces- sary, and future meetings will be held to this end. There was, however, no resolution of the basic differences in foreign policy. --SEeRET-- 4 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 ��ei�e' N���1 Ambassador Bruce feels that the Soviet approach will encourage those elements in West Germany which support various schemes for disengagement in central Europe as a means of appeasing Moscow. He believes that considerable public pressure will be generated in favor of reaching some kind of accommodatiOn with Moscow through negotiations. -SEffZET-- 4 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 'vnri crrincT Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 yore Noe II, ASIA-AFRICA Former Lebanese President Seeks Arms From Iran Former President Chamoun is attempting to obtain Iranian assistance in developing a paramilitary force of 122000, to 15,000 youths in anticipation of renewed civil strife, which he believes may begin within six months. Chamoun's arms request may be in anticipation of new parliamentary elections next spring. Chamoun requested 15,000 rifles and submachine guns and $450,000. Chamoun has already organized a party which he says is national in character, but which in fact is almost exclusively Christian. The party already includes the well-disciplined and well-organized paramilitary Christian Phalange led by the cabinet minister Pierre Jumayyil. The anti-Nasir antisectarian Social National party, also a strongly dis- ciplined paramilitary group, cooperated with pro-Chamoun forces during last summer's rebellion but has avoided com- mitting itself to any alliance involving sectarian differences. Chamoun and other anti-UAR elements received Iranian and Turkish shipments of arms throughout the rebellion, and small quantities have probably been landed secretly along the Lebanese coast during the fall. A German mili- tary instructor, employed by the Social National party last summer, is apparently now training C amoun's paramilitary group. T0? 3ECRE 4 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 lose \Iry Bourguiba's Expropriation Plan Arouses French Tunisian President Bourguiba's surprise announcement on 29 November that his government plans to purchase all farm lands now held by non-Tunisians during the next "three to four years" has drawn a vigorously hostile re- action from French officials and from some of the 2,600 families of French origin in Tunisia likely to be directly affected. Altogether, about 100,000 persons who have retained French nationality are permanently domiciled in Tunisia. The counselor of the French Embassy in Tunis said on 1 December that his government had already informed the Tunisians that it would not "tolerate" the elimination of the French farmers. He said their protection, alon_g with that of other "productive" French members of the Tunisian community, was the principal aim of France's "liberal" program toward Tunisia. According to the counselor, many settlers are talking of appealing to the French Army for help if it is not forthcoming from the Paris government. Bourguiba's current three-week tour of Tunisia's southern provinces, where domestic elements hostile to his leadership have always been strongest, may have convinced him that his prestige has slipped seriously and could only be restored by a dramatic and ultranationalistic gesture. His doubts that De Gaulle can control the French Army and terminate the Algerian conflict may also have helped precipitate the move. The American Embassy in Tunis believes that even if some loophole is left by which the settlers could continue to use the land, Bourguiba's action is bound to have an unsettling effect. This will be particularly true with respect to potential foreign investors from whom Bourguiba has been seeking much- needed capital. It will also increase the apprehension of French landowners in Algeria that they would be subject to similar action in an independent Algeria, and they can be expected to continue to press for the complete intecyrAtion of Algeria into metropolitan France. -SEC-REZ 4 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 Ise Moroccan Government Crisis The differences between moderate and left-wing factions of the ruling Istiqlal party apparently have been intensified by the futile attempt of Allal el-Fassi, the party's veteran leader, to form a government to replace the Balafrej regime. El- Fassi is reported to have included several left-wing leaders in his proposed cabinet without clearing the list with the present moderate premier, Ahmed Balafrej, who thereupon refused to participate in the El-Fassi government. As a result, El-Fassi is reported to be aligning himself with the left wing, and the party may eventually split into two or more political organizations. Balafrej and the moderates still retain control over party machinery, but the left wing can be expected to make a strong bid during the Istiqlal congress in January to oust him as secretary general. King Mohamed V, who has maneuvered behind the scenes in an effort to create a political party in competition with Istiqlal, has hesitated to take a public position during the prolonged governmental crisis, which has devolved largely from the intra-Istiqlal struggle. He now may feel that he has to intervene publicly in governmental affairs, thereby jeopardizing the prestige of the throne, which is already under attack from the pro-republic Istiqlal left wing. 4 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 *el \wive All-African People's Conference The All-African Peoples' Conference which is to convene in Accra, Ghana's capital, between 5 and 12 December will provide African nationalism with another strong psychological boost. It appears certain to be appreciably more inflammatory and probably more stridently neutralist than was the meeting of eight independent African states held last April, also under the aegis of Ghana's ambitious Prime Minister Nkrumah. According to conference organizers, invitations went out to all "progressive" political parties and other organiza- tions in both dependent and independent African territories with the aim of assembling some 500 official delegates. Fraternal delegates, representing sympathizing individuals and groups outside Africa, and observers�including a delegation from the USSR--have also been. invited. The principal avowed purpose of the conference is to pre- pare a "blueprint" and work out "Ghandi-like tactics and strategy" to guide the African "nonviolent revolution" against colonialism, racialism, and tribalism�terms of reference which point to a conference focused primarily on sub-Saharan Africa. Other topics on the provisional agenda include the special problems of Africans in multiracial territories, the "adjustment of artificial frontiers," and the "amalgamation or federation" of independent African states. The nongovernmental character of the conference and anticipated preponderance of representatives from areas still struggling to overthrow colonial rule will play into the hands of nationalist and pro-Communist extremists. Nasir's UAR appears to be readying a strong group, and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Secretariat�despite basic hostility to the Accra meeting as an unwelcome rival to its own Cairo-based "peoples" movement--has announced plans to send a five- member delegation, including nationals of the USSR and Com- munist China. Many Jprominent moderate nationalists probably will not attend, partly to avoid identification with what they be- lieve will be minority positions. SECRET 4 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 %se Moscow radio has already begun to exploit the con- ference as a backdrop for its regular propaganda attacks against Western "imperialism." -SECRET. 4 Dec 58 CFNTRAI INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 T-v r 2-1 Pr, Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 Norr� Possible Showdown Between Indonesian Army and Political Parties A showdown on the Indonesian Army's governmental role, which has been gradually expanding at the expense of political parties, may develop in a 5 December meeting between President Sukarno and key cabinet officers. The meeting has been announced as a discussion of ways to achieve President Sukarno's onneppt of "guided democracy." army chief Nasution is prodding Sukarno to give strong support to the extension of martial law and to his plans to broaden the army's participa- tion in government. The meeting may also consider legal measures to limit the activities of political parties. The army, in addition to its broad powers under martial law since March 1957, now has one cabinet post, is represented in the National Council, and has assigned a ranking officer as consul general in Singapore. asserted that, beginning in January, they intend to place more personnel in key executive, legislative, and diplomatic posts, including all ambassadorships in Southeast Asia. Strong opposition to the extension of martial law by some leaders of the largest government party, the Indonesian Na- tional party, could lead to the party's withdrawal from the Djuanda cabinet. The outcome of the conflict may depend largely on President Sukarno, who has so far apparently ap- proved Nasution's reported plans for steering Indonesia be tween the extreme Communist left and the extreme Moslem right, but may fear a growing personal challenge from the army chief. -SECRET 4 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 "1,NATT"ITIVItIT'7 A Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 �1�10 III. THE WEST Guinea Applies for UN Membership Guinea's formal presentation of its application for UN membership to Secretary General Hammarskjold on 2 Decem- ber makes any further delay:in UN action unlikely. Hammar- skjold is unenthusiastic, but feels there is no way to avoid calling a Security Council meeting, possibly on 8 December. France hopes to postpone Guinea's membership by in- ducing Western members on the Security Council to abstain from voting, thereby withholding council endorsement of Guinea's membership this year for lack of the required seven affirmative votes. Thus far, only China is likely to join France in not voting. The Canadian UN deleption believes any "footdragging" by the West would be a "catastrophic mistake" which would prejudice future relations with Africa. The Canadians intend to inform the French of the "absurdity" of their maneuver. Although France has recourse to the veto to prevent Guinea's entry, Paris seems unwilling at this time to take such drastic ation,, CONFIDENTIAL 4 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 ',4ad THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director CONF1DOIR'IAL Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998395 y *114-0-12-SECRET-- 4.1* g � : , -, 7 ,