Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
January 27, 2020
Document Release Date: 
January 30, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 11, 1958
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15777320].pdf482.53 KB
/4/Z. (/// r4l/// for Release: 2020/01/23 ///1 Approvec998400 TOP SECRET.. //. 'WO), t 9 11 December 1958 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Copy No. C t; 0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 0 0 . , 4 / / 4 . . . ,4 . BULLETIN DA k. ill. DOCUMENT NO N;() CHANGE IN CLASS. ; . FAIC LASS: 7 17: D CLAI.:=-; CHAH.-.::,D Tfl: .9, 1/71,Z17///fr/ZZZApproved TOP SECRET for Release: 2020/01/23 � c 029984o ozwizzizziw z:7J. Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400IUVLL Alttik Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 SECRET *11 DECEMBER 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR introduces draft nuclear-test- control system at Geneva talks; ma- jor decisions to be subject to veto. IL ASIA-AFRICA Iraqi Government permitting charges of US plotting to go unchallenged. India reluctant to accept Soviet offer to train 500 steelworkers. III. THE WEST Venezuela - President-elect Betan- court planning coalition government of parties committed to seeking larger revenue from US firms. Guatemala - Rightist groups form front with aim of forcing Ydigoras out of office. Approved for for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 7x %Ili Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 z L-) q? CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 11 December 1958 DAILY BRIEF L THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR--Geneva talks: The Soviet delegate to the test- cessation talks has introduced a text of "basic provisions" for a control system in an effort to create the impression of progress and to counter Western charges that the USSR is refusing to negotiate. Under the Soviet plan, all major decisions in the proposed control commission would be sub- ject to a veto by any of the three "founder states" in the commission; disagreements would be referred to the UN Security Council. (Page I) Watch Committee conclusion�Berlin: There is no assurance that the USSR will wait for the full six months' period mentioned in the Soviet note of 27 November before transferring to the East Germans control over Allied traf- fic to Berlin or undertaking harassment of some other sort. Current Soviet efforts in the Berlin situation appear directed primarily toward forcing counterproposals and negotiations with the West. Watch Committee conclusion�Taiwan: The Chinese Communists retain the capability to initiate major military action in the offshore islands area without prior warning. However, the Communists do not appear to intend, in the immediate future, to terminate the self-imposed restriction against interference with resupply operations on alternate days. /1 TOP SECRET AApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 1,Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 TOP II. ASIA-AFRICA Watch Committee conclusion�Middle East: A deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities in the Middle East is un- likely in the immediate future, although the situation remains unstable throughout the area. The Iraqi and Jordanian internal situations continue to be explosive, and there are reports of plots to overthrow the regimes in both countries. The Israeli- Syrian border situation is also explosive, and Israeli retaliatory raids into Syria may occur if Israel is not satisfied with the UN Security Counc re additional serious bor- der incidents. Iraq: The pneral atmosDhere in Baghdad appears to be tense but quiet. a growing ap- prehension by the UAR that the upshot of the coup attempt will be new o � portunities for the Communists in Iraq. Id e Qasim regime is permitting the impression that the /, United States rather than the UAR is the "foreign power" behind , recent plotting to go unchallenged. A Baghdad newspaper has /7: repeated UAR and Soviet propaganda chres that the United / , / ; ,, States was involved. "1 0, India-USSR: The Soviet Union--in further exploitation of its construction of the Bhilai steel mill--has offered to pay all costs of training 500 skilled Indian steelworkers in the Soviet Union. New Delhi is reluctant to accept the offer. An Indian official states that 60 workers recently trained in the USSR have shown susceptibility to Soviet propaganda. The training of Indian work- ers in the Soviet Union would assist the Communist-controlled All-India Trade Union Congress in its vigorous drive to gain con- trol of the country's steelworkers. (Page 3) II Dec 58 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET AApproved for Release: 2020T61/23 CO2998400 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 %Ivo �Ted' SLCRET zdA III. THE WEST Venezuela: President-elect Romulo Betancourt--in line with pre-election statements--apparently plans a coal- ition government which will include the two other major parties along with his own leftist Democratic Action party. The Communists will probably be excluded. All three coal- ition parties are committed to seek social reforms and a larger share of profits from US-owned oil companies. Betancourt may consider establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc. Long-standing antagonism between Betancourt and the military raises the possibility of a coup attempt. However, plottine at this time is not believed to hp in an arivanepel ai-acrp �,11.14.1,,U1114.1.4; OU v er al riguList, punuccia groups 1141N e WilleU in a ''national anti-Communist front" to attempt to force Pres- ident Ydigoras out of office through a series of planned public demonstrations. While Ydigoras lacks an effective political machine, he is believed to retain the backing of the army. An armed clash between the police an4 demonstrators would fur- ther weaken his position, however. (Page 4) 11 Dec 58 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET jApproved for Release: 2020/61/23 CO2998400 o Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 valoyof I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet Union Introduces "Basic Provisions" for Test- Control System The long, detailed Soviet text of "basic provisions" for a control system to supervise a nuclear-test cessation prob- ably is designed to create the impression of substantial progress toward agreement before the Christmas recess and undercut Western charges that the USSR refuses to dis- cuss details. The plan, introduced on 9 December at the Geneva talks, is intended to appear comprehensive in scope, but it fails to include the guarantees suggested previously by the West. The USSR insists that all substantive decisions of the control "commission" be subject to a veto by any of the three "founder states" in the commission and that disputes be re- ferred to the UN Security Council. The plan also fails to meet Western requirements on other major issues. It does not provide for a truly international organization, requiring instead that all personnel at the control posts, except for one or two senior officials, be nationals of the country in which the post is located. Soviet delegate Tsarapkin contended that his proposals were based on the report of the Geneva technical talks last summer or, in some cases, on the views expressed by the Soviet expert. Tsarapkin also alleged that these "basic draft provisions" were sufficient and that all other details should be covered in agreements drafted by the organization itself. Tsarapkin's insistence that the Soviet control plan is de- rived from the Geneva technical report will probably be used by Soviet propaganda as a basis for charges that a Western re- jection is another retreat from previous positions and agree- ments. While the USSR may be willing to compromise on such points as the make-up, privileges, and immunities of control post personnel, and on communication facilities for the control organ, it is unlikely to drop its insistence on unanimity on all important questions. CONFIDEN T1A L II Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 Page 1 "law, Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 _ /ow NNW In a press conference on 9 December, Tsarapkin firmly rejected majority voting, stating that Moscow "cannot accept an automatic two-to-one majority against it." However, he did tell the Western delegates that it should be possible to find a compromise defining which questions re .uire un ni which ones need only a simple majority. CONFIDENTIAL 11 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 Nal II. ASIA-AFRICA USSR Offers to Train 500 Indian Steelworkers The USSR apparently is attempting to exploit India's need for skilled steelworkers to aid the Communist-controlled All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) in its drive to gain control of labor in this vital industry. Moscow officially has offered to pay all the costs of training 500 skilled workers in the Soviet Union for the government steel plants under construc- tion in India. Despite its acceptance of a $132,000,000 loan for the con- struction of the Bhilai steel mill, New Delhi is reluctant to accept the Soviet offer because it fears that the workers will be influenced by Soviet propaganda, as was a group of 60 such workers who recently returned from the USSR. Engineers sent previously to the Soviet Union have proved less suscepti- ble, to Soviet propaganda. India, however, may decide it must accept the Soviet offer, since the first units of the 13hilai and Rourkela steel mills have already begun operation and the re- maining units�as well as the Durgapur mill--are to be in op- eration by 1961. Moscow probably believes Soviet training of the workers would help the AITUC to displace the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), which is controlled by the Congress party, as the leading Indian labor federation. AITUC, already the dominant union in the steel industry, has increased its strength in recent years, and this trend appears likely to con- tinue. CONFIDENTIAL 11 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 *NW' NS vied III. THE WEST Political Tensions Rising Again in Guatemala Uncertainty and tension are mounting in Guatemala in the aftermath of the bitterly contested 7 December municipal elec- tions in which the leftist but non-Communist Revolutionary party (PR) won control of the Guatemala City government. Rightist political groups blame their defeat on President Ydigoras' refusal to outlaw the PR, and they have joined in a "national anti-Communist front" dedicated to ousting him. These groups, which include some disillusioned former sup- porters of Ydigoras, have planned a series of public demon- strations at which they intend to accuse the President of know- ingly furthering Communist objectives. This charge, though unwarranted, is given credence in rightist circles because of Ydigoras' temporary alliance with pro-Communist groups dur- ing his struggle for the presidency in October t9'57 and because of his refusal, after becoming President last March, to crush organized labor and take drastic action against the Communists. The PR, probably Guatemala's strongest single party, was a prime Communist target, but last June strongly anti- Communist leaders consolidated their control and have since been systematically purging Communists and pro-Communists from the party. Extreme rightists, however, still regard the PR as being Communist. Ydigoras appears to be concerned over the prospect of demonstrations against him on the Communist issue, but he is believed to have decided for the present against suppressing them. If demonstrators should get out of control and bloodshed result, however, his regime could be seriously weakened. Ydigoras has no effective political machine of his own, but he is still believed to have the backing of the military, and this remains his most important asset. CONFIDENTIAL 11 Dec 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 Page 4 Itgro, Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 t....fiva� WEAN 1 IbiL, %WI Name THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400 " , 1 4 v 4 I,,,/,,,i ,..., 1 , J... I /7 /7"4 // 4/ 0 , fo'' �,ii 4/ 40.40,2 07 7 ,,,���,,,,##/$ ,zz 4/ ;7 14� / -TOP-S-EGRET- I 0,,,,,ZWZMZZZA0A p p r o v e d for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2998400ymtzmrnm do