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January 27, 2020
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January 30, 2020
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December 31, 1958
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15777451].pdf633.09 KB
Approved for 1TOP SLKT 66/ // 31 December 1958 3.3(h)(2) Copy No. C CENTRAL IN'TELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO Ci-IJACE IN CI ASC. CHANC.:!':1) TO HEX flEV:EW DATE r � TOP SECRET /Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011W Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 � Oak, r ri Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 Approved for Release: 720/01/23 7000011 31 DECEMBER 1958 L THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet planning chief Kuzmin maybe new presidium member. II. ASIA-AFRICA Iraq - Power struggle intensifies between pro- UAR elements and Communists whose influence is in- creasing; Qasim's position remains equivocal. Iranian Government instructs Washington military attach�o es- tablish close relations with Israeli officials. Britain indicates willingness to ac- cept any Cyprus solution provided base rights are protected; Greek- Turkish talks get under way. Japan - Kishi eases political crisis by acceding to demands by dissidents In his own party. India planning to increase aid to Tibetans resisting Chinese Commu- nist rule. CD Ceylon - Bandaranaike government's position further weakened by failure to take firm action against strikes. Cambodian military figure, Dap Chhuon, asks American support in plan to overthrow Sihanouk regime. III. THE WEST Cuba - Government commander in Santiago may be planning to bargain with rebels. Fighting continues in Las Villas Province. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 1 Ur 43LA�ICL 1 kA6 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 31 December 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC been elected to the party presidium at the central commit- tee meeting this month. A TASS broadcast on 27 Decem- ber included his name in proper alphabetic order among members of the presidium attending a session of the Rus- sian Republic Supreme Soviet. Kuzmin was transferred to the important planning job in May 1957 from a post on the executive staff of the party secretariat, and his elec- tion to the presidium would be logical, although there is no other evidence supporting it. Watch Committee conclusion--Berlin: The Berlin situation remains potentially dangerous and may develop into a crisis at any time although current Soviet efforts still appear directed primarily toward forcing counter- proposals and negotiations with the West. Watch Committee conclusion--Taiwan Strait: There were no significant developments noted during the past \.......A o week which reflect on Chinese Communist intentions re- garding the Taiwan Strait situation_ )00 II, ASIA-AFRICA Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: A delib- erate initiation of large-scale hostilities in the Middle East AApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 C0300001 id rz r 4Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 (o 0 ur ptt,h1:, 1 Sid is unlikely in the immediate future. The situation, however, remains precarious throughout the area. � In Iraq, Communist influence and activity, unless checked, continue to pose the threat of eventual Communist control of overnment. Iraq: Nasir's attack on Arab Communists has intensified the struggle in Iraq between pro-UAR elements and Communists whose influence is increasingly pervasive. Prime Minister Qasim's position remains equivocal. Army leaders have been meeting in Baghdad, ostensibly to consider promotions, while the bulk of the army's armored enuipment has been assembled near ihe anital (Page 1) Cyprus: Greek-Turkish conversations on Cyprus are now getting under way in Ankara. London indicates it will agree to any final settlement devised by Athens and Ankara, providing that the retention of British bases is assured. Britain's decision to carry out controversial provisions of its plan for interim self-government on the island could coin- lica e the negotiations. (Page 2) Japan: Prime Minister Kishi has acceded to demands by dissidents in his governing Liberal-Democratic party for more cabinet and party posts and postponement of the election of party president. Kishi's concessions ease the political crisis tempo- rarily, but continued party factionalism and instability are ex- pected to weaken Kishi's leadership further and make his future uncertain. (Page 3) 31 Dec 58 DAILY BRIEF "TOP SECRET '/ AApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011r 11 M WA ,AApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 . ""Tilr'"VCCItrrn India - Communist China: India apparently plans to in- crease its covert support of Tibetan resistance activities. Communist China has already protested Indian activities, and probably will respond to any increased Indian effort by adopting a more unyielding position on border disputes and possibly by sending additional patrols into the disputed areas. (Page 4) (Map) Ceylon: The Bandaranaike government's position, seri- ously weakened by the recent allegations of a coup plot im- plicating the prime minister, is being further damaged by a series of leftist-led urban strikes beginning on 18 December with which the government has not (yet dealt firmly. iolitical tensions are likely to increase with more strike activity by the left and further consideration of coup plans by rightist elements. (Page 5) Cambodia: Dap Chhuon, powerful anti-Communist war lord in western Cambodia, is seeking support from the United States for a plan to overthrow the Sihanouk regime. His plan would also involve support from Thailand and South Vietnam. Chhuon, like several other conservative Cambodian leaders, Is alarmed by growing Communist influence in the government. (Page 6) III. THE WEST Cuba: While fighting continues around the capital of Las Vilfas Province, the rebel forces besieging Santiago In Oriente province are being reinforced by other rebel columns. General Cantillo, government commander in Oriente, has pulled ,outlying garrisons back to Santiago; his apparent refusal to engage the rebels stipvsst7 that he may be planningto bargain with them. /Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011, / A Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 A N...." A La A-JN......116.1....A A I. THE 'COMMUNIST BLOC No Back-up Material. IL ASIA-AFRICA Iran Seeking Closer Relations With Israel Iran and Israel apparently are working on an informal agree- ment to exchange information. The problems and uncertainties relating to the new regime in Iraq have created a situation where close collaboration could be of mutual benefit. Israel and Turkey have also established closer ties. Iranian relations with Israel have been quietly improving over a period of several years. Diplomatic relations have not been established primarily because of Iran's desire not to irritate the Arabs, bill Israel has been purchasing Iranian oil, Iranians have visited Israel as official guests, Iranian newspaper articles favor- able to Israel have appeared, and in early 1958 Iran requested Switzerland to protect Iranian interests in Israel. An official Israeli trade representative, whose instructions probably go be- yond the mere conduct of commercial relations, has resided in Tehran for over a year. TOP SECRET 31 Dec 58 f"Ck.ITD Al IkITCI I in.norc DI II I CTIkl Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 Noe Noe British Foreign Office Views on Cyprus Settlement London will probably accept any plan for a final Cyprus settlement devised by Athens and Ankara in the conversations on guaranteed independence getting under way in Ankara. The parties have already agreed to convene a tripartite conference with Britain if these talks succeed in reducing their differences. Final agreement will depend largely on the ability of the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers to convince their respective gov- ernments of the desirability of making concessions. A .British Foteign 'Office Official_ said on ,29 December that he believed the British cabinet would accept any plan agreed to by Athens and Ankara provided certain requirements are met. The most crucial point--retention of British bases--has already been assured by both Greece and Turkey, and provisions to guard against a Communist take-over would presumably be in- cluded in any plan. The Foreign Office official stated that in January London intends to promulgate controversial provisions of its interim self-government plan for the island, particularly establish- ment of separate Turkish municipal governments. This action could antagonize the Greeks enough to jeopardize the talks. However, London's recent conciliatory gestures�public modifi- cation of its stand on partition and commutation of eight death sentences--suggest, that it may delay implementation as long as agreement appears possible. SECRET 31 Dec 58 e'Ck�IT'D A I IkITCI I le"�Ckle`C DI II I ETlkl Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 Kishi Surrenders to Party Dissidents Japanese Prime Minister Kishi, in an attempt to avoid a rupture in his governing Liberal-Democratic party and the possible fall of his government, has yielded to demands for a major reshuffle of cabinet and party posts which will give party dissidents greater power in governmental and party af- fairs. He has also agreed to postpone the party's presiden- tial election. Although this will give the dissidents more time to strengthen their organization, Kishi's re-election still seems prolYable. These concessions will ease the current political crisis and remove the immediate threat to Kishi's position as prime minister. His prestige and power, however, have been fur- ther reduced by this retreat. In November he submitted to Socialist terms for ending the parliamentary crisis over;the bill to strengthen police powers. The success of the current dissident movement will en- courage similar moves against Kishi in the future. He prob- ably will be forced into additional compromises which will further erode his power, limit the effectiveness of his gov- ernment, and possibly shorten his tenure as prime minister. NTIAL 31 Dec 58 CPKITD A I 11�ITIPI I in=kirc RI II I CTIKI Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 Agokt. Agiik Sino- Indian Border' Disputed areas HONG TAIWAN KONG Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 +.0 A %La A Nee' *ire India Apparently to Increase Support for Tibetan Resistance Movement India apparently plans to increase its covert financial sup- port to refugee Tibetan resistance leaders based in India. the Indian overnment now fully realizes that Communist China's actions In Tibet pose a serious threat to India and that it is consider- ing ways to help the Tibetans. approach the United States for assistance, e Indian Government would present no obstacles to such a move. India's attitude toward Peiping has cooled considerably dur- ing the past year because of China's procrastination on settle- ment of the Tibetan-lbdian boundaries, its continued publication of maps showing parts of India as Chinese territory, and its attacks on Yugoslavia and endorsement of the Hungarian ex- ecutions. While New Delhi is reluctant to damage its relations with Peiping, it has allowed Tibetan resistance leaders to carry on political activities in India despite two Communist protests in 1958, and growing concern over Peiping's intentions suggests that India will expand its efforts to limit Chinese power In Tibet. Prtme Minister Nehru made his first official visit to Bhutan in September to emphasize his concern with Chinese activ- ity along India's northern border. Should Peiping learn of Indian financial aid to the Tibetan rebels, it would probably not make a public protest because of its desire to maintain a semblance of friendly relations as called for by the Bandung Conference, but it would almost certainly take an even harder line toward New Delhi. This could be manifested by refusal to discuss border demarcation, by more aggresbive patrolling into disputed areas claimed by India, and by increasing efforts.' to expand Chinese influence in Nepal and Bhutan. 31 Dec Dec 58 a".1711.1-rri Al 11,11.1 I 11/"��1. 1/"C fli II I ielr116.1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 %-/J. V1 1 L., L.4 11 I I 4-11-4 'NW Immo' Labor Unrest Growing in Ceylon The Bandaranaike government's position, already seri- ously weakened by the recent allegations of a conservative coup plot implicating the prime minister, is being further damaged by a series of leftist-led urban strikes with which the government has not yet dealt firmly. While Bandaranaike's 30 December decision to take personal charge of the strike negotiations and place Governor General Goonetilleke in charge of the port situation indicates an awareness of the need to halt the wave of strikes, the government does not appear to have a well conceived policy to replace its recent wavering tactics in dealing With the unions. If the strike situation is not brought under control by the government, the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj party (LSSP)--Which is behind most of the strikes--may expand the work stoppages, although fear of alienating the public is likely to cause it to stop short of a general strike. The economic confusion and increased political tension caused by the strikes may stimulate further consideration by rightist elements of plans for an eventual coup. The agitation began on 18 December with a strike by about 3,000 LSSP-led port workers who were subsequently joined by a Communist port union. The government's will- ingness to yield to the strikers' demands apparently en- couraged other unions, and strikes have spread to petroleum and bank employees and are threatened by employees of Colombo's principal business firms and of the island's na- tionalized bus line. Such strikes Will further disrupt Ceylon's important foreign trade activities and cause increased infla- tionary pressures. CONFIDENTIAL 31 Dec 58 t"CAITII A! IkITCI I Ir'�_eklf"G 13111 I CT11.1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 Nary Coup Planning Against Sihanouk Government Brigadier General Chhuon Mochulpic (Dap Chhuon), mili- tary governor of Siem Reap Province in western Cambodia, is seeking US support for a plan to oust Crown Prince Sihanouk from power and replace his neutralist regime with a strongly anti-Communist government. He hopes for additional support from South Vietnam and Thailand in the form of menacing mili- tary demonstrations on Cambodia's borders. Chhuon, who con- trols the palace guard in Phnom Penh in addition to three bat- talions in the field, believes if such a pretext were furnished he could stage a coup. Dap Chhuon has long been critical of Sihanouk's accommo- dation with the Sib-Soviet bloc but has hoped the policy would change. He now feels that Cambodia's domestic situation is deteriorating rapidly because of increasing Communist influence in the government. His alarm is shared by other conservative Cambodian leaders, but as yet there apparently has been no effective coalescence of internal opposition to Sihanouk. Dap Chhuon's aims would almost certainly draw sympathetic response from the Thai and Vietnamese governments, both of which are convinced that Sihanouk is a menace and must be re- moved. However, any move against the Phnom Penh regime-- unless quickly consummated�would run the risk that Sihanouk would ask for Chinese Communist military intervention on his behalf. SECRET 31 Dec 58 r=kITD A I IkIT=1 I in=kirp ru III PTIKI Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 Page 6 ApproveCFfO.�riReTeia7e7:: M17670 1 /2 3 C03000011 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director �tie't01'HaevLfh4th� Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011 TOP -SECRET- / izzirmjyrnmjrzzApprovTOP SECRET '4 ed for Release: 2020/01/23 C03000011