CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/12/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03000011
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: December 31, 1958

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31 December 1958
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Copy No. C
CENTRAL
IN'TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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31 DECEMBER 1958
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet planning chief Kuzmin maybe
new presidium member.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq - Power struggle intensifies
between pro- UAR elements and
Communists whose influence is in-
creasing; Qasim's position remains
equivocal.
Iranian Government instructs
Washington military attach�o es-
tablish close relations with Israeli
officials.
Britain indicates willingness to ac-
cept any Cyprus solution provided
base rights are protected; Greek-
Turkish talks get under way.
Japan - Kishi eases political crisis
by acceding to demands by dissidents
In his own party.
India planning to increase aid to
Tibetans resisting Chinese Commu-
nist rule.
CD
Ceylon - Bandaranaike government's
position further weakened by failure
to take firm action against strikes.
Cambodian military figure, Dap
Chhuon, asks American support in
plan to overthrow Sihanouk regime.
III. THE WEST
Cuba - Government commander in
Santiago may be planning to bargain
with rebels.
Fighting continues in Las Villas
Province.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
31 December 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
been elected to the party presidium at the central commit-
tee meeting this month. A TASS broadcast on 27 Decem-
ber included his name in proper alphabetic order among
members of the presidium attending a session of the Rus-
sian Republic Supreme Soviet. Kuzmin was transferred
to the important planning job in May 1957 from a post on
the executive staff of the party secretariat, and his elec-
tion to the presidium would be logical, although there is
no other evidence supporting it.
Watch Committee conclusion--Berlin: The Berlin
situation remains potentially dangerous and may develop
into a crisis at any time although current Soviet efforts
still appear directed primarily toward forcing counter-
proposals and negotiations with the West.
Watch Committee conclusion--Taiwan Strait: There
were no significant developments noted during the past
\.......A o week which reflect on Chinese Communist intentions re-
garding the Taiwan Strait situation_
)00
II, ASIA-AFRICA
Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: A delib-
erate initiation of large-scale hostilities in the Middle East
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is unlikely in the immediate future. The situation, however,
remains precarious throughout the area. �
In Iraq, Communist influence and activity, unless checked,
continue to pose the threat of eventual Communist control of
overnment.
Iraq: Nasir's attack on Arab Communists has intensified
the struggle in Iraq between pro-UAR elements and Communists
whose influence is increasingly pervasive. Prime Minister
Qasim's position remains equivocal.
Army leaders have been meeting in Baghdad, ostensibly
to consider promotions, while the bulk of the army's armored
enuipment has been assembled near ihe anital
(Page 1)
Cyprus: Greek-Turkish conversations on Cyprus are
now getting under way in Ankara. London indicates it will
agree to any final settlement devised by Athens and Ankara,
providing that the retention of British bases is assured.
Britain's decision to carry out controversial provisions of
its plan for interim self-government on the island could coin-
lica e the negotiations.
(Page 2)
Japan: Prime Minister Kishi has acceded to demands by
dissidents in his governing Liberal-Democratic party for more
cabinet and party posts and postponement of the election of party
president. Kishi's concessions ease the political crisis tempo-
rarily, but continued party factionalism and instability are ex-
pected to weaken Kishi's leadership further and make his future
uncertain. (Page 3)
31 Dec 58
DAILY BRIEF
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India - Communist China: India apparently plans to in-
crease its covert support of Tibetan resistance activities.
Communist China has already protested
Indian activities, and probably will respond to any increased
Indian effort by adopting a more unyielding position on border
disputes and possibly by sending additional patrols into the
disputed areas.
(Page 4) (Map)
Ceylon: The Bandaranaike government's position, seri-
ously weakened by the recent allegations of a coup plot im-
plicating the prime minister, is being further damaged by a
series of leftist-led urban strikes beginning on 18 December
with which the government has not (yet dealt firmly. iolitical
tensions are likely to increase with more strike activity by
the left and further consideration of coup plans by rightist
elements. (Page 5)
Cambodia: Dap Chhuon, powerful anti-Communist war
lord in western Cambodia, is seeking support from the United
States for a plan to overthrow the Sihanouk regime. His plan
would also involve support from Thailand and South Vietnam.
Chhuon, like several other conservative Cambodian leaders,
Is alarmed by growing Communist influence in the government.
(Page 6)
III. THE WEST
Cuba: While fighting continues around the capital of
Las Vilfas Province, the rebel forces besieging Santiago
In Oriente province are being reinforced by other rebel
columns. General Cantillo, government commander in
Oriente, has pulled ,outlying garrisons back to Santiago;
his apparent refusal to engage the rebels stipvsst7 that he
may be planningto bargain with them.
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I. THE 'COMMUNIST BLOC
No Back-up Material.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iran Seeking Closer Relations With Israel
Iran and Israel apparently are working on an informal agree-
ment to exchange information. The problems and uncertainties
relating to the new regime in Iraq have created a situation where
close collaboration could be of mutual benefit. Israel and Turkey
have also established closer ties.
Iranian relations with Israel have been quietly improving over
a period of several years. Diplomatic relations have not been
established primarily because of Iran's desire not to irritate the
Arabs, bill Israel has been purchasing Iranian oil, Iranians have
visited Israel as official guests, Iranian newspaper articles favor-
able to Israel have appeared, and in early 1958 Iran requested
Switzerland to protect Iranian interests in Israel. An official
Israeli trade representative, whose instructions probably go be-
yond the mere conduct of commercial relations, has resided in
Tehran for over a year.
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British Foreign Office Views on Cyprus Settlement
London will probably accept any plan for a final Cyprus
settlement devised by Athens and Ankara in the conversations
on guaranteed independence getting under way in Ankara. The
parties have already agreed to convene a tripartite conference
with Britain if these talks succeed in reducing their differences.
Final agreement will depend largely on the ability of the Greek
and Turkish foreign ministers to convince their respective gov-
ernments of the desirability of making concessions.
A .British Foteign 'Office Official_ said on ,29 December that
he believed the British cabinet would accept any plan agreed to
by Athens and Ankara provided certain requirements are met.
The most crucial point--retention of British bases--has already
been assured by both Greece and Turkey, and provisions to
guard against a Communist take-over would presumably be in-
cluded in any plan.
The Foreign Office official stated that in January London
intends to promulgate controversial provisions of its interim
self-government plan for the island, particularly establish-
ment of separate Turkish municipal governments. This action
could antagonize the Greeks enough to jeopardize the talks.
However, London's recent conciliatory gestures�public modifi-
cation of its stand on partition and commutation of eight death
sentences--suggest, that it may delay implementation as long
as agreement appears possible.
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Kishi Surrenders to Party Dissidents
Japanese Prime Minister Kishi, in an attempt to avoid
a rupture in his governing Liberal-Democratic party and the
possible fall of his government, has yielded to demands for
a major reshuffle of cabinet and party posts which will give
party dissidents greater power in governmental and party af-
fairs. He has also agreed to postpone the party's presiden-
tial election. Although this will give the dissidents more
time to strengthen their organization, Kishi's re-election still
seems prolYable.
These concessions will ease the current political crisis
and remove the immediate threat to Kishi's position as prime
minister. His prestige and power, however, have been fur-
ther reduced by this retreat. In November he submitted to
Socialist terms for ending the parliamentary crisis over;the
bill to strengthen police powers.
The success of the current dissident movement will en-
courage similar moves against Kishi in the future. He prob-
ably will be forced into additional compromises which will
further erode his power, limit the effectiveness of his gov-
ernment, and possibly shorten his tenure as prime minister.
NTIAL
31 Dec 58
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Agokt. Agiik
Sino- Indian Border'
Disputed areas
HONG TAIWAN
KONG
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India Apparently to Increase Support for Tibetan Resistance
Movement
India apparently plans to increase its covert financial sup-
port to refugee Tibetan resistance leaders based in India.
the Indian
overnment now fully realizes that Communist China's actions
In Tibet pose a serious threat to India and that it is consider-
ing ways to help the Tibetans.
approach the United States for assistance,
e Indian Government would present no obstacles to such
a move.
India's attitude toward Peiping has cooled considerably dur-
ing the past year because of China's procrastination on settle-
ment of the Tibetan-lbdian boundaries, its continued publication
of maps showing parts of India as Chinese territory, and its
attacks on Yugoslavia and endorsement of the Hungarian ex-
ecutions. While New Delhi is reluctant to damage its relations
with Peiping, it has allowed Tibetan resistance leaders to
carry on political activities in India despite two Communist
protests in 1958, and growing concern over Peiping's intentions
suggests that India will expand its efforts to limit Chinese power
In Tibet. Prtme Minister Nehru made his first official visit to
Bhutan in September to emphasize his concern with Chinese activ-
ity along India's northern border.
Should Peiping learn of Indian financial aid to the Tibetan
rebels, it would probably not make a public protest because of
its desire to maintain a semblance of friendly relations as
called for by the Bandung Conference, but it would almost
certainly take an even harder line toward New Delhi. This could
be manifested by refusal to discuss border demarcation, by more
aggresbive patrolling into disputed areas claimed by India, and
by increasing efforts.' to expand Chinese influence in Nepal and
Bhutan.
31 Dec Dec 58
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'NW Immo'
Labor Unrest Growing in Ceylon
The Bandaranaike government's position, already seri-
ously weakened by the recent allegations of a conservative
coup plot implicating the prime minister, is being further
damaged by a series of leftist-led urban strikes with which
the government has not yet dealt firmly. While Bandaranaike's
30 December decision to take personal charge of the strike
negotiations and place Governor General Goonetilleke in charge
of the port situation indicates an awareness of the need to halt
the wave of strikes, the government does not appear to have
a well conceived policy to replace its recent wavering tactics
in dealing With the unions. If the strike situation is not
brought under control by the government, the Trotskyite
Lanka Sama Samaj party (LSSP)--Which is behind most of
the strikes--may expand the work stoppages, although fear
of alienating the public is likely to cause it to stop short of
a general strike. The economic confusion and increased
political tension caused by the strikes may stimulate further
consideration by rightist elements of plans for an eventual
coup.
The agitation began on 18 December with a strike by
about 3,000 LSSP-led port workers who were subsequently
joined by a Communist port union. The government's will-
ingness to yield to the strikers' demands apparently en-
couraged other unions, and strikes have spread to petroleum
and bank employees and are threatened by employees of
Colombo's principal business firms and of the island's na-
tionalized bus line. Such strikes Will further disrupt Ceylon's
important foreign trade activities and cause increased infla-
tionary pressures.
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Coup Planning Against Sihanouk Government
Brigadier General Chhuon Mochulpic (Dap Chhuon), mili-
tary governor of Siem Reap Province in western Cambodia,
is seeking US support for a plan to oust Crown Prince Sihanouk
from power and replace his neutralist regime with a strongly
anti-Communist government. He hopes for additional support
from South Vietnam and Thailand in the form of menacing mili-
tary demonstrations on Cambodia's borders. Chhuon, who con-
trols the palace guard in Phnom Penh in addition to three bat-
talions in the field, believes if such a pretext were furnished
he could stage a coup.
Dap Chhuon has long been critical of Sihanouk's accommo-
dation with the Sib-Soviet bloc but has hoped the policy would
change. He now feels that Cambodia's domestic situation is
deteriorating rapidly because of increasing Communist influence
in the government. His alarm is shared by other conservative
Cambodian leaders, but as yet there apparently has been no
effective coalescence of internal opposition to Sihanouk.
Dap Chhuon's aims would almost certainly draw sympathetic
response from the Thai and Vietnamese governments, both of
which are convinced that Sihanouk is a menace and must be re-
moved. However, any move against the Phnom Penh regime--
unless quickly consummated�would run the risk that Sihanouk
would ask for Chinese Communist military intervention on his
behalf.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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