CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/01/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03000014
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 5, 1959

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5 January 1959
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CENTRAL
3.3(h)(2)
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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5 JANUARY 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Supplementary GMIC Statement on
2 January Soviet lunar probe.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq.. Street clashes between Com-
munists and nationalists continue;
some armed forces personnel re-
portedly participate in Communist
demonstration.
Morocco - Anti-Istiqlal dissident
elements step up activities.
Pakistan - Finance Minister Shoaib's
program to place finances on sound
basis still faces difficulties despite
cancellation of submarine purchases.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
5 January 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Supplemental GMIC Statement on Soviet lunar probe:
The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee made the fol-
lowing statement at 1600 EST, 4 January 1959:
The claimed success of the Soviet lunar probe which was
launched from the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range (TTMTR)
at 1141 EST, 2 January 1959,
There is no reason to doubt the Soviet statements that
the vehicle passed within:about,4,660 Miles of the moon
at 2159 EST on 3 January, and there is evidence that it is now
becoming a man-made planet of the sun.
This is the first successful lunar probe in a Soviet pro-
gram which probably included at least three previous firings.
These firings occurred on 23 September, 11 October, and 4
December 1958.
The variety and extent of scientific data reportedly being
collected enroutp is indicative of a very sophisticated space
laboratory.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: Street clashes between Communists and national-
ists are continuing. The Communists have been staging
street demonstrations, apparently as a show of strength to
intimidate the populace. The Communists have been making
efforts recently to increase their support in the Iraqi armed
forces, and a Commu-
nist demonstration on 2 January included 200 members of the
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4110 Nor eJL.A....116L-4
army and air force. Several recent reports suggest that
Premier Qasim's speech on 6 January, Iraqi Army Day,
will be an impottant statement of foreign and domestic
policy, and may include announcements on government re-
organization, cabinet changes, and Iraq's intention to with-
draw from the Baghdad Pact. (Page 1)
Morocco:: Anti-Istiqlal dissident elements, consisting
mainly of Berber tribesmen in the Rif and Middle Atlas
regions of northern Morocco, appear, to have stepped up
both the pace and boldness of their activities. Troops sus-
pect of sympathizing with the local population in the areas
most affected by Berber violence have been replaced by
other royal army elements.
(Page 3)
Pakistan: garachi's apparent. decision to cancel its
planned purchases of three submarines from the United
Kingdom indicates the new government is giving priority to
Finance Minister Shoaib's polities to place the country's
finances on a sound basis' Shoaib informed US officials in
December that President yub had given him virtual veto
powers over government expenditures, and that he is de-
termined to eliminate deficit financing by reducing govern-
ment expenditures and raising taxes on the heretofore priv-
ileged agricultural sector. It is not certain, however, that
Ayub will continue to support Shoaib in the face of pressures
from other government officials for increased spending.
(Page 5)
5 Jan 59
DAILY BRIEF i i
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
No Back-up Material.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Developments in Iraq
Street clashes between Communist and nationalist groups
in Iraq are continuing. The Communists have been staging deril-
onstrations, apparently in a show of strength to intimidate the
nationalists and other potential sources of opposition. They ap-
pear to be gaining support in the Iraqi armed forces.
the Commuilist party had staged a demonstration ,
that day in Baghdad honoring 29 of its members killed in recent
clashes with the nationalists, in which 200 army and air force
personnel and about 3,000 women took part. The nationalists
are reported to have canceled plans for a show of armed strength
in Baghdad on the same day but the threat of increasingly seri-
ous clashes remains. The Turkish ambassador to Iraq stated
recently that the senior Iraqi officers are mostly moderate na-
tiongists, while the younger officers are largelypro-Nasir. He
claimed that there are few Communist officers, but that their
number is growing and that Premier Qasim's influence in the army
is declining. He said he believes Communists among the senior
officers include Air Force chief Awqati, and Farid Dhia, chief
of operations on the Army General Staff.
Several recent reports suggest that Premier Qasina's
speech on 6 January, Iraqi Army Day, will be an important
statement of foreign and domestic policy and may include an-
nouncement of cabinet changes, reallocation of authority within
the government, and possibly the intention to withdraw from
the Baghdad Pact.
he
demor lizauon 0/ nationalist cabinet ministers Foreign Minis-
ter Iomard and Minister of State Rikabi, and their awareness
that their removal from the cabinet might be, imminent. An-
other indicatibn of a possible cabinet change is the return to
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Baghdad on 26 December, from self-imposed absence in Bei-
rut, of Social Affairs Minister Brigadier Nail Talib, who re-
portedly plans to resign. Talibis prolonged stay in Beirut for
treatment of his heart troubleis believed to have been induced
in part by his opposition to Qasim's policies.
Foreign Minister
Jomard had againf attempted to resign on 26 December, and that
Jomard and at least four other nationalist cabinet members were
considering resignation in the hope of persuading Qasim to re-
duce his reliance on the Communists. Qasim is attemptingi to
stall these maneuvers, however, while the nationalist ministOrs
appear wary of forcing a showdown with Qasim.
5 Jan 59
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Moroccan Dissidents Step Up Activities
/Predominantly Berber elements in northein Morocco
host]. e to the dominant Istiqlal party--and especially to its
left wing which took over the premiership and other important
posts in the cabinet invested on 24 December--appear to have
stepped up both the pace Mid the boldness of their dissident ac-
tivities. Istiqlal's principal newspaper, Al Alam, has in recent
days carried an increasing number of artra.es concerning
violent incidents, and on 2 January it asserted that "many at-
tacks" have been perpetrated against party offices and person-
nel as part of b. foreign-supported plot against the part y\
Concerned but apparently undaunted by this increasingly
serious security problem, Premier Ibrahim's government has
so far pursued an uncompromising, even provocative, course
which could precipitate an early showdown between the contend-
ing forces. Immediately after its investiture a former Berber
governor of an outlying prdvince, who was forcibly removed and
arrested in January 1957 for defying orders from Rabat and
leading an abortive anti-Istiqlal revolt, was finally brought to
trial. This led in turn to accusations that the chief "plotter"
in the 1957 affair--which Istiqlal leaders claim was supported
by France--was another and much more important Berber lead-
er, Lahcen Lyoussi, a partisan of King Mohamed V and a crown
counselor until his resignation was forced two weeks ago. The
King, however, appears to have been fully aware of Lyoussfs
complicity in the affair and, moreover, to have deliberately
permitted him to leave Rabat following his resignation and to
take refuge among his tribal followers in the Middle Atlas
region. This action, coupled with the King's apparent protection
of two other anti-Istiqlal leaders implicated in the present Berber
dissidence, may hasten a reckoning between Mohamed V and
republic-minded Istiqlal extremist_g
Napanwhile, elements of the royal army suspected of
sympathizing with the local populations in the disaffected areas
have been replaced by other, non-indigenous troops,
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vivid
are 'reports that a decision has been taken to suppress the
dissidents by force. however, the King, who still controls
the army through Chief of Staff Crown Prince Moulay Hassan,
has thus far endeavored to keep the use of troops to a minimum
and would probably be reluctant to sanction drastic military ac-
tion except as a last resort. If a major tribal revolt should de-
velop, it is doubtful that the army could suppress it without as-
sistance.-1
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Pakistani Government Apparently Placing High Priority on
Economic Progress
Karachi's apparent decision to cancel its planned purchase
of three submarines from the United Kingdom indicates that
the new government is giving priority to Finance Minister
Shoaib's policies aimed at placing the country's finances on a
sound basis. This support increases the prospects for econom-
ic progress in Pakistan, but it is not certain that Ayub will con-
tinue to back Shoaib in the face of pressures from other govern-
ment officials for additional spending. The decision on the sub-
marines was forecast by Shoaib in December when he informed
US officials that President Ayub had given him virtual veto
power over government expenditures:7
Shoaib, one of Pakistan's ablest economists) believes that
the first task facing the government is to halt inflation by end-
ing deficit financing. He is determined to reduce government
expenditures and increase tax revenues enough to accomplish
this. He plans to raise taxes on the heretofore privileged
agricultural sector, and told US officials on 2 January that the
government's crackdown on income tax violators had already
yielded $50,000,000 in back taxes and should reduce tax eva-
sion in the future. If the government succeeds in halting infla-
tion, the competitive position of Pakistan's exports will be con-
siderably improved, thereby easing the foreign exchange short-
age.
The government has yet to make a basic decision, however,
on the policies it will follow to increase agricultural and indus-
trial production. There is a conflict between those in the gov-
ernment who are inclined to favor a controlled economy and those
--led by Shoaib--who favor placing primary reliance on incen-
tives to increase production. While the final decision on this is-
sue is likely to be a compromise, the extent to which the govern-
ment has followed Shoaib's advice to date suggests that basically
sound policies will be adopted.
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vrirs,
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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