CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/01/05

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03000014
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RIPPUB
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U
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12
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February 25, 2020
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2020
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Publication Date: 
January 5, 1959
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ZZ/ZZ/Z////////////// Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 * � 3.5(c) 5 January 1959 Copy No. C CENTRAL 3.3(h)(2) INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN r OCJMFNTNO 110 r,"4,4NI;F: '2' C; :r-NGE.11 iVz:VIEVi DA i E: et, Gioi_it) A' U. T1/1.4441.0 n EWER �TOP SECRET� jrnm,71"MWZAApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C030000147/// /////i/jr,jr, Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 AIM% 1371ttlittr 1000* Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 11100 5 JANUARY 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Supplementary GMIC Statement on 2 January Soviet lunar probe. II. ASIA-AFRICA Iraq.. Street clashes between Com- munists and nationalists continue; some armed forces personnel re- portedly participate in Communist demonstration. Morocco - Anti-Istiqlal dissident elements step up activities. Pakistan - Finance Minister Shoaib's program to place finances on sound basis still faces difficulties despite cancellation of submarine purchases. rrnr, err.Dvrr Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 - Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 Nal CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 5 January 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Supplemental GMIC Statement on Soviet lunar probe: The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee made the fol- lowing statement at 1600 EST, 4 January 1959: The claimed success of the Soviet lunar probe which was launched from the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range (TTMTR) at 1141 EST, 2 January 1959, There is no reason to doubt the Soviet statements that the vehicle passed within:about,4,660 Miles of the moon at 2159 EST on 3 January, and there is evidence that it is now becoming a man-made planet of the sun. This is the first successful lunar probe in a Soviet pro- gram which probably included at least three previous firings. These firings occurred on 23 September, 11 October, and 4 December 1958. The variety and extent of scientific data reportedly being collected enroutp is indicative of a very sophisticated space laboratory. II. ASIA-AFRICA Iraq: Street clashes between Communists and national- ists are continuing. The Communists have been staging street demonstrations, apparently as a show of strength to intimidate the populace. The Communists have been making efforts recently to increase their support in the Iraqi armed forces, and a Commu- nist demonstration on 2 January included 200 members of the TOP SECRE71 ,Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 4110 Nor eJL.A....116L-4 army and air force. Several recent reports suggest that Premier Qasim's speech on 6 January, Iraqi Army Day, will be an impottant statement of foreign and domestic policy, and may include announcements on government re- organization, cabinet changes, and Iraq's intention to with- draw from the Baghdad Pact. (Page 1) Morocco:: Anti-Istiqlal dissident elements, consisting mainly of Berber tribesmen in the Rif and Middle Atlas regions of northern Morocco, appear, to have stepped up both the pace and boldness of their activities. Troops sus- pect of sympathizing with the local population in the areas most affected by Berber violence have been replaced by other royal army elements. (Page 3) Pakistan: garachi's apparent. decision to cancel its planned purchases of three submarines from the United Kingdom indicates the new government is giving priority to Finance Minister Shoaib's polities to place the country's finances on a sound basis' Shoaib informed US officials in December that President yub had given him virtual veto powers over government expenditures, and that he is de- termined to eliminate deficit financing by reducing govern- ment expenditures and raising taxes on the heretofore priv- ileged agricultural sector. It is not certain, however, that Ayub will continue to support Shoaib in the face of pressures from other government officials for increased spending. (Page 5) 5 Jan 59 DAILY BRIEF i i TOP SECRET ( J;;;;;"roved "G"ITJI"';';..--i6/567657/16CriCE-61-7 A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 ,4011..1`6.0. 11.11-4 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC No Back-up Material. II. ASIA-AFRICA Developments in Iraq Street clashes between Communist and nationalist groups in Iraq are continuing. The Communists have been staging deril- onstrations, apparently in a show of strength to intimidate the nationalists and other potential sources of opposition. They ap- pear to be gaining support in the Iraqi armed forces. the Commuilist party had staged a demonstration , that day in Baghdad honoring 29 of its members killed in recent clashes with the nationalists, in which 200 army and air force personnel and about 3,000 women took part. The nationalists are reported to have canceled plans for a show of armed strength in Baghdad on the same day but the threat of increasingly seri- ous clashes remains. The Turkish ambassador to Iraq stated recently that the senior Iraqi officers are mostly moderate na- tiongists, while the younger officers are largelypro-Nasir. He claimed that there are few Communist officers, but that their number is growing and that Premier Qasim's influence in the army is declining. He said he believes Communists among the senior officers include Air Force chief Awqati, and Farid Dhia, chief of operations on the Army General Staff. Several recent reports suggest that Premier Qasina's speech on 6 January, Iraqi Army Day, will be an important statement of foreign and domestic policy and may include an- nouncement of cabinet changes, reallocation of authority within the government, and possibly the intention to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact. he demor lizauon 0/ nationalist cabinet ministers Foreign Minis- ter Iomard and Minister of State Rikabi, and their awareness that their removal from the cabinet might be, imminent. An- other indicatibn of a possible cabinet change is the return to �T-OP SECRET 5 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 ".1.115� Baghdad on 26 December, from self-imposed absence in Bei- rut, of Social Affairs Minister Brigadier Nail Talib, who re- portedly plans to resign. Talibis prolonged stay in Beirut for treatment of his heart troubleis believed to have been induced in part by his opposition to Qasim's policies. Foreign Minister Jomard had againf attempted to resign on 26 December, and that Jomard and at least four other nationalist cabinet members were considering resignation in the hope of persuading Qasim to re- duce his reliance on the Communists. Qasim is attemptingi to stall these maneuvers, however, while the nationalist ministOrs appear wary of forcing a showdown with Qasim. 5 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 Page 2 1IIMINT11IPTV Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 Moroccan Dissidents Step Up Activities /Predominantly Berber elements in northein Morocco host]. e to the dominant Istiqlal party--and especially to its left wing which took over the premiership and other important posts in the cabinet invested on 24 December--appear to have stepped up both the pace Mid the boldness of their dissident ac- tivities. Istiqlal's principal newspaper, Al Alam, has in recent days carried an increasing number of artra.es concerning violent incidents, and on 2 January it asserted that "many at- tacks" have been perpetrated against party offices and person- nel as part of b. foreign-supported plot against the part y\ Concerned but apparently undaunted by this increasingly serious security problem, Premier Ibrahim's government has so far pursued an uncompromising, even provocative, course which could precipitate an early showdown between the contend- ing forces. Immediately after its investiture a former Berber governor of an outlying prdvince, who was forcibly removed and arrested in January 1957 for defying orders from Rabat and leading an abortive anti-Istiqlal revolt, was finally brought to trial. This led in turn to accusations that the chief "plotter" in the 1957 affair--which Istiqlal leaders claim was supported by France--was another and much more important Berber lead- er, Lahcen Lyoussi, a partisan of King Mohamed V and a crown counselor until his resignation was forced two weeks ago. The King, however, appears to have been fully aware of Lyoussfs complicity in the affair and, moreover, to have deliberately permitted him to leave Rabat following his resignation and to take refuge among his tribal followers in the Middle Atlas region. This action, coupled with the King's apparent protection of two other anti-Istiqlal leaders implicated in the present Berber dissidence, may hasten a reckoning between Mohamed V and republic-minded Istiqlal extremist_g Napanwhile, elements of the royal army suspected of sympathizing with the local populations in the disaffected areas have been replaced by other, non-indigenous troops, SECRET 5 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 vivid are 'reports that a decision has been taken to suppress the dissidents by force. however, the King, who still controls the army through Chief of Staff Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, has thus far endeavored to keep the use of troops to a minimum and would probably be reluctant to sanction drastic military ac- tion except as a last resort. If a major tribal revolt should de- velop, it is doubtful that the army could suppress it without as- sistance.-1 SEERE-T- 5 San 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 %wow Pakistani Government Apparently Placing High Priority on Economic Progress Karachi's apparent decision to cancel its planned purchase of three submarines from the United Kingdom indicates that the new government is giving priority to Finance Minister Shoaib's policies aimed at placing the country's finances on a sound basis. This support increases the prospects for econom- ic progress in Pakistan, but it is not certain that Ayub will con- tinue to back Shoaib in the face of pressures from other govern- ment officials for additional spending. The decision on the sub- marines was forecast by Shoaib in December when he informed US officials that President Ayub had given him virtual veto power over government expenditures:7 Shoaib, one of Pakistan's ablest economists) believes that the first task facing the government is to halt inflation by end- ing deficit financing. He is determined to reduce government expenditures and increase tax revenues enough to accomplish this. He plans to raise taxes on the heretofore privileged agricultural sector, and told US officials on 2 January that the government's crackdown on income tax violators had already yielded $50,000,000 in back taxes and should reduce tax eva- sion in the future. If the government succeeds in halting infla- tion, the competitive position of Pakistan's exports will be con- siderably improved, thereby easing the foreign exchange short- age. The government has yet to make a basic decision, however, on the policies it will follow to increase agricultural and indus- trial production. There is a conflict between those in the gov- ernment who are inclined to favor a controlled economy and those --led by Shoaib--who favor placing primary reliance on incen- tives to increase production. While the final decision on this is- sue is likely to be a compromise, the extent to which the govern- ment has followed Shoaib's advice to date suggests that basically sound policies will be adopted. SECRET 5 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 Approved-tfriRelevarZer7. 2t 0 70701/21 C03000014 vrirs, THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000014 rzffifr ziwitzt/t