CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/01/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03000020
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 13, 1959

� - Approved for Release. 2020/02/21 C03000020 3.5(c)
11.10`
3.3(h)(2)
13 January 1959
Copy No. C 63
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
D3CLIMI: III. NO.
NO CHANE Cl CL AE Y
:DE1.Arir ED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: -rtbf
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AU-1-H: FR7 1,4
DATE.
TOP SECRET
fil
fo'r Release: SO4'20/0S/1j-Cf)3f4H:f2C: Xf/717/7/ZZA
T11
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
.',I- 11G-G-MC
04,4,
41. WI. aft m. Ank
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
�CrINDE'71
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
13 JANUARY 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow proposes resumption of sur-
prise-attack talks and insists they
must be linked to disarmament.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Japan - Premier Kishi's position fur-
ther weakened by refusal of party dissi-
dents to participate in new cabinet. 0
Taiwan - Ten-percent cut in military
forces under consideration.
South Korea - Police harass Korean
visitors to US Embassy.
Indonesia - USSR may have offered
new $125,000,000 loan.
Afghanistan - USSR to train more
Afghan military personnel, extend other
aid. 0
0 Sudan - Abboud has not fulfilled prom-
ises to act on major issues; may be
tempted by Soviet aid offers.
0 London increasing small commando
forces supporting Sultan of Muscat
against Omani rebels.
III. THE WEST
0 Paraguay - Armed exiles massing on
Argentine border.
-SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
4004/ Liriitrciii
Nwo
11
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
6) 13 January 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Surprise=attack talks: The Soviet proposal to reconvene
the technical talks in Geneva on measures to prevent sur-
prise attack reaffirms Moscow's 28 November omnibus plan
which links this problem to disarmament measures. Moscow
probably believes this action will make a favorable public
contrast to Western insistence that the results of the pre-
vious sessions be evaluated before setting a specific date for
reconvening. (Page 1)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Japan: The refusal of major dissident leaders in the rul-
ing Liberal-Democratic party to participate in the new cabinet
and party executive line-up announced on 12 January has fur-
ther weakened Prime Minister Kishi's position. The party and
cabinet reshuffle is only a superficial resolution of intraparty
strife, and pressure will be maintained on Kishi to accede fur-
ther to dissident demands. (Page 2)
Taiwan:
serious consideration is being given to�
a 10.-rptrcent cut in the strength of the Nationalist Army, Navy,
and Air Force. The motivation stems partly from the need to
hold down military spending and from the reduced numbers of
Taiwanese available for conscript service in the coming year)
(Page 3)
4;0";1;13;17Wii-20i20i70i2/21 C0300I0E0
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
1116# Nue,
South Korea: Eplice are subjecting the US Embassy in
Seoul to close surveillance and are harassing its Korean vis-
itors. The action may be designed to limit the embassy's
knowledge of the repressive police measures now being taken
against the opposition Democratic party. It may also be re-
lated to Rhee's reported belief that the US is providing finan-
cial support to the Democrats-4
USSR-Indonesia: new $125,000,000 Soviet loan has re-
portedly been offered Indonesia, but President Sukarno is
said to be reluctant to accept. The Indonesian finance minis-
ter is urging acceptance of at least part. The first Soviet
credit totaling $100,000,000 was accepted by Indonesia in Fe
ruary 1958 and has been almost fully allocated by Djakarta
for economic project (Page 4)
Afghanistan-USSR: pecific agreements reached between
the USSR and Afghanistan during the early January Moscow
visit of Foreign Minister Naim include training of additional
Afghan military personnel in the USSR, institution of jet air-
craft service to Afghanistan, increased medical aid, and im-
proved facilities for commerce (Page 5)
(Map)
Sudan: khe Abboud government has not fulfilled its prom-
ises of providing more dynamic action on the major issues
confronting the Sudan. No agreement with the UAR on Nile
waters distribution is in sight, cotton marketing practices
have not been reformed, and the cabinet's military members
are unwilling to seek help from experienced civilians. Despite
its apparent desire to maintain a pro-Western orientation, the
government will be strongly tempted by aid offers carried by a
Soviet trade delegation due to arrive on 22 January, especially
if they would enable Abboud to claim significant progress on the
Nile waters development problem9 (Page 6)
13 Jan 59
DAILY BRIEF
TOP SECRET
11
AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C01000020 f
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
%di yr 3.CA.,11C,
Britain-Oman: .11 the Sultan of Muscat's inconclusive
18-month campaign against the Omani rebels, the latest de-
velopment is London's decision to increase the 100-man corn
mando-type force with which it supports the Sultan's British-
led native troops. It probably hopes to eliminate the rebels
before summer seriously handicaps operations.
Saudi Arabia appears to be sending more aid to the
(Page 8) (Map)
rebelsg (
III. THE WEST
Paraguay: Reports of large numbers of armed exiles
massed on the Argentine border have seriously disturbed
the government. The exiles, mainly left-wing opposition ele-
ments, have six
aircraft as well as expectations of support by some army ele-
ments and organized civilian groups within Paraguay. Two
smaller exile invasion efforts failed last year.
13 Jan 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
4Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 6.13000(120r
VA
A
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
ma IV 1-d {II IC11, 1.4
Name
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
New Soviet Note on Surprise Attack Talks
The Soviet call to reconvene the technical conference in
Geneva on measures to prevent surprise attack underlines
Moscow's effort to place the onus on the West for the stale-
mate in the pre-Christmas sessions. The note charges that the
Western rejection of the original Soviet proposal to reconvene
on 5 January was responsible for delaying the search for a mu-
tually satisfactory solution. Moscow probably believes that
this bid to resume negotiations will contrast favorably with
Western insistence that the results of previous sessions be
evaluated before a specific date is set for reconvening.
Moscow has not changed its views on the scope of the talks.
The note reaffirms its determination to introduce political con-
siderations into the negotiations, and specifically states that
the declaration introduced on 28 November by the Soviet dele-
gate is still the Soviet position. The 28 November declaration,
as amended by Moscow's so-called technical paper introduced
on 12 December, would link the surprise-attack problem to
politically motivated disarmament measures. Reiteration of
this omnibus plan--previously rejected by the West--indicates
that the USSR still does not desire serious negotiations.
13 Jan 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
WM. ULAN 1 1 A
voiS
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Japanese Cabinet Reshuffle Fails to Stabilize
Kishrs Position
The refusal of major dissident leaders in the ruling
Liberal-Democratic party to accept any of the four cabinet
vacancies filled on 12 January or to participate in the re-
shuffle of party executive posts has dealt a major blow to
Prime Minister Kishrs leadership and makes his tenure as
prime minister even more uncertain.
Dissident leader Mitsujiro Ishii, who contended unsuccess-
fully with Kishi for the prime ministership in 1957, at the last
minute refused to accept the post of deputy prime minister in
the cabinet line-up and thwarted Kishi's efforts to restore party
balance. The ensuing appointment of subordinate leaders to
fill the cabinet vacancies created when dissident leaders resigned
late last month probably is only a temporary solution.
The reshuffle points up Ki.shits diminishing control of the
party and government. By withholding their participation,
prominent dissident leaders are maintaining pressure on Kishi
to meet their demands for a complete cabinet reshuffle and for
a postponement of the party presidential election until the ex-
piration of Kishrs term in March. The postponement could give
the dissidents time in which to agree on a candidate to challenge
Kishi for the top party post and the prime ministership.
CONFIDENTIAL
13 Jan 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
�L�tirtirl1=Tirrn=
*re *IS
Chinese Nationalists Cotisider Armed Forces Reduction
LMajor General I Fu-en, the chief of Chinese Nationalist
Air Force intelligence, informed an American official on 31
December that a directive was being drafted to require each
Nationalist military branch to lower its personnel ceiling by
10 percent. General I explained, however, that actual strength
is generally below existing ceilings, implying that the cut would
actually be less than 10 percent.]
[General I's information tends to confirm earlier reports of
an impending strength reduction. Finance Minister C. K. Yen
stated in mid-December that he believed that 20,000 to 25,000
men would be dropped from the services, and that a start would
be made by eliminating certain units not supported by American
funds. General I said that Vice President Chen Cheng supports
the move, which has the approval of all top military leadersA
123oth fiscal and political considerations appear to play a
part. The present armed forces strength of about 636,000 men
cannot be maintained for many more months without retaining
Taiwanese conscripts beyond their legal terms of service, a
move which would arouse antagonism. Also, additional expend-
itures incurred during the recent offshore islands crisis have
threatened to upset the national budget and to produce inflation-
ary pressures, to which the Nationalists are sensitive in light
of their experience on the China mainland in 1948 and 1949.
it 10-percent cut would pose special problems for the navy
and 'air force, which have been receiving additional equipment
for which increased manpower is necessary;)
CONFIDENTIAL
13 Jan 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Ire LA-illiriuLdr I 11314
Novi
USSR Offers New Loan to Indonesia
[The Soviet ambassador in Djakarta is reported to have
offered President Sukarno a new loan worth $125,000,000.
Moscow may hope by this means to forestall Indonesian ac-
ceptance of additional Western aid for major development
programs by anticipating Djakarta's need for further assist-
ance. The reported offer follows the conclusion on 2 Janu-
ary of Soviet-Indonesian talks which probably considered
allocation of the remainder of the $100,000,000 loan accepted
by Djakarta in February 1958. This loan is being used to
provide Indonesia with ships, consumer goods and foodstuffs,
road construction, an iron smelter, other small industrial
projects, and probably some foreign exchange
diresident Sukarno reportedly is reluctant to accept the
loan, possibly out of fear of further alienating the West and
cutting off all hope of receiving effective Western assistance.
Finance Minister Sutikno Slamet, however, is urging that at
least part be accepted. Indonesia's desire for industrial de-
velopment and its own inability to finance it make a new Soviet
credit offer highly tempting. In September 1958 Soviet tech-
nicians in Indonesia reviewed requirements for an Indonesian
economic reconstruction program'.
CONFIDENTIAL
13 Jan 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
dook Amit,
All weather road
Broad-gauge railroad
Narrow-gauge railroad
, MILES , ISO
UNCLASSIFIED
Kushka
Herat
Farah
Zahedan
24703
90112-5
Sta lina bad
S S R
Mazar-i-
Sharif
andahar
�sChaman
Quetta
Basra
KAB
Fort
Sandeman
PAKISTAN
Jalalabad
Khyber
Pass
TURKEY
" SYRIA
ARABIA
ETHIOPIA
SOMALILAND
KENYA
CHINA
� )JAM MU
� AND
e� KASHMIR
\ (Status in dispute)
Rawalpindi
' AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
CEYLON
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
vase
Afghanistan to Receive Additional Soviet Assistance
ghan Foreign Minister Nairn., who ended a visit to Mos-
cow on 5 January, reached a number of
agreements, in the
military, economic, and health fields, reflect the USSR's de-
sire to exploit Afghan apprehension over what Kabul considers
a hardening Pakistani attitude and a possible cooling of West-
ern interest in Afghanistar9
/Elaim is reported pleased with his negotiations, probably
because all of them will be carried out at Soviet expense. Naim
may see in them an indication of a new Soviet willingness to
give Afghanistan grant aid, which hitherto has been forthcom-
ing in significant amounts only from the United StatesD
the military sphere, 65 Afghan jet pilot trainees who
have been receiving Soviet instructions in Afghanistan are to
be rotated to the USSR for additional training. In addition, 100
Afghan Army majors are reportedly to be sent to the USSR for
three or four years' training. So far, the Afghan Government
has sent only 50 to 70 senior officers to the USSR because of the
risk of Communist indoctrination. The new agreement suggests
that Kabul now is willing to take greater risks in order to step
up its military preparedness program3
_3
. the economic fieic13, Soviet air 'service to Afghanistan is to
be extended by the introduction of jet service when the Bagram
airport, 30 miles north of Kabul, is completed this summer.
A gift of 3,000 tons of Soviet seed wheat is to relieve Afghani-
stan's wheat shortage. The USSR has also promised further to
develop Qizil Qala, an Afghan port on the Amu Darya Rive.0
Eiedical treatment in the USSR is being offered to all
Afghans at bargain priceq
SECRET
13 Jan 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RI II I FTIN page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
I
keS
Sudanese Situation
Lille American Embassy in Khartoum believes that un-
less General Abboud's government in the Sudan can soon
come up with some accomplishment demonstrating its
superiority over the politicians it replaced, the stage
may be set for still another army clique to attempt to
seize power. The principal problems on which Abboud
has failed to make significant progress are agreement
with the UAR on the Nile waters, restoration of trade
relations with the UAR, building the Roseires Dam to
control the Nile inside the Sudan, solving the cotton sur-
plus problem, and getting an over-all development pro-
gram under way]
[The government, which initially promised to move
quickly to solve outstanding problems with the UAR, now
appears pessimistic about the possibility of any agreement.
Sudanese Foreign Minister Kheir has stated that UAR pres-
sure on the Sudan is still at about the same level as before
the Khartoum coup last November. UAR clandestine activity
Is likely to continue among the leaders of banned political
parties and disgruntled junior army officers. Leaders of
the National Unionist party late in December sought the co-
operation of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mandi, the spiritual
leader of the opposing Umma party, in pressing the army
regime to allow the parties to function. While this initiative
reportedly was rebuffed, efforts to revive political activity
will multiply as jobless politicians resume agitating among
their erstwhile constituentsj
the economic field, the British ambassador in
Khartoum has reported that the Sudanese Government
seems determined to maintain pricing practices which
have resulted in very large cotton surpluses in previous
years and which will place the Sudan in a particularly un-
favorable position when British-UAR economic relationsj
SECRET
13 San 59
r=kITD A I !KIWI I IrtFkIrP RI II I FTIKI
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Niro,
.turn to a normal basis. An influential member of the
cabinet has indicated that the government's policy is to
rely on either the World Bank or the United States for ex-
ternal financial assistance for a development program.
However, the Soviet trade mission scheduled to arrive in
Khartoum on 22 January may offer tradeaid deals diffi-
cult to resist. A Soviet offer related to Nile waters con:-
trol Droiects would be nartieularly attrantivp-1
13 Jan Jan 59
r rktret A I IkITCI I leGli..1/"*C DI III GT1k1
`""Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020 Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
AlIlk 41 f
--
Indelmite buunddry
Protectoiale boundary
. ,,
, BAHREIN 'i
As :?QATAR : 8}"ri,i
.�4 TRUCIAL
. Rivudh
^ ' ,
11", ' "�-; SHEIKDOMS/
Mecca
�
SUDAN
ETHIOPIA
UNCLASSIFIED
AMARAN
6111rES 300
24510
SAUDI ARABIA
I .c;
/ 44' 4
'77[
0
4S)
"0
".5..H0FAR
Tharaut �
EASTERN ADEN
Sana.. PROTECTORATE
YEMEN WESTERN
ADEN:
PAOTECTORAit
ADEN COLONY (U )
SOCOTRA
(Aden Prot
�Salala
80624 5/g0112 6
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
arA.-ttri
Nee'
Britain Augmenting Special Force in Oman
abe 100-man British Special Air Services (SAS) contingent
recently committed against the Omani rebels is being increased--
possibly doubled. The SAS is an elite force specially trained to
operate behind enemy lines and has proved especially useful
against Communist guerrillas in Malaya. SAS raids are intended
to surprise and capture the leaders of the Omani rebels, who
seek independence from the British-backed Sultan of Muscat,
and so demoralize the rebels that they can be dealt with by the
Sultan's "army." The British, presumably encouraged by the per-
formance of the SAS in Oman so far, may hope to eliminate the
rebels before summer heat seriously interferes with military
operations and allows the rebellion to drag on for another yeae.-I
The Sultan's forces, which are supplied, trained, and led
by the British, and supported by RAF aircraft strikes, have not
shown much stomach for the intermittent fighting during the re-
bellion which began 18 months agsj
Efhe British adopted their new tactics after the breakdown
of November truce talks with the rebels, who were apparently
stalling for time pending the arrival of more aid from Saudi
Arabia, the UAR, and Iraq. In addition to small arms, the
rebels have been supplied with machine guns, mortars, and
land mines. 50-caliber machine-
gun ammunition and land mines to be delivered to the governor
of the Eastern Province. In the past,
to arms destined for the rebels
TOP SECRET
13 Jan 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000020
�FiV14#3 ///12A.
-120-P-SEGRET-
ei
el
el
ej or,/
orj
ef
fl
fj
ej
e/ #
ey ,/
1
1
0/
e/
e/
e/ ,/
e/ ,./
,0/
el
/0/
r"
,/
e'40/
e/
e/
ej
e/
e/ //
//
e/
e/ //
//
e/ I/
0/
e/
edl I/
//
//
I/
e/
e/
e/
e/ i'%
I/
I/
edI
e/
e/
e/
e/
e/
e/ /0,
0/
e/
eZ //
//
/I
ve,. 40
t40
oo
t,
4,
40
40
0,,
-,/.. TOP SECKEI
/
/
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3000020 Z