CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/10/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03000847
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: October 24, 1954

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24 October
1954
Copy No,
8 i)
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS g
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 9- 0 10
ALITH: HR 70-2
DATE: 7 5;4�. 60 REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
rto
00003,13/01A
0W13/17177/A
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Comment on results of Rhee-US meetings (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Vietnamese army reported planning to move against government
(page 4).
3, Increasing Communist activity in north Burma indicated (page 4).
LATIN AMERICA
4. Communists planning to attack American government offices in
Cuba (page 6).
LATE ITEMS
5. Comment on Soviet note of 23 October proposing four-power con-
ference (page 7).
6. Comment on changes in the Pakistani government (page 8).
* * * *
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FAR EAST
1. Comment on results of Rhee-US meetings:
President Rhee rejected on 22 October
the draft minute of understanding pro-
viding for Korean co-operation with the
United States in a military-economic aid
program. He presented a counterproposal which again sets forth,
in extreme terms, all his previous demands on disputed points.
Rhee's counterproposal is also an attempt to renegotiate many is-
sues settled previously, while keeping everything the United States
has granted him so far.
Rhee offered to accept American pro-
posals on military force levels and aid levels for the current fis-
cal year and, subject to certain conditions, to keep his forces
under operational control of the UN Command. However, he
called on the United States to support the unification of Korea by
�
force, made proposals on procurement which would disqualify
Japan as a source of supply, insisted on maintaining the unreal-
istic 180-1 exchange rate, and demanded that all previous agree-
merits be canceled, since--he said--during the war "Seoul had a
tendency to sign anything regardless of the long-term effects."
He offered to normalize relations with Japan,' but at the same time
he put forth conditions which he knows are unacceptable to Japan.
The deterioration� in the ROK economy
and in general US-ROK relations resulting from the impasse is
already creating considerable public opposition to the president's
stand, and his continued obstruction of the aid program may soon
subject his leadership to one of its severest tests. Nevertheless,
Rhee will now find it difficult to retreat without considerable loss
of prestige. and he is reported to have told Korean officials
that he was prepared to "take care of" popul�
opposition if aid were stopped.
Rhee's actions suggest that his objective
is to seek another round of negotiations, perhaps with a new high-
level American negotiator, at which he will bargain hard in hopes
of gaining, at a minimum, face-saving concessions from Wash-
ington.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Vietnamese army reported planning to move against government:
Comment: The American ambassador
in Saigon expressed the view on on 23 October that a coup d'etat was
still possible but not probable. Chief of Staff General Hinh has
kept the threat of a coup alive as part of his war of nerves against
the Diem government.
3. Increasing Communist activity in north Burma indicated:
Comment: The information regarding
the "political commissars" indicates the deepest penetration of
Burma by Chinese Communist agents so far reported. Previous
reports had indicated that Peiping's agents were concentrated
near Yunnan province in an area claimed by Communist China.
24 Oct 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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It has become clear during the past four
years that Burmese Communist forces, composed of approximately
3,000 poorly armed troops in widely scattered units, are incapable
of overthrowing the Burmese government without assistance from
China.
LATIN AMERICA
4. Communists planning to attack American government offices in
Cuba:
Comment: Previous reports indicate
that the Communists are planning demonstrations against the re-
gime prior to the 1 November elections. The government is
reported to be well aware of these plans and h4s arranged for
the close military surveillance of all strategic 'points during the
critical period before and after the election.
Batista, who continues to be backed by a
large majority of the armed forces, would probably be successful
in thwarting any attempt to oust him.
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LATE ITEMS
5. Comment on Soviet note of 23 October proposing four-power con-
ference:
The Soviet note of 23 October, calling
for a four-power conference in November
on German unity and free elections, the
withdrawal of troops from Germany and
the holding of a European security con-
ference, adds nothing to the Soviet posi-
tion spelled out in its notes of 24 July
and 4 August and in Molotov's Berlin speech of 6 October.
Ambassador Bohlen believes that the main
purpose of the note is to give the impression that Moscow's posi-
tion on Germany will be more flexible than it was at last winter's
Berlin conference if the London agreements are not carried out.
He notes that the USSR does not commit itself in the slightest de-
gree to any new position.
The note repeats Molotov's recent Berlin
statement that the USSR is willing to consider the Western propos-
als�along with its own--for free German elections, but it does
not commit the Soviet Union to any specific election formula. It
clings to the standard Soviet formula that agreement to unify
Germany on a "peace-loving and democratic basis" is essential to
agreement on elections, indicating continuing rigidity in Moscow's
stand on this issue.
The proposal for an ambassadors' confer-
ence in Vienna on the Austrian treaty is a repetition of previous
Moscow proposals; it ignores the Western and Austrian demand that
a treaty must provide for the withdrawal of foreign troops, and
therefore indicates no Soviet flexibility on this issue.
This note further emphasizes the Kremlin's
belief that an offer to discuss any issue now, combined with its
threat to block the settlement of basic issues if the London agree-
ments are ratified, will be enough--for the present--to hamstring
such ratification by stirring up a European demand for further talks
with Moscow.
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L..INC,
West German and French public opinion,
although favorably disposed toward another try at four-power talks
on Germany, will probably continue to be skeptical of Soviet mo-
tives. The West Germans regarded the 17 October East German
elections as farcical, and probably will not believe that Moscow is
ready to grant truly free all-German elections.
Just before this well-timed note was re-
ceived, however, French premier Mendes-France told Secretary
Dulles that he was "apprehensive as to the consequences of a for-
mal Soviet proposal regarding Germany." The premier has re-
ferred publicly to the possibility of East-West negotiations on
Germany proceeding "parallel" to Western moves on West German
rearmament.
The Austrian government may indicate
to the West that it favors new talks, at least on Austria, on the
grounds that--after the signature of the London accords--Moscow
may be more amenable to compromise.
6. Comment on changes in the Pakistani government:
Governor General Ghulam Mohammad's
dissolution of the Pakistani Constituent
Assembly and dismissal of Prime Minis-
ter Mohammad Al's cabinet on 24 Octo-
ber, immediately following the prime
minister's return from the United States
clearly indicates that the governor gen-
eral is in command of the situation. His
action will presumably be upheld, since the chief justices of the
Federal Court and High Court, to whom any protest would be made,
are said to be loyal to him.
The fact that Mohammad All drove to a
three-hour conference with Ghulam Mohammad immediately after
landing at Karachi airport suggests that he will be allowed little
communication with the dissident Moslem League group which,
with his support, engineered the "coup" of 21 September. Moham-
mad All is probably being kept in office only because of the gover-
nor general's desire not to embarrass the United States.
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The new cabinet is heavily weighted with
men loyal to the governor general. General Ayub Khan and Iskan-
der Mirza, two of the three strongest members of the ruling clique,
are natural choices for Defense and Interior Minister resnectivelv.
Commerce and Industry Minister Ispahani rep-
resents wealthy jute and business interests. The absence of former
Interior Minister Gurmani is as yet unexplained, since he was
loyal to the clique. Former Food and Industry Minister Qayum
Khan, a leader of the dissident group, understandably is absent.
H. S. Suhrawardy, opposition Awami League leader who was widely
rumored due to be the next prime minister, will presumably have
to settle for the chief ministership of East Bengal and the restora-
tion of democratic government there.
Ghulam Mohammad's action is unlikely to
result in any civil disorder in the near future. Pakistan's foreign
policy will remain pro-American.
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