CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/10/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03000970
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: October 12, 1955

_ Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 CO3000970
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October
1955
Copy No. 100
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO.CHANGE IN CLASS.
LI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CfiANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 20/0
MOH: HR
DATE; ""C` FIEVIEvVER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
1.
2.
3.
4. SOUTH KOREAN ARMY CHIEF CRITICAL OF COUNTRY'S
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (page 6).
5. JAPANESE EXPORT CREDITS TO BURMA MAY OBVIATE
NEED FOR US AID (page 7).
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1 UP
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4. SOUTH KOREAN ARMY CHIEF CRITICAL OF COUNTRY'S
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
South Korean army chief of staff Chong
Il-kwon told Under Secretary Hoover
during a briefing on 7 October that the
South Korean military establishment
pledges its co-operation and complete loyalty to the United
States. Chong later told an American embassy official
that his remarks were intended to convey a sincere pledge
of the army's loyalty "in contrast to the attitude of the poli-
ticians which was damaging South Korean-US relations."
In earlier talks between President Rhee
and Hoover, the president did not raise any substantive is-
sues. Shortly thereafter, however, inflammatory articles
directed against the United States appeared in Rhee's own
newspaper.
Comment Chong, who asserts that 14 of the 20
division commanders are his followers,
has expressed his determination on several occasions to
block any irrational military action by Rhee.
Chong's attempt to develop status as the
United States' most reliable supporter in South Korea reflects
his growing political ambition and his determination to develop
powerful American support for his future moves. Chong's
term as chief of staff expires in February 1956, and he may
wish to assure himself of American backing for another term
in what he considers the country's key position.
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Now'
5. JAPANESE EXPORT CREDITS TO BURMA MAY OBVIATE
NEED FOR US AID
The Japanese embassy in Rangoon has
indicated that negotiations for a short-
term Japanese loan to Burma, in the
form of export credits amounting to
approxima e y ,000,000, are about to be concluded. The
American embassy comments that this loan, together with
the recent Indian agreement to provide credits amounting
to $40,000,000, slightly exceeds the immediate foreign ex-
change requirements of the Burmese government. Rangoon
may, therefore, for political reasons terminate negotiations
for American assistance.
Comment
ilangoon, even without the Japanese
loan, was seriously considering withdrawing its application
for American assistance unless it could be obtained without
adherence to the provisions of the Battle Act. The Burmese
believe the limitations required on their trade with the Com-
munist bloc would compromise their policy of neutrality.
Premier Nu was reluctant in the first place to request aid
from the United States because he felt that as a result of such
a request he would no longer be in a position to mediate be-
tween Peiping and Washington.
3hinese Communist premier Chou En-lai
was seeking to impress the Burmese commander in chief,
who recently visited Peiping, with the idea that Burma's
trade with China was a valuable asset in helping to meet its
foreign exchange problem.
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