CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/06/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03001359
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: June 13, 1954

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13 lune 1954
Copy No.
80
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 17 /
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS CHANGED TO: TS 0
NEXT REVIEW DATE-
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:el/Ma. REVIEWER:.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Pravda correspondent states progress on Indochina unlikely
until French government crisis resolved (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Japan passive on regional security plans (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Viet Minh seen now possessing logistic capabilities for delta
attack (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
4. Indian troops moved to West Bengal to control possible Hindu-
Moslem disturbances (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Comment on announcement of unification of Egyptian and Saudi
armies (page 5).
LATIN AMERICA
6. Peron reaffirms support for calling OAS on Guatemala (page 6).
LATE ITEM
7. Comment on French government crisis (page 7).
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GENERAL
1. Pravda correspondent states progress on Indochina unlikely until French
government crisis resolved:
Zhukov
of Pravda stated that no progress on Indochina
is likely until after the French government crisis
is brought to an end and that serious negotiations
are not possible until Bidault becomes convinced that the United States is
not going to intervene in Indochina. According to Zhukov, Molotov is con-
fident that agreement could be reached but it would take time.
Zhukov said that the Viet Minh representative
on the military committee would shortly introduce a plan under which the
Viet Minh would retain all of the Red River delta except the Hanoi-Haiphong
area. He gave the impression that this plan would involve a French with-
drawal to coastal regions where France would retain a Hong Kong type of
foothold, observed that this would leave the Viet
Minh in control of all the interior, Zhukov replied that this could not be
avoided under any circumstances.
Comment: Communist tactics at Geneva appear
to have been based on the belief thai the Laniel government would either
move toward the Communist position or be replaced by a government pledged
to negotiate an immediate end to the hostilities.
The 'Communists probably calculate that the
French would be tempted by the possibility of ending the war while re-
taining a face-saving "presence" in Hanoi and Haiphong. Under these con-
ditions, the Viet Minh could feel confident that a combination of diplomatic
and military pressure would eventually bring Hanoi under its control.
FAR EAST
2. Japan passive on regional security plans:
The marked lack of Japanese official and press
interest in the Cambodian proposal at Geneva
that japan be a member of the Indochina truce
supervision commission demonstrates Japa-
nese unwillingness to give positive support to measures for Far East
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stability, according to the American embassy. A Foreign Ministry
official has dismissed as premature,any thought of Japan's now join-
ing a regional security organization.
The embassy feels Japanese passivity re-
sults from the psychological unpreparedness of the people and the
long-range hope that Japan can play a neutral balancing role. The
lack of public support, the antipathy of some Far East nations toward
Japan, and the deficiency in military and economic power to back its
position apparently explain the government's policy of avoiding further
commitment in the world power struggle.
Comment: Nevertheless, there have been
continuing indications that Japanese policymakers, in their long-term
plans, look increasingly toward closer working arrangements with
Asia rather than remaining indefinitely dependent on the United States.
Recent graduates of the Japanese Foreign Service Institute were told
that the more able among them would be used in the Asia service.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Viet Minh seen now possessing logistic capabilities for delta attack:
Viet Minh now has sufficient supplies stock-
piled in rear depots to begin an attack on the
Tonkin delta. The French anticipate no Viet
tcu es in supplies of food, ammunition or weapons and be-
lieve that the nearness of the operating area to the China border would
rpermit resupply by the Chinese to sustain an offensive.
the French see a possibility that the rate ot uninese aid
will be increased by the end of June.
Comment: The Dien Bien Phu campaign
apparently largely depleted Communist stockpiles in Tonkin, for the
later stages of the battle supplies were sent directly from China to the
battle zone.
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There has been little specific information
since Dien Bien Phu to indicate the scope and nature of Chinese-supplied
rear stockpiles, although on several occasions French officials have
described recent shipments as large.
Forward movement of supplies from rear area
depots has afforded a warning of last-minute Communist preparations
prior to previous major Viet Minh attacks.
SOUTH ASIA
4. Indian troops moved to West Bengal to control possible Hindu-Moslem
disturbances:
Home Minister
Katju stated on 9 June that about 5,000 Indian
troops had recently been moved into the
Calcutta area to control any disturbances that might arise in West
Bengal if conditions deteriorate and Hindu-Moslem clashes occur in
East Pakistan.
Comment: This precautionary move, which
confirms earlier rumors, shows the Indian government's determination
to maintain order in West Bengal. India's precautions are likely to be
unnecessary, as East Pakistan has been quiet since the promulgation of
Governor's Rule on 30 May.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Comment on announcement of unification of Egyptian and Saudi armies:
The announcement that Egypt and Saudi Arabia
have agreed to pool their military resources
and unify their armies is probably intended
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principally for propaganda purposes. It is unlikely that any practical
measures will result from the agreement which, according to the
Egyptian minister of national guidance and King Saud, is an oral one
existing only "in our hearts and souls."
The proposed unification, to take place
within the framework of the Arab League Collective Security Pact,
reflects Egyptian and Saudi concern that Iraq and other League mem-
bers may align themselves with the Turkish-Pakistani Pact, thus
isolating Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The announcement is apparently
a maneuver to stimulate Arab interest in a pact which Egypt would
dominate as a counter to the Western-supported pact.
Saudi Arabian acceptance of closer relations
with Egypt follows King Saud's rejection in January of American grant
military assistance and the adoption of n increasingly non-co-operative
attitude.
LATIN AMERICA
6. Peron reaffirms support for calling OAS on Guatemala:
Argentine president Peron sent word to
Ambassador Nufer on 10 June that his
assurances of 1 June on calling an Organi-
zation of American States consultation on
Guatemala were still completely valid. Peron reiterated that if the
United States found impractical his suggestion for a general meeting
on Communist penetration, at which the Guatemalan problem would
inevitably arise, Argentina would support convocation of a meeting
on Guatemala alone.
Peron added that Argentina would go to
the meeting with "hard facts" as he had full information on Commu-
nist plans directed against the hemisphere.
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Comment: Peron's assurances on 1 June
had appeared to be weakened by his Foreign Minister Remorino on
8 June, when the latter disclaimed knowledge of these statements and
said that "other means of solution" should be exhausted before call-
ing an OAS meeting on Guatemala.
In Buenos Aires, the mounting anti-Commu-
nist press campaign and the arrest of more Communists suggest that
Peron is in fact concerned over Communist penetration in Argentina--
as he recently admitted to Nufer for the first time.
LATE ITEM
7. Comment on French government crisis:
President Coty is presumably making a tactical
move in asking Radical Socialist Mendes- France
to form a new French cabinet. It appears un- �
likely that Mendes-France can obtain the abso-
lute assembly majority of 314 necessary for investiture. He is person-
ally unpopular, and his opposition to immediate EDC ratification has
alienated a large bloc of the deputies on whom he would have to depend
for support. His near approach to investiture as premier in June 1953
was due to the fact that many Radical Socialists supported him as a
party candidate, knowing that he would not get 314 votes.
Tradition demands, however, that the person
or party most directly responsible for a cabinet crisis be given first
choice in forming a new government, and it was the Radical Socialist
ministers in Laniel's coalition whose ibsistence on a change in govern-
ment forced the president to accept Laniel's resignation.
Coty is reported to prefer ex-premier Pinay
(Independent), now ill; Foreign Minister George Bidault (Popular Re-
publican); or ex-premier Robert Schuman (PppularRepublican)--all pro-
EDC. He is also reported to be considering ex-premier Edgar Faure
(Radical Socialist), but the latter's recently voiced opposition to EDC
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makes his acceptance by the Popular Republicans doubtful, in view of
their reiterated intention not to support any government hostile to the
treaty. Still another possibility is Francois Mitterrand, leader of the
small Resistance Union and proponent of the view that France should
abandon Indochina and concentrate its energies on its African possess-
ions. His relative youth--he is 38--is, however, against him.
Since the search for a new government will
probably be prolonged, the Assembly may end by turning in desper-
ation to a political unknown as it did a year ago in the case of Laniel.
It is certain,, however, that the successful candidate will be pledged
to do everything possible to end hostilities in Indochina.
In any event, Coty's acceptance of the Laniel
resignation temporarily sidesteps the threat of an Assembly dissolu-
tion. While the Assembly could dissolve itself, the fact that it care-
fully avoided a constitutional majority against Laniel on 12 June in-
dicates little possibility of such a move now. The constitution re-
quires that 15 days must elapse following a premier's investiture be-
fore the overthrow of a cabinet can permit dissolution under Article
51 of the Constitution.
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