CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/07/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03001382
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: July 13, 1954

Approved for Release: 2019/08/13C03001382.' "/
/ r
Copy No, 80
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. _42 /cr.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
LI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE � 20.10
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:-3/i/e0_ REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
13 July 1954 E )
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
////
.//
TOP RET
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03001382
pn D C 0401557-71
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03001382
SUMMARY
GENERAL
I. Mendes- France sees possible last-minute agreement at
Geneva (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Four Soviet merchant ships ordered to leave Singapore for
rendezvous point (page 4).
FAR EAST
3. President Rhee now accepts invitation to visit United States
(page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. French believe Viet Minh may be attempting to cut Tonkin delta
in half (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Ankara seeks Iranian commitment to join Turkish-Pakistani
defense pact (page 6).
* * * *
2
TOP SE
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03001382-
13 July 54
'Tr n
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03001382
eirme4
GENERAL
I. Mendes-France sees possible last-minute agreement at Geneva:
Mendes-France looks for a possible last-
minute agreement at Geneva on 19 July,
Comment The Communists are expected to
offer Mendes-France a settlement on Indochina, in advance of his
20 July deadline, which the French premier will find it difficult to
refuse.
The offer is expected to include a cease-fire
proposal and an outline for a political settlement requiring further
negotiations. Ambiguities in the Communist proposals would be
designed to make agreement easier.
The French were mistaken in believing that
Chou En-lai had withdrawn Communist demands on behalf of the
"resistance movements" in Laos and Cambodia. It is believed that
Communist proposals will involve the partitioning of Vietnam on
terms very favorable to the Communists, Communist control of some
part of Laos, and some form of recognition for Communist forces in
Cambodia.
3
TOP RE T
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03001382
13 July 54
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03001382
;41. Nearr
SOVIET UNION
2. Four Soviet merchant ships ordered to leave Singapore for
rendezvous point:
Comment: According to a press report from
Singapore, the Alexande-Fgevsky, the A. Andreev, the Leningrad,
and another tanker, the Maikop, left Singapore on 12 July.
It is likely that once the ships have sailed well
north of Formosan waters, some will be redirected to China. How-
ever, the Chinese Nationalists are credited with the capability of
intercepting vessels 500 miles off Formosa.
While there is no evidence of Soviet or
Chinese Communist plans to provide naval escort or air cover to
convoy the group of merchant ships, that possibility is suggested by
the establishment of a rendezvous point. The first Soviet note to
the United States on the Tuapse incident, sent on 24 June, stated
that necessary measures would be taken to protect Soviet ships in
the Far East. An alternative to armed escort would be to keep as
far as practicable outside Formosan waters.
The intercepted Soviet tanker Tuapse is
still held by the Chinese Nationalists.
4
err,Dr.
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03001382
13 July 54
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03001382
Now,
FAR EAST
3. President Rhee now accepts invitation to visit United States:
President Rhee told Ambassador Briggs
on 10 July he has now decided to accept an
invitation to visit the United States and wishes
to depart "within two or three weeks." Rhee
expects to bring a predominantly military staff with him, including
Defense Minister Sohn, Army Chief of Staff General Chong I1-kwon,
and two high-ranking air force officers.
Briggs reports he had never seen the
president in such poor physical condition. Rhee's mind wandered
several times during a half-hour conversation, and he appeared
vague and confused.
invitation,
Comment: Rhee previously rejected this
�Rhee's primary objective is to obtain American
aid in expanding the South Korean armed forces. A secondary ob-
jective is to redirect American interest away from Japan as the basis
for the United States' position in Asia.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. French believe Viet Minh may be attempting to cut Tonkin delta in
half
The start of a Viet Minh attempt to cut the
Tnnkin (Italia in hnlf isnlatina Hanoi, may,
13fe indicated
by increased enemy activity during the past
few days in the Luc Nam and Hung Yen
areas, on the northern and southern edges of the present French
defense line.
- 5 -
FrnD DC T
' Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03001382
13 July 54
� I
ApprovedToi7R�elease: 2019/08/13 C03001382
%awe Z
Comment: Enemy activity in these
areas, some of which involireTgements of the Viet Minh
divisions returned from Dien Bien Phu, has been coincident
with increased pressure from the north and west of Hanoi. An
effort to split the delta and thus hasten the fall of Hanoi pre-
sumably would be accompanied by an attack on the French defense
line northwest of Hanoi, where enemy intelligence units are re-
ported active.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Ankara seeks Iranian commitment to join Turkish-Pakistani
defense pact:
Recognizing that Iran's immediate adherence
is not possible, Ankara nevertheless wants Tehran to commit itself
now to eventual participation.
Comment: The shah and Prime Minister
Zahedi have accepted th-g�p-iii�Terple that Iran should adhere to the
Turk-Pakistani pact. They insist however, that careful prep-
aration of the public is a prerequisite, and the shah has hinted that
Iranian participation may depend on substantial increases in American
military aid.
The current Soviet campaign to block Iran's
participation in Western defense planning suggests the degree of
Moscow's concern over these discussions. Tehran's new anxiety
over Soviet intentions will probably preclude Iran's acceptance of
the pact in the near future and increase its equivocation on Western
commitments.
'MP 1-CPPT
Approved for Release: 2019/08/13 C03001382
13 July 54