CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/02/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003007
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: February 1, 1958

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1 February 1958
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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1 FEBRUARY 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR claims position "elastic" on
summit conference.
Peiping continues attack on
"rightists."
USSR urging Laos to establish
diplomatic missions.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Proclamation of Egyptian-Syrian
union expected soon.
Syria continues close military
relations with USSR.
Israel concerned over long-range
effect of Egyptian-Syrian union.
Indonesian army chief calls conference
of Sumatran military commanders.
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III. THE WEST
United civilian support of Venezuelan
junta may not last long.
France increasingly concerned over
Algerian rebels in Tunisia.
Spanish offensive against irregular
Army of Liberation expected in Ifni.
Tank ri an ill T1 rr
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
1 February 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*Summit talks - Soviet view: On 28 January, Soviet
Ambassador Malik told Acting British Prime Minister
Butler that the USSR's position is "elastic" on the com-
position and date of a heads-of-government meeting.
Khrushchev's remark in the London Times on 1 February
that the USSR is willing to postpone a Summit meeting be-
yond its suggested date if "two to three months" is "too
soon" is probably intended to emphasize this point. Mos-
cow is apparently confident that mounting popular pressure
will force the US to drop its insistence on adequate prepar-
atory work. (Page 1)
Communist China: Peiping has fired the communica-
tions, food, and timber industry ministers. They have
been under attack since last June for "opposing" Commu-
nist party domination of the central government. Three
more ministers and four vice ministers have also been
criticized recently in the Communist press. Some of these
men may possibly be dismissed during the National Peo-
le's Congress which convenes on 1 February.
(Page 2)
Soviet pressure on Laos: The USSR is again pressing
Laos to exchange diplomatic missions. This move is
probably timed to counter the favorable effects of Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma's visit to the US and has the
longer-range objective of buttressing the Communist-
controlled Pathet Lao political and subversive campaign
within Laos. The Laotian Government may continue to
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stall, at least until after the elections for additional
� National Assembly seats to be held 4 May.
(Page 3)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Egyptian-Syrian union: Syrian President Quwatli's
arrival in Cairo on 31 January will probably be followed
very soon by a inini� 1w+hin uri+h nn Vcrunfi an-
Syrian union.
Syrian-Egyptian-Soviet military ties: Syrian-
Egyptian-Soviet military collaboration continues to be
close. Damascus is sending additional trainees to the
USSR, and additional Soviet instructors are scheduled to
go to Syria to give courses and to participate in discus-
sions of tactical and strategic doctrines. The USSR is
also providing Syria with generally reliable information
on Israeli military forces. Syria in turn furnishes Ezra
with military information.
(Page 4)
Israeli-Syrian tension: Israel's note to the United
Nations charging Syrian "aggression" is a reminder of
Israel's long-range concern over the effect of Egyptian-
Syrian union on Israel's security. Syrian nervousness re-
garding Israeli intentions is suggested by the fact that a
Syrian official has queried the American Embassy in Da-
mascus about Israeli troop movements. However, a
reconnaissance of Israel's northern and central commands
has revealed no observable Israeli military build-up.
1 Feb 58
DAILY BRIEF
TOP SECRET
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with dissident plans to deliver an ultimatum to Djakarta,
and it is doubtful that all will attend. A split between
Javanese and Sumatran elements of the Masjumi party
is developing over support for a rival government on
Sumatra. (Page 1)
The Communist bloc continues to develop :its re-
lations with Indonesia. A Polish delegation recently de-
parted for Djakarta to investigate the chartering of Polish
ships to Indonesia and to offer personnel for operation
of Indonesian vessels. The recent visit of Czech Pre-
mier Siroky resulted in a communiqud aligning the bloc
with Indonesia on important local and international issues.
III. THE WEST
Venezuela: The widespread civilian support presently
behind the Venezuelan governing junta may not last long.
The political party leaders hold varying and often conflict-
ing views, and some are calling for a revision of Venezue-
lan petroleum policies. Their basic unifying interest is the
desire to expand civilian influence in government--a poten-
tial source of conflict with the military. (Page 6)
France - Tunisia: Recent reports suggest that civilian
leaders in Paris are beginning to share to an increasing ex-
tent the frustrations of French military leaders in Algeria
over the sanctuary in Tunisia enjoyed by Algerian rebels.
It is unlikely that Premier Gaillard will sanction a major
punitive offensive at this time, but the Algerian-Tunisian
frontier situation continues to have explosive potentialities,
and new incidents might force Gaillard's hand. In the mean-
time, Paris is apparently delaying any further diplomatic
approaches to Bourguiba.
Spanish West Africa: The Spanish offensive being pre-
pared for early February against the irregular Army of
1 Feb 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Liberation may be mounted in Ifni as well as in Spanish
Sahara and the Southern Morocco protectorate. France
is to assist the Spanish forces with transport and ma-
teriel, and a French supporting offensive into Spanish
Sahara appears likely.
(Page 7)
1 Feb 58
DAILY BRIEF iv
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Views on Preparations for Summit Meeting
Soviet Ambassador Malik told British Acting Prime
Minister Butler on 28 January that the Soviet views on
the composition and date for a heads-of-government meet-
ing are "elastic," but repeated the public Soviet position
that a foreign ministers' conference should follow, rather
than precede, a summit meeting. Malik said Moscow
wants preparatory arrangements to be made through dip-
lomatic channels.
Khrushchev's remark to the London Times, published
1 February, that the Soviet Union is willing to postpone a
summit meeting, if the date of "within two to three months"
suggested to the West in Bulganin's January letters is "too
soon," is designed to underscore Soviet flexibility on this
point.
The USSR has been encouraged by signs of Western
disunity, particularly by British and French statements,
and will probably continue to hold out for a summit meet-
ing with a minimum of preparation. The Soviet leaders
are apparently confident that mounting popular pressures
on Western governments will eventually force the United
States to drop its insistence on adequate preparatory work
by a foreign ministers' conference as well as through dip-
lomatic channels.
The absence of Soviet criticism of French Premier
Gaillard's proposal that a foreign ministers' conference
refrain from "substantive" discussion of issues suggests
that Moscow might eventually agree to foreign ministers'
talks if limited to such question oms. i ion tend
and other procedural matters.
-CONFIDENTIAL
1 Feb 58
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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Chinese Communist Cabinet Shake-up
Communications Minister Chang Po-chun, Food Min-
ister Chang Nai-chi, and Minister of Timber Industry Lo
Lung-chi were removed from their posts on 31 January by
the standing committee of the National People's Congress
in Peiping. All three men have been under attack since
last June for political deviation�including "opposition" to
Communist party domination of the central government.
Three more ministers and four vice ministers have
also been criticized recently in the Communist press. The
minister of building materials industry has confessed "mis-
takes" in leadership which permitted counterrevolutionaries
to penetrate subordinate offices in his ministry. The min-
ister of education and the minister of marine products were
under fire earlier for criticizing the Communist party.
Some of these men may possibly be dismissed by the
National People's Congress which convenes on 1 February.
Others are expected to lose their posts during the next few
months of the "rectification" campaign.
-GONFIDENHAL-
1 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Moscow Again Bids for Diplomatic Exchange With Laos
The USSR is again pressing Laos to exchange diplo-
matic missions. Soviet officials in Bangkok, who made
the approach, probably timed it to counter the improved
US-Laotian relations resulting from Premier Souvanna
Phouma's visit to Washington. The USSR's longer range
objective is to support the developing political and sub-
versive campaign by the Pathet Lao now that it has given
up its military efforts to gain power in Laos.
Laos may continue to delay a decision, at least un-
til after the national elections for additional assembly seats
to be held on 4 May. Souvanna would probably be embar-
rassed to default so quickly on assurances given in Wash-
ington and London, and he may also wish to assess the
Pathet Lao's popular strength before running the risk en-
tailed in accepting bloc embassies.
The Pathet Lao has surrendered its former base areas
in Sam Neua and Phong Saly Provinces. The Laotian Army
as of 29 January occupied key posts along the provinces'
borders with North Vietnam and Communist China.
SECRE-T
1 Feb 58
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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II. ,ASIA-AFRICA
Syrian and Egyptian Military Relations With the
Soviet Union
Syrian-Soviet military ties and, to a lesser extent,
those between Egypt and the USSR, continue to be close.
Some 170 Syrian military trainees will probably leave
soon for the Soviet Union, where training of other Syrian
and Egyptian military personnel is already under way.
A group of Soviet officers arrived in Syria on 15 January
to participate in discussions with Syrian and Egyptian of-
ficers on organization of infantry and armored units.
Syrian-Egyptian-Soviet discussions of Soviet tactical and
strategic doctrine have been planned. In mid-February, 15
Soviet military instructors are scheduled to arrive in
Syria to give staff-college-level courses to members of
the army., The USSR has provided the Syrians with ex-
tensive and generally accurate intelligence on the strength
and disposition of Israeli military forces, much of which
the Syrians relay to the Egyptians.
TOP SECRE
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Indonesian Army Chief Orders Sumatran Commanders
ToJava Meeting
Army Chief of Staff General Nasution has ordered
the four Sumatran army commanders, two of whom are
actively engaged in the dissident movement, to report
personally to him in Bandung, West Java, on 4 and 5
February to discuss critical regional problems. Nasu-
tion undoubtedly hopes to forestall reported Sumatran
plans to send an ultimatum to the central government in
early February. He may also calculate that, if all or
some of the commanders fail to attend the conference,
he can charge them with insubordination, and subse-
quently discharge them from the army.
The anti-Communist Masjumi party may split over
support of the Sumatran movement. Several Masjumi
leaders, including the party chairman, Natsir, are al-
ready in Sumatra and are working actively with the dis-
sidents. Javanese elements of the party, however, fear
central government retaliation if they openly support the
Sumatrans and are considering opposing as unconstitu-
tional the proposed rival government which may be es-
tablished in Sumatra.
According to Padang radio, public meetings are
being scheduled throughout central Sumatra to urge the
resignation of the Djuantda cabinet. Senior dissident mil-
itary leaders are to address the groups.
'P SECRET
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III. THE WEST
Outlook in Venezuela
The widespread civilian support of the Venezuelan
governing junta may not last long as a result of the varied
and often conflicting views of the political leaders. The
announced unity among the four major parties, including
the Communists, could break down in a struggle for rep-
resentation in government and in unilateral efforts of the
parties to extend their popular and labor support. Their
principal unifying interest, since President Perez' ouster,
apparently is the desire to expand civilian influence in goy-
ernment--a potential source of conflict with the military.
The Communists stand to gain by their membership
in the four-party Patriotic Front and by the junta's policy
of allowing the return of all exiles. They could become a
powerful force in the labor movement by broadening the
position they were allowed to retain under Perez, even if
the military block the legalization of the party.
Although the junta plans to continue Venezuela's pres-
ent petroleum policies, some political leaders are already
calling for a revision or review. The nationalistic oil is-
sue has current political appeal because US voluntary re-
strictions on oil imports, extended to all five US import
districts by December 1957, have provoked considerable
public resentment.
SECRET
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Spanish Offensive in West Africa Reported Scheduled for
Early February
There are indications that the Spanish offensive being
prepared for early February against the irregular Army
of Liberation may also be mounted in Ifni, as well as in
The US air attach�n Madrid reported on 29 January
that the Spanish Air Force would send about a dozen planes
to El Aiun within a few days and more later. He added
that Spanish aircraft already in the West African area in-
cluded five heltcopters and 20 light bombers.
France is to assist Spanish forces with naval trans-
portation from Spain and also materiel,
a number of light armored scout cars comprised the
only French military assistance given so far. A French
supporting offensive into Spanish Sahara appears likely,
with French forces reportedly prepared to move west
from Tindouf, Fort Trinquet, and Fort Gouraud.
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DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
�P-41X-raCIAVAT.Mi_4E
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1 (Jr I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
1 February 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*Summit talks - Soviet vie e 28 January, Soviet
Ambassador Malik told Ac British Prime Minister
Butler that the USSR's tion is "elastic" on the com-
position and date o eads-of-government meeting.
Ehrushchev's rrark in the London Times on 1 February
that the USS
yond its s
soon" �
cow
willing to postpone a Summit meeting be-
ested date if "two to three months" is "too
robably intended to emphasize this point. Mos-
apparently confident that mounting popular pressure
force the US to drop its insistence on adequate prepar-
atory work. (Page 1)
Communist China: Peiping has fired the communica-
tions, food, and timber industry ministers. They have
been under attack since last June for "opposing" Commu-
nist party domination of the central government. Three
more ministers and four vice ministers have also been
criticized recently in the Communist press. Some of these
men may possibly be dismissed during the National Peo-
ple's Congress which convenes on 1 February.
(Page 2)
Soviet pressure on Laos: The USSR is again pressing
Laos to exchange diplomatic missions. This move is
probably timed to counter the favorable effects of Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma's visit to the US and has the
longer-range objective of buttressing the Communist-
controlled Pathet Lao political and subversive campaign
within Laos The Laotian amp rnman+ tmw f"
stall, at least until after the elections for additional
National Assembly seats to be held 4 May.
(Page 3)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Egyptian-Syrian union: Syrian President Quwatli's
arrival in Cairo on 31 January will probably be followed
very soon by a joint proclamation with Nasir on Egyptian-
qxrri nn iirrinn
Israeli-Syrian tension: Israel's note to the United
Nations charging Syrian "aggression" is a reminder of
Israel's long-range concern over the effect of Egyptian-
Syrian union on Israel's security. Syrian nervousness re-
garding Israeli intentions is suggested by the fact that a
Syrian official has queried the American Embassy in Da-
mascus about Israeli troop movements. However, a
reconnaissance of Israel's northern and central commands
has revealed no observable Israeli military build-up.
The Communist bloc continues to develop its re-
lations with Indonesia. A Polish delegation recently de-
parted for Djakarta to investigate the chartering of Polish
ships to Indonesia and to offer personnel for operation
of Indonesian vessels. The recent visit of Czech Pre-
mier Siroky resulted in a communiqu�ligning the bloc
with Indonesia on important local and international issues.
France - Tunisia: Recent reports suggest that civilian
leadgrs in Paris are beginning to share to an increasing ex-
tent the frustrations of French military leaders in Algeria
over the sanctuary in Tunisia enjoyed by Algerian rebels.
It is unlikely that Premier Gaillard will sanction a major
punitive offensive at this time, but the Algerian-Tunisian
frontier situation continues to have explosive potentialities,
and new incidents might force Gaillard's hand. In the mean-
time, Paris is apparently Flelaving any further diplomatic
approaches tAPproved_for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007
_
stA.