CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/02/01

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03003007
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RIPPUB
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U
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17
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January 27, 2020
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January 30, 2020
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February 1, 1958
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Approved for Release. 2019/08/20 C03003007 kno '3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 1 February 1958 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO Ci 1AN:3E tN CLASS 11 Dv:CL1SS:F.1ED CLASS. CHANGED TO: NEXT REVIEW DATE. Auntie wiri, !mit REVIEWER: . 0/ ff, 0.1/41 ',Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007/ZZ/Z/mmdowZ TOP�SEC-R-E-T- pproved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 � �=�� Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 1 FEBRUARY 1958 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR claims position "elastic" on summit conference. Peiping continues attack on "rightists." USSR urging Laos to establish diplomatic missions. II. ASIA-AFRICA Proclamation of Egyptian-Syrian union expected soon. Syria continues close military relations with USSR. Israel concerned over long-range effect of Egyptian-Syrian union. Indonesian army chief calls conference of Sumatran military commanders. ",/ \ \ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 ur 3G.L.,11.E. III. THE WEST United civilian support of Venezuelan junta may not last long. France increasingly concerned over Algerian rebels in Tunisia. Spanish offensive against irregular Army of Liberation expected in Ifni. Tank ri an ill T1 rr Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 Approved for Release. 2019/08/20 CO3003007 *ISI VI- iji"-.1%1L� Iii �40* CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 1 February 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *Summit talks - Soviet view: On 28 January, Soviet Ambassador Malik told Acting British Prime Minister Butler that the USSR's position is "elastic" on the com- position and date of a heads-of-government meeting. Khrushchev's remark in the London Times on 1 February that the USSR is willing to postpone a Summit meeting be- yond its suggested date if "two to three months" is "too soon" is probably intended to emphasize this point. Mos- cow is apparently confident that mounting popular pressure will force the US to drop its insistence on adequate prepar- atory work. (Page 1) Communist China: Peiping has fired the communica- tions, food, and timber industry ministers. They have been under attack since last June for "opposing" Commu- nist party domination of the central government. Three more ministers and four vice ministers have also been criticized recently in the Communist press. Some of these men may possibly be dismissed during the National Peo- le's Congress which convenes on 1 February. (Page 2) Soviet pressure on Laos: The USSR is again pressing Laos to exchange diplomatic missions. This move is probably timed to counter the favorable effects of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's visit to the US and has the longer-range objective of buttressing the Communist- controlled Pathet Lao political and subversive campaign within Laos. The Laotian Government may continue to 1 NN TOP SECRET z \Appr'oved for Release: 2019/08/20 C0300307 'two krtpl , '21,0 stall, at least until after the elections for additional � National Assembly seats to be held 4 May. (Page 3) IL ASIA-AFRICA Egyptian-Syrian union: Syrian President Quwatli's arrival in Cairo on 31 January will probably be followed very soon by a inini� 1w+hin uri+h nn Vcrunfi an- Syrian union. Syrian-Egyptian-Soviet military ties: Syrian- Egyptian-Soviet military collaboration continues to be close. Damascus is sending additional trainees to the USSR, and additional Soviet instructors are scheduled to go to Syria to give courses and to participate in discus- sions of tactical and strategic doctrines. The USSR is also providing Syria with generally reliable information on Israeli military forces. Syria in turn furnishes Ezra with military information. (Page 4) Israeli-Syrian tension: Israel's note to the United Nations charging Syrian "aggression" is a reminder of Israel's long-range concern over the effect of Egyptian- Syrian union on Israel's security. Syrian nervousness re- garding Israeli intentions is suggested by the fact that a Syrian official has queried the American Embassy in Da- mascus about Israeli troop movements. However, a reconnaissance of Israel's northern and central commands has revealed no observable Israeli military build-up. 1 Feb 58 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET \ \Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 \ N \ 11 LI s., N.k.X 11 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 1 lir or,;�rtz:. 1 Ner at, )/c,49 with dissident plans to deliver an ultimatum to Djakarta, and it is doubtful that all will attend. A split between Javanese and Sumatran elements of the Masjumi party is developing over support for a rival government on Sumatra. (Page 1) The Communist bloc continues to develop :its re- lations with Indonesia. A Polish delegation recently de- parted for Djakarta to investigate the chartering of Polish ships to Indonesia and to offer personnel for operation of Indonesian vessels. The recent visit of Czech Pre- mier Siroky resulted in a communiqud aligning the bloc with Indonesia on important local and international issues. III. THE WEST Venezuela: The widespread civilian support presently behind the Venezuelan governing junta may not last long. The political party leaders hold varying and often conflict- ing views, and some are calling for a revision of Venezue- lan petroleum policies. Their basic unifying interest is the desire to expand civilian influence in government--a poten- tial source of conflict with the military. (Page 6) France - Tunisia: Recent reports suggest that civilian leaders in Paris are beginning to share to an increasing ex- tent the frustrations of French military leaders in Algeria over the sanctuary in Tunisia enjoyed by Algerian rebels. It is unlikely that Premier Gaillard will sanction a major punitive offensive at this time, but the Algerian-Tunisian frontier situation continues to have explosive potentialities, and new incidents might force Gaillard's hand. In the mean- time, Paris is apparently delaying any further diplomatic approaches to Bourguiba. Spanish West Africa: The Spanish offensive being pre- pared for early February against the irregular Army of 1 Feb 58 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET \ N-4;;;;a-1;-'--aii)19/08/20 C0300330)L *WO Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 WI- ,LLtLI Liberation may be mounted in Ifni as well as in Spanish Sahara and the Southern Morocco protectorate. France is to assist the Spanish forces with transport and ma- teriel, and a French supporting offensive into Spanish Sahara appears likely. (Page 7) 1 Feb 58 DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET pproved for Release: 2019/08/20 N\ co3OCiiCi'OL Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 �Wftriiiitn=C 41,0 Nopie I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet Views on Preparations for Summit Meeting Soviet Ambassador Malik told British Acting Prime Minister Butler on 28 January that the Soviet views on the composition and date for a heads-of-government meet- ing are "elastic," but repeated the public Soviet position that a foreign ministers' conference should follow, rather than precede, a summit meeting. Malik said Moscow wants preparatory arrangements to be made through dip- lomatic channels. Khrushchev's remark to the London Times, published 1 February, that the Soviet Union is willing to postpone a summit meeting, if the date of "within two to three months" suggested to the West in Bulganin's January letters is "too soon," is designed to underscore Soviet flexibility on this point. The USSR has been encouraged by signs of Western disunity, particularly by British and French statements, and will probably continue to hold out for a summit meet- ing with a minimum of preparation. The Soviet leaders are apparently confident that mounting popular pressures on Western governments will eventually force the United States to drop its insistence on adequate preparatory work by a foreign ministers' conference as well as through dip- lomatic channels. The absence of Soviet criticism of French Premier Gaillard's proposal that a foreign ministers' conference refrain from "substantive" discussion of issues suggests that Moscow might eventually agree to foreign ministers' talks if limited to such question oms. i ion tend and other procedural matters. -CONFIDENTIAL 1 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 IL, LI/ Nif If 1 1.A.I.4 va* Chinese Communist Cabinet Shake-up Communications Minister Chang Po-chun, Food Min- ister Chang Nai-chi, and Minister of Timber Industry Lo Lung-chi were removed from their posts on 31 January by the standing committee of the National People's Congress in Peiping. All three men have been under attack since last June for political deviation�including "opposition" to Communist party domination of the central government. Three more ministers and four vice ministers have also been criticized recently in the Communist press. The minister of building materials industry has confessed "mis- takes" in leadership which permitted counterrevolutionaries to penetrate subordinate offices in his ministry. The min- ister of education and the minister of marine products were under fire earlier for criticizing the Communist party. Some of these men may possibly be dismissed by the National People's Congress which convenes on 1 February. Others are expected to lose their posts during the next few months of the "rectification" campaign. -GONFIDENHAL- 1 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 *1400 Moscow Again Bids for Diplomatic Exchange With Laos The USSR is again pressing Laos to exchange diplo- matic missions. Soviet officials in Bangkok, who made the approach, probably timed it to counter the improved US-Laotian relations resulting from Premier Souvanna Phouma's visit to Washington. The USSR's longer range objective is to support the developing political and sub- versive campaign by the Pathet Lao now that it has given up its military efforts to gain power in Laos. Laos may continue to delay a decision, at least un- til after the national elections for additional assembly seats to be held on 4 May. Souvanna would probably be embar- rassed to default so quickly on assurances given in Wash- ington and London, and he may also wish to assess the Pathet Lao's popular strength before running the risk en- tailed in accepting bloc embassies. The Pathet Lao has surrendered its former base areas in Sam Neua and Phong Saly Provinces. The Laotian Army as of 29 January occupied key posts along the provinces' borders with North Vietnam and Communist China. SECRE-T 1 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 1 Lfil *MOO II. ,ASIA-AFRICA Syrian and Egyptian Military Relations With the Soviet Union Syrian-Soviet military ties and, to a lesser extent, those between Egypt and the USSR, continue to be close. Some 170 Syrian military trainees will probably leave soon for the Soviet Union, where training of other Syrian and Egyptian military personnel is already under way. A group of Soviet officers arrived in Syria on 15 January to participate in discussions with Syrian and Egyptian of- ficers on organization of infantry and armored units. Syrian-Egyptian-Soviet discussions of Soviet tactical and strategic doctrine have been planned. In mid-February, 15 Soviet military instructors are scheduled to arrive in Syria to give staff-college-level courses to members of the army., The USSR has provided the Syrians with ex- tensive and generally accurate intelligence on the strength and disposition of Israeli military forces, much of which the Syrians relay to the Egyptians. TOP SECRE 1 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 1 VI 0./..�ritLi -INO1 Indonesian Army Chief Orders Sumatran Commanders ToJava Meeting Army Chief of Staff General Nasution has ordered the four Sumatran army commanders, two of whom are actively engaged in the dissident movement, to report personally to him in Bandung, West Java, on 4 and 5 February to discuss critical regional problems. Nasu- tion undoubtedly hopes to forestall reported Sumatran plans to send an ultimatum to the central government in early February. He may also calculate that, if all or some of the commanders fail to attend the conference, he can charge them with insubordination, and subse- quently discharge them from the army. The anti-Communist Masjumi party may split over support of the Sumatran movement. Several Masjumi leaders, including the party chairman, Natsir, are al- ready in Sumatra and are working actively with the dis- sidents. Javanese elements of the party, however, fear central government retaliation if they openly support the Sumatrans and are considering opposing as unconstitu- tional the proposed rival government which may be es- tablished in Sumatra. According to Padang radio, public meetings are being scheduled throughout central Sumatra to urge the resignation of the Djuantda cabinet. Senior dissident mil- itary leaders are to address the groups. 'P SECRET 1 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 0 LA:LW' I III. THE WEST Outlook in Venezuela The widespread civilian support of the Venezuelan governing junta may not last long as a result of the varied and often conflicting views of the political leaders. The announced unity among the four major parties, including the Communists, could break down in a struggle for rep- resentation in government and in unilateral efforts of the parties to extend their popular and labor support. Their principal unifying interest, since President Perez' ouster, apparently is the desire to expand civilian influence in goy- ernment--a potential source of conflict with the military. The Communists stand to gain by their membership in the four-party Patriotic Front and by the junta's policy of allowing the return of all exiles. They could become a powerful force in the labor movement by broadening the position they were allowed to retain under Perez, even if the military block the legalization of the party. Although the junta plans to continue Venezuela's pres- ent petroleum policies, some political leaders are already calling for a revision or review. The nationalistic oil is- sue has current political appeal because US voluntary re- strictions on oil imports, extended to all five US import districts by December 1957, have provoked considerable public resentment. SECRET 1 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 pproved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 uritlivrIVels R SDE ORO Ft. Gouraud CI* � 01B.RM,TAR = Ceuta � MOROCCO *,0 OW' / / / 0� ALGERIA � Tindouf POR.TOOti AL WEST AFRICA ARMY OF LIBERATION CONCENTRATIONS 1 FEBRUARY 1958 ISIANOS Villa Bens � 'it &tun � IF OC Spas. Prot. skcpy EL HAMRA SPANISH ell SAHARA 1 Ft. Trinquet kr FRENCH AFRICA 0 MILES 300 L_ 80131 2 ers"ra roPr� Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 %AI I tivio Njf Spanish Offensive in West Africa Reported Scheduled for Early February There are indications that the Spanish offensive being prepared for early February against the irregular Army of Liberation may also be mounted in Ifni, as well as in The US air attach�n Madrid reported on 29 January that the Spanish Air Force would send about a dozen planes to El Aiun within a few days and more later. He added that Spanish aircraft already in the West African area in- cluded five heltcopters and 20 light bombers. France is to assist Spanish forces with naval trans- portation from Spain and also materiel, a number of light armored scout cars comprised the only French military assistance given so far. A French supporting offensive into Spanish Sahara appears likely, with French forces reportedly prepared to move west from Tindouf, Fort Trinquet, and Fort Gouraud. TOP SECRET 1 Feb 58 rmirpei !MTN I IMPKICF RI II I PTIKI Page 7 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 1-4 /Uri. T I 1.1-1'.1.4.1 /I A.CAA.4 -T-44004 DISTRIBUTION THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Operations Coordinating Board Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director �P-41X-raCIAVAT.Mi_4E Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 1 (Jr I CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 1 February 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *Summit talks - Soviet vie e 28 January, Soviet Ambassador Malik told Ac British Prime Minister Butler that the USSR's tion is "elastic" on the com- position and date o eads-of-government meeting. Ehrushchev's rrark in the London Times on 1 February that the USS yond its s soon" � cow willing to postpone a Summit meeting be- ested date if "two to three months" is "too robably intended to emphasize this point. Mos- apparently confident that mounting popular pressure force the US to drop its insistence on adequate prepar- atory work. (Page 1) Communist China: Peiping has fired the communica- tions, food, and timber industry ministers. They have been under attack since last June for "opposing" Commu- nist party domination of the central government. Three more ministers and four vice ministers have also been criticized recently in the Communist press. Some of these men may possibly be dismissed during the National Peo- ple's Congress which convenes on 1 February. (Page 2) Soviet pressure on Laos: The USSR is again pressing Laos to exchange diplomatic missions. This move is probably timed to counter the favorable effects of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's visit to the US and has the longer-range objective of buttressing the Communist- controlled Pathet Lao political and subversive campaign within Laos The Laotian amp rnman+ tmw f" stall, at least until after the elections for additional National Assembly seats to be held 4 May. (Page 3) IL ASIA-AFRICA Egyptian-Syrian union: Syrian President Quwatli's arrival in Cairo on 31 January will probably be followed very soon by a joint proclamation with Nasir on Egyptian- qxrri nn iirrinn Israeli-Syrian tension: Israel's note to the United Nations charging Syrian "aggression" is a reminder of Israel's long-range concern over the effect of Egyptian- Syrian union on Israel's security. Syrian nervousness re- garding Israeli intentions is suggested by the fact that a Syrian official has queried the American Embassy in Da- mascus about Israeli troop movements. However, a reconnaissance of Israel's northern and central commands has revealed no observable Israeli military build-up. The Communist bloc continues to develop its re- lations with Indonesia. A Polish delegation recently de- parted for Djakarta to investigate the chartering of Polish ships to Indonesia and to offer personnel for operation of Indonesian vessels. The recent visit of Czech Pre- mier Siroky resulted in a communiqu�ligning the bloc with Indonesia on important local and international issues. France - Tunisia: Recent reports suggest that civilian leadgrs in Paris are beginning to share to an increasing ex- tent the frustrations of French military leaders in Algeria over the sanctuary in Tunisia enjoyed by Algerian rebels. It is unlikely that Premier Gaillard will sanction a major punitive offensive at this time, but the Algerian-Tunisian frontier situation continues to have explosive potentialities, and new incidents might force Gaillard's hand. In the mean- time, Paris is apparently Flelaving any further diplomatic approaches tAPproved_for Release: 2019/08/20 C03003007 _ stA.