COMMUNIST COUNTERACTION AGAINST THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIETNAM - 1967/11/20

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003247
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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'NW
ILLEGIB
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
ential
3.5(c)
Intelligence Memorandum
COMMUNIST COUNTERACTION AGAINST THE REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIETNAM
ential
20 November 1967
No. 1666/67
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
20 November 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Communist Counteraction Against the
Revolutionary Development Program in South Vietnam
Summary
The pace of Communist counteraction against the
South Vietnamese Government's Revolutionary Develop-
ment (RD) programs has increased markedly this year.
In part this is due to the larger number of RD
workers in the field and hence to the growing con-
frontation with the enemy. It also results, however,
from an increased commitment of Communist resources
against the program. In recent months, the Commu-
nists have begun to hit hard at the Chieu Hoi ("Open
Arms") and refugee resettlement centers, apparently
judging them to be weakly protected links in the
government's pacification effort as well as points
at which a maximum impact can be registered on the
populace. The Communists view successful counter-
RD action as a means of retaining their prestige
with the populace and of keeping the populace in-
timidated and vulnerable to continued exploitation.
The principal enemy military effort against the
RD program appears to be conducted by Viet Cong
local force units. In recent months, however, enemy
main forces have been used increasingly in opera-
tions and attacks acjainst US units in sparsely
populated areas of South Vietnam. The strategy is
to prevent the shifting of allied containment forces
from these areas for security duty related to the RD
program in the more populous areas. These Commu-
nist offensive operations are also designed to draw
in as reinforcements allied units from the more populous
areas and thus ease pressure on local Viet Cong units
in those areas.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It
was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated with the Office of National Estimates, the
Vietnamese Affairs Staff, and the Clandestine Services.
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The Communists have also apparently undertaken
some reorganization of their administrative ap-
paratus in order to help them compete more success-
fully with the RD program's appeal in contested
areas.
The enemy can be expected to continue, or
even step up, his anti-RD actions. His success in
any given area will depend on the friendly security
situation prevailing there. The GVN has a long way
to go to improve security and establish adequate
conditions for pacification.
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Anti-RD
Anti-RD Military and Terrorist Activity
1. Since late 1966, an increasing number of
reports
/supported
by captured documents, have indicated deep concern
by the Communists over the possibility of govern-
ment success with the Revolutionary Development (RD)
programs. These reports reflect not only the Com-
munists' uneasiness over the grass roots activities
of the RD teams themselves--which represent the
first well-organized challenge to the enemy appara-
tus at the hamlet level--but over such related pro-
grams as the Static Census Grievance Cadres, the
refugee program, and the Chieu Hoi campaign.
2. During 1967, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Army (VC/NVA) troops in South Vietnam have stepped
up their activities directed at countering the RD
program. They have struck primarily at the RD teams
and supporting troops--especially the Regional and
Popular Forces. They have also conducted forays
against Chieu Hoi centers and resettlement hamlets
in the hope of causing their abandonment.
3. When they have failed to dislodge the
people from these centers, the Communists have at-
tempted to reactivate or establish covert cells
within them. Communist forces have tried to infil-
trate covert supporters into the RD cadre ranks or
into the village/hamlet administrative organization.
They have also employed extensive terrorism against
the National Police, Hoi Chanh (ralliers), and vil-
lage/hamlet officials. The enemy is almost certainly
aware that there is a definite relationship between
successful RD programs, in particular the cadre and
Chieu Hoi aspects, and an increased flow of informa-
tion to the RD workers about his activities.
4. The threat posed to the local Viet Cong
political apparatus by the government's nation-
building efforts has forced the Communists to devote
a greater percentage of their over-all energies to
combatting these programs. Success in anti-RD
operations has also assumed greater psychological
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importance for the enemy as he has become somewhat
less able to conduct successful large-scale military
operations. Successful counter-RD actions help the
enemy to retain his prestige with the rural populace
and to inflict continued attrition on the weak low-
level GVN leadership.
5. During 1966 there were about 25 significant
enemy attacks against the RD teams or People's Action
Teams. As a result of these and other enemy initiated
incidents, a total of 593 cadre members were killed
by the Viet Cong. The majority of the incidents took
place in areas where inadequate security was a major
factor. In many cases, teams that were exposed to
enemy activity had been placed in hamlets where the
securing forces were understrength, inadequate, or
simply nonexistent. Some provincial officials did
not understand the significance of deployment or the
correct use of the teams and often tended to use them
as static security units.
6. During 1967 there has been a marked increase
in incidents directed against the RD cadres. In the
first nine months of the year, there were about 900
incidents against the RD teams alone, and approximately
487 cadres have been killed thus far. The increase
is due in part, of course, to the increased number of
RD workers in the field and hence to the growing con-
frontation with the Communists. In all but three
months of this year, however, the largest number of
anti-RD incidents have occurred in I Corps, scene Of
the most intensive enemy combat.
7. The principal enemy military effort against
the RD program appears to be by Viet Cong local force
units. Hamlet and village guerrillas in contested
areas support anti-RD operations and often work in
conjunction with the local forces. Prior to April
1967, there were few reports of the use of enemy main
force troops against RD teams, but main force employ-
ment in this mission has reportedly increased sharply
since then, especially in the coastal areas of I, II,
and southeastern III Corps. In keeping with the enemy's
previous tactics in other fields, specific anti-RD
agencies are apparently being established. Such an
agency has been reported in the III Corps province of
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Long Khanh, while "special action" companies and/or
sapper units appear to have been assigned a specific
counter-RD mission in other areas.
8. The Communists' over-all strategy in the
employment of their main forces is also tied in with
the anti-RD program. By conducting persistent and
threatening maneuver operations and occasional at-
tacks, the main forces hope to keep the bulk of the
US combat units in South Vietnam deployed against
them in sparsely populated areas such as the Demili-
tarized Zone, the western highlands, and northern
III Corps. This strategy is designed to prevent
the shifting of the allied containment forces to se-
curity operations in connection with the RD programs
in the lowlands and delta areas.
9. Communist offensive activities in the high-
lands and other remote areas are also designed to
draw in as reinforcements allied units which have
been operating against the enemy in more populous
areas. In the current fighting at Dak To, for exam-
ple, US elements which had been attempting to improve
security in coastal Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa provinces
were, by necessity, redeployed to the highlands as
reinforcements. The absence from the coastal area
could contribute to an easing of pressure on the lo-
cal Viet Cong units. The same strategy, with some
variations, was used against the French from 1946
to 1954.
10. Information from a variety of sources suggests
that the security situation in several strategic prov-
inces has somewhat deteriorated over the past several
months. Areas involved are ones in which allied forces
scored a number of victories over enemy units in mid-
1966. Since that time vigorous efforts to consolidate
allied gains have been under way. The enemy may have
regained control of portions of the population in at
least Quang Ngai, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa provinces which
had been lost to the government during the past year.
Communist Internal Reorganization
11. At least partially to ensure the continua-
tion and development of their anti-RD activities, the
Communists have made several shifts in their internal
apparatus. They appear for one thing to be putting
increased emphasis on guerrilla warfare and military/
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civilian proselyting activities in the countryside.
Moreover, they have made a number of changes in the
organization or territorial area responsibilities of
their provincial administrative structure. Some of
these changes are evidently designed to streamline
and reduce the administrative overhead and release
more men for military service. Other reports refer
to a movement of cadres from higher to lower echelons
to strengthen grass root organization and revitalize
the leadership at the lowest levels in an effort to
compete with government gains. It may be the enemy's
intention to decentralize a degree of authority and
allow lower level officials and organizations to be
more flexible in certain situations.
12. Over the past year, there have been indica-
tions that a number of the enemy's district village
cadres have been demoralized by allied military
pressures, by the prospects of fighting what they
believe will be a protracted war, and by the govern-
ment's Chieu Hoi program. alleged that
North Vietnamese cadres specializing in antipacifica-
tion activities were being infiltrated to replace the
"demoralized" cadres and those lost through normal
attrition. "Purges" of cadre have reportedly occurred
in many provinces.
13. The amount or degree of support the Commu-
nists have in an RD area, combined with their esti-
mate of what resources the GVN will put into the area,
usually determines whether or not the Communists will
withdraw their overt apparatus in the hamlets and
villages. Secret party and Liberation Front members
are reportedly being designated in rural areas to
serve as stay-behind forces should the government
establish itself. In some areas, partly to counter
RD programs and to retain the sympathies of the pea-
sants and landowners, the Communists have reportedly
had to reform--or occasionally reduce--some of their
taxes.
Communist Proselyting
14. The Communists have shown a remarkable or-
ganizational resilience and flexibility and, within
certain limits, appear to be highly adaptable to dif-
ering local situations. There has been and still
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remains a lack of detailed information on Communist
political action/armed propaganda units. These ele-
ments apparently change their modus operandi to conform
to local situations; however, captured documents and
interrogation reports have yielded some information on
these cadres and units and suggest that the enemy -pro-
motes and maintains a strong psychological warfare
effort.
15. Agit/Prop Teams (AP)--also referred to as
task teams, assault propaganda teams, political action
units, and armed propaganda units--appear to be the
Communist organization which comes closest to the con-
cept of the GVN's RD teams. The APs are probably tar-
geted against contested or GVN-controlled villages
and hamlets. Generally, they enter a hamlet--usually
at night--assemble the residents, and spread leaflets
and banners, collect information, and conduct propa-
ganda and civilian/military proselyting activities.
16. In their proselyting, the AP teams attempt
to recruit villagers for military units, urge those
with relatives working for the government to persuade
their relatives to desert or act as agents in place,
and occasionally extract money or goods from the vil-
lagers. Where security conditions permit, the AP
teams are often accompanied by cultural or entertain-
ment groups, whose shows are geared to discrediting
the government and extolling the Viet Cong.
17. The AP units apparently seldom engage in
terrorism. This is probably left to district commit-
tees using local guerrillas or "special cell" members.
The professional entertainment, propaganda, and/or
proselyting cadres who may be part of these agit/prop
units rely almost exclusively on propaganda and per-
suasion. Nevertheless, the presence of their weapons,
although for defensive purposes, can still serve to
coerce or intimidate local people into cooperating.
18. The Communists usually make a distinction
between full-time AP units and those organized on an
ad hoc basis to carry out a propaganda mission against
a specific target. The majority of propaganda activi-
ties conducted by the Viet Cong in government-controlled
or sharply contested areas are probably carried out by
the latter units. Although propaganda disseminated in
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this manner may lack a certain degree of profession-
alism--but not necessarily effectiveness--it gives
the Viet Cong an instant response to a local incident,
something the government often lacks.
Prospects
19. The recent increase of enemy activity in the
more strategic and heavily populated provinces along
the central coast and in the delta south of Saigon
has been primarily directed against RD or RD-related
programs. Enemy attacks on refugee and Chieu Hoi
centers are now becoming fairly routine occurrences.
These attacks, clearly indicative of the enemy's
growing concern over the RD programs, suggest, in
addition, that he has completed his assessment of the
allied strategy on pacification and is beginning to
hit at what he regards as probable weak spots in it.
Small-unit tactics, including harassment by fire and
terrorism, can be expected to continue against these
targets and against the RD cadres, the National Police
and the government's village and hamlet administrators.
The enemy moreover appears capable of accelerating
these activities.
20. The degree of success the Communists can
achieve in their anti-RD efforts will depend, in the
final analysis, on the over-all friendly security sit-
uation in a particular area. Such security is depen-
dent upon the meshing of programs and forces in an
area as well as upon the fortitude, motivation, and
training of the government's civilian and military
leadership at the lower levels. The GVN still has a
long way to go in both respects before really adequate
conditions for pacification are created.
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--etiarRerintit�Nerirnitilrrette�ivre--
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0 NOTICE NO 13.6.457 COVER SHEET D1111111.11"�ISSEM AUTHORIZATION
MEMO NO 1666/67 DATE fp November 1967 Due D/OCI Review
Dates: Dissem215 November, 1967
SUBJECT: Communist Counteraction Against the Revolutionary
Development Program in South lietnam
REQUESTED OR OR IGIKATED BY: seit.tatiated
PURPOSE:
ASSIGNED TO:ocadinin GRAPHICS
DISSEMINATION
0 Preliminary (DDI, D/OCI, and their staffs)
O Category Recommended to D/OC
ZJ Category_i_Finally Authorized By:
COORDINATE CEWSAVA/ZIDP
OUTSIDE OCI
El Specified Other Ito 0 Release to Commonwealth Liaison Reps
Slim Washingtonaoe
= to Dm Reps
Abroad
Cat. E (Routine internal and external)
Cat. D (Routine internal CIA only)
Cat. B (Subcabinet and internal CIA)
Cat. A (Elite--External top officials only and internal CIA)
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