CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/03/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003278
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: March 13, 1955

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13 March 1955
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO "
41
NO CHANGE IN CLASS _ta
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _.?...Q.LQ
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE. 5 . 8.0 REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Comment on Soviet statement on negotiations with Austria (page 3).
2. Comment on Pravda article on Tito speech (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
3. Comment on Soviet military promotions (page 4).
FAR EAST
4. Japan may avoid taking generally anti-Communist stand at Afro-
Asian conference (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Bonn Socialist confident on bringing Saar treaty before court
(page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
6. Chilean president may choose to resign (page 6).
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GENERAL
1. Comment on Soviet statement on negotiations with Austria:
The Soviet statement of 11 March on
recent conversations between Foreign
Minister Molotov and Austrian am-
bassador Bischoff is an attempt to create the impression that
the USSR is willing to sign an Austrian treaty on conditions ac-
ceptable to the West. It is intended to exert pressure on Austria
to persuade the Western powers to agree to a conference which
could cause a delay in ratification of the Paris accords, or, if
the West refuses, create friction between it and Austria.
The statement fails to clarify what
Molotov meant in his speech to the Supreme Soviet by four-power
"agreed measures on the German question" necessary to "pre-
clude the possibility" of a new Anschluss. Austrian Communist
propaganda has emphasized that "real and effective measures"
and not mere "paper guarantees" are needed, indicating that the
Anschluss prohibition in Article 4 of the draft treaty is not enough.
It appears that Moscow's demand at any conference on Austria
would be the banning of West German rearmament.
Austrian foreign minister Figl publicly
stated on 9 March that his government would maintain its previous
position that guarantees against a future Anschluss and military
alliances were provided in the draft state treaty and past official
government statements.
2. Comment on Pravda article on Tito speech:
Pravda's 12 March comment on Tito's
criticism of Molotov's references to
Yugoslavia in his speech before the
Supreme Soviet is an attempt to assure the Yugoslays that the
new Soviet regime will continue to seek improved relations.
Pravda emphasizes the future prospects for better relations,
and tries to avoid a continued debate over the causes of and the
blame for the 1948 split. At the same time, the Pravda article
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is probably also intended as a warning to Belgrade that the Soviet
Union will not publicly admit that it was to blame for the split in
1948.
Ambassador Bohlen had earlier implied
that the publication of Tito's attack in the Soviet press may have
reflected on Molotov personally, although there have been no other
signs that Molotov's position had been impaired. There may have
been some dissatisfaction among the other Soviet leaders with the
fact that the strongly Stalinist tone of Molotov's speech has caused
some alarm abroad. In this respect, the Pravda article is probably
an effort to correct the record and to convey the idea that Molotov
has been misinterpreted.
SOVIET UNION
3. Comment on Soviet military promotions:
The elevation on 11 March of six officers
to the rank of marshal of the Soviet Union
is the largest simultaneous promotion ever
made by the USSR to this highest normal military rank. It increases
to seventeen the number of marshals of the Soviet Union. The de-
cree also provided for the promotion of five additional officers to
the next lower rank of marshal of a special arm or service.
These promotions, published shortly
after the major governmental changes in February, reflect a
further increase in the prestige of the military leadership in the
USSR, which has risen steadily since the death of Stalin and the
purge of Beria. The promotions are a further manifestation of re-
cent Soviet emphasis on military preparedness.
With the exception of Biryuzov, the new
marshals of the Soviet Union were outstanding combat commanders
of World War IL For three of them�Grechko, Moskalenko, and
Biryuzov--this promotion represents an unusually rapid advancement,
since they were promoted less than two years ago. Grechko and
Moskalenko were associated with Khrushchev in the Ukraine during
the postwar period, and, in comparison with other military figures,
have been active in party affairs.
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The three air officers included in the
promotion list are experienced primarily in tactical aviation.
No officers associated with the Long Range Mr Force have been
reported to a high rank in recent years. Inclusion of the three
air officers does not alter the fact that the Soviet air forces are
notably under-represented in the higher military ranks in com-
parison with ground force officers.
FAR EAST
4. Japan may avoid taking generally anti-Communist stand at Afro
--
Asian conference:
Tokyo's general approach at the Afro-
Asian conference will be to "avoid taking
a stand as an Anti-Communist nation,"
although certain of its recommendations
may tend to line up Japan against the Chinese Communists, accord-
ing to a Foreign Ministry policy paper transmitted to the American
embassy. Tentative Japanese proposals include discussion of dis-
armament and the peaceful uses of atomic energy, emphasis on
economic problems, and adoption of objectives identical with those
of the United Nations.
The embassy comments that while no final
policy decision is possible until appointment of the next cabinet,
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu is in accord with Japan's over-all
policy of a soft, noncontroversial tone in the plenary sessions.
Comment: Japan's latest policy paper
more than likely represents a compromise between the two factions
within the Foreign Ministry--one of which wants Japan to remain
strictly neutral at the conference and the other of which advocates
a strong anti-Communist stand. Current reports indicate that
Shigemitsu, who has been somewhat of a restraining influence on
those Japanese eager to do business with the Orbit, is almost cer-
tain to be retained as foreign minister.
It is doubtful if Prime Minister Hatoyama
and his closest advisers, however, would approve of any actions
which would antagonize Peiping.
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WESTERN EUROPE
5. Bonn Socialist confident on bringing Saar treaty before court:
Karl Mommer, West German Social
Democratic Bundestag deputy, is now
confident that his party will get suffi-
cient support from dissident coalition
epu ies to enable it to bring the Saar treaty before the Consti-
tutional Court. Mommer informed American officials that in
his opinion the court will not only accept the party's petition,
but will issue an injunction to prevent the treaty's promulgation
until the case has been heard.
Bundestag supporters of Chancellor
Adenauer now admit that the Socialists may secure the required
number of signatures on their petition to bring the matter to the
court. They do not believe, however, that the court will hear
the case or issue a restraining injunction.
Comment: The Socialist case is legally
weak and does not appear likely to delay final ratification and
deposit of the Saar treaty, which is a part of the Paris accords.
LATIN AMERICA
6. Chilean president may choose to resign:
The "pressure of political and economic
problems" has convinced President
Ibanez that he should resign,
I the army is opposed to his resignation
at this time, since it wants to use Ibanez as a front for its own con-
trol of the government.
Ibanez had received a memo signed by 40 high army
officers asking that "professional politicians" be removed and that
the government "return" to the economic policies of Jorge Prat,
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former minister of finance, a general belief
that Agrarian Labor Party members of the government would be
removed and some type of military administration set up.
Comment: Should Ibanez resign, it is
unlikely that the army would permit Interior Minister Montero,
an Agrarian Laborite, to fulfillthe duties of president pending an
election, as constitutionally provided.
Because Prat's economic policies
demanded official economies, increased taxes, limits on wage
increases, and decreased government employment, they aroused
popular opposition which resulted in Ibanez' sixth cabinet reorgani-
zation in January. Execution of his policies, which were never
adopted, would be very difficult even for a military regime.
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