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October 15, 1958
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---Ml-r---3-C�KC Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 *DO' 15 October 1958 3.3(h)(2) Copy No0 c 5 9 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. II DECLASSIFIED CLASS. Cl ANGPD TO: NEXT FIEVIEW DATE: AuTivH ' 0 DAT REVIEWER: TOP SECRET for Release: 2020/01/23 C030033019 Approved fo7Reresas�e:76H707/M C03003301 40-12-4�FaDE-T- Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 1 ,L4 15 OCTOBER 1958 L THE COMMUNIST BLOC Taiwan Strait - Nationalist newspaper says Taipei will reduce forces on Quemoy and Matsu if US agrees to defend islands. Intensity of bloc-Yugoslav mutual recriminations may be leveling off. USSR increasing economic pressure on Finland, probably hoping to bring about government change and more favorable Finnish policy toward Moscow. IL ASIA-AFRICA Iraq - Separatist sentiment increas- ing among Kurds despite Barzani's avowal of loyalty to regime. Indian Foreign Ministry considers Pakistan's new military regime "level-headed and practical." 0 Thailand - Marshal Sarit plans un- announced return from England to quash discord among his followers. 0 Agreement to hold conference on Cyprus problem increases possi- bility of compromise. IlL THE WEST France - De Gaulle's crackdown on political activity by military in Algeria and his call for broad participation in November elections pose challenge to European settlers. LATE ITEM Lebanon - Karame forms compro- mise four-man cabinet. rrit-in T7r1r) Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 \\\\\ \\:\ Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO3003301 Soo I (.7u .../EA-ru.:, I '111110 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 15 October 1958 11 Ii ii .\,\N ,A\;\ I DAILY BRIEF L THE COMMUNIST BLOC *Taiwan Strait situation: A Nationalist China news- paper, published by a ranking member of the Kuomintang, stated on 14 October that Taipei probably will accept a request by the United States to reduce military forces on 0 )4� Quemoy and Matsu if America agrees to defend the islands. The report probably is a 'filar balloonto assess American reaction. There was no significant military activity on 14 October. (Page 1 ) (Chart) (1))- OK-- USSR-Yugoslavia: There are suggestions that Mos- cow's dispute with Yugoslavia may be leveling off. Khru. shchev went to particular pains to meet with the Yugoslav ambassador on 8 October before the latter's departure for reassignment. The moderate tone of Tito's speech four days later may reflect his hopes that Belgrade's relations, at least with Moscow, will not degenerate further. (Page 2) USSR-Finland: Soviet economic pressures on Finland are building up, probably aimed at replacing the present Finnish coalition government with one more favorably disposed toward the USSR. The Helsinki govern- ment faces acute economic problems, and failure to cope with growing unemployment could lead to a cabinet crisis. (Page 3) IL ASIA-AFRICA Iraq: Separatist sentiment among Iraq's Kurds, en- couraged by local Communists, has increased since the July revolution, and Kurdish leaders seem likely to seek inde- pendence or increased autonomy. Mustafa Barzani, a Kurdish N N N 710P SECRET lApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 60\31303301k is publicly pledging loyalty to the regime. Should he revert to a separatist position, he would most probably have of a majority of the 800,000 Iraqi Kurds. (Page 4) (Map) India-Pakistan: that New Delhi does not exnect trouble from Karachi in the near future. (Page 6) Thailand: Marshal Sarit, the leader of the ruling Thai military group, is planning to return unannounced to Bangkok within a week. Sarit's decision to cut short his stay in England apparently stems from reports of continuing discord among his military followers and a specific request from Premier Thanom. (Page 7) Cyprus: Agreement in the North Atlantic Council on 13 October that Britain, Greece, and Turkey, subject to final approval by the respective governments, Will hold a conference on the Cyprus issue at arr early dateoaffers a new opportunity for progress toward a negotiated settlement. The willingness of all parties to the dispute to compromise on procedure in- creases the prospects for substantive concessions. There continues to be a wide difference of opinion, however, as to NIt'hat constitutes a satisfactory solution. (Page 8) II L THE WEST France-Algeria: De Gaulle's order to the French Army in Algeria to withdraw from political activity, and his invitation to "all tendencies" to participate in the November legislative elections threatens the position of the European settlei.s and oses the first major test of his control over the military. The lgerian rebels are unlikely to cooperate openly with the De aulle election program, but may not repeat their attempt, un- uccessful in the �titutional referendum, to enforce a general oslem boycott. (Page 9) 15 Oct 58 \ \ N i \\A � , Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 lb* / ur ant-an 1 4 e, leader who recently returned to Iraq from the Soviet Union, .4., * ,..., \; i DAILY BRIEF ii � \� tX' X.13s-p�sr'sOscieCrii3;714eiesieT-iiiia 1/23 C03003301 \ Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 *ar, 1 LAI 1.3 CilANLI 1 LATE ITEM *Lebanon: Agreement has been reached on a stopgap four-Man cabinet headed by the present prime minister, Rashid Karamet and including militant Christian leader Pierre Gemayel. This compromise has enabled Gemayel to call off the strike which his supporters have been trying to enforce. Attempts probably will have to be made soon to bring additional individuals into the government, however, and new difficulties may well arise over their selection. 15 Oct 58 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301\ Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 OM% TAIWAN STRAIT TALLY SHEET (From ICS Situation Report No. 9i) Air Situation (Plane losses claimed through 13 Oct) TODAY CUMULATIVE Destroyed Probable Possible Destroyed Probable Possible Communist 0 0 0 33 4 8 Nationalist 0 0 0 6** 0 2* *Damaged **Includes 2 C-46s, 2 F-84G's, and 2 F-86's Chinmen Supply Situation - (Tonnage through 11 Oct) Total Delivery - 7-11 Oct 18,459 Total (since 7 Sept) 24,366 Average Daily Rate for Sept 125 Average Daily Rate for Oct 1,906 Minimum Austere Daily Requirements 320 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 Approved f"oPRItele"as"e7 '211761/237C03003301 -*110 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Taiwan Strait Situation A Nationalist Chinese newspaper, published by a ranking member of the Kuomintang, stated on 14 October that Taipei probably will accept a request by the United States to reduce military forces on Quemoy and Matsu if America agrees to defend the islands. The report probably is a trial balloon to assess American reaction. Peiping on 14 October issued its 31st "serious warning," charging two US warships entered territorial waters in the Matsu area and two US fighter aircraft "intruded" over Pingtan 'Wand in the same area on that day. Peiping continues its efforts to maintain the pose of an ag- grieved party in the current situation and to keep up some degree of tension among the mainland population. A Sidewinder exhibi- tion which opened in Peiping on 14 October "depicts the crime of the American aggressor for directing the Chiang Kai-shek air force to use the Sidewinder guided missile." When parts of the Sidewinder were originally found in Chekiang Province, Peiping promised "punitive" action against the Chinese Nationalist Air Force. There was no such threat in today's announcement. CONFIDENTIAL 15 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 ApprovedToiRelele:-.202-0701;23 C03003301 1%01 Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict May Be Easing The lengthy talks in Sochi on 8 October between Khru- shchev and Yugoslav Ambassador Micunovic before the latter's departure from the USSR for reassignment may her- ald an easing in Moscow's anti-Yugoslav campaign. This is suggested by Khrushchev's last-minute decision to hold this meeting and to put a special aircraft at Micunovic's disposal. Micunovic had stated during his farewell call on Ambassador Thompson on 4 October that he did not expect to see Khru- shchev before he left for Belgrade, but that differences with Moscow appeared to have "evened out," although at a very unsatisfactory level. Khrushchev may feel that his efforts to achieve greater unity within the "socialist camp" have succeeded to a point where carrying the anti-Yugoslav campaign further would be self-defeating. He may, consider that the forthcoming "friend- ship" visit to Moscow by Gomulka--a persistent holdout in the anti-Yugoslav campaign--will be more successful as a. demon- stration of bloc unity if efforts to curtail the Moscow-Belgrade dispute are in evidence. While Tito's speech on 12 October sharply condemns ele- ments within the bloc for their attacks and reaffirms that Yugo- slavia will not change its basic policies, his moderate tone could reflect his hope that relations with Moscow, if not with other members of the bloc, will not degenerate further. Mos- cow may not object to anti-Yugoslav attacks emanating from other quarters, for the East German- Bulgarian communique of 11 October again attacked Yugoslav "revisionism" as the bloc's primary enemy. CONFIDENTIAL 15 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 Soviet Pressures on Finland Increasing Soviet pressures on Finland appear aimed at bringing about the fall of the present Finnish coalition government, the most conservative in Finland since 1945, and replacing it with one more favorably disposed toward the USSR. Moscow desires the inclusion in the govern- ment of the Communist-front Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL)--the largest single party--which has not had cabinet representation since 1948. Although the present cabinet is perhaps the strongest postwar government in Finland, it faces acute economic problems, and failure to cope with the growing unemploy- ment could lead to a cabinet crisis and replacement by another coalition including the SKDL. The USSR is stalling on trade talks which had been expected to be- gin early in October, and any consequent curtailment of Soviet purchases would eventually increase unemploy- ment. Finnish Communists are seeking to create an air of crisis around Finnish-Soviet relations by charging that the "rightist!' Fagerholm government is pursuing a policy damaging to Finland's neutrality. The USSR may also be concerned over Finland's possible economic association with Western Europe through OEEC and ultimately through a European free trade area. CONFIDENTIAL 15 Oct 58 ao"GkITEI A I ikITCI I IngkirF Rill I FTIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 Arm% Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 crrncirr Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 'too' vie0 IL ASIA-AFRICA Iraqi Kurds Likely to Press for Greater Independence Kurdish approaches to American representatives in Iraq for support and the public excitement generated by the return to Baghdad of Kurdish dissident leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani after a 12-year exile in the Soviet Union indicate a reawakening of Kurdish nationalism since the July revolution. The American Embassy believes there will be some sort of Kurdish bid for independence or increased autonomy within the next year. Mulla Mustafa is reported to have by far the largest following among the 800,000 Iraqi Kurds, and his influence also extends into northern Iran. His present tactic is to pledge loyalty to the revolutionary regime, emphasizing that Kurds and Arabs stand "in one solid rank" to defend the Iraqi republic. Should he choose other tactics, the em- bassy estimates that 50-60 percent of Iraqi Kurds would fol- low him in any adventure even if it were clearly Communist- inspired. The regime may, however, attempt to buy him off by offering him an official post. For the moment, it is felt, Mulla Mustafa will move cau- tiously because of unsolved family rivalries and because he does not command the loyalty of all Iraqi Kurds. His brother, Sheik Ahmad, was released from jail following the revolution and is his bitter enemy. There are also possibly 30,000 Kurds in the area near the Iranian border who oppose Mulla Mustafa on family and anti-Communist grounds, but who also oppose the Iraqi Gov- ernment because they do not believe they will get a fair deal from the new regime. There is also a very small number of "moderate" Kurds, represented by Minister of Communica- tions Baba Ali, who hope the revolution will improve the lot of their people and who are cooperating with the new regime. The influence of this group probably will disappear quickly SECRET 15 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 Page 4 rri) r 'V Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 unless the new government, unlike the Nun i Said regime, be- gins significant rural development and education programs in the Kurdish tribal areas. With the present deterioration of economic conditions in Iraq and the administrative confusion prevailing in Baghdad, the chances of the government's undertaking such programs seem slight,while the chances of trouble with the Kurds are growing. SECRET 15 Oct 58 ����k 1.1�11.� � t 1k II Imoft re h. 11.IP el II Iriq-ki Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 Page 5 rrr�rt orrDrrr Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 *41.4 1101 Indian Reaction to Mirza's Take-over in Pakistan The Indian Government apparently feels that the take-over in Pakistan by Iskander Mirza and General Ayub on 7 October presents no immediate threat to Indian security. a belief that these two men will be able to control proponents of anti-Indian views, such as Deputy Martial Law Administrator Aziz Ahmed. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs expects no "adventures" against India at least for the next few weeks because of the "dispersal of effort" attending the take-over. It cautions, however, that anti-Indian moves could not be ruled out if the Mirza-Ayub re- gime failed to maintain internal stability. Prime Minister Nehru in a press conference on 12 October admitted to a "twinge of anxiety" regarding developments in Pakistan, but stressed that the take-over was an internal af- fair and that India is prepared to deal with the new government. Nehru stated that US military aid and Pakistan's membership in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact had nothing to do with the take-over and that no foreign power was involved in it. His major concern apparently is that while a military dictatorship can maintain law and order, it is unlikely to lead to a solution of political and economic problems. The Indian press has commented on the failure of democracy in an increasing number of Asian countries, and some concern has been expressed over India's becoming surrounded by military dic- tatorships. TOP SECRET 15 Oct 58 � ITO% � I Ilk 1.1.N1'������..11.. I i II I Img�Ilk I Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 NIS Sarit Newly Concerned Over Thai Political Situation Marshal Sarit, the leader of the ruling Thai military group, plans to return unannounced from London to Bangkok prior to 20 October, He is said to be concerned over reports of factionalism within the military group, and his decision to go home was reportedly inspired in part, at least, by a specific request from Premier Thanom. Sarit, whose health is still precarious, made a sim- ilar precipitous return from the United States last June, follow- ing which there was a minor reshuffle of the cabinet. The exact sources of Sarit's concern are not specifted, but recent reports from Bangkok suggest a strong undercurrent of restiveness among Sarit's military supporters, who are con- stantly vying with each other for an increased share ofAhe-power and loot available to Thailand's military rulers. Sarit may ae particularly concerned over the loyalty of Interior Minister Prapat, who seems increasingly disposed to take unilateral ac- tion without first clearing it with Sarit and has steadily improved his power position within the military group. Sarit finally may have concluded that his constant presence in Bangkok is necessary if Prapat is to be controlled. In recent weeks Premier Thanom has been a much more vig= orous premier than he was during the first eight months of his tenure. Contrary to his earlier concern that Thanom was too weak a premier, Sarit now may fear that the politically inexperi- enced Thanom's new activism will inevitably lead to a major clash with Prapat or other members of the military group. In any event, Sarit's return may foreshadow further changes in the Thai Gov- ernment and in the military hierarchy on which it is based. 15 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 rim Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 *4�10 11110 Cyprus Situation The North Atlantic Council on 13 October obtained the agreement of British, Turkish, and Greek representatives to hold a conference on the Cyprus question with representa- tives of the Turkish and Greek population on Cyprus and an observer from NATO present. This provides a new oppor- tunity for progress toward a negotiated settlement, although wide differences continue over what would constitute an ac- ceptable solution. Approval or rejection of this agreement by the governments concerned is expected when the council meets on 15 October. NATO Secretary General Spaak's talk with Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu reassured the Turks of Spaak's objectivity and has improved prospects for a more conciliatory Turkish atti- tude. Turkey had earlier insisted that a conference not include discussion of a final solution for the island and had objected to the participation of representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots,, Ankara now is expected to agree to a conference al- though the Greek Cypriots are likely to be represented by Archbishop Makarios, The Karamanlis government also is under substantial pres- sure to resolve the Cyprus issue and is expected to ratify the proposed conference arrangements since they provide a means of backing down from its insistence that any conference should have a firm agenda specifically excluding partition. SECRET 15 Oct 58 AprprokvieTdE)fAoir Rietera%"20707101.1./g23TC)131010.311111 Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23.003003301 I I I. THE WEST De Gaulle's Crackdown Will Test His Control Over Military th. Algeria Premier de Gaulle's order to the French armed forces in Algeria to withdraw from political activity and his invita- tion to Algerians of "all tendencies" to participate in the November legislative elections threaten the position of the European settlers and reopen the question of his control of the military there. Rightist settler groups, particularly those in Algiers who command a considerable paramilitary organization, may feel they have nothing to lose by demonstrations aimed at re- awakening sympathy and support among the military and metro- politan French rightists as they did on 13 May. General Massu and the other military members have withdrawn from the Algeria-Sahara Committee of Public Safety, but some highly placed officers reportedly are again expressing open bitter- ness over De Gaulle's "treatment" of the army. While even extremist army elements are unlikely to challenge the pre- mier openly, the possibility that they would refuse to suppress any major settler demonstrations cannot be ruled out. Most of the non-Communist press in France endorses the premier's move. Leaders of the rebel National Liberation Front (FLN), who established a provisional Algerian government last month, are unlikely to cooperate openly with the De Gaulle program and may continue their public denunciation of French policy. Their conspicuous failure to enforce a Moslem boycott of the consti- tutional referendum, however, may lead them to permit some form of narticinatinn hu wLN adherents in the forthcoming elec- tions. CONFIDENTIAL 15 Oct 58 rebaT6 A I Ilk terr.a � � Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 Noe LATE ITEM New Lebanese Cabinet The announcement of agreement on a four-man stopgap cabinet in Beirut has enabledthe militant Christian elements to call off their violent pressure tactics against the Karame government Karame is to remain at the head of the new com- bination as representative of the Moslem rebels. Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Christian Phalange paramilitary formation, repre- sents the former pro-Chamoun "loyalists," The other members are veteran Lebanese politicians, Husayn Uwayni and Raymond Edde. Uwayni is a Moslem moderate adherent of the rebel fac- tion Edde, a Maronite, is the son of a former Lebanese president and has admitted presidential ambitions himself. He was a leader of the so-called "third force" during the past several months. According to preliminary press reports, the two Moslem min- isters are to hold most of the important portfolios. In addition to being prime minister, Karame is to hold finance, economics, defense, and information, while Uwayni holds foreign affairs, justice, and planning. On the Christian side Edde holds interior and social affairs, with Gemayel taking public works, education, agriculture, and health. The major obstacle during the past few days of cabinet nego- tiations was the objection of one faction or the other to some par- ticular individual; the reduction of the cabinet to four men evades rather than solves this problem. As constituted, the new govern- ment represents only two--albeit the two most important--of Lebanon's religious divisions, the Sunni Moslems and the Maronite Christians. The important Druze, Shia Moslem, Greek Orthodox, and other communities will not be satisfied for long without their traditional voice in the government, and the previous difficulties may well arise again when an attempt is made to exciand the cab- inet to include representatives of these elements. CONFIDENTIAL 15 Oct 58 I"CkITD A I IkITCI I irtmorr RI III sTIN Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 .11�M %or I A LLL.dL L I4IJ.J Nee *se THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03003301 4